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This volume, the second in a series entitled "Modern 
America," is devoted to a reappraisal of the 1920's 
—a period that Arthur Link has called "the exciting 
new frontier of American historical research." 
Historians have become increasingly aware that 
behind the wild antics of the flapper and the glitter 
of the Jazz Age, profound and far-reaching changes in 
American life were clearly taking place; but it is only 
comparatively recently that any serious effort has 
been made to identify and describe those forces that 
were at work. Chronicled in this collection are, 
among others: the plight of agriculture in the depres­
sion that followed the World War I boom; the imme­
diate success but ultimate failure of management 
to block the unionization of labor; the bitter and 
often poignant struggles of religious fundamentalists 
to resist the encroachment of science and secular­
ism; the breakdown of Victorian restraint in a sudden 
relaxation of moral standards; the resurgence of 
bigotry and a revivified Ku Klux Klan; the Teapot 
Dome scandal; and that "noble experiment," Pro­
hibition. 
The authors of these original essays are David 
Burner, Burl Noggle, Gilbert C. Fite, Mark Perlman, 
David Brody, Paul A. Carter, William Moats Miller, 
Joseph R. Gusfield, Frederick J. Hoffman, Gilman M. 
Ostrander, John Chynoweth Burnham, and Charles N. 
Glaab. 
In addressing himself to his topic, each has been 
concerned with assessing the degree to which the 
old and familiar elements in American life have tem­
pered the forces of novelty and change in an era of 
often spectacular progress, unrivaled prosperity, and 
bumptious optimism. 
John Braeman is professor of history at the Uni­
versity of Nebraska; Robert H. Bremner is professor 
of history at the Ohio State University; and David 
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INTRODUCTION

THIS is the second in a series of volumes devoted to the 
history of the United States since 1890 to be published by 
the Ohio State University Press. The series, whose over-all 
title is MODERN AMERICA, is intended to facilitate publica­
tion of scholarly articles in all areas of recent American 
history. The editors hope that MODERN AMERICA will pro­
vide a publication outlet for monographic studies as well 
as synthetic and interpretative essays. 
The present volume is devoted to the reappraisal of the 
1920's, a decade Arthur S. Link has called "the exciting 
new frontier of American historical research." l Historians 
have become increasingly aware that beneath the glitter of 
the Jazz Age profound and far-reaching changes in Amer­
ican life were taking place. During the last fifteen years, as 
one of the contributors to this volume has recently pointed 
out, scholarly interest in the 1920's has mounted.2 The 
1
 Arthur S. Link, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement 
in the 1920's," American Historical Review, LXIV (1959), 834. 
2
 Burl Noggle, "The Twenties: A New Historiographical Fron­
tier," Journal of American History, LIII (1966), 299-314. 
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essays in this volume have a twofold purpose: to provide 
a synthesis based upon existing scholarship and also to break 
new ground by investigating hitherto unexplored problems. 
In "1919: Prelude to Normalcy," David Burner shows 
how the manifold tensions generated by World War I came 
to an explosive head along a broad front in 1919 and sug­
gests that Harding's election did represent a "return to 
normalcy." Burl Noggle's "Oil and Politics" reassesses the 
foremost political scandal of the era in the larger context 
of government-business relations. Although the image of 
the decade is one of prosperity, investigation has revealed 
significant exceptions. Gilbert C. Fite depicts the plight of 
agriculture in his article on "The Farmers' Dilemma, 1919­
1929"; Mark Perlman examines the weakness of organized 
workers in "Labor in Eclipse"; and David Brody, in "The 
Rise and Decline of Welfare Capitalism," explores the short-
run success of management's efforts to block unionization. 
Perhaps the most far-reaching changes of the decade 
took place in the realm of ideas and attitudes. Three of our 
contributors study the negative side of the picture: the 
resistance—bitter, yet often poignant—of the old to the 
new. Paul A. Carter's "The Fundamentalist Defense of the 
Faith" traces the fundamentalist reaction to the encroach­
ments of science and secularism. Robert Moats Miller, in 
"The Ku Klux Klan," takes a penetrating and sobering 
look at the decade's most notorious example of intolerance. 
In "Prohibition: The Impact of Political Utopianism," 
William Gusfield applies insights from sociology to assess 
the significance of the "noble experiment." 
Of more long-range importance than the defense of the 
old was the triumph of the new. Frederick J. Hoffman's 
essay analyzes the developments in fiction that were so 
important in shaping the modern-day image of the 1920's. 
Gilman Ostrander's "The Revolution in Morals" surveys 
the breakdown of Victorian mores. John Burnham, in "The 
 IX INTRODUCTION
New Psychology: From Narcissism to Social Control," 
shows how the "new psychology" reflected, and in turn 
speeded, the transformation underway in American life. 
In the concluding essay "Metropolis and Suburb: The 
Changing American City," Charles N. Glaab explores the 
urban "revolution." 
With this volume, David Brody joins the board of editors 
for the series, replacing Everett Walters, who has with­
drawn because of the pressures of his duties as vice-
president for academic affairs, Boston University. The 
editors wish to express their appreciation to Dr. Walters 
for his indispensable assistance in launching this project. 
The editors also extend their thanks to the contributors, 
to the many historians who have expressed interest in 
MODERN AMERICA, and to Mr. Weldon A. Kefauver, director 
of the Ohio State University Press. Without Mr. Kefauver's 
co-operation, assistance, and long-suffering patience, this 
volume would never have appeared. We particularly wish to 
thank Mrs. Catherine M. Bremner for preparing the Index. 
The next volume in the series, currently in preparation, 
will be devoted to American foreign policy in the twentieth 
century. Suggestions for future volumes are welcomed. 
JOHN BRAEMAN 
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1919: Prelude to Normalcy 
DAVID BURNER 
AN eminent psychologist predicted that after World War I 
"personal loves, personal jealousies, and the pursuit of 
personal gain will not function as they customarily did"; 
instead, the age would be one of altruism. The editors of 
the Nation also thought that class interests were going to 
be submerged in favor of the general welfare. Cosmic 
optimism of this kind represented the idealistic fervor of 
America's first international war; it was soon to prove 
itself groundless, dissipating in a postwar period of strikes, 
high prices, unstable markets, spotty employment, racial 
unrest, and acrimonious foreign-policy debate. And beneath 
the particular stresses of the era was a mood of rural-urban 
suspicion and anger, rekindled by the debate over prohi­
bition but of a kind that has traditionally appeared in 
American politics.1 
If the tensions of 1919 gave the lie to war idealism, those 
tensions were, nonetheless, to a large extent the product of 
America's involvement in the great conflict. Institutions 
and customs that once maintained the social equilibrium had 
been altered or destroyed, in part by the governmental 
controls of wartime, in part by the emotional and social 
 James R. Mock and Evangeline Thurber, Report on Demobiliza­
tion (Norman, Okla., 1944), p. 28; Nation, CVII (Nov. 2, 1918), 503. 
1
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disturbances of war itself. Workers, having become accus­
tomed to a measure of war prosperity and to collective 
bargaining enforced by the War Labor Board, anxiously 
sought to preserve their gains as government prepared to 
withdraw from the economy; but labor faced employers 
even more resolute in wishing to restore the days of "open 
shop," and applying in their struggle against collective 
bargaining the rhetoric of the "American Plan." Farmers 
cried for various forms of aid from a Congress deaf to 
their pleas, and as price supports came near to ending, 
entreated with a cabinet equally unmindful of their plight. 
In northern cities Negroes attempted to hold on to their 
wartime jobs as soldiers returned home looking for work. 
Negroes themselves came back from the trenches, bringing 
with them an aggressive edge their fathers had never 
possessed. Following the success of the Russian revolution 
and its spread to Central Europe, an ambitious attorney-
general, aroused by frightened citizens, clashed with liberals 
of all shades in his ill-defined attempt to suppress revolu­
tionary plots. Debate on the League of Nations separated 
idealist from realist, and realist from isolationist. Vainly, 
the progressive worked to resist the course of reaction. 
The atmosphere of conflict was thickened by a state of 
mind for which the war itself had in large part prepared 
the condition. The war had imposed upon the American 
people a discipline beyond their normal experience; in turn, 
their hopes for the postwar era expanded indefinitely, only 
to be followed by disillusionment and frustration. Our par­
ticipation in World War I, moreover, was too brief to 
expend the reserve of fighting spirit manufactured by the 
Committee on Public Information. That wartime propa­
ganda agency had planned a symphony in creed and emotion 
that was to reach its crescendo by the middle of 1919. 
Though the war ended sooner than had been expected, the 
emotion lingered on, no longer fixed and steadied by the 
pursuit of victory. 
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Problems of foreign policy split the progressives into 
their internationalist and isolationist components. Bull 
Moosers of Theodore Roosevelt's bellicose stamp deserted 
their progressivism entirely in their frenzy for war, while 
the more pacific of President Wilson's followers grew dis­
illusioned as the prospects for reform were everywhere for­
gotten. No issue could have divided the progressive move­
ment more irreparably than the World War. The conflict 
itself, moreover, had assaulted the reformers' faith in prog­
ress and human virtue. In any case, progressivism was not 
likely to flourish in the repressive atmosphere of wartime 
conformism. The principal reform of 1919 was prohibition, 
which further divided the progressives, this time into their 
rural-urban camps. The main branches of the reform move­
ment went to seed amid the materialism and reaction that 
followed the war. 
The postwar period, particularly 1919, was a time of 
much more intense reaction than the 1920's themselves. 
Progressivism faltered after 1918 because the mood upon 
which it had succeeded was largely destroyed after the war. 
During President Wilson's first term the national temper 
had clearly been progressive; after the war his second term 
reveled in reaction; the progressive Wilson himself, not 
Harding, initiated the postwar conservatism. "Can anyone," 
asked Walter Lippmann late in 1919, "name a single piece 
of constructive legislation and administration carried 
through since the armistice?" 2 
Demobilization caught the country by surprise, for no 
one expected the war to end as quickly as it did. Official 
 In the opinion of a historian who wrote recently on the period: 
"From the winter of 1918-1919 to Harding's inauguration in March, 
1921, the federal government's policies, both executive and legislative, 
that affected business, labor, agriculture, and the consumer were 
thoroughly conservative."—David Shannon, Between the Wars, 1919­
1939 (Boston, 1965), p. 16. For "Recent Opinion on the Decline of the
Progressive Movement," see Herbert F. Margulies' article of that 
title in Mid-America, XLV (October, 1965), 250-68. Lippmann wrote 
in the New Republic, XX (Nov. 12, 1919), 315. 
2
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planning began a scant month before the Armistice, 
although some farsighted individuals and groups had 
earlier recommended action. Prominent among them was 
the War Industries Board, which repeatedly petitioned the 
President to appoint competent study groups as European 
nations had done even before we entered the war. The 
Board argued for gradual demobilization, vocational educa­
tion, and the creation of a "buffer industrial army" to 
be employed in public works. Secretary of the Interior 
Franklin K. Lane pushed his own plan for the reclamation 
of arid lands to be settled by veterans; and Assistant 
Secretary of Labor Louis Post suggested a far broader 
program of developing the nation's natural resources. But 
the government failed to take the lead in reconstruction, 
and private organizations and individuals made more im­
aginative proposals. Some segments of labor believed that 
the government should continue to operate the railroads 
and utilities. William F. Ogburn of the National War Labor 
Board suggested the enactment of a minimum-wage law. 
George W. Perkins of Bull Moose fame called for profit-
sharing after the war. Matthew Woll, chairman of the 
AF of L Reconstruction Committee, wanted the govern­
ment to aid needy industries while stipulating the con­
ditions that were to prevail to restore free speech and to 
avoid militarism. The National Municipal League recom­
mended federal housing, control of living costs, and gen­
erous financing under the United States Employment Office 
for the placing of veterans in private occupations. A con­
servative association of business papers, on the other hand, 
declared that reconstruction would of necessity require the 
prompt return of the railroads to private ownership, and 
even that stalwart liberal journal, the Nation, concerned 
over the residual federal powers that the war had called 
into use, argued for a gradual relaxation of federal controls.3 
 Secretary of War Newton D. Baker wrote to Senator James 
A. Reed of Missouri that "the collapse of the Central Powers came 
3
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Wilson, engaged in the war effort and then in negotiations 
for the treaty of peace, had little time for such things. 
Though he briefly contemplated appointing an advisory 
reconstruction commission under the chairmanship of 
Bernard Baruch, he distrusted the work of the European 
commissions. In December, 1918, he told Congress that the 
government did not know how to control reconstruction. 
"People would go their own way," he insisted. His only 
pertinent suggestion—one he repeated to a conference of 
governors and mayors the following March—was that the 
government might undertake public works, including the 
reclamation of unusable land; whatever control there must 
be, he said, could be exercised through existing agencies. 
Schemes of reconstruction in Congress also went awry, 
deadlocked in factionalism, abandoned in the rage for 
economy, or shunned as socialistic. Partisanship in par­
ticular stalled planning: in September and October, 1918, 
Congress debated whether reconstruction was a presidential 
responsibility or, as in the era of reunion, a Congressional 
affair. Legislators feared that the President might dominate 
Congress, and this fear Wilson had no desire to encourage 
more quickly than even the best informed military experts thought 
possible."—Apr. 3, 1919, Justice Department File 370-163, National 
Archives. Marc Karson, American Labor Unions and Politics, 1900­
1918 (Boston, 1965), pp. 114-15; Louis Post to Elwood Mead, May 14, 
1918, Labor Department Pile 46-8, National Archives; John C. 
Sparrow, "History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States 
Army," U.S. Department of Defense, 1951, pp. 14-15. (Mimeo­
graphed.) Ogburn's plan is discussed in Survey, XLI (Dec. 14, 1918), 
337; Woll's in Nation, CVII (Nov. 2, 1918), 505; see also ibid. (Nov. 
9, 1918), 545, CVIII (Jan. 4, 1919), 5, and (Jan. 18, 1919), 84. Mock 
and Thurber, Report on Demobilization, pp. 36, 54-55, 101-4; John 
M. Clark, Demobilization of Wartime Economic Controls (New York, 
1944), passim; Dixon Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home (Cambridge, Mass., 1944), passim; Saturday Evening Post, CXCII (Mar. 1, 1919), 20. See also the articles of E. Jay Howenstine, Jr., 
"Demobilization After the First World War," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, LVIII (November, 1943), 91-105; "Lessons of World War 
I," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences,
CCXXXVIII (April, 1945), 180-87; and "Public Works Program 
After World War I," Journal of Political Economy, LI (December, 
1943), 523-37. 
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—perhaps he was thinking ahead to the day when he would 
need Congressional support for his peace treaty. By the 
time the war had ended, no central agency had been estab­
lished to return the country to peace. Most government 
regulation was terminated on January 1, 1919; by March 
almost none remained.4 
Some decisions had to be made about demobilization. In 
Britain the government for a time tried moving soldiers 
with needed industrial skills to the head of the demobiliza­
tion schedules, but widespread resentment in the camps 
forced an end to the practice. Secretary of War Newton 
Baker preferred a somewhat similar program under which 
soldiers with jobs awaiting them would be the first to be 
discharged. Yet such a program would work great in­
equities. For example, those soldiers most recently drafted 
—and therefore most likely to be holding some claim to 
their former jobs—would receive priority. Furthermore, 
such a carefully planned demobilization would require costly 
investigations into the demand for labor, at a time when 
Congress was in a mood for economy. It was finally decided 
to discharge largely by military unit, usually at a point 
near the soldier's own home. The men were dismissed as 
rapidly as possible; carrying gas masks and helmets as 
souvenirs, the greater number reached their homes by the 
summer of 1919.5 
The War Department, hitherto totally involved in waging 
the fight, had been charged with demobilizing the troops. 
The United States Employment Office, a branch of the 
Department of Labor, helped soldiers to find jobs; but in 
March, 1919, the economy-minded Sixty-seventh Congress 
curtailed its funds. Business interests apparently opposed 
 Mock and Thurber, Report on Demobilization, pp. 38, 108-10. 
5 Churchill, The Aftermath (London, 1928), pp. 41-55; for a 
contemporary guide to British planning, see Nation, CVIII (Jan. 25, 
1919), 119-21. See also Sparrow, "History of Personnel Demobiliza­
tion," p. 453 
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the continuation of the agency. They feared the extension 
of wartime economic control of any kind; at least a few 
were ready to capitalize on the cheap labor and means for 
strikebreaking that unemployment provides. Further, busi­
nessmen charged the agency's social workers and reformers 
with favoritism toward organized labor. The opposition of 
private employment agencies, which accused the Employ­
ment Office of inefficiency, also contributed to its demise, 
as did the more diffuse antiadministration sentiment of 
Congress. Despite the housing shortage caused by the migra­
tion to the city, the Senate directed the United States 
Housing Commission to stop all work on government hous­
ing projects not 75 per cent completed. And although there 
was a great need for the kinds of non-military public build­
ing that had been suspended by the war, the Senate in 
January, 1919, defeated a federal works bill that would 
have provided for veterans, and in the House several bills 
for the employment of soldiers were unsuccessful. Nor 
would the Congress extend the lives of governmental 
agencies that might have given effective help in adjusting 
to peace. Only the Council of National Defense, a wartime 
co-ordinating agency, was favored with appropriations, but 
it was essentially a fact-finding body.6 
When a conference of governors and mayors met with 
Wilson early in April, Governor Calvin Coolidge of Massa­
chusetts echoed the widespread complacency: "Ninety per­
 On the federal employment agency, see New York Times, Jan. 
14, 1918, p. 13; Survey, XLI (Feb. 18, 1919), 662-63; and Nation,
CVIII (Feb. 15, 1919), 244-45. In February, 1919, Congressman Pat 
Harrison was advised by telegraph that "propaganda of private 
interests against Employment Service has so influenced House Ap­
propriations Committee" that it would soon be discontinued. In June 
an Indiana businessman advised another congressman that the 
Service had fomented labor trouble, was inefficient and inimical to 
states' rights. Labor Department Files 129-14 and 129-14-E, Na­
tional Archives. As late as December, 1919, Wilson asked Congress 
for additional help in finding jobs and farm land for ex-servicemen. 
Literary Digest, LXIII (Dec. 13, 1919), 14. 
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cent of the boys," he said, "were able to take care of 
themselves." The governor of Indiana, the state that con­
tributed the largest number of volunteers to the army, 
expressed his constituents' disdain of federal controls. The 
refrain, let the economy return to natural forces, was 
repeated endlessly. Reconstruction meant some effort to 
channel released manpower in a rational way. In fact, 
demobilization was chaos.7 
Contributing to the unsettled political conditions of 
postwar American society was an economic dislocation 
brought on by the return of peace. But the extent and 
nature of the dislocation must be identified with some care, 
for on the surface conditions appeared quite good. 
Demobilization of the armed forces itself was soon 
completed; by the fall of 1919 the service contained only 
its normal component of men. The demobilization produced 
some brief hardship early in 1919, but no lasting unemploy­
ment problem; nor did the mass revocation of military 
orders induce an immediate deflation. As Paul Samuelson 
has pointed out, "Economically, the first World War lasted 
until 1920." The economy was kept active: money was 
spent on demobilization itself, consumer savings and dis­
missal pay for veterans were soon in circulation as shelves 
were restocked and as servicemen returned, business con­
tracts were settled, the military deficit had to be financed, 
and the Treasury desired to postpone any contraction until 
after the floating of a last major war loan and further 
loans to European countries. These monetary policies 
sparked a revival in automobile production, housebuilding, 
and numerous related industries that eased the readjust­
ment for the nine million workers formerly engaged in 
defense work and the four million soldiers returned to 
7
 Mock and Thurber, Report on Demobilization, pp. 62, 65; Nation,
CVIII (Mar. 20, 1919), 459. 
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peacetime life. Industrial production declined a maximum 
of 10 per cent by the middle of 1919, but in the last six 
months of the year it reached a new high. Such figures do 
not record the vast shifting of jobs and resulting hardships 
that must have occurred in 1919. Yet extensive unemploy­
ment would not appear until 1920, when government spend­
ing and industrial expansion both halted—partly through 
the deliberate contraction policy of the administration.8 
The postwar period was, then, prosperous. Why was the 
public dissatisfaction so intense? A major reason was a 
steady rise in the cost of living that angered and perplexed 
consumers. Despite the wartime controls on prices of certain 
items, the cost of living almost doubled between 1914 and 
1920, and in New York City it rose 28 per cent between 
1919 and 1920 alone. The people, according to a correspon­
dent of Mark Sullivan, were "more interested in the price 
of beefsteak and a pair of shoes" than in Wilson's League 
of Nations. The administration had proposed that an indus­
trial board in the Commerce Department be allowed to set 
maximum prices, but George Peek, lacking authority to 
keep steel prices down, resigned as its head in May, 1919. 
Not until April of 1920 did the price index begin to fall. 
Added irritants were the scarcities that persisted after the 
war as labor unions struck and the economy pursued its 
uneven course. Viewing the high cost of living as the 
nation's greatest postwar problem, the Federal Reserve 
Board acted against the inflation of 1919 and early 1920 
by raising the rediscount rate, curtailing credit, and 
discouraging expansion. A major depression began in 
 Paul Samuelson and Everett E. Hagen, After the War (National 
Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C., 1943), p. 21; George H. 
Soule, Prosperity Decade (New York, 1947), pp. 83-84; Elmus R. 
Wicker, "A Reconsideration of Federal Reserve Policy during the 
1920-1921 Depression," Journal of Economic History, XXVI (June, 
1966), 223-38. 
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1920, soon enough to contribute to the defeat of the 
administration in the fall election.9 
To many Americans, labor appeared responsible in 
considerable part for the country's economic and social 
unrest. "Men are either blindly for or blindly against 
labor," reported the journalist Lincoln Colcord. For in 
1919 labor and capital were engaged in a bitter struggle. 
The war had upset the balance of power established in 
the prosperous days of the progressive era. As unions 
grew in size and power, labor's aspirations also expanded. 
Yet while the war added to the gross income of labor and 
the government required employers to accept collective 
bargaining, war also brought its frustrations: the adminis­
tration discouraged the closed shop and sometimes required 
short apprenticeships, and inflation ate into wage increases. 
"It is doubtful," one economist wrote, "if in the long run 
real wages were appreciably bettered by the war." In 
addition, labor was restless after months of abnormal 
exertion in wartime industry. Business also grew stronger 
in the war, and former competitors learned the blessings 
of government-sanctioned co-operation. More important, 
business lost some of the tarnish of the muckraking era, 
as the strength of American industry contributed its im­
portant part to winning the war. But management too was 
troubled, by high taxes that lasted into 1919 and by the 
failure of government to award just compensation for 
some of the voided war contracts. Business was frightened 
by the apparent growth of radicalism and nervous over 
the threat of government ownership. Will Hays, the Repub­
 For cost-of-living figures, see New York Times, May 3, 1920, 
p. 1; Samuelson and Hagen, After the War, pp. 13, 31; and U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bulletin of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
CCCLVII (May, 1924), 466; John A. Peters to Mark Sullivan, 1920 [?], Sullivan Papers, Hoover Institute on War and Peace; Frederic 
L. Paxson, Postwar Years: Normalcy, 1918—1923 (Berkeley, Calif., 
1948), p. 45; Houston, Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, 1913-1920,(New York, 1926), II, 105 ff. 
9
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lican national chairman, called the businessmen "supremely 
loyal" and "entitled to every consideration, including the 
right to run their own business." "We need a businessman 
for President," declared the Saturday Evening Post. The 
combatants were all the more tenacious because they clashed 
in an atmosphere of class consciousness over issues of 
fundamental importance, including collective bargaining 
and the open shop. When labor forced the hand of capital 
in a series of massive strikes, the public was forced to 
take sides.10 
Unfortunately for labor, the public was in no mood to 
champion its cause or to tolerate its strikes. During the 
war the laboring man's living standard had sometimes risen 
to middle-class levels, and white-collar workers were dis­
turbed that their wages had risen only 5 to 10 per cent. 
While their pugnacity offended most of their countrymen, 
laborers were largely unsuccessful in obtaining their goals. 
In September, President Wilson asked workers not to strike 
for higher wages, since strikes would raise even further the 
high cost of living; and he denounced the Boston police 
strike as a "crime against civilization." To assuage the 
hard feelings between capital and labor, he called a National 
Industrial Conference to meet in October. But the AF of L 
i° Colcord is quoted in Nation, CIX (Nov. 15, 1919), 636. A good 
essay on the inevitability of postwar friction between capital and 
labor is William F. Ogburn, "Capital and Labor," in Frederick A. 
Cleveland and Joseph Schafer (eds.), Democracy in Reconstruction (New York, 1919), pp. 305-26; see also Isaac Lippincott, Problems 
in Reconstruction (Boston, 1919), p. 229 and passim. The economist 
quoted is Harold U. Faulkner, American Economic History (8th ed.; 
New York, 1960), p. 594. On the breaking of war contracts, see 
Cleveland and Schafer (eds.), Democracy in Reconstruction, and 
Benedict Crowell and Robert Forrest Wilson, Demobilization: Our 
Industrial and Military Demobilization After the Armistice, 1918­
1920 (New Haven, Conn., 1921), pp. 126-44. Will Hays is quoted in 
Nation, CIX (Dec. 18, 1919), 733. Saturday Evening Post, CXII (Oct. 
4, 1919), 28. A typical case of employee discontent over the loss of 
collective bargaining occurred among telephone workers; see Felix 
Frankfurter to William B. Wilson, Sept. 2, 1919, Labor Department 
File 16-603, National Archives. 
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withdrew on the grounds that representatives of the em­
ployers refused—in the face of the steel strike then under 
way—to affirm the principle of unrestricted collective bar­
gaining that had widely established itself during the war. 
When the bituminous coal miners went out on strike in 
November, Attorney-General Palmer obtained two federal 
court injunctions against the strikers that aroused labor's 
ire. Following the example of some businessmen, the 
Attorney-General styled the strikers radicals and their 
conduct a rehearsal for communist revolution. Wilson 
estranged the Railway Brotherhoods by refusing to support 
the revolutionary Plumb plan that would have nationalized 
the railroads and given the workers a share in their 
management and profits.11 Despite the generous arbitration 
of Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson in the coal strike 
and the President's efforts on behalf of the steel workers, 
labor's dissatisfaction with the economic and political status 
quo increased as rapidly as the public's dissatisfaction with 
labor. In early 1920 the Esch-Cummins Act came danger­
ously close to requiring compulsory government arbitration 
of labor disputes—a thing that in an era of conserva­
tive federal administration would hold little promise for 
the worker—and the antistrike provision of the act also 
offended labor. Samuel Gompers blamed this act and the 
11
 Progressive Republicans especially feared the abuse of public 
interest on the part of labor unions. George H. Mayer, The Republi­
can Party, 185U-196U (New York, 1964), p. 386. Editorial reaction of
the country's newspapers to the strikes of 1919 is contained in Liter­
ary Digest, LXIII (Oct. 25, 1919), 11-14, and (Nov. 22, 1919), 11. 
On Palmer's use of the injunction, see Franklin K. Lane to Woodrow 
Wilson, Oct. 19, 1919, Serial VI, File 5085, Wilson Papers, Library of
Congress; Gompers to Lee Seamster, Mar. 29, 1920, Gompers Papers, 
AFL-CIO Building, Washington, D.C.; William B. Wilson to James 
Duncan, Apr. 22, 1920, William B. Wilson Papers, Pennsylvania 
Historical Society. For the reaction of the railway brotherhoods to 
the President's discarding of the Plumb plan, see New York Times,
Feb. 24, 1920, pp. 1-2. Nation, CIX (Sept. 6, 1919), 326-27; New 
York Times, Oct. 23, 1919, p. 1; and Outlook, CXXIII (Sept. 3, 
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"unrest in the country" on Congress. Sometime in 1920, it 
would appear, the workers decided that they had lost the 
industrial war of 1919, and labor militancy receded. By 
and large, both the activities of unions and the incidence 
of strikes declined in the 1920's when labor completed its 
strategic retreat.12 
Farmers found themselves in their familiar dilemma of 
squaring the higher cost of living with declining market 
prices for their crops. Although the 1918 Congressional 
elections had marked the departure of many farmers from 
the Democratic party, the Department of Agriculture made 
little effort to forestall further desertions. For a time the 
postwar agricultural market prospered as foreign demand 
sustained the expanded wartime production. But farmers 
felt uneasy in 1919, knowing that government price sup­
ports would end in the spring of 1920. Since we were now 
a creditor nation and since European borrowing was grad­
ually diminishing under the War Finance Corporation, 
foreign exports now also declined sharply. And even though 
farm mortgages had more than doubled since 1914, Secre­
tary of Agriculture David Houston—a southerner viewed 
with considerable suspicion by western farmers—along 
with his successor, Edwin T. Meredith, awaited indiffer­
ently the end of price supports. To heighten further the 
agrarian dislike of the Wilson administration, the adoption 
of the Esch-Cummins law in January, 1920, returning the 
railroads to private hands was followed by a rate increase 
of 35 to 40 per cent, and the Federal Reserve Board gave 
no effective help to agriculture. Unlike the laborer, the 
farmer did not participate in the complacency of the twen­
ties; agrarian feeling increased in militancy and raised its 
12
 David Brody, Labor in Crisis: The Steel Strike of 1919 (Phila­
delphia, 1965), pp. 102-11. Gompers is quoted in American Federa­
tionist, XXVII (July, 1920), 656-57. Labor before and during the 
Great Depression is the subject of Irving Bernstein's A History of 
the American Worker, 1920-1933: The Lean Years (Boston, 1960). 
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protest as it looked upon relative health that eventually 
came to prevail throughout the economy.13 
The economic trouble of 1919 was not a depression; 
that was to follow from 1920 to 1922. What disturbed 
America after the war was an uncertainty about the future, 
an uneven distribution of prosperity, and the threat of 
depression. 
Closely joined to the unsteadiness of the postwar economy 
was an injurious psychological mood. Wilson's son-in-law, 
William Gibbs McAdoo, observed in 1920 that "there is a 
strange poison in the air." 14 There was indeed. The poison 
had gathered during the war, and even with the coming 
of peace and the elimination of the immediate center of 
infection it was working its way throughout the social 
body and mind. 
The duty of spreading a patriotic war spirit had fallen 
to the highly efficient Committee on Public Information. 
The unit owed much of its effectiveness to its chairman, 
George Creel, a Denver progressive who shrewdly worked 
upon chauvinistic feelings already present in American 
society and brought to a new intensity a national mood 
that blended aggression and sincere idealism, patriotic 
dedication and xenophobia. The success of the Creel Com­
mittee, as measured by sales of war bonds and subscrip­
tions to Liberty Loans, went beyond anyone's expectations. 
Liberals in government failed to foresee, however, that 
wartime propaganda and repression, like any strong drug, 
13
 United States Department of Labor, Statistical Abstract, 1920 (Washington, 1921), p. 464; Arthur S. Link, "The Federal Reserve 
Policy and the Agricultural Depression of 1920-21," Agricultural
History, XX (July, 1946), 166-75. Secretary of the Treasury Houston
curtailed the Federal Reserve Board's extension of credit to foreign
countries for the purchase of agricultural goods. Crowell and Wilson,
Demobilization, p. 179. 
14
 McAdoo to Jouett Shouse, Sept. 17, 1920, McAdoo Papers, 
Library of Congress. 
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might have harmful aftereffects in a time of peace. The 
psychological gratifications of war were hard to surrender. 
In Bolshevism, symbol alike of anarchy and of traitorous 
retreat from the wartime alliance, the aroused American 
temper found in postwar days a new object to replace the 
defeated Hun. Stories of Bolshevik cruelty replaced those 
of German atrocities, and of course it was rumored that 
Germans had instigated the Russian upheaval. Indeed, 
Bolshevism was the enemy in Siberia, where in February, 
1919, American troops suffered considerable casualties. And 
when the international ambitions of the Bolsheviks became 
publicized, organizations such as the American Vigilantes' 
International sprang up to combat them, and the newly 
formed American Legion went on the alert: both organi­
zations were products of the wartime experience. At the 
same time the Russian Revolution provided a fresh vision 
for the socialists and communists of America. Though it 
was unrelated to Bolshevism except in the imaginations of 
superpatriots, the massive labor agitation of 1919 added 
to the fear of insurrection from the left. 
During the war the Creel Committee had asked citizens 
to report those who spread pessimistic stories about the 
war or cried for peace. In response the American Protec­
tive League arose. Made up of business and professional 
men, it acquired a semi-official status during the war as 
an arm of the Bureau of Investigation. The League publica­
tion The Spyglass directed its postwar attention to the 
communist menace. The first of many antisocialist riots 
instigated by veterans occurred in New York just a few 
weeks after the war had ended. Soldiers seeking employ­
ment in large cities frequently turned violently upon 
socialist agitators. The formation of the Comintern the 
following March further heightened the prevalent anxiety. 
Soon the various representatives of public sentiment were 
calling on the Justice Department directly to act against 
18 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: THE 1920's 
all radicals as well as to keep wartime political prisoners 
in jail. And at the head of the department was a man with 
both an aggressive temper and presidential ambitions. 
Although Attorney-General Palmer at first displayed a 
judicious attitude in keeping with his earlier career as a 
liberal, political opportunism and a lifelong distrust of 
foreigners and their ways eventually warped his sober 
judgment. The explosion of a bomb in front of his house 
spurred him to a fanaticism of one who believed himself 
persecuted. Red propaganda, he reportedly claimed, gave 
him "the creeps," and he maintained that the Reds were 
not going to "get him." But his notorious actions occurred 
only after alarmist reports from J. Edgar Hoover, newly 
appointed head of the antiradical division in the Bureau 
of Investigation, convinced him that the country faced 
a revolution.15 
Of course, in 1919 many events caused understandable 
public anxiety. The Seattle general strike in the winter 
seemed unlike anything in the native tradition of labor 
dissent, and the May Day bombs and riots appeared to 
make clear the radical origins of at least some of the agita­
tion. In reality, the Seattle strike was aimed only at intran­
sigent employers and the May Day riots were as often as 
not set off by nervous citizens. But when bombs exploded 
15
 In April, 1919, Palmer told Governor Cox of Ohio that current 
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more repressive legislation would play into the hands of the radicals.
Nation, CVIII (June 14, 1919), 927. And even in November he thought
some of the Senate bills "too drastic." Palmer to John S. Starkweather, 
Nov. 17, 1919, and Palmer to Senator Lawrence C. Phipps, Nov. 19, 
1919. Justice Department File 100-374, National Archives. On 
Palmer's subsequent attitude, see Stanley Coben, A. Mitchell Palmer: 
Politician (New York, 1963), pp. 155-56, 185-86, 198-99, 203, 205, 
207, 212; and Donald Johnson, The Challenge to American Freedoms: 
Word War One and the Rise of the American Civil Liberties Union (Lexington, Ky., 1963), pp. 120-75. 
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in eight cities in early June, public apprehension continued 
to mount with some reason. The Overman Judiciary Sub­
committee of the Senate titillated the public with stories 
of the Bolshevik threat of the "nationalization of women," 
and the Lusk Committee of the New York State Assembly 
descended upon the Rand School in New York City. Strikes 
had reached their greatest frequency in August, 1919; but 
the most important ones, including those in coal and steel, 
occurred in the fall. The Boston police strike of September 
and the Armistice Day massacre at Centralia, Washington, 
erased whatever uncertainty remained in the public mind 
about whether the issue was indeed radicalism. That it was 
a foreign threat was seemingly illustrated by the tenacity 
of immigrant strikers during the steel strike. 
Late in 1919 and after, Palmer, ignoring fundamental 
canons of human and civil rights, caused the unlawful 
imprisonment of hundreds of aliens suspected of revo­
lutionary sentiment. Even while opposing immigration 
restriction, he attempted summarily to deport as many 
foreign-born radicals as he could. Anthony Caminetti, com­
missioner of immigration in the Department of Labor, 
temporarily prevailed on his superiors to condone many 
deportations. The policy itself was not new, but its massive 
implementation was. The Red scare intensified the social 
and political reaction that flourished in 1919; the scare 
was not unrelated to the strength of nativism in the 1920's, 
exemplified by the rapid growth of the Ku Klux Klan.18 
16
 Stanley Coben has contributed a new interpretation of the Red 
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The "deportations delirium" itself ended abruptly early 
in the election year of 1920. Palmer's predictions of social 
unrest failed to materialize, and he encountered the opposi­
tion of aroused liberals. Even George Creel, no insignificant 
spokesman for full-blooded Americanism, worked with the 
American Civil Liberties Union to free imprisoned radicals. 
Finally, Palmer met his match in Acting Secretary of Labor 
Louis Post. The authority to deport radicals lay only with 
the Secretary of Labor, and Post—convinced by an Indus­
trial Workers of the World brief concerning encroach­
ment on the rights of radicals—repeatedly reversed Justice 
Department decisions. To remove the obstacle, an angry 
House Committee started impeachment hearings against 
Post; but despite his seventy-one years, the Acting Secre­
tary stymied the committee with a storehouse of irrefutable 
and damning facts about deportation cases. Curious citizens 
who came to scoff at Post remained to applaud when he 
reprimanded the committee members for abusing the Bill 
of Rights.17 
17
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While the Red scare was in progress, conditions of 
another sort were generating irrational angers. As never 
before, the Negro was coming into major contact, and often 
major collision, with white society. The war years were a 
time of mass migration from the rural South to the urban 
North. Between 1915 and 1920 the Negro population of 
New York rose 66 per cent to 152,000; in Chicago it 
increased 148 per cent to 109,000; in Cleveland, 307 per 
cent to 34,000; and in Detroit, 611 per cent to 40,000. And 
in Europe, Negroes fired guns, wore honored uniforms, and 
experienced some measure of social equality; they were 
prepared—some of them—for militancy. Inevitably, as 
colored neighborhoods expanded into contiguous residen­
tial areas and recently demobilized soldiers competed with 
Negroes for jobs, passions flared. Barred from a number 
of unions, Negroes were hired as scabs during the steel 
strike. Race riots broke out in several cities, including 
Washington, Chicago, Omaha, and Knoxville; hundreds of 
lives were lost. Lynchings rose from thirty-six in 1917 and 
sixty in 1918 to seventy-six in 1919, and then declined 
sharply in the twenties. And in 1919 the revived Klan 
began its meteoric rise, gaining some 100,000 members in 
the South.18 
in National Hysteria, 1919-1920 (Minneapolis, 1955), pp. 247-49. 
Concerning Palmer's defense, there is Johnson, The Challenge to 
American Freedoms, pp. 161-62; and U.S. Congress, House Com­
mittee on Rules, A. Mitchell Palmer on Charges Made against
Department of Justice by Louis F. Post and Others, Hearings, 66th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 1920. Palmer on Post is in Secretary of State Robert 
Lansing's Private Memoranda, Apr. 14, 1920, Lansing Papers, 
Library of Congress. For Wilson's own attitude on wartime propa­
ganda, suppression, and related matters, see Harry Scheiber, The 
Wilson Administration and Civil Liberties, 1917-1921 (Ithaca, N.Y., 
1960), pp. 40-41. 
18
 The statistics on Negro population are quoted in Oscar Handlin, 
The American People in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 
1954), p. I l l  ; those on lynchings are from Jessie P. Guzman et al. (eds.), The Negro Yearbook, 1952 (New York, 1952), p. 278. Brody, 
Labor in Crisis, pp. 162-63. 
22 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: THE 1920's 
In its larger significance, the Post-Palmer skirmish was 
symptomatic of emerging political disorder within the 
Democratic party. The administration had lost its power 
to discipline and stimulate Congress to act on pressing 
national problems. This near abandonment of party disci­
pline, especially on the part of Wilson, goes far in itself 
to explain the temper of the nation. Neither were the 
Republicans able to muster the leadership the times seemed 
to require. 
During the first months of the peace Wilson's schedule 
made it impossible for him to provide domestic leadership. 
He spent the month after the Congressional elections of 
1918 preparing for the Paris Peace Conference. On Decem­
ber 2 he left for Paris, and, except for a ten-day trip home 
in the late winter to sign bills and attend to unavoidable 
domestic duties, his work kept him abroad until July 8, a 
period of about seven months. On the trip home he met his 
cabinet, talked to a fairly complacent conference of gov­
ernors and mayors about unemployment, and had dinner 
with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Commit­
tee; but a ten-day whirlwind of activity could not replace 
constant presidential concern and leadership.19 
In the weeks to come the fight over the League of Nations 
consumed much of Wilson's time, and he continued to give 
little attention to domestic and party affairs. "There is no 
real note of leadership coming out of the White House," 
complained the Nation in August. Although weakened by 
a severe attack of influenza, Wilson began on September 3, 
1919, a tour to generate support for his League. On 
September 25 he had a physical breakdown in Pueblo, 
Colorado, and shortly afterward suffered a paralyzing 
19
 In this period Wilson sent three messages to Congress that 
touched only peripherally upon political and social reform. Perhaps 
he could have worked more actively for reform had he returned to 
America sooner or had his health not given out. For the messages, 
see New York Times, Dec. 2, 1918, pp. 1-2; May 21, 1919, pp. 1-2 (cabled from Paris); and Aug. 9, 1919, pp. 1-2. 
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cerebral hemorrhage. Since that affliction often leaves some 
of the bodily and mental functions unimpaired and a few 
of Wilson's visitors during the last year and a half of his 
presidency found him apparently hale, their testimony has 
occasionally been taken as evidence that his illness did not 
seriously damage his capacities. But the opposite was the 
case. The stroke prevented him from performing effectively 
the complex activity of a President; he was rarely able to 
work more than an hour or two a day or to sustain more 
than a few minutes of dictation. In the middle of 1920 
Doctor Cary T. Grayson, Wilson's physician, spoke of the 
President's gradual mental deterioration. Nor is it possible 
to separate emotional from intellectual impairment. Had 
illness not struck him down, Wilson might have continued 
as the strong party leader he had described in his Congres­
sional Government. As it was, his party floundered for 
lack of direction, all the more so because earlier he had 
accustomed it to the vigorous leadership of a prime min­
ister. Few Democratic leaders, "thanks to Mr. Wilson^ 
domination of his party," observed the Nation, "retain any 
special capacity for independent thought or constructive 
statesmanship.20 
The President's absence forced an unaccustomed degree 
of independence on even the least active cabinet members, 
whom he had regarded condescendingly as administrators 
rather than as members of an important political body. 
Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo, the most competent 
executive, had already resigned. Inexperienced though they 
were at independent leadership, the more ambitious secre­
taries jumped at the opportunity to direct government pol­
icy. The most flagrant exercise of autonomous power was 
20 Nation, CVII (Nov. 9, 1918), 545; CIX (Aug. 2, 1919), 133. 
On Wilson's illness, see John Garraty, Woodrow Wilson (New York, 
1956), p. 182; Arthur Walworth, Woodrow Wilson (2 vols.; New York, 
1958), I, 400; and the thorough bibliographical note in John Blum, 
Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era (Boston, 1951), p. 312 (see also 
pp. 214, 216). 
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by Attorney-General Palmer, who issued his famous injunc­
tion against the United Mine Workers less than two months 
after Wilson's collapse. Palmer's actions in the Red scare 
severely divided Wilson's advisers: Joe Tumulty, Robert 
Lansing, and Albert S. Burleson supported him in opposi­
tion to William B. Wilson, Franklin K. Lane, and Josephus 
Daniels. Secretary of State Lansing acquired Wilson's en­
mity by calling cabinet meetings without the President's 
consent. According to Daniels and others, Lansing wanted 
Vice-President Thomas Marshall to take over the govern­
ment. Bitterly contentious Postmaster-General Burleson 
"created everywhere a sense of extreme sensitivity." The 
new executive leadership frequently took on a conservative 
character. Fundamental decisions on economic policy lay 
chiefly with Carter Glass and David F. Houston, successors 
to McAdoo in the Treasury; and both Houston and Glass 
wanted the ailing postwar economy to mend itself. Lincoln 
Colcord of the Nation diagnosed the situation in an article 
entitled "The Administration Adrift": 
So with the President out of commission, it has been Carter Glass 
and Mr. Burleson, and Mr. Houston, all Bourbon southerners, 
who have dominated the Administration and formulated its 
policies during this critical time. There seems little doubt 
that the leaders of the Bourbon Democracy have utilized the 
full power and prestige of the Presidency to work their own 
ends.21 
Another indication of the President's declining role as 
leader was his failure to provide a progressive domestic 
program. Conservationists in particular were discouraged; 
 Between the end of the war and the election of 1920, six of the
nine cabinet officers had to be replaced. Wilson's conception of party 
government is discussed in Arthur Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton, N.J.: 1956), pp. 145-47. David Houston, among others,
recalls the encroachments by the Congress on executive domain after 
Wilson's illness. Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, II, 71-90; 
Houston to Woodrow Wilson, Apr. 15, 1920, Houston Papers, Library 
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but for a liberal filibuster, a "giveaway" leasing act would 
have passed early in 1919. Even such significant legislation 
as was passed after 1918—the progressive General Leasing 
and Water Power acts of 1920, for instance—had for 
the most part been initiated long before the meeting of the 
Sixty-sixth Congress, whereas other measures, such as the 
Transportation and Merchant Marine acts of 1920, were 
steps backward from the radical nationalization of war­
time. In referring to the railroad act, the New Republic 
condemned "the unfortunate legislation of 1920. It 
was the product of a mediocre, spineless and leaderless 
Congress." A decade later the same journal observed: 
"Wilson through the force of his own personality carried 
his party into a position of progressivism which was not 
native to it and from which it promptly backslid as soon 
as his individual authority was removed. By 1920, there 
was little evidence left in the party of the spirit which in 
1913 was busy inaugurating the Federal Reserve Board 
and so many other measures of reform." The last years of 
the Wilson administration offered little to Americans of 
progressive persuasion, while federal acts of political 
repression disgusted liberals.22 
The Nation agreed that "the breakdown in the executive 
branch of government is everywhere apparent." But, it 
added, "the breakdown is none the less serious" in Con­
gress. Intimidated by the mounting national debt, Congress 
felt obliged to practice economy. Even the magazine that 
mourned the inactivity of Congress preached that "rigid 
economy in government expenditures is imperatively re­
quired in the interest of the American people." The Saturday 
of Congress. On Wilson's declining role as party leader, see George 
Creel, The War, the World, and Wilson (New York, 1920), p. 134. 
Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The President's Cabinet (New York, 1959), 
pp. 22 58-59. Colcord article is in Nation, CIX (Nov. 15, 1919), 635-36. 
 New Republic, XX (Nov. 12, 1919), 315; LVIII (May 8, 1929), 
320; J. Leonard Bates, The Origins of Teapot Dome, pp. 165, 180, 
200 if. 
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Evening Post could think of little else. The Senate was less 
conservative than the House, which spent much of its time 
in 1919 debating various peacetime sedition bills. But the 
Senate, beginning in the spring of 1919, was so immersed 
in the debates over the League of Nations and the Treaty 
of Versailles that it became, in the view of the Nation, 
"literally impervious to the condition of the country." No 
important accomplishment can be credited to the Congress 
in 1919, save for the ratification of constitutional amend­
ments propelled by the thrust of the progressive era, the 
war, and various pressure groups.23 
The one issue that might have rallied liberal support was 
the League of Nations, and yet in fact the League added to 
disharmony. It was indeed on foreign policy more than on 
any other issue in the postwar era that the progressive 
movement fragmented. For a time the League was able to 
ride the crest of an internationalism expounded by Wilson 
in his cherished wish to "make the world safe for democ­
racy"; it was promoted to a degree by the same spirit of 
wartime idealism that also unleashed the more chauvin­
istic impulses of the day. Evidence of the League's initial 
strength was ubiquitous. Newspapers supported it over­
whelmingly, and even thirty-two state legislatures endorsed 
some kind of international organization. But the League— 
still little more than a pleasant notion in most people's 
minds—was pushed into the background by the immediacy 
of the domestic program, and a shift in the sentiment of 
the people was soon to come.24 
23 Nation., CIX (Dec. 6, 1919), 711 ; (Dec. 13, 1919) , 735, 743; 
Saturday Evening Post, CXC (Dec. 7, 1918), 20 ; CXCII (May 17, 
1919) , 28. 
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The President's conduct at Versailles helped to trigger 
the reaction against the League. Republicans were the first 
to be estranged. Already, in his appeal in 1918 for a Demo­
cratic Congress to further his policies, Wilson had invited 
a partisan response from the Republican party; and by 
failing to take influential Republicans with him to Paris, 
or to keep the Senate leaders informed of the treaty-
making progress, he further widened the breach. Wilson's 
highhanded indifference to the Republicans—his apparent 
assumption, at Versailles and thereafter, that it was the 
duty of the Senate Republicans, as it was the duty of the 
Democrats, to provide a rubber stamp for a Wilson treaty 
—lost him a good deal of the support that he might other­
wise have commanded. Of course, if Wilson had triumphed 
in peace as he had in war, the Republican cause would 
have been less hopeful. But he did not. The Republicans, 
by fastening their argument upon Article X of the League 
Covenant—a controversial statement guaranteeing the in­
tegrity of national boundaries—and by representing the 
provision as a binding commitment that would involve 
American soldiers in an unending series of wars and police 
actions, brought many of their listeners to a new idea of 
the League as an instrument not for peace but for 
bloody international adventure. And Wilson stiffened the 
opposition when he assailed the anti-League senators as 
"bungalow-minds" whose heads were "knots tied to keep 
their bodies from unravelling." 25 
25
 It is possible, of course, that the President could on no account
have secured Republican co-operation. However tactful he might have
been, a handful of powerful isolationist Republican senators would 
have threatened the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com­
mittee with a party bolt in 1920. And despite Henry Cabot Lodge's 
own milder sentiments, Lodge might have backed the isolationists, if 
only to prevent a revolt within his party similar to the Bull Moose 
rebellion of recent and searing memory. On May 10, 1919, Colonel 
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A more surprising effect of Wilson's performance at 
Versailles was the desertion of many ardent liberals who 
could have been expected to rekindle the idealism of 1917 
and 1918. Unprepared for the conflict between ideals and 
self-interest, they abandoned the Treaty of Versailles after 
becoming convinced that the President had betrayed his 
own principles. And by tying the League to the treaty, he 
invited greater opposition than he would otherwise have 
encountered. For example, the New Republic observed in 
1920 that the Fourteen Points really belonged to the lib­
erals of the world, not to Wilson, who had negotiated them 
so badly. Those liberals who had been suspicious of Wilson 
from the first had their fears confirmed; for those who 
trusted him, the disillusionment was far more shattering. 
The protests of some of Wilson's own advisers increased 
the ranks of those who wanted no part of a League tied 
to a punitive and "reactionary" peace treaty—one that 
perpetuated existing injustices and so could only lead to 
another war—and mounting evidence of Allied perfidy in 
bringing on the war also disillusioned the liberals. The 
Nation imaginatively charged that the international bank­
ing interests, operating through Elihu Root, were pushing 
the League. Domestic events confirmed their suspicions that 
the President had relinquished his role as a reform leader. 
The shambles at Versailles was matched in their eyes by 
the repression of the Palmer raids.26 
The Republicans were hostile, the liberals cool or con­
fused, and old-stock Americans were increasingly alarmed 
over foreign entanglements. The Democrats could ill afford 
to draw into the League debate still another and steadily 
it will become worse and worse as his term wanes. It was all so 
useless and it has hampered him in the exercise of his public work."
2« New Republic, XXIV (Sept. 9, 1920), 18; Nation, CIX (July 5, 
1919), 3. 
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expanding force in American politics: the organized immi­
grant, perhaps more intractably hostile to Versailles than 
was any native American faction apart from the staunchest 
isolationists. Yet in his January plea that the election of 
1920 be a "solemn referendum" on the League, Wilson laid 
the party open to the animosity of the national minorities. 
Political bosses, such as Charles Murphy of New York, 
Thomas Taggart of Indiana, and George Brennan of Illinois' 
pleaded against the idea. They saw that to make the League 
a central issue in the campaign would shatter Democratic 
foreign blocs in Boston, New York, Chicago, and other large 
cities—would hopelessly alienate immigrants or Americans 
of immigrant extraction for whom the Treaty of Versailles 
represented a slighting, a betrayal, or an oppression of the 
old countries. For once the chauvinism of the immigrant 
was joined to the chauvinism of the native isolationist. 
Long before the presidential campaign of 1920, wartime 
idealism flagged in the face of the continuing and fruitless 
debates in and out of the Senate, along with Wilson's infuri­
ating proprietary attitude toward the League. A growing 
weariness first arose among Republicans, immigrants, and 
disillusioned liberals; and gradually, the skepticism perme­
ated the mind of the whole nation. The press, antagonized 
by Wilson's censorship policies as well as his poor han­
dling of the news from the Versailles conference, was in 
a mood to promote the change in sentiment. It was the 
fate of the Democratic party to become a political scapegoat 
in the League struggle wherein the issues were unclear and 
distorted. One correspondent wrote to Franklin Roosevelt: 
"I fear that the Wilson League of Nations is about 
the most effective millstone that any party, bent on suicide, 
has tied about its neck to date." 27 
 Barbara Leahy to Franklin Roosevelt, June 9, 1920, Roosevelt 
Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. 
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What kind of public and political tone was to dominate 
in the 1920's? Would there be a frenzied effort to revive a 
lost and innocent past? The Red scare had suggested some­
thing of this; but by the end of 1920 the American people 
were firmly on another course. In the decade of the 1920's 
they would, as usual, pursue the good life. Not that the 
age of normalcy solved problems; rather, its non-combative 
posture ignored them and awaited their disappearance. 
Normalcy was a victory for the middle elements in Ameri­
can life, for the deep-rooted consensus of the American 
experience that easily outlasted the conflict of the postwar 
months. The brief span of the reaction supports the view 
that much of the disturbance of 1919 was superficial rather 
than serious. 
In 1919 people had hurried to resume a way of life that 
was gone; by the summer of 1920 they had accepted its 
disappearance and hastened to embrace the new order. 
When Attorney-General Palmer opened 1920 with his raids 
on radicals, twenty-two New York clergymen denounced 
the deportations delirium, a Philadelphia United States 
District Attorney resigned in protest, and in Minnesota 
veterans condemned the attacks on free speech. When five 
Socialists were expelled from the New York Assembly early 
in 1920, conservatives, including Charles Evans Hughes 
and Warren Harding, protested their dismissal. May Day 
came and went without the radical violence predicted by 
Palmer, and Americans could scoff with the Nation: "Who 
was Queen of the May this year? Why, A. Mitchell Palmer 
without a doubt." The Congressional sedition laws were 
forgotten, and new popular fads diverted attention from 
politics to pleasure, from the League of Nations to the 
baseball teams of the American League. In contrast to 
Wilson, who could not forgive Eugene Debs his honest 
hatred of war, Warren Harding—though for purely politi­
cal reasons—was to commute the Socialist leader's thirty­
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year prison sentence. Soon, Walter Lippmann would write 
that there were no parties, no leaders, and no issues. The 
1920's had begun in earnest. There were disturbances: a 
serious depression lasted from 1920 to 1922, farming never 
came out of its economic slump, and the Klan replaced the 
Red hunters. But at no time in the decade was American 
society to be so confused and distraught as in the single 
year 1919.28 
28
 An editorial appearing in the Saturday Evening Post in May, 
1920, in some ways heralded the coming of normalcy: newspapers had
exaggerated the recent discontent, the Post asserted, whereas in 
reality life was pretty ordinary. CXCII (May 15, 1920), 28. The word
"normalcy" was supposedly coined by Warren Harding when he 
misread it for "normality" in his inaugural address. In fact, normalcy
had its niche in the English language long before. For two nineteenth-
century usages, see the Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford, 1933) 
VII, 208. Nation, CX (May 8, 1920), 607 The Lippmann essay, "The
Causes of Political Indifference," first appeared in the spring of 1921 
and is collected in Men of Destiny (New York, 1927), pp. 18-34. 

Oil and Politics 
BURL NOGGLE 
THE Teapot Dome affair, both as scandal and as symbol of 
shoddy politics in the 1920's, has been long in need of re­
appraisal. For some forty years, descriptions and evalua­
tions of the great scandal have been monotonously uniform. 
Historians, Democrats running for office, journalists search­
ing for historical metaphors—all have said much the same 
thing about Teapot Dome. 
College-level textbooks occasionally offer a dispassionate 
narrative of the essential facts, but more commonly they 
serve up moral condemnations: "Vulgarity and scandal" in 
the Harding administration "were the sordid fruits of 
normalcy." 1 The "tortuous and sordid details of the oil 
scandals" added up to a "sorry mess." 2 The "loose morality 
and get-rich-quickism of the Harding era flared forth spec­
tacularly in a series of scandals," with Teapot Dome the 
"most shocking of all."3 In his Only Yesterday (1931), a 
book that was the first to treat the 1920's as a historical unit, 
1
 John M. Blum, et al., The National Experience (New York, 1963), 
p. 603. 
2
 Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager, The Growth 
of the American Republic (5th ed.; 2 vols.; New York, 1963) II, 653. 
3
 Thomas A. Bailey, The American Pageant (2nd ed.; Boston, 
1961), pp. 784-85. 
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Frederick Lewis Allen entitled his chapter on the Harding 
administration "Harding and the Scandals." Allen gave 
some ten pages to Teapot Dome, calling it "the aristocrat 
among the scandals." 4 Twenty-five years later, Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., wrote that Albert B. Fall (Teapot Dome's 
central figure) was "without shame." 5 
In making such judgments, historians are keeping alive a 
version of Teapot Dome as old as the affair itself. The Tea­
pot Dome story began to reach the front pages of the na­
tion's newspapers—began, that is, to become a public 
"scandal"—about mid-January, 1924. During the next 
three months editorial commentary and reports on public 
pulse-taking were rampant. In early February the Free­
man saw Teapot Dome as a valuable object lesson in the 
"whole disreputable and thieving business of government 
by politics." 6 A New York Times editorial of February 3 
stressed "the evil" that had been wrought by some of the 
Teapot Dome plotters, men who had committed "an incal­
culable wrong." 7 In late February the Christian Advocate 
found in Teapot Dome "sickening evidence" of an "ethical 
paralysis" in America.8 By the beginning of March, news­
papers throughout the country, were editorializing upon the 
scandal. The Rochester (N.Y.) Post Express found that the 
"political immorality which had forecast the decadence of 
nations throughout history is beginning to rear its head in 
our own United States." The Charlotte (N.C.) Observer 
quoted favorably a religious journal's opinion that "the very 
indignation that the faithlessness of a few officials has 
aroused from sea to sea, is very good evidence that the 
4
 Frederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday (paperback ed; New 
York, 1959), pp. 86-112. 
6
 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order (Boston, 
1957), p. 52. 
6
 "Teapot Dome," Freeman, VIII (Feb. 6, 1924), 509-10.

7 New York Times, Feb. 3, 1924, II, 6:1.

s Christian Advocate, Feb. 21, 1924, p. 20.
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public sentiment of the country is on the aide of honesty 
and uprightness." 9 
Such public indignation rose and fell through the next 
three years. The Teapot Dome story soon lost its early 
sensationalism, but periodically it returned to the national 
headlines. Early in 1927, after a jury had acquitted Albert 
B. Fall and Edward L. Doheny of conspiring to defraud 
the government, a New Republic columnist lamented the 
jury's failure to accept evidence of "impropriety , 
duplicity and lying that had shocked the decency of 
America's honest citizenry." 10 In March, 1928, in response 
to some current revelations, Republican Senator Arthur 
Capper of Kansas delivered a broadside that no critic of 
Teapot Dome has ever surpassed: "The smudge of oil being 
smeared blankly across the pages of history is repulsive 
to the entire country. The trail is slimy, odorous, 
reeking with corruption. [For] ways that are dark and 
tricks that are vain, for intrigue and plot, for impudent 
daring, for melodramatic episodes, for duplicity, craft and 
cunning the conspiracy of Teapot Dome is the equal of any 
of the major crimes carried out by unscrupulous and in­
famous freebooters in the Middle Ages. It is more medieval 
than modern." n The World's Work, meantime, took in less 
history for comparison when it judged Teapot Dome to be 
"a record of deception, lying, fraud, and graft without 
parallel in the last century of our national politics." 12 
Public response during the 1920's and historical ap­
praisals since then have not, of course, been unanimous. 
From the very beginning, critics of the scandal had their 
9
 "Sinister Shadows behind the Oil Scandal," Literary Digest,
LXXX (Mar. 1, 1924), 1-9.
10
 J. M. Landis, "The Fall-Doheny Verdict," New Republic, LXIX (Jan. 19, 1927), 239-41. 
11
 New York Times, Mar. 19, 1928, II, 2. 
v
- "Money and Nerve in Politics,' Worlds Work, LVI (May, 1928), 
9-10. 
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own detractors. Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana, who 
led the Senate investigation into Teapot Dome, sometimes 
suffered vicious assaults. One editorialist called him a hyena, 
and then denned the animal as "a carnivorous quadruped 
long celebrated for the great size of its neck and 
jaws, its voice, and its propensity for robbing graves." 13 
In May, 1924, in a summary analysis of the Senate inquiry 
to that time, Felix Frankfurter noted that "various power­
ful forces" were trying to discredit the investigation, that 
influential Republicans were beginning to denounce the 
Senate committee itself, and that public condemnation was 
now being reserved "for the exposers and not for the 
exposed." 14 
Many political observers in the 1920's recognized much 
of the condemnation of Teapot Dome for what it was—a 
grasp for party advantage by Democrats seeking to magnify 
a Republican scandal. One journalist in April, 1924, pointed 
up a lesson to be learned from the affair—"the way partisan 
politics messes up justice." Teapot Dome had given both po­
litical parties the chance "to mount their protected soap 
boxes in [Congress] and scream their suspicions, rumors, 
and slanders to the four winds." After all, he admitted, 
congressmen were not only lawmakers; they were also can­
didates for re-election, "leaders and henchmen of two rival 
organizations struggling for advantage." The journalist 
Stanley Frost, whose articles on the Teapot Dome affair 
were always insightful and sometimes prescient, made the 
glum observation in March, 1924, "We Americans might 
as well prepare to live from now till election day in an 
atmosphere filled with oil and mud and reverberant with 
drums. Political Washington has settled down to such 
13
 See, for example, Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 8, 1924), 2056, for reprints of editorials. 
14
 Felix Frankfurter, "Hands Off the Investigation," New Repub­
lic, XXXVIII (May 21, 1924), 329-31. 
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a [presidential] campaign of vituperation as has not been 
known for more than a generation." 15 And then there was 
the chairman of the board of Bethlehem Steel, who in 
March, 1924, complained that hysteria over the oil scandal 
was hampering business.16 
Despite these variations, the central evaluation or 
"image" of Teapot Dome has always been clear: a nefarious 
and secret deal, sodden with graft and corruption, carried 
out with conspiratorial intent for purely personal gain. 
That any other view is even possible may seem naive or 
irresponsible or both. Yet other approaches are feasible. 
The morality—or lack of it—in the Teapot Dome affair 
may be left to the moralists, who admittedly have plenty of 
evidence to work with. The historian, although free (and 
some would say certain) to make such judgments, can 
find in the history of Teapot Dome many other themes 
suitable for study. Graft and corruption are not all that 
the scandal's history contains. Some of the highest drama 
and some of the most ingenious maneuvering in modern 
American politics took place during, and because of, the 
Teapot Dome scandal. Teapot Dome has quite rightly come 
to epitomize politics in the twenties, and it is the politics 
rather than simply the immorality that needs to be ex­
amined and emphasized.17 
15
 Frank Crane, "Oil and Dirty Waters," Current Opinion, LXXVI (April, 1924), xxxii; Stanley Frost, "Oil, Mud, and Tom-Toms," 
Outlook, CXXXVI (Mar. 12, 1924), 423-25. 
16
 New York Ti)ncs, Mar. 11, 1924, p. 1. For a careful study of 
responses to the Teapot Dome affair by businessmen, see Robert A. 
Waller, "Business and the Initiation of the Teapot Dome Investi­
gation," Business History Review, XXXVI (Autumn, 1962), 334-53. 
17
 J. Leonard Bates, "The Teapot Dome Scandal and the Election 
of 1924," American Historical Review, LX (January, 1955), 303-22, 
was one of the very first studies of Teapot Dome's political history, 
done by a professional historian concerned more with determining 
what happened than with merely repeating the usual morality tale. 
David Stratton also has done some careful essays of this kind: see 
his "Behind Teapot Dome: Some Personal Insights," Business History 
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The expression "Teapot Dome" is older than the scandal 
of the same name. Originally, Teapot Dome was the name 
of a government oil reserve in Wyoming, set aside in 1915 
for exclusive use and benefit of the United States Navy. 
Progressives, conservationists, and scientists in government 
service had led a concerted drive during the progressive 
era for a new oil-leasing policy. Believing that the country's 
domestic oil supply would, without government regulation, 
become inadequate for the future needs of the economy and 
of the U.S. Navy, they agitated for conservation and re­
striction policies. In 1909 President William Howard Taft 
withdrew from private entry over a million acres of oil-
bearing lands in California and Wyoming. In 1912 Taft 
established within the California area two naval petroleum 
reserves, Elk Hills (Reserve No. 1). and Buena Vista Hills 
(Reserve No. 2). In 1915 President Woodrow Wilson added 
Teapot Dome (Reserve No. 3) in the Wyoming area.18 
The Teapot Dome reserve lay just south of the town of 
Midwest, in the northeast quadrant of the state. Overlook­
ing the area is an eroded sandstone formation, one re­
sembling a disfigured human hand but named Teapot Rock. 
Men in the oil business associated the oil dome with the 
landmark and called the reserve Teapot Dome. In turn, 
Review, XXXI (Winter, 1957), 385-402; and "Splattered with Oil: 
William G. McAdoo and the Presidential Nomination," Southwestern 
Social Science Quarterly, XLIV (June, 1963), 62-75. On this latter 
topic, and for still another example of the dispassionate approach,
see Lee N. Allen, "The McAdoo Campaign for the Presidential Nomi­
nation in 1924," Journal of Southern History, XXIX (May, 1963), 
211-28. In my Teapot Dome: Oil and Politics in the 1920's (Baton 
Rouge, 1962), I sought to shift attention away from the question of 
guilt, as such, and to concentrate upon the scandal's effects in party 
politics. 
is J. Leonard Bates, "The Midwest Decision, 1915," Pacific North­
west Quarterly, LI (January, 1960), 26-27 and The Origins of Teapot 
Dome: Progressives, Parties, and Petroleum, 1909-1921 (Urbana, 
111., 1963), pp. 14-25; Noggle, Teapot Dome, pp. 16-17. 
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the reserve supplied the name for the great scandal of the 
Harding administration. 
There was much that was fortuitous in the history of 
Teapot Dome, and especially in the very discovery of the 
scandal. The Senate investigation that exposed the affair 
grew in an unforeseen fashion out of a conservation feud, 
one that had begun well before 1920 but one that quickened 
after Harding's election in that year. Between 1909, when 
the California oil lands were withdrawn from private entry, 
and 1921, when the new Harding administration began to 
formulate an oil policy, much legislative and bureaucratic 
wrangling over national oil resources and oil policy had 
taken place. The basic question had been whether or not 
the government should lease the reserves to private in­
terests and, if so, under what terms. Businessmen wanted 
to tap the reserves—and had support from some influential 
politicians. Conservationists, also with political support, 
fought to keep them out. The oil-leasing policy of Harding's 
secretary of the interior, Albert B. Fall, as well as the 
policies of conservationists who opposed him, was a con­
tinuation into the 1920's of this running fight that had 
begun a decade earlier.19 
Harding's nomination in 1920 actually pleased Gifford 
Pinchot and many other old progressives and conservation­
ists concerned with the country's oil supply. They had, of 
late, built up deep resentment against the Wilson adminis­
tration. They felt that Wilson himself, his attorney-general 
A. Mitchell Palmer, and his secretary of the interior Frank­
lin K. Lane had, in their recent policies, turned reactionary. 
The Wilson administration was not, to them, a friend of the 
conservation movement. In contrast, they felt that Harding 
could be persuaded to support a progressive program, in­
 Bates, Origins of Teapot Dome, passim. 19
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eluding a policy of conservation. Pinchot visited Harding 
in Marion, Ohio, in mid-summer; afterward, he declared 
himself pleased with Harding's views.20 
After his sweeping victory in November, Harding named 
Albert B. Fall as secretary of the interior. Fall, senator 
from New Mexico since 1912, was an aggressive and im­
petuous southwesterner, whose manners and values per­
fectly matched the stereotype of the folklore frontiersman.21 
As senator, Fall bitterly fought against the conservation 
program of Wilson's administration. Gifford Pinchot wrote 
of him: "On the record it would have been possible to pick 
a worse man for Secretary of the Interior, but not alto­
gether easy." Later, another conservationist wrote: "Fall 
was condemned as absolutely unfit for such a post by every 
detail of his record in the Senate. He had been an exploiter 
and a friend of the exploiters. He had always opposed the 
conservation movement." 22 
What Fall thought about the naval petroleum reserves 
was quite clear—they should never have been established.23 
Yet upon moving into the Department of the Interior, Fall 
did not attempt an immediate change in oil policy. That he 
was an anticonservationist is clear. That he was an am­
bitious man of forceful action and independent thinking is 
also clear. But that he immediately set out to lease or sell 
2" Ibid., pp. 210-12; Noggle, Teapot Dome, pp. 5-6. In 1924 charges 
were to arise that oil company money was improperly at work during 
the Republican convention. It is clear that oilmen, with their money 
and their lobbyists, descended upon the convention, but their connec­
tion with Harding's nomination and with his subsequent cabinet 
appointments is not clear at all. His nomination may have been a 
colossal error in judgment, but the party leaders backed him as a 
compromise in a deadlocked convention, not because of shady maneu­
vers by his supporters in the oil business. See Wesley M. Bagby, The 
Road to Normalcy (Baltimore, 1962), pp. 79-100; Noggle, Teapot
Dome, pp. 3, 141-43. 
21 Ibid., pp. 8-11. 
22 Pinchot to Samuel McCune Lindsay, Mar . 6, 1921, Box 239, 
Gifford Pinchot P a p e r s , Division of Manuscr ip ts , L i b r a r y of Congress ; 
John Ise, The United States Oil Policy (New Haven , 1926), pp . 
365-66. 
23
 Ba tes , Origins of Teapot Dome, p . 226. 
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the petroleum reserves for personal gain, or even from 
honest conviction, is not clear at all. He did, however, 
begin a policy that stirred up rumors and that aroused the 
suspicion of certain conservationists. 
Among these latter critics was Harry A. Slattery, an 
old Pinchot supporter who more than any other single 
person set in motion the investigation that uncovered the 
Teapot Dome scandal. In 1920 Slattery was practicing law 
in Washington.24 Shortly after Fall took office, Slattery 
heard a rumor that Fall, through executive order of Presi­
dent Harding, had acquired control of the petroleum re­
serves. Harding did, in fact, issue such an order, dated 
May 31, 1921, transferring them from the Navy Depart­
ment, which had been given control of them only a year 
earlier. Fall wrote it for him and Secretary of the Navy 
Edwin Denby approved it. On June 1 the administration 
announced the transfer, thus confirming Slattery's earlier 
fear. Albert Fall now controlled the naval oil reserves.25 
Slattery promptly went to see Senator Robert M. La Fol­
lete, Republican of Wisconsin, a veteran conservationist. 
La Follette encouraged Slattery in the latter's proposal to 
investigate the transfer. This Slattery did, over a ten-month 
period. Gradually, he came to the conclusion that Fall was 
planning a massive program of throwing open the federal 
domain for sale and exploitation.20 
24
 F rom 1909 to 1912 Sla t te ry had been secre ta ry to Gifford 
Pinchot; between 1912 and 1917 he had served as secre ta ry of the 
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investigator, counsel, legislative d ra f t sman , and confidant for conser­
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One of Fall's proposals was to transfer the Forest Service 
from the Department of Agriculture to his own Interior 
Department. When Slattery reported this plan to Gifford 
Pinchot, the former Forester reacted instantly. Pinchot had, 
over the years, developed an intense supicion of the Interior 
Department and any and all of its secretaries. He fought 
all attempts to transfer the Forest Service to its jurisdic­
tion. The Service was, he felt, the key agency in the con­
servation movement that he had helped to establish. Pinchot 
now joined Slattery and La Follette in what was rapidly 
becoming an anti-Fall crusade. Between the spring of 1921 
and early March, 1922, Pinchot engineered a newspaper 
campaign against Fall's policies, principally his proposed 
transfer of the Forest Service and his plans for administra­
tive changes in Alaskan forests.27 
Near the end of this year-long assault on Fall, Harry 
Slattery discovered the first evidence of a scandal in oil. 
Learning that Fall had begun to grant drilling rights in 
the California reserves to the Pan-American Petroleum and 
Transport Company of millionaire Edwin L. Doheny, 
Slattery wrote to La Follette, suggesting that the senator 
call for a Senate investigation into all oil leases made by 
Fall. Slattery had little more than hunches at this point— 
he was suspicious, but evidently his proposal to La Follette 
was simply a tactical move in the "Fall war," as he called 
it. He had no clear evidence of any corruption or mal­
feasance by Fall.28 
La Follette was at first reluctant to ask for a Senate 
inquiry. But then Fall, on April 7, 1922, leased the entire 
Teapot Dome reserve to Harry Sinclair's Mammoth Oil 
 Noggle, Teapot Dome, pp . 20 ff. 
28 Slattery to La Follette, Mar. 15, 1922; La Follette to Slattery, 
Mar. 20, 1922; Slattery to H. H. Chapman, Apr. 19, 1922; and Slattery 
to Philip Wells, Mar. 20, 1922, Slattery Papers. 
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Company. Two weeks later, Edward L. Doheny received 
further drilling rights in the California oil reserves. In 
fact, as the Senate inquiry would later reveal, Fall leased 
to him the entire Elk Hills reserve. La Follette, responding 
to these actions and to more and more rumors and protests 
that Slattery and other correspondents were communicating 
to him, asked the Senate to investigate Fall's oil-leasing 
policy. On April 29, 1922, the Senate voted approval of 
his proposal. Initiative now passed to the investigators, 
the Senate committee on Public Lands and Surveys.29 
La Follette had chosen his committee of inquiry with 
care. The logical choice, the Naval Affairs Committee, was 
weighted with administration supporters. The Public Lands 
Committee contained Reed Smoot (Utah), Irvine Lenroot 
(Wisconsin), and other Republican stalwarts; but it also 
included Republican insurgents George W. Norris (Ne­
braska), Edwin E. Ladd (North Dakota), and Peter Nor-
beck (South Dakota), as well as strong-willed Democrats 
Thomas J. Walsh (Montana) and John B. Kendrick (Wy­
oming). This latter group was not likely to pigeonhole 
La Follette's resolution or neglect its task out of partisan 
calculation. Nevertheless, hearings did not begin until eigh­
teen months after the Senate had approved the investiga­
tion. Perhaps Smoot and other stalwarts did work for a 
delay beyond the 1922 Congressional election, but the hesi­
tancy and the deliberation of Thomas J. Walsh was perhaps 
even more significant.30 
La Follette had urged Walsh to "take the leadership in 
investigating." Walsh, already burdened with numerous 
committee assignments, was reluctant. Then in June, 1922, 
in compliance with the Senate resolution, Fall «ent to the 
29 Noggle, Teapot Dome, pp . 34-42. 
3 0
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committee a truckload of documents. During the next six­
teen months—from June, 1922, to October, 1923—Walsh 
made what he called "a critical analysis of the lease." He 
studied past legislation relevant to the leasing, and he sent 
letters to "all journals which had exhibited any special 
interest in the subject," asking for the sources of their 
published statements. Slattery and Pinchot, and to a degree 
even La Follette, had been quick to suspect corruption. 
Walsh was aroused more slowly. Not until early 1923 did 
he display any real misgivings over Fall's conduct. Finally, 
on October 22, 1923, when the hearings began, Walsh took 
informal command of a committee containing a Republican 
majority and a Republican chairman.31 
Between April, 1922, when the Senate agreed to investi­
gate Fall's policies, and October, 1923, when the hearings 
began, Fall had resigned, Harding had died, and Calvin 
Coolidge had moved into the White House. Fall had re­
sented Pinchot's campaign against him and had bitterly 
struck back at what he called "vicious propaganda" and 
"Pinchotism." 32 But Fall did not resign merely because of 
Pinchot's opposition; nor did the pending Senate investi­
gation alone drive him from the cabinet. As early as 
February, 1922—two months before La Follette's request 
for an investigation—there were rumors of Fall's resigna­
tion. Loss of influence in New Mexico politics, where he 
had long been a power, and disappointment over his relative 
unimportance in the cabinet had supposedly turned Fall's 
si Belle C. and Fola La Follette, Robert M. La Follette (2 vols.; 
New York, 1953), II, 1051-52; Thomas J. Walsh, "The True History 
of Teapot Dome," Forum, LXXII (July, 1924), 1-12; J. Leonard 
Bates, "Senator Walsh of Montana, 1918-1924: A Liberal Under 
Pressure," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1952), 
309-10; Harry A. Slattery, "From Roosevelt to Roosevelt," MS in 
Slattery Papers; Leases upon Naval Oil Reserves (1924), pp. 24-68. 
32 New York Times, Mar. 7, 1922, p. 2, quoting a letter from Fall 
to "Chairman of one of the principal committees of the House." The 
latter was N. J. Sinnott, chairman of the Committee on Public Lands.
See Fall to Sinnott, Mar. 3, 1922, Box 7, Albert B. Fall Papers, Uni­
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thoughts toward resigning.33 Several New Mexico news­
papers expressed regret when Fall did resign early in 1923. 
Harry Slattery was jubilant and believed that " the threat 
of the coming investigation drove Fall out of the 
Cabinet." 34 Whatever motivated Fall when he resigned, his 
public character was untarnished. Nine months later, he 
would be wholly discredited. 
The Walsh committee, beginning work on October 22, 
1923, uncovered little of significance during its first two 
months of activity.But then late in November and early in 
December, witnesses testifying before the committee re­
vealed that Fall, early in 1923, had suddenly begun making 
costly improvements on his New Mexico ranch—at about 
the same time he had leased Teapot Dome. Late in Decem­
ber, Fall, informing the committee of his financial status, 
declared that he had borrowed $100,000 in cash from Ed­
ward B. McLean, publisher of the Washington Post. But 
McLean, when questioned about the loan, denied making it. 
Now under intense pressure from Walsh, Fall admitted to 
a lie, saying he had found "other sources." 35 
With this development, a dull and unrewarding Senate 
inquiry suddenly became the Teapot Dome scandal. Fall's 
confession was the first of several dramatic revelations. One 
33
 For an early analysis of Fall's possible resignation, see the 
Santa Fe New Mexican, Feb. 19, 1922, which reported that "eastern 
papers" for some time had been carrying the rumor. Meantime, the 
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Sept. 3, 1921; and Aug. 22 and 23, 1922. See also George Curry, 
George Curry, 1861-19U7, An Autobiography, ed. H. B. Hening (Albu­
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and Fall to C. E. Mitchell, July 31, 1922, Fall Papers. 
34
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35
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that quickly followed it was Edward L. Doheny's calm 
statement to the Wash committee that he had been the 
"other source" of Fall's $100,000—and that his son, Ed­
ward, Jr., had carried it to Fall's office, in cash, "in a little 
black bag." Doheny emphasized his friendship for Fall as 
motive for the loan, the two men having been prospectors 
together in Mexico and the Southwest years earlier.36 
In itself Fall's lie was perhaps the most fateful statement 
he ever uttered, and was one he deeply regretted the re­
mainder of his life. That he had, in truth, received a loan 
from Doheny, the oilman to whom he had leased the Elk 
Hills reserve—this was, if anything, even more incrimina­
ting. Then, immediately after Doheny revealed himself as 
Fall's creditor, the Walsh committee learned that in 1923, 
just after Fall's resignation, Sinclair had sent Fall "$25,000 
or 30,000 in bonds." 37 
During the next three months—January through March, 
1924—the Teapot Dome hearings were a national sensation. 
Charges and countercharges, insinuations of guilt and cor­
ruption in high offices, and maneuverings for political 
advantage seemed to possess Washington. Democrats jubi­
lantly made the most of this Republican scandal. That 1924 
was a presidential election year merely added zest (and 
sometimes desperation) to the uproar. In January the 
Democratic national committee began publicizing "the 
rape" of Teapot Dome.38 President Coolidge directed Attor­
ney-General Daugherty to send a competent staff member 
to all hearings before the Walsh committee and to take any 
action necessary to protect the interests of the federal gov­
ernment.39 Daugherty himself, as well as Secretary of the 
36
 Leases upon Reserves (1924) , pp . 1771 ff.

37 Ibid., pp . 1713-17.

38
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Navy Denby, came under heavy criticism and finally both 
men resigned—Denby in February, Daugherty in March.40 
From January into spring charges persisted that Cool­
idge, as well as Secretary of Commerce Hoover and Secre­
tary of State Hughes, had sat in certain cabinet meetings 
where Fall's leases were discussed and approved.41 In early 
February William Gibbs McAdoo's bright chances for the 
Democratic presidential nomination suddenly turned dim 
when Doheny testified that he had once employed McAdoo 
as legal counsel.42 
As such revelations and rumors piled up, public excite­
ment arose in proportion, and in Congress partisan debate 
swelled. The Santa Fe New Mexican noted: "The oil lease 
probe is spreading. The deeper you get into it the more 
bottomless it appears." 43 Albert Fall allayed none of this 
discussion when, in February, he appeared before the Walsh 
committee and refused to testify on the grounds that his 
answers might tend to incriminate him.44 Later in the 
month, Coolidge appointed special government counsel with 
unlimited authority to handle prosecution of the oil leases.45 
40
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But Democrats continued to attack Coolidge for inaction 
and complacency, and even charged him with guilt by asso­
ciation with Fall, a man now thoroughly discredited.46 
Then the scandal began to abate. Through March the 
excitement did not lessen; but as April gave way to May, 
no new revelations arose to feed the scandal. The elaborate 
newspaper reports, the detailed magazine articles and anal­
yses, the extravagant accusations from editors and from 
Congress—all diminished or disappeared. Attendance at the 
hearings shrank away, until finally not a single spectator 
showed up. On May 14, 1924, the committee adjourned.47 
The scandal was far from ended. In the 1924 presidential 
campaign the Democrats played Teapot Dome for all it was 
worth.48 Between 1924 and 1929, court trials in California 
and Wyoming restored the naval reserves to the government 
and produced new evidence of still more money passing 
into the hands of Albert Fall, as well as into the coffers 
of the Republican national committee.49 In January, 1928, 
the Walsh committee began another—though briefer—in­
quiry, an attempt to dissect the workings of the Continental 
Trading Company, Ltd. 
In 1924 government agents working for Coolidge's special 
counsel, Owen Roberts and Atlee Pomerene, discovered the 
existence of this corporation. In November, 1921, a group 
of oil men, Harry Sinclair among them, had held an or­
ganization meeting in New York City; later, they received 
incorporation in Canada. Several of the organizers were 
officers in major oil companies, a condition they promptly 
46 Noggle, Teapot Dome, pp. 114, 118, 123-36, and 149-51. 
47
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exploited to their own profit and their companies' loss. As 
members of the Continental Trading Company, they con­
tracted to buy 33,333,333 barrels of crude oil at $1.50 a 
barrel from a company controlled by Colonel A. E. Humph­
reys, himself one of the Continental organizers. On the same 
day they sold this contract to two oil companies, one headed 
by Harry Sinclair, the other by James E. O'Neil, each of 
whom was also a Continental organizer. Sinclair and O'Neil, 
as heads of their respective companies, agreed to buy the 
oil at an increase of 25 cents a barrel. They took delivery of 
the oil directly from Humphreys, but paid for it through 
Continental. Between January 1, 1922, and May 26, 1923, 
over 8,700,000 barrels of oil had exchanged hands under 
this agreement and the Continental organizers had netted 
a profit of more than $2,000,000, which they invested in 
Liberty bonds. Roberts and Pomerene managed to learn 
that Fall received at least $233,000 worth of these bonds. 
This left $2,770,000 worth of bonds unaccounted for.50 
In the fall of 1927 Paul Y. Anderson, a reporter for the 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, began a search for the missing 
bonds. Unable to gain information or co-operation from the 
Treasury Department or the Department of Justice, he 
persuaded Senator George W. Norris to ask for a Senate 
investigation. On January 9, 1928, the Senate agreed, and 
once more the Public Lands Committee—Walsh in charge— 
brought Albert Fall under scrutiny and Teapot Dome into 
the midst of national politics.51 
The committee soon determined that Harry Sinclair had 
delivered the $233,000 worth of Liberty bonds to Fall and 
50 Noggle, Teapot Dome, pp . 180-83. See also Car l Taeusch, Policy 
and Ethics in Business (New York and London, 1931) , pp. 197-221, 
for a discussion of the Cont inenta l T r a d i n g Company. 
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had later loaned him $36,000 more. Thus, from Sinclair, 
Fall had received a total of $304,000. Doheny's $100,000 
loan (plus another $5,000 that Doheny mentioned) meant 
that Fall had received at least $409,000 from the two men 
to whom he had leased the Teapot Dome and Elk Hills 
reserves. Further testimony revealed that some of the 
Continental profits had gone to the Republican national 
committee.52 
These revelations produced a new wave of political 
charges, denials, and strategic moves. But the Continental 
inquiry never reached the fevered intensity of the 1924 
investigation. In the 1928 presidential campaign Democrats 
tried to exploit the scandal. Senator Thomas J. Walsh, 
Teapot Dome's great prosecutor, campaigned for the Demo­
cratic nomination, but Al Smith easily defeated him in the 
early primaries.53 As they had done in 1924, Republicans 
studiously ignored Teapot Dome. The scandal had little 
perceptible effect on the election's outcome.04 
On July 20, 1931, having been tried and sentenced for 
bribery, Albert Fall entered prison in Santa Fe, New 
Mexico. Doheny and Sinclair, also tried, went free. Senator 
Norris had once suggested that it was impossible to convict 
a hundred million dollars in the United States. The busi­
nessman-as-hero image of the 1920's may have saved mil­
52
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lionaires Sinclair and Doheny from conviction, even though 
the United States Supreme Court had nullified their leases.55 
Albert Fall's conviction ended the legal history of Teapot 
Dome. Already, the 1928 campaign had demonstrated the 
ineffectiveness of the scandal as a political weapon, and 
court action in the 1920's altered the policy that Fall had 
sought to establish. The Teapot Dome scandal ended with 
the decade that produced it. Thereafter, it survived as 
history, as morality tale, and as political folklore. 
For the political historian of the twenties, Teapot Dome 
offers some insight into political behavior and political 
values of the decade. This great scandal, cutting deep in 
many directions, seems to confirm conventional images of 
life in the 1920's: an inept Harding and his cronies, gross 
favors for American business, and widespread immorality 
and irresponsibility, all in contrast to the progressive 
era that preceded the decade and the New Deal that 
followed it. This view, of course, is not entirely wrong, but 
it is too simple. Something more needs to be said. Within 
the past decade or so, historians have begun to question 
the old view that America in the 1920's was merely a dreary 
period of reaction sandwiched between two eras of reform. 
Arthur S. Link, in 1959, was one of the first historians to 
call attention to this new approach that scholars were 
attempting. Link agreed that the prewar progressive move­
ment "unquestionably declined" in the twenties, but he 
denied that it was dead. We must, he wrote, "recognize 
that the progressive movement was certainly not defunct 
 Noggle, Teapot Dome, pp 200-201, 184-85, 211. Sinclair served 
a few months in jail in 1929 for contempt of the Senate and for 
criminal contempt of court. Doheny, at least technically, may have 
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in the mind of the defendant, determined or refuted the guilt. I have 
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in the 1920's; that on the contrary at least important parts 
of it were very much alive." 50 
The Teapot Dome affair illustrates this very well. The 
scandal has been—and should be—used to point up some 
reactionary and irresponsible traits of politics in the 
twenties. But it can also be used to reveal the endurance of 
progressivism.57 To begin at the very beginning, men who 
had been progressives before the war initiated the Senate 
inquiry that uncovered the scandal. Carrying into the 
1920's the same aspirations and behavior they had mani­
fested earlier, Harry Slattery, Gifford Pinchot, and Robert 
M. La Follette went after Albert Fall in 1921-22 as they 
had gone after Richard A. Ballinger in 1909-10, and for 
much the same reason.58 
These conservationists had helped to create the prewar 
conservation movement; in the twenties, they never once 
slackened their interest in sustaining that program.59 Dur­
ing the decade conservation may not have enjoyed the 
positive support that Theodore Roosevelt had once given 
discussed this matter very briefly in Teapot Dome, p. 211. See also an 
article, New York Times, March 30, 1930, III: 7, edited by Current 
Events Committee of American Association of Legal Authors; and 
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it and that Franklin D. Roosevelt would later provide. But 
neither did the conservationists fade away (or promote a 
return to nineteenth-century style land-grabbing, depletion, 
and exploitation). The twenties may have been a return 
to McKinleyism in some ways, but not in conservation.60 
Pinchot and Slattery may well have prevented Albert 
Fall from gaining control of the Alaskan forests. They ob­
viously were responsible—Slattery especially—for turning 
La Follette's attention to Fall's oil policy and to an investi­
gation of his leases. That investigation was a windfall for 
conservationists. Evidently, in 1921-22, Pinchot and his 
supporters had only a general suspicion of Fall and wanted 
only to drive him from office—to repeat the maneuver they 
had used against Richard A. Ballinger, an earlier secretary 
of the interior who had opposed them. This they did.61 Then, 
after the Senate investigation uncovered scandal and Tea­
pot Dome became a sensational political issue, President 
Coolidge and, later, President Hoover took actions that 
benefited the conservation program, actions that the con­
servationists had not foreseen but ones that they now 
welcomed. In December, 1924, Coolidge established a Fed­
eral Oil Conservation Board, instructing it to determine the 
best methods for conserving the government's oil supply. 
Secretary of the Interior Hubert Work claimed in 1925 
that creation of a new conservation board in the Geological 
Survey was "for the purpose of placing every possible 
safeguard around the leasing of the Nation's estate." In 
March, 1927, Coolidge revoked Harding's executive order 
6 0
 Donald C. Swain , Federal Conservation Policy, 1921-1988, 
clearly demonstrates the achievements in conservation during the 
1920's. 
 In explanation of his resignation, it is debatable as to which 
influenced Fall the most—the attacks on his policy by his opponents 
in conservation, or his disappointments over failure to become a 
dominant figure in the Harding cabinet, even while he was losing 
power he had once held in New Mexico. See Noggle, Teapot Dome, 
52-55. 
61
54 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: THE 1920's 
that had transferred the oil reserves to the Interior Depart­
ment/12 Hoover, eight days after taking office, announced a 
new oil conservation policy: "complete conservation of gov­
ernment oil in this administration." Two days later, on 
March 15, 1929, he announced that the Interior Department 
would review some 20,000 existing oil leases in order 
to determine whether the holders were complying with 
the law.63 
It is difficult to determine how much of this presidential 
action was designed to offset the damage Teapot Dome had 
caused the Republican party. Both Coolidge and Hoover 
may have been more concerned about the oil market than 
about political scandal. In establishing the FOCB, Coolidge 
was trying to control production and raise prices for the 
oil industry, which was suffering from overproduction. 
Certainly, Hoover in 1929 was trying to decrease produc­
tion; and his actions were entirely in keeping with the 
neo-mercantilism that he had worked for during the 1920's 
even before the Teapot Dome scandal had erupted.64 The 
policies of both Presidents reflected their concern for the 
oil industry, but there is no doubt that each man was also 
62
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trying to offset the political effects of the oil scandal. In 
such ironic fashion, a scandal in oil helped to further the 
oil conservation movement in the 1920's. 
Not only did progressives launch the Teapot Dome 
investigation and thereby motivate a conservation program, 
but they also—most of them nominally Republicans—car­
ried on a running verbal attack against the scandal through­
out the mid-1920's. Besides La Follette, the three most 
conspicuous senatorial critics of the scandal were Thomas 
J. Walsh, George W. Norris, and Republican Senator 
William E. Borah of Idaho. La Follette's resolution in 
April of 1922 launched the inquiry. Later in 1922, La 
Follette chaired a Senate subcommittee that investigated 
the high prices of gasoline and other petroleum products. 
He turned over to Walsh much of what this committee dis­
covered, including evidence that increased suspicions of 
Fall's policies. During his 1924 bid for the presidency on 
the Progressive party ticket, La Follette and his running 
mate Burton K. Wheeler made much use of Teapot Dome.85 
Walsh and Norris worked largely through the Public 
Lands Committee, using it as a forum for attacking the 
Coolidge administration and the scandal. Walsh's role as 
prosecutor of Teapot Dome is a familiar story, but his 
crucial importance needs emphasizing. During the first 
weeks of hearings in the fall of 1923, Walsh alone carried 
the burden of inquiry. Reed Smoot and Irvine Lenroot, two 
Old Guard members of the committee, were totally negative. 
Peter Norbeck, one of several maverick Republicans on the 
committee, observed in February, 1924, that "most of the 
Republican members and some of the Democratic members 
were not very anxious to stir up that Teapot Dome 
 U.S. Senate, High Cost of Gasoline and Other Petroleum 
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business. Senator Walsh had to fight his way through 
all along."66 
George Norris was a notable exception to this judgment. 
Several months after the hearings had begun, Walsh wrote 
to Norris: "Until you came I never had one word of 
encouragement or even sympathy from the majority side, 
at best I guessed that Ladd and Norbeck were not un­
friendly." 67 Throughout the investigation in 1924 and 1928, 
in private correspondence and in the Senate, Norris was 
a consistent critic of the scandal and of its Republican 
principals. As early as January, 1924, before all of the 
damaging details of the scandal had been revealed, Norris 
suggested that Fall's leasing contracts were due to "deep, 
disgraceful fraud and corruption." In March Norris wrote 
to a Nebraska constituent that "a good many prominent 
Republicans" were "continually [throwing] water on this 
investigation. They have in many cases and in many ways 
tried to prevent the full disclosures of the truth." Such 
critics Norris deplored; and in particular he was "not 
at all satisfied with Coolidge a partisan more than 
anything else." 68 
It was Norris who, in 1928, reopened the Senate inquiry 
that, led by Walsh, explored the workings of the Continental 
Trading Company.69 Again, it was Norris who, in the 1928 
presidential campaign, found the Republican platform "a 
sad disappointment to every progressive citizen," for it was, 
among other things, silent "on the disgraceful disclo­
sures of the naval oil leases." The same men who controlled 
the Republican convention, said Norris, had "fought every 
68
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step to uncover any of these disgraceful and treason­
able frauds." 70 Near the end of the 1928 campaign, Norris 
issued a plea for all "Progressives" to support Democrat 
Al Smith. "When I think of the oil scandals and the 
debauchery and the crime in high places," said Norris, 
"I think of [the past] seven years with a sense of humili­
ation and shame, and I feel like condemning myself when 
I remember that I did my mite toward putting the 
Harding Administration in power." As for Hoover, Norris 
found the same men backing him who had defended Fall; 
and Hoover himself, during the Senate committee's "weary 
grind toward the facts," had remained "as silent as a 
sphinx" while knowing of the crimes.71 
If Norris was the leading Republican progressive among 
the Teapot Dome critics, Walsh, meantime, was the tireless 
and relentless Democratic prosecutor. He grilled reluctant 
witnesses, he endured verbal attacks from Republican news­
papers and even from fellow members of the Public Lands 
Committee, he uncovered vital information, and he pub­
lished articles on the affair and delivered to the Senate 
judicious summaries of the committee's findings.72 
Borah was, next to La Follette and Norris, the most 
acrid Republican critic of Teapot Dome. Early in 1924, 
Borah demanded that Attorney-General Daugherty resign 
because of his presumed connivance in the Harding scandals, 
as well as his negligence in turning up evidence for the 
Senate committee's use. At this time Borah believed that 
70
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the best tactic for the Republican party was to "clean 
out." ™ In March, 1928, in keeping with this tactic, Borah 
made a dramatic gesture to cleanse his party. After the 
Public Lands Committee in 1928 had determined that Harry 
Sinclair had contributed some of his Continental Oil Com­
pany profits to the Republican national committee, Borah 
repudiated the contribution. On March 5 he appealed to 
national chairman William M. Butler to purge the party 
of the "stigma" of "oil money" by returning to Sinclair 
all donations he had made. The party could not "in honor 
and decency" keep the money, since the whole Continental 
transaction "had in view an ulterior and sinister purpose." 
Borah believed that "plenty of Republicans" would con­
tribute "from one dollar up to any reasonable sum to clear 
their party of this humiliating stigma." 74 
Republicans reacted to Borah's plan at once. William 
Allen White wrote to him: "You are on the right line. 
The louder you talk the better it will be for the party. We 
can't go into the campaign of 1928 with the blight upon 
us of tainted money." 7f> Not enough Republicans agreed 
with Borah's plan, however, to contribute the necessary 
amount to Sinclair. Borah did receive hundreds of letters 
and as many small contributions. By March 30, he had 
collected only $6,184. In mid-April Borah began returning 
the money to those who had contributed.76 
Teapot Dome, then, became a scandal because progres­
sives sought it out, found it, probed it, and exploited it. 
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At least two interpretations of their actions and attitudes 
are possible. To an extent, La Follette and his fellow 
Republican insurgents undoubtedly took a stand against 
Teapot Dome because it was a political liability to their 
party. In this respect they were neither more nor less 
progressive than any other Republican—Coolidge himself 
moved shrewdly and subtly to offset the scandal's effect." 
But they also appear to have spoken and acted against Tea­
pot Dome because it was a scandal involving an old bete 
noire of progressivism, "big business," including in this 
case two oil millionaires, Doheny and Sinclair, neither of 
whom had ever shown much sense of public responsibility. 
La Follette, Norris, Borah, Pinchot, and other Republican 
progressives opposed Teapot Dome partly because of the 
big businessmen they could assault and the natural re­
sources they could protect—two traditional elements of 
progressivism. They also, as hard-headed politicians, hoped 
to cleanse their party. But this, too, reveals a residue of 
progressivism in the 1920's, since to cleanse meant to un­
cover what progressives had long assumed to be the unfor­
tunate "reality" of politics—the vested interest, the bribe, 
the dishonest politician, the immoral businessman.78 While 
this progressive activity hardly adds up to a major reform 
program, it does, especially in view of the amount of money 
and oil involved, deserve emphasis as a progressive achieve­
ment in the 1920's. 
In at least one instance, instead of calling forth 
progressivism, Teapot Dome undermined it by seriously 
damaging William Gibbs McAdoo's chances for the Demo­
cratic presidential nomination in 1924. As early as the 
summer of 1923, McAdoo was a serious contender for the 
Democratic prize. By early 1924, he appeared to be the 
leading contender. When the Democratic national commit­
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tee met in Washington on January 15, newspaperman 
Frank Kent reported great optimism among McAdoo sup­
porters. A poll of the committee showed that more than 60 
of a total of 106 were for McAdoo. Atmosphere in the 
Washington hotel lobbies, wrote Kent, "was a McAdoo 
atmosphere and the McAdoo control of the committee was 
conceded." Reports and private correspondence from many 
sections of the country, meantime, revealed considerable 
support for McAdoo.79 But then on February 1, 1924, 
Edward L. Doheny testified before the Public Lands Com­
mittee that he had once employed McAdoo as legal counsel 
for his Pan-American Petroleum Company. Doheny's testi­
mony had been deliberately provoked by Senator Lenroot, 
acting upon instructions from Senator James A. Reed of 
Missouri. Reed was himself campaigning for the Democratic 
nomination and knew that Doheny's testimony would 
embarrass McAdoo.80 
Doheny did more than embarrass McAdoo. He effectively 
demolished his bid for the nomination. By pure association 
McAdoo was linked to scandal, and at once his political 
support began to crumble/1 McAdoo himself refused to 
give up, but some of his major supporters—including 
Bernard Baruch, who had been helping to finance his cam­
paign—now began turning to other candidates.82 McAdoo 
still entered the convention with about three hundred dele­
gates pledged to him. If Teapot Dome had injured him, 
other issues gave him support. Rural, Protestant, and pro­
hibitionist elements in the party from the South and the 
West remained loyal to him, partly as a means of opposing 
79 Noggle, Teapot Dome, pp. 60-61, 99; Allen, "The McAdoo 
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Al Smith, who was strong among urban, Catholic, and 
repeal-minded delegates from the Northeast.83 
The Democratic convention of 1924 was a suicidal brawl, 
as Smith and McAdoo forces held fast for over one hundred 
ballots, with neither able to gain the necessary two-thirds 
majority. On the 103rd ballot, after some complex maneu­
verings by and for several lesser candidates, and after 
McAdoo released his own delegates, the convention nomi­
nated John W. Davis of West Virginia.84 Teapot Dome 
alone had not spoiled McAdoo's chances. The deadlock be­
tween Smith and McAdoo reflected a fundamental division 
in the Democratic party, which in turn mirrored a signifi­
cant fact of American life in the 1920's—the conflict 
between rural, Anglo-Protestant America and a newly 
rising urban and secular society. Yet had McAdoo never 
been tainted with Teapot Dome, he just may have attained 
the margin of votes he needed to defeat Smith and to 
gain the nomination. 
McAdoo was not a clear-cut progressive, although he 
called himself one and sought to appeal to farmers, to 
organized labor, and to other groups traditionally associated 
with progressivism.sr' He never once censured the Klan, 
which openly supported him. One of McAdoo's strategists 
once suggested, "there is no sense in denouncing the Klan 
and entering upon the impossible task of competing with 
Smith for the Catholic vote, for that is just what it 
amount [s] to." 80 Frank Freidel has perhaps characterized 
McAdoo best in calling him a "mildly progressive Demo­
crat." 87 By any standard, however, he was more of a 
83 Burner, "The Democratic Party in 1924," pp. 95 fF. 
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progressive than was John W. Davis88—though like Davis, 
McAdoo likely would have been drubbed by Coolidge in 
the 1924 election.89 
The effect of Teapot Dome upon McAdoo's candidacy 
points up the paradox that the scandal's history so often 
displayed. In 1924 this Republican scandal was a far 
greater disadvantage to McAdoo, Democrat, than it was 
to Calvin Coolidge, Republican. Coolidge, in fact, exploited 
88
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the scandal to political advantage. As vice-president, from 
March, 1921 to August, 1923, Coolidge had little if any 
connection with the Teapot Dome affair. But as successor 
to Harding, he inherited responsibility for that unfortunate 
man's administration—including the actions of his cabinet. 
Coolidge had been president less than six months when 
the scandal erupted. At first, Coolidge said and did virtually 
nothing to offset or to counter the damage that the scandal 
did to his party. But then, slowly, Coolidge began to take 
action to cope with the liability. He did so shrewdly and 
effectively. Once he had accepted the enormity of the 
scandal and had realized the need for action, he moved with 
deliberation, maintaining a delicate balance between too 
little concern and too much. He eased Harry Daugherty 
out of the cabinet, replacing him with respectable Harlan 
Fiske Stone. He appointed special counsel, who soon began 
carrying cases to court and winning decisions; and his 
secretary of the navy, Curtis D. Wilbur, inaugurated an 
oil conservation program that contrasted markedly with 
Albert Fall's. While acting in such ways beneficial to his 
party, Coolidge at the same time conveyed the impression 
that the scandal was not nearly so dastardly as his 
Democratic critics pretended.90 
Teapot Dome was not a major issue for Coolidge to 
overcome in the 1924 election; however, in so far as voters 
were disturbed over the corruption theme, Coolidge was 
probably attractive to them. He had reformed his cabinet, 
had appointed prosecutors, and had begun an oil conserva­
tion program. In addition, Coolidge himself had a certain 
appeal. As Walter Lippmann suggested soon after the elec­
tion, Americans liked Calvin Coolidge. In a time of luxury 
and pleasure, they installed in the White House "a frugal 
little man who in his personal life is the very antithesis 
8n
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of the flambouyant ideal that everybody is frantically 
pursuing. At a time when Puritanism as a way of 
life is at its lowest ebb among the people, the people are 
delighted with a Puritan as their national symbol." 91 
Coolidge won in 1924 not merely because he overcame 
the Teapot Dome issue. But since the Democrats, in the 
face of the Harding scandals, failed to win, many com­
mentators then and later concluded that the American 
voter was apathetic over corruption in government92— 
which may be one reason why so many historians have 
moralized over Teapot Dome more than they have described 
or analyzed it. Yet as this essay has attempted to show, 
Teapot Dome is not simply a morality tale. It is above all a 
political story, one that is often complex, often ambiguous, 
often paradoxical. The Senate investigation might never 
have been made had the conservationists not been alarmed 
over Albert Fall's appointment and his early policies. The 
inquiry, once begun, developed as it did because of the work 
of several key figures, most of them politicians, and men 
who were for the most part progressives. The oil conserva­
tion policies of Coolidge and Hoover developed, to an extent 
at least, as a response to the scandal. Especially in 1924, 
but also in 1928, scandal motivated some dramatic political 
91
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maneuverings, as Democrats tried to exploit the affair and 
Republicans to minimize it. It was probably more than 
coincidence that both Senate investigations came during a 
presidential election year. Yet Teapot Dome did not handi­
cap Coolidge in 1924, nor Hoover in 1928. Coolidge effec­
tively overcame the scandal in 1924; the two powerful issues 
of liquor and religion buried it in 1928. Thereafter, Teapot 
Dome survived in politics mostly as a byword and, at that, 
one imprecise in meaning and dubious in effectiveness. 
For the politician, Teapot Dome has lost whatever 
partisan usefulness it once had. For the political historian, 
serious contemplation of the affair has only begun.93 
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The Farmers' Dilemma, 1919-1929 
GILBERT C. FITE 
DURING the 192O's American farmers experienced difficult 
and frustrating times. Most other major segments of the 
economy enjoyed unprecedented prosperity, but agriculture 
suffered from high costs of operation, heavy debt burdens, 
and relatively low prices. Annual per capita income of 
people living on farms averaged only $273 in 1929; the 
average for all persons was about $750. Looking back at 
the postwar decade, one Oklahoma farmer wrote: "We 
have been in bad shape here ever since the war. 
Everybody in this part of the country has been in the 
same boat for years, a sinking one." x 
In contrast to this discouraging picture, American farm­
ers had enjoyed unusually good times between 1900 and 
1920. The period before World War I has been labeled the 
"golden era" of American agriculture, and the war itself 
enhanced the growing prosperity. Farmers found them­
selves in better circumstances because the rate of agricul­
tural expansion slowed down after 1900 and the demand 
by a growing urban population for farm products increased. 
This brought supply and demand into a better balance than 
 L. D. Jones to Senator Elmer Thomas, Dec. 12, 1931, Thomas 
Papers, University of Oklahoma Library. 
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had existed in much of the late nineteenth century, or later 
in the 1920's. Since there were no large surpluses, farm 
commodity prices advanced sharply. For example, in 1900 
wheat brought 62 cents a bushel, but by 1916 it sold for 
$1.43 and went higher after the United States entered 
World War I. Cotton prices rose from about nine cents a 
pound to seventeen cents in the same period. The growing 
value of farm products prompted the Country Life Com­
mission to write in 1909 that "there has never been a time 
when the American farmer was as well off as he is today." 2 
Increased farm prices did not in themselves assure agri­
cultural prosperity. The welfare of farmers depends basi­
cally upon the relationship between the prices of their 
commodities and the prices of non-farm goods that they 
must purchase. It is the exchange value between farm and 
non-farm products that is of vital concern to agricultural 
producers. In this respect farmers were fortunate in the 
early years of the twentieth century because farm prices 
rose faster than industrial prices. For instance, the value 
of ten leading agricultural crops rose 72 per cent between 
1900 and 1909, while the prices of a selected list of non­
farm commodities increased only 12 per cent. The price 
relationship was considered so fair to farmers in the years 
from 1909 to 1914 that farm prices were later considered 
to have been at "parity" with other prices in that period. 
Farmers also benefited from rising land prices. The value 
of land and buildings increased from an average of $19.81 
per acre in 1900 to $39.60 in 1910, and shot upward to 
$69.38 by 1920. In some states the advance was phenomenal. 
The price of South Dakota farm land, for instance, rose 
Report of the Country Life Commission, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 
Sen. Doc. 705, p. 21. Agricultural Statistics, 1962 (Washington, 1963), 
pp. 1-2; and Yearbook of Agriculture, 1909 (Washington, 1910), 
pp. 9-33. 
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more than 300 per cent between 1900 and 1910. In short, 
farmers made money by just holding land.3 Thus the com­
bination of rising commodity prices and increasing land 
values meant better times for farmers in the years before 
World War I. The tremendous demands for food and fiber 
during the war further contributed to agricultural pros­
perity. Net income of farm operators exceeded $8 billion 
in both 1917 and 1918, and reached nearly $9 billion in 
1919. This was more than double the figure for 1916. The 
South had its first $2 billion cotton crop in 1919 when 
average farm prices rose to thirty-eight cents a pound. 
As a result of this newly found prosperity, farmers 
expanded their operations, improved their facilities, and 
enjoyed a better standard of living. 
In 1920, however, farm conditions changed radically. 
Agricultural prices began to weaken in the summer, and 
within six to twelve months farmers were engulfed in a 
serious postwar depression. For example, in June, 1920, 
the farm price of wheat averaged $2.58 a bushel, but by 
December 1 it had dropped to $1.43. A year later the price 
had declined to less than $1 a bushel. Cotton that brought 
thirty-seven cents a pound in July, 1920, commanded only 
fourteen cents in December when much of the crop was 
going to market. Hog and cattle prices did not drop seri­
ously until November and December, but by June, 1921, 
prices were from 40 to 50 per cent below what they had 
been a year earlier. Secretary of Agriculture Henry C. 
Wallace declared that in 1921 most agricultural products 
sold "at bankruptcy prices." Wallace explained that price 
drops came "as a stunning surprise to a majority of farm­
ers." Though they had expected some postwar decline, he 
 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Agriculture, 1950, General Report, II (Washington, 1952), pp. 48-53. 
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said, they had not anticipated anything "so severe as what 
actually happened." 4 Because of these sharp price declines, 
net income to farm operators in 1920 was more than $1 
billion below the figure for 1919. By 1921, however, net 
farm income was down more than 50 per cent from the 
year before, totaling only $3.3 billion, the lowest since 
before 1910. Land values also tumbled, wiping out billions 
in capital investment.5 
But statistics fail to tell the story of human tragedy on 
the farm. The experience of a Missouri cattle-feeder was 
typical of thousands of livestock farmers who were ruined 
by falling prices. In October, 1919, U. A. Towns bought 
200 head of stocker steers at what he thought was a low 
price. After wintering and pasturing them during the fol­
lowing summer, he put them in the feed lot in September, 
1920. When he marketed the first 100 head, in February, 
1921, they brought $2,000 less than they had cost, not to 
mention his grain and labor. Moreover, there was no 
chance of getting anywhere near the original outlay for 
the other 100 head. Towns told Secretary Wallace that he 
had to borrow money to pay his taxes and interest, and in 
addition, he was forced to negotiate a second mortgage on 
his farm.6 If owners were hard hit, conditions were even 
worse for tenants. One farmer wrote to Secretary Wallace 
that his neighbor, a hard-working renter who farmed 
320 acres, had turned everything over to his landlord on 
December 1, 1921, "save one team which they hitched to 
an old wagon, put in their household goods, got in the 
wagon themselves, and drove away to get work at day 
labor and make a new start in life." 7 A Georgia share­
4
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cropper who had a wife and "8 head of children" said that 
he was unable to feed or clothe his "naked and barefooted" 
family, and that they would be better off in an orphan's 
home.8 
The postwar price declines placed farmers in an espe­
cially difficult economic position because costs of operation 
remained high. Production expenses for the 1920 crop 
were the highest on record and continued heavy in subse­
quent years. Prices of equipment and machinery, labor, 
taxes, interest, transportation, and other costs were exces­
sively high in relation to the very low prices brought by 
most farm products. For example, by 1921-22 taxes paid 
on farm real estate averaged 226 per cent above that of 
1913-14,9 and beginning in August, 1920, railroad rates 
advanced from 25 to 40 per cent, just in time to raise the 
cost of marketing much of the current farm crop.10 More­
over, during the war many farmers had gone heavily into 
debt to buy land and to expand their operations. Between 
1910 and 1920 farm mortgage debt had risen from $3.2 
billion to $8.5 billion, and the yearly interest charges had 
increased from $203 million to $574 million. Non-real 
estate agricultural loans totaled an additional $3.5 billion 
by 1920, and interest rates were often as high as 10 per 
cent for this type of credit.11 
Rapidly declining agricultural prices and continued high 
operating expenses placed farmers in an oppressive cost-
price squeeze by 1921. Farmers in the postwar period 
were in exactly the opposite position from that in the 
prewar years. Considering the farm price index in 1913 
8
 Idua Sapp to Secretary Wallace, Dec. 13, 1921, Secretary's 
Correspondence, USDA, National Archives. 
9
 Yearbook of Agriculture, 1922, p. 1002. 
10
 James H. Shideler, Farm Crisis, 1919-1923 (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1957), pp. 58 ff. Shideler's book is the best and most com­
prehensive account of farm problems and the suggestions made to 
solve them in the early 1920's.
11
 Historical Statistics of the United States from Colonial Times 
to 1957 (Washington, 1960), pp. 286-87. 
72 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: THE 1920's 
as equaling 100, by 1921 corn had dropped to 59, wheat 
to 78 and cotton to 48. The purchasing power of several 
basic farm products in 1921 was only 67 per cent of what 
it had been in 1913.12 The practical effect of this unfavor­
able price relationship can be better understood by looking 
at specific illustrations. A suit of clothes, for instance, that 
cost a North Dakota farmer the equivalent of 21 bushels 
of wheat in 1913 required 31 bushels in 1923. It took 63 
more bushels of wheat to purchase a wagon in 1923 than 
it did a decade earlier. To be sure, other segments of the 
economy were also in trouble by 1921; but the agricultural 
situation was different in that, as one economist empha­
sized, farm "prices fell first, fell fastest, and fell farthest." 
This explains why farmers were in a singularly unfavorable 
economic position.13 
Farmers initially blamed most of their difficulties on 
poor credit facilities, high interest rates, heavy transporta­
tion charges, rigged markets, inadequate tariffs, and a 
drop in foreign trade. When the Joint Commission of 
Agricultural Inquiry studied the farm situation in 1921, it 
concentrated on credit, transportation, and marketing and 
distribution.14 These questions did affect the welfare of 
farmers, and certain reforms would have been helpful to 
hard-pressed producers. However, the "farm problem," as 
it came to be known, went much deeper and was more 
complicated than these discussions and proposals implied. 
Agriculture was an industry out of balance. That is, pro­
duction exceeded demand at prices profitable to farmers. 
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In economic terms this meant that there was more land, 
labor, and capital devoted to farm production than was 
needed to meet both domestic markets and export trade. 
The main problem was one of surpluses. 
Supply and demand had gradually moved toward a 
somewhat better balance before World War I. However, 
the tremendous need for food and fiber of the United States 
and its allies during the war years encouraged heavy 
production, especially of wheat and pork. Farmers har­
vested 73.7 million acres of wheat in 1919 compared to 
only 52 million acres in 1913, and wheat acreage continued 
large during the 1920's. Gross production of crops rose 
about 15 per cent between 1913 and 1920. There were 
also about twelve million more hogs on farms in 1919 
than five years earlier. During the half dozen years before 
1920, farmers geared their production to abnormal demands 
and failed to consider the drastically changed conditions 
that would come with peace. World War I disrupted a long-
run adjustment needed in the agricultural sector of the 
economy to bring supply and demand into better balance. 
Unfortunately for the welfare of agriculture, American 
farmers expanded their productive capacity at the very 
time other major agricultural countries were also enlarging 
their output. This meant that after World War I American 
farm surpluses had to compete in world markets with the 
products of Canada, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, and other 
countries. Although United States farm products were able 
to compete quite successfully for their share of the foreign 
export trade, the prices of raw materials and primary food 
products were low in world markets after the war due to 
heavy production and lack of purchasing power in the war-
torn countries of Europe. The worst aspect of the problem 
was that the domestic price of wheat, cotton, tobacco, and 
other staple crops was largely determined by the surplus 
that had to be sold abroad. In other words, the low foreign 
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price set the domestic price of crops like wheat and cotton, 
which depended heavily upon export sales. And no amount 
of tariff protection could effectively raise prices as long 
as farmers produced large surpluses. The main problem 
then was how to deal with excess agricultural capacity 
and overproduction in order to keep burdensome surpluses 
from depressing the domestic price level. 
Much of the increased productivity on American farms 
resulted from increasing efficiency in the use of resources. 
Encouraged by the United States Department of Agricul­
ture and acting on their own experiences, farmers intro­
duced new crops, bought labor-saving machinery, applied 
more fertilizer, and adopted better management practices. 
The most important change was the rapid expansion in 
the use of tractors. Between 1920 and 1929 the number 
of tractors on farms increased from 246,083 to 852,989. 
These and other changes improved the efficiency on many 
American farms. While crop acreage and livestock numbers 
remained about the same between 1919 and 1929, farm 
output jumped 20 per cent. At the same time population 
rose only 16 per cent.15 Increased efficiency undoubtedly 
helped individual farmers, but the over-all effect was to 
depress prices and penalize the whole agricultural industry. 
This was a paradoxical situation whereby the welfare of 
individual farmers often conflicted with the condition of 
agriculture as a whole. 
The agricultural dilemma was also complicated by other 
factors. Because of the large number of farms (more than 
six million in 1920), uncertain weather, insects, disease, 
and other influences, farmers were unable to control their 
production even if they knew in advance about how much 
of a commodity the market would take at profitable prices. 
Since they could not regulate total production, they could 
 Yearbook of Agriculture, 1981,., p. 25. 15
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not influence the price of their commodities. On the other 
hand, industry regulated its production. A farm machine 
manufacturer did not produce the maximum number of 
reapers but only made as many as he could sell at a profit­
able price. A good example of the difference between the 
position of agriculture and industry can be seen in the 
period between 1929 and 1933. As demand weakened fol­
lowing the stock market crash, farm machine and motor 
vehicle production was cut some 80 per cent, while prices 
were reduced from only 6 to 16 per cent. But even though 
agricultural prices declined about 63 per cent in those four 
years, production dropped a mere 6 per cent. Since a 
farmer's income is determined by quantity times price, low 
prices may actually encourage him to produce more in 
order to get enough money to pay operating and living 
expenses. When he does this, he adds to the problems of 
all farmers. 
Farmers were at a further disadvantage in dealing with 
other economic groups. As individual producers, they could 
not bargain effectively over either the price they paid for 
non-farm goods or the price they received for their com­
modities. Part of the difficulty was that farmers dealt with 
representatives of large and powerful corporations. Three 
large tobacco companies bought nearly half the tobacco in 
the 1920's, thirteen flour mills purchased more than 50 per 
cent of the wheat, and three meat packers bought more 
than one-fourth of the cattle and hogs marketed. At the 
same time a half-dozen farm machine manufacturers pro­
duced most of the agricultural machinery, and many of 
the other things that farmers bought were produced by 
big corporations. As a matter of fact, both the price of 
what the farmer bought and what he sold was set by others. 
When he took wheat to the elevator, he received the estab­
lished price or did not sell his grain. When he bought a 
plow, he paid the asking price or returned home without 
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the machine. The individual farmer was simply in no posi­
tion to influence the price of commodities he sold or pur­
chased. This was one of the main reasons that agriculture 
suffered from inequality or disparity of income. Farmers 
were penalized for being old-style competitive operators in 
an economy dominated by large corporations that admin­
istered their prices.16 
Moreover, the supply and demand situation in agriculture 
was unlike that of many other industries. The demand for 
several basic farm commodities was inelastic; lower prices 
did not bring a proportionate increase in consumer pur­
chases. In the case of bread and potatoes, for example, 
people will pay higher prices if the supply is scarce, but 
they will not buy much more even at considerably lower 
prices. In other words, if the price of potatoes drops from 
$1.00 to 50 cents a bushel, consumers will not buy twice as 
many bushels. Moreover, gradual dietary changes reduced 
the demand for certain basic products like wheat and 
potatoes in the 1920's. The annual per capita consumption 
of potatoes averaged about four pounds less during the 
1920's than in 1919. This was a drop of some eight million 
bushels, or between 2 and 3 per cent of total production. 
Per capita wheat consumption declined from an average 
of 217 pounds in 1909 to 180 pounds in 1925.17 The declin­
ing rate of population growth in the postwar decade also 
affected the demand for farm products. On the other hand, 
the widespread shift from horse to tractor power freed 
millions of acres of land for food production that had 
previously been needed for horse feed. 
Farmers were also confronted by rigid and fixed expenses 
that were a severe burden. The cost of interest and taxes 
alone rose from 6 to 8 per cent of total cash farm income 
16
 Carl T. Schmidt, American Farmers in the World Crisis (New 
York, 1941), pp. 45-97. Schmidt has an outstanding discussion of 
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17
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before World War I to 8 to 14 per cent in the 1920's.18 
Since farmers had no control over the price of their prod­
ucts, they could not pass these fixed costs on to consumers 
in the form of higher prices as was customarily done by 
businessmen. Altogether, farmers were in a most unfavor­
able position. 
By 1921 it was widely recognized that agriculture was 
in deep trouble, but not many people, farmers or others, 
really grasped the fundamental problems confronting the 
agricultural industry. Few saw the problem in terms of an 
excess of resources devoted to farming. Furthermore, the 
"conventional wisdom" held that it was dangerous to reduce 
the agricultural sector of the economy. This did not mean 
that farmers should not try to adjust their operations to 
market requirements. Indeed, it made sense to cut the 
output of crops in surplus and diversify production to meet 
changing demands. But farm spokesmen were suspicious 
of any program that might hurry the decline of agricul­
ture's relative position in the economy. Most Americans 
seemed to believe that farming had special character-
building virtues for both individuals and the nation as a 
whole, and that agriculture was the very basis of a pros­
perous economy. Secretary of Agriculture Wallace wrote 
that forcing people to the cities in abnormal numbers was 
not good for either the farm communities or the nation. 
Reflecting his agricultural fundamentalism, Wallace argued 
that industry, commerce, and labor could not prosper very 
long if agriculture were depressed. The "unchallenged" 
truth was, Wallace wrote, "national prosperity must rest 
on a sound and prosperous agriculture." 19 
The drastic fall in farm prices in 1920 brought frantic 
demands that the federal government do something to help 
farmers. Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston wrote 
18
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18
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that "the agitation for relief became hysterical,"20 and 
his successor Henry C. Wallace said that "visionary schemes 
of all kinds are presented." 21 Most farm spokesmen flatly 
rejected the idea that farmers could and should be expected 
to weather the severe deflation on their own resources. A 
wide variety of proposals designed to assist farmers was 
advanced, including plans to enlarge agricultural exports 
and schemes for outright government price-fixing of major 
crops. Several bills were introduced in 1920 and 1921 to 
establish fixed prices for farm commodities by government 
fiat. It is not surprising, however, that these measures 
failed. Besides being opposed by Democratic and Repub­
lican leaders, they ran counter to the growing popular 
demand in 1920 and 1921 to take the government out of 
business. Speaking in 1921 against the proposal of Senator 
George W. Norris to have the government purchase surplus 
farm products and sell them abroad on credit, Senator 
Henry Cabot Lodge remarked: "It puts the United States 
into active business. I think at this time the more we take 
the United States out of business and the less we put it 
in the better." 22 
Although the Harding administration opposed placing the 
government in the business of handling farm products or 
setting their price, it was not unsympathetic to the farmers' 
plight. Since, however, administrative and Congressional 
leaders did not understand the basic economic handicaps 
under which farmers operated in the economy, the pro­
posals for relief tended to treat the symptoms rather 
than the underlying problems. Most farm relief proposals 
advanced in 1921 and 1922 called for more generous credit, 
20 David F . Houston, Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet (2 vols.; 
New York, 1926), II, 109. 
21
 Yearbook of Agriculture, 1921, p . 15. 
22 Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 19, 1921), 
p. 4039. 
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higher tariff duties, regulation of the grain exchanges and 
packers, and improved co-operative marketing. 
Under growing insistence from agricultural leaders and 
farm constituents, Congress passed a series of so-called 
farm relief bills during the Harding administration. Much 
of the political pressure was exerted by the farm bloc. This 
was a bipartisan group first organized in the Senate in 
May, 1921, under the leadership of Senator William S. 
Kenyon of Iowa, and subsequently in the House by Iowa 
Congressman L. J. Dickinson. In May, 1921, Congress 
passed the Emergency Tariff Act, which raised duties on 
many farm commodities, including cotton. This legislation 
could not, and did not, raise prices of farm products of 
which there was an exportable surplus, but the principle 
of protecting the home market had a wide appeal to mis­
informed farmers and their leaders. The three major farm 
organizations, the Grange, Farm Bureau, and Farmers 
Union, all favored this law.23 In July and August Congress 
amended the Farm Loan Act to furnish more capital for 
the Federal Land Banks. It was hoped this would indirectly 
help farmers with their credit problems. Moreover, the 
War Finance Corporation, which had been revived late in 
1920, was permitted to expand its lending power by $1 
billion in a law passed in August, 1921. The Packers and 
Stockyards Act was passed at about the same time. The 
result of years of agitation, this law authorized the secre­
tary of agriculture to extend some supervision and control 
over packers and stockyards, who, farmers believed, had 
been exploiting producers. 
In 1922 Congress passed the Grain Futures Act to 
regulate dealing in futures, and the Capper-Volstead 
Co-operative Marketing Act, which specifically exempted 
 James R. Connor, "National Farm Organizations and the United
States Tariff Policy in the 1920's," Agricultural History, XXXII (January, 1958), 32-43. 
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80 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: THE 192O's 
farm marketing associations from the antitrust laws. The 
Intermediate Credits Act was approved early in 1923. It 
set up twelve Intermediate Credits Banks to make loans 
to banks and other financial institutions that handled farm 
credit. This law reflected the general belief among farm 
groups that credit contraction had been a major cause in 
the price declines of 1920 and 1921.24 
The agricultural question probably received more Con­
gressional attention than any other single issue during the 
Harding administration. Many farm bills were passed, 
Congressional debate was extensive and sometimes heated, 
and the whole nation became aware that there was a "farm 
problem." But farmers received more sympathy and atten­
tion than real help. None of the legislation passed between 
1921 and 1923 got to the heart of farmers' basic difficulties 
of surpluses and price disparities. Congress, as well as 
most farm leaders, advanced the old nostrums of credit, 
co-operative marketing, and regulation of dealers in agri­
cultural products. The only proposal to deal directly with 
the surplus problem was Senator George W. Norris' bill 
that would have established a government-financed export 
corporation to buy up farm surpluses and sell them abroad 
on credit. But this departed too far from the accepted eco­
nomics of Harding and the conservative Republicans, and 
went down to defeat in August, 1921. 
Although Secretary Wallace believed that legislation 
might be of some assistance to farmers, he recognized that 
these laws were only doctoring symptoms. Referring to 
credit legislation, Wallace wrote: "Better prices for the 
crops the farmers have to sell and lower prices for the 
things they have to buy are far more needed than an 
opportunity to go further in debt." -5 But Wallace had no 
pat answers for the plight of farmers. Like others, he was 
24
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25
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searching and struggling for something that would bring 
genuine relief to a sick industry. He recognized the need 
for more study of agricultural economics and wrote in 
1921 that "had we in the past given as much attention to 
the economics of agriculture as we have to stimulating 
production, it is not too much to say that at least some 
of the troubles which now beset us might have been antici­
pated and avoided." 2C In July, 1922, Wallace organized the 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics in the Department of 
Agriculture with Henry C. Taylor as chief. The Bureau 
employed a group of outstanding economists to study all 
aspects of agriculture, but during its early years the BAE 
considered itself a "fact-finding, information-giving and 
service-rendering institution" rather than an agency to 
develop policy.27 
Secretary Wallace urged farmers to adjust their produc­
tion to market conditions and believed that the United 
States Department of Agriculture had a responsibility to 
inform farmers of probable demand. The Secretary favored 
voluntary reduction of acreage among cotton growers in 
1921, and wrote to his son, Henry A., who was editing 
Wallace's Farmer back in Des Moines, that "we should cut 
down production to our own needs, or a little more." 28 
Indeed, there was considerable support for cutting wheat, 
cotton, and corn acreage in 1921 and 1922 as a means 
of bringing supply and demand into better balance. The 
Wallaces, Harry N. Owen, editor of Farm, Stock and Home 
in St. Paul, economists, a few congressmen, publishers, and 
some business leaders supported this move. The editor of 
the Washington Post wrote on May 14, 1924, that "the 
remedy is plain: let American wheat growers quit trying 
-'« Ibid., p . 16. 
27
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to compete with cheap foreign wheat and cut their produc­
tion down to home needs." 29 Farmers did not generally 
favor this kind of advice, and by 1924 total crop acreage 
was only about one million acres less than the high years 
of 1918 and 1919. Wheat acreage was down, but that of 
cotton and corn was up.30 
Meanwhile, Congress set up a Joint Commission of 
Agricultural Inquiry in 1921 to study the farm situation. 
The Commission described many of the problems plaguing 
farmers, but its recommendations were confined mainly 
to orderly marketing. Secretary Wallace then called a 
National Agricultural Conference that met in January, 
1922. Although numerous proposals for helping farmers 
were discussed, the Conference's principal contribution was 
to publicize ideas, clarify the problems, and emphasize the 
difficulties in solving the farm dilemma.31 Although by 
1922 and 1923 farm problems had been thoroughly explored 
and some agricultural legislation had been passed, the basic 
question of the disparity between farm and non-farm prices 
still remained. The continued seriousness of this problem 
finally brought a new approach to solving agriculture's 
difficulties. 
It was George N. Peek and Hugh S. Johnson, officials of 
the Moline Plow Company, who proposed a practical plan 
to achieve equality for agriculture. During 1920 and 1921, 
as farm leaders and government officials sought an answer 
to farm ills, Peek and Johnson watched their sales of 
agricultural implements decline. Viewing this situation, 
Peek exclaimed that "you can't sell a plow to a busted 
29
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customer," and set out to analyze the problem and come 
up with a solution. Like others who had studied the matter, 
Peek and Johnson saw that surplus production depressed 
the price of staple crops to the world level and that a 
tariff had no effect in raising the price of commodities 
of which there was an exportable surplus. As it was, 
farmers bought in a protected market where industry 
benefited from tariffs while they sold their products at 
world prices. This situation, they believed, was largely 
responsible for the disparity in prices between farm and 
industrial commodities. Peek and Johnson, and those who 
came to support their plan, did not attack the tariff system. 
They were economic nationalists who believed that tariffs 
were largely responsible for America's higher standards 
of living. "America could make no greater blunder at this 
crisis than to abandon protection," Peek wrote; but he 
and Johnson argued that agriculture must be brought 
under the umbrella of the tariff system so that "it will 
do for agriculture what it does for industry." To achieve 
this goal, it was necessary to remove or segregate the 
surplus portion of a crop that depressed the prices to 
about the world level. Once the price-depressing surpluses 
were eliminated from the home market, farm prices would 
then rise behind a tariff wall. There were two ways of 
dealing with the surplus problem: cut production to only 
what the domestic market would absorb, or dump the 
excess abroad. Peek favored the latter approach, and 
advocated segregating the surpluses and selling them in for­
eign markets at world prices and then maintaining tariff-
protected domestic prices at home. 
Effective tariff protection for farmers, Peek declared, 
would give their products a "fair exchange value" with 
non-farm goods and place agriculture on an economic 
equality with industry. Peek's objective was to raise the 
price of farm commodities to the point where they would 
have the same purchasing power as they had in the favor­
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able period from 1909 to 1914. Here was the idea of parity 
prices for farmers. This concept went back at least to the 
1890's, but Peek and Johnson were the first to advocate 
incorporating the principle in national farm legislation.32 
They suggested that Congress set up a government corpo­
ration that would buy agricultural surpluses and sell them 
abroad for whatever they would bring. Any losses on this 
operation were to be paid by the farmers through an 
equalization fee or tax on each unit of a commodity sold.33 
In other words, though a government corporation would 
administer the program, it would be self-supporting. 
Peek's approach to the farm problem was important in 
at least three major respects. It broke new ground in 
policy matters by stating, first, that parity prices were a 
practical legislative goal and, second, that the means to 
achieve this objective was through an agency of the federal 
government. Moreover, it broke the restrictive bonds on 
farm thinking that held that government aid should be 
confined to education, credit, co-operative marketing, or 
regulation of business. 
During 1922 and 1923 Peek actively promoted his plan 
of "equality for agriculture" among farm leaders, econ­
omists, businessmen, and government officials. He presented 
it before a committee of the National Agricultural Con­
ference in January, 1922, and this group resolved that 
Congress and the President "should take such steps as will 
immediately re-establish a fair exchange value for all farm 
products with that of other commodities." However, no 
action followed this committee resolution. Peek was espe­
cially anxious to get Secretary Wallace's support. Though 
32
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Wallace was friendly to the idea, he did not commit himself. 
Some economists in the Department were openly critical 
of the ratio-price scheme, although Henry C. Taylor, chief 
of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, was sympathetic. 
Despite the lack of encouragement, Peek did not give up. 
He wrote letters, talked with farm leaders, especially in 
the Farm Bureau, and continued to seek support in the 
United States Department of Agriculture. During 1922 he 
sent out hundreds of copies of a pamphlet, Equality for 
Agriculture, that outlined his views. His main problem was 
to reach the Congressional and administrative power struc­
ture. This was not easy, but the continued farm depression, 
especially in the wheat belt, helped Peek win political sup­
port for his plan. Farmers in the northwest were constantly 
bombarding their congressmen, the President, the Secretary 
of Agriculture, and farm organization leaders with demands 
for price-lifting legislation. As Peek's proposals became 
known, policy-makers began to hear from the grass roots. 
Moreover, neither the farm organizations nor the adminis­
tration was offering anything that might meet the farm 
demand for higher prices. Late in 1923 Senator Thomas J. 
Walsh of Montana wrote that "the farmers of my state 
are giving their endorsement to the so called Johnson-
Peek plan for an agricultural export corporation." Another 
Montanan wrote that it was "spreading like wildfire" 
among farmers and small businessmen. Thus the Peek 
plan was conspicuous in its appeal for support. Of 
course, there were frequent demands for outright govern­
ment price-fixing of farm products, but no one really 
believed that Congress would enact legislation to implement 
this idea.34 
By late 1923 the Peek proposal had gained a surprising 
amount of backing at the grass roots and was beginning 
34
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to win important support in Washington. In the Depart­
ment of Agriculture, economists and Secretary Wallace 
were wrestling with the problem of just how far the fed­
eral government should go in trying to help farmers. On 
September 22, 1923, Taylor sent Wallace a memorandum 
in which he discussed various approaches to the farm prob­
lem, and concluded: "The question is, shall we adhere to 
the policy of providing information on a basis of individual 
and collective action and await the very gradual recovery 
of agriculture through growth and readjustments of popu­
lation; or, shall we undertake to bring about a more 
immediate solution of the problem by direct governmental 
action which will re-establish pre-war price relations at an 
early date." 35 Taylor did not answer his own question, but 
in November Secretary Wallace gave his guarded endorse­
ment to the Peek principles. In a report to the President 
on the wheat situation, he wrote that the "most careful 
consideration" should be given to setting up an agricultural 
export corporation to handle surplus crops. It would be 
the duty of the corporation, he said, "to restore, so far as 
possible, the pre-war ratio between wheat, and other farm 
products of which we export a surplus." 36 
With strong support in the wheat belt, from northwestern 
congressmen and senators, and from some agricultural lead­
ers, and now approval by Secretary Wallace, the next step 
was to draw up a measure for Congressional consideration. 
By November, 1923, Charles J. Brand, a consulting special­
ist in the Department of Agriculture, was busy writing a 
bill. After some modifications it was introduced in January, 
1924, by Senator Charles L. McNary of Oregon and Repre­
sentative Gilbert N. Haugen of Iowa. The McNary-Haugen 
35
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bill called for establishing an agricultural export corpora­
tion capitalized at $200 million with power to buy enough 
surplus agricultural commodities to bring the domestic 
price up to the "ratio price." The ratio price was that 
figure which gave a commodity the same purchasing power 
that it had in the period from 1905 to 1914, a time when 
the exchange value of farm products was considered favor­
able. By taking the all-commodity index and comparing it 
to the price of wheat in 1923, for instance, wheat should 
have been bringing $1.53 a bushel to have the same buying 
power or exchange value that it had in the prewar years. 
Actually, wheat was selling for only 92 cents a bushel. 
It is easiest to illustrate how it was thought the plan 
would work by considering wheat. Under the McNary-
Haugen bill, the export corporation would buy enough 
wheat to maintain the ratio price in the domestic market 
and then it would sell the surplus abroad at world prices. 
The loss on foreign sales was to be recouped by placing a 
small tax on the farmer for each bushel he sold. For 
example, if the United States produced 800 million bushels 
of wheat and consumed 600 million bushels domestically, 
there would be 200 million bushels to sell abroad. The 
difference between the ratio price and the world price in 
1923 was about 61 cents a bushel, which would mean a 
loss to the export corporation of $122 million dollars on 
the 200 million bushels disposed of in foreign markets. 
In order to pay this, a tax or equalization fee on each of 
the 800 million bushels sold would have to be about fifteen 
cents. But since the farmer received the full ratio price 
of $1.53 for his wheat, he would still have $1.38 a bushel 
instead of 92 cents, even after paying the 15-cent tax. 
Thus the heart of the plan was to get near-parity prices 
for basic farm crops by segregating and disposing abroad 
of the price-depressing surpluses. To protect higher domes­
tic prices, a flexible tariff provision was added to keep out 
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imports. The bill covered only eight so-called basic crops: 
wheat, flour, corn, cotton, wool, cattle, sheep, and swine. 
Cotton was later dropped. It was believed that if the major 
crops were helped, most of agriculture's problems would be 
solved. The McNary-Haugen bill was primarily a marketing 
device that, as Henry A. Wallace later explained, would 
give farmers "the centralizing power of the Federal Gov­
ernment so they could dump enough of their surplus abroad 
to raise prices in the domestic market." 37 
After about four months of hearings, debate, and discus­
sion, the first McNary-Haugen bill was killed in the House 
of Representatives by a vote of 223 to 155, and Congress 
adjourned without passing any major legislation. Opposi­
tion to the measure was intense. President Calvin Coolidge 
was among the leading opponents. He believed that farmers 
could work out their own problems or at least get some 
help by expanding their own marketing co-operatives. The 
President's position had been made clear in his first annual 
message. He said that "no complicated scheme of relief, 
no plan for government fixing of prices, no resort to the 
public treasury will be of any permanent value in estab­
lishing agriculture." 38 Lined up behind Coolidge were busi­
nessmen, especially those in the grain trade, metropolitan 
editors, most southern Democrats, professional economists, 
and many farm journals. Critics charged that the bill was 
unworkable and economically unsound. The main objection, 
however, was that it would put the government in the 
business of handling farm products; and that was consid­
ered un-American. 
37 H e n r y A. Wallace, New Frontiers (New York, 1934), p . 148. 
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Though the opposition to surplus-control and price-lifting 
legislation was organized and nation-wide, supporters were 
disorganized and represented mainly sectional interests. 
Most of the favorable votes came from the wheat states 
and the western part of the corn belt. Southerners were 
not interested in the proposal because at that time cotton 
was selling considerably above the ratio price. Miscellaneous 
support from Secretary Wallace, an occasional business 
leader like Bernard Baruch (Peek's old boss on the War 
Industries Board), a scattering of individual farm leaders, 
and a few local bankers and businessmen did not represent 
enough political power to enact this type of legislation. 
It became clear in the fight over the first McNary-Haugen 
bill that the farm dilemma was political as well as economic. 
The broad diversity of agricultural interests made it ex­
tremely difficult to present anything approaching a united 
front in Congress. Wheat-growers, livestock-raisers, dairy­
men, cotton and tobacco farmers, and vegetable-raisers had 
relatively little in common. Also, there were conflicts of 
interest within particular crop and livestock regions. Cattle-
feeders, for instance, did not want higher grain prices. The 
same kind of farm program was not suitable for all farmers. 
Furthermore, agricultural power in Congress was slowly 
but surely weakening in the face of a rapidly rising urban 
population. For the first time the census of 1920 revealed 
that more Americans lived in cities than on farms or in 
small towns. Although no reapportionment was made on 
the basis of the 1920 census, in 1930 Minnesota, Iowa, 
Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas lost representation. 
Thus the problem before Peek and supporters of the 
McNary-Haugen bill was twofold. They had to develop 
a program that would attract as many farmers and farm 
leaders as possible, and then organize rural political power 
to push the legislation through Congress. It was obvious 
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in the summer of 1924 that if the McNary-Haugenites 
were to obtain any major farm relief they must have organi­
zation, leadership, and money. During the next two years 
Peek and his associates developed the most powerful 
agricultural lobby in the nation's history. 
On July 11, 1924, about one hundred and fifty farm 
leaders met in St. Paul to consider the next move in the 
fight for farm relief. Among those present were Peek; 
Henry A. Wallace; Frank W. Murphy, a Minnesota farmer 
and lawyer; Charles E. Hearst of the Iowa Farm Bureau; 
William Hirth, leader of the Missouri Farmers Association; 
C. H. Hyde, vice-president of the Farmers Union; and 
George C. Jewett, head of American Wheat Growers Asso­
ciated. The American Council of Agriculture was organized 
out of this meeting to "secure the enactment of legis­
lation embodying the principles of the McNary-Haugen bill 
and thus secure for American agriculture equality with 
industry and labor." 39 The American Council of Agricul­
ture was a non-partisan group designed to provide central 
direction and united leadership in the battle for McNary-
Haugenism. Peek was elected president. He moved to Wash­
ington in January, 1925, and set out to marshal the farm 
relief forces into an effective pressure group. At this 
juncture southern farm leaders were conspicuous by their 
absence. 
Meanwhile, farm relief advocates had to face the dis­
couraging reality of Coolidge's re-election. To make matters 
even worse, Secretary Wallace, a loyal friend of surplus-
control legislation, died on October 25, 1924, and was re­
placed a few months later by William M. Jardine, president 
of Kansas State College. Like Coolidge, Jardine believed 
that farmers could best solve their problems through 
39
 "Report and Record, Agricultural Conference, July 11 and 12, 
1924." Mimeographed copy, Peek Papers, Western Historical Manu­
scripts Collection, University of Missouri. 
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co-operative marketing and voluntary adjustments in pro­
duction. Furthermore, increased prices in 1924 took some 
of the urgency out of demands for price-raising legislation. 
Wheat rose nearly 40 cents a bushel, and, although cotton 
prices were lower, a larger crop gave farmers about the 
same returns that they had received in 1923 when cotton 
reached 31 cents a pound. In 1925 total farm income went 
up about 7 per cent, and the parity index figure for all farm 
crops, according to the Secretary, increased to 87 by the 
end of the year.40 
In an effort to improve farm marketing and to divert 
attention from surplus-control legislation, Coolidge gave 
his active support to co-operative marketing in 1925. In 
January a National Agricultural Conference called by the 
President recommended co-operative marketing as the best 
relief for farmers, along with more credit, lower freight 
rates, and higher tariffs on some agricultural products.41 
When Coolidge addressed the annual meeting of the Ameri­
can Farm Bureau Federation the following December, he 
again emphasized his devotion to co-operative marketing 
and closed by saying that the "future of agriculture looks 
to be exceedingly secure." Agriculture was indeed secure, 
quipped humorist Will Rogers, "by at least two mort­
gages." 42 To the McNary-Haugen supporters, co-operative 
marketing was nothing but a sop thrown to farmers to quiet 
their demands for effective price-lifting legislation. 
By 1925 the farm issue was joined. Coolidge, with the 
strong support of Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, 
Jardine, and conservatives in Congress, believed that the 
role of government should not be extended beyond advising 
farmers on marketing and production, and perhaps liberal­
izing farm credit and tinkering with tariffs. The adminis­
40
 Yearbook of Agriculture, 1924, pp . 2 - 3 , 1 7 - 1 8 ; ibid., 1925, p . 2. 
41
 68th Cong., 2d Sess., Sen. Doc. 190 ( J a n . 28, 1925) . 
42
 Wash ing ton Post, Dec. 20, 1925. 
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tration flatly rejected both the need for, and wisdom of, 
federal handling of farm commodities. 
On the other hand, the McNary-Haugenites insisted that 
agriculture was still suffering from basic disadvantages 
that only surplus-control legislation could solve. They espe­
cially objected to the suggestions that farmers should cut 
production. When Hoover told the President's Agricultural 
Conference that "the fundamental need is balancing of 
agricultural production to our home demand," critics inter­
preted this to mean that farmers must give up their foreign 
markets while industrialists pushed their own overseas 
exports. "Non-export for the farmer and aggressive export 
for the manufacturer," Mark Sullivan wrote, would defi­
nitely subordinate farming to other industries.43 Peek and 
his backers saw this as a sinister move by the industrial 
interests to benefit themselves without any regard to the 
position of farmers. They tried to play on the deep agrarian 
sympathies of Americans: "Shall we industrialize America 
at the expense of agriculture ?" The implication was 
clear. Unless something like the McNary-Haugen bill was 
passed, American farmers would drift into peasantry.44 
In May, 1925, the farm lobby was strengthened by 
formation of the Grain Belt Federation of Farm Organi­
zations. This organization became popularly known as the 
Corn Belt Committee and was headed by William Hirth. 
At the same time Peek was busy widening the support for 
surplus-control legislation among businessmen and farm 
organizations. In December, 1925, Sam H. Thompson, a 
supporter of the McNary-Haugen bill, was elected presi­
dent of the American Farm Bureau Federation. This was 
a sign of growing insistence by farmers for price-raising 
measures. Peek won the backing of Frank O. Lowden, 
« Mark Sullivan, "The Waning Influence of the Farmer," World's 
Work, LI (April, 1926), 657-61. 
 For a discussion of this entire question see Fite, George N. 
Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity, chap. viii. 
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former governor of Illinois and popular in farm circles. 
The most important support, however, originated with the 
Iowa Bankers Association. The Hawkeye bankers took the 
lead in calling an "all agricultural area" marketing con­
ference in Des Moines in January, 1926, attended by repre­
sentatives from eleven states. The conference endorsed the 
idea of creating a farm export corporation and authorized 
Governor John Hammill of Iowa to appoint two men from 
each state to carry on the farm relief fight. A subcommittee 
of this executive committee of twenty-two worked closely 
with Peek, who set up offices in Washington and Chicago 
to promote farm relief legislation. 
By 1926 Peek and a few close associates were co­
ordinating the activities of the American Council of 
Agriculture, the Corn Belt Committee, and the executive 
committee of twenty-two. Never before had farmers enjoyed 
such strong representation in Washington. Farm lobbying 
had at last come into its own. Although the Farmers Union 
and the Farm Bureau had their own offices in Washington, 
they worked closely with the special pressure groups 
directed by Peek. Only the Grange remained aloof from 
the central farm relief efforts. The Grange supported the 
export-debenture plan, a scheme to raise prices on export­
able surpluses by paying an export bounty. In February, 
1926, Chester C. Davis was brought into the farm relief 
campaign as a paid worker after serving as commissioner 
of agriculture in Montana. In order to finance the farm 
lobby, Peek and his associates tapped the agricultural 
organizations, wealthy friends, and contributed much out of 
their own pockets. For example, Bernard Baruch initially 
gave $5,000, and later, Mark Woods of Nebraska contrib­
uted a similar amount. Several of the farm organizations 
gave fairly substantial sums, but often money was short 
and Peek had to pay office expenses himself.45 Nonethe­
4 5
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less, constant pressure was applied on Congress to pass a 
McNary-Haugen bill. 
Throughout 1925 and 1926 the McNary-Haugenites not 
only increased their political power but significantly modi­
fied their legislation. By giving co-operatives a larger role 
in price-support operations, they hoped to win support 
from some of the large co-operatives and to reduce opposi­
tion from the Coolidge administration. The McNary-Haugen 
bill of 1926 provided for a federal farm board with power 
to help remove surpluses of basic crops—cotton, corn, 
wheat, butter, cattle, or swine—if favored by the co­
operatives. The board could arrange with co-operatives, 
processors, or others who handled farm products to sell 
the surpluses abroad or hold them in storage for higher 
prices. A revolving fund of $375 million was to be pro­
vided by Congress to handle surplus operations, but the 
ultimate cost of dumping crops abroad was to be met by 
the farmers themselves through the equalization fee. Peek's 
original ratio-price plan was abandoned, and prices were 
to be raised to the world price plus the tariff. 
Under this bill, the co-operatives would play a much 
larger role. The federal farm board was not to engage in 
price-lifting activities unless they were first approved by the 
co-operatives, and it was anticipated that the co-operatives 
would also have an important part in the actual handling 
and disposing of surpluses. Yet the essential principles for 
which farm groups had been fighting were maintained. 
Though it appeared that the McNary-Haugenites had made 
some significant compromises with those who had opposed 
their first bill, a measure incorporating these revisions was 
defeated in May, 1926, by a House vote of 212 to 167.46 
*6 Murray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790­
1950 (New York, 1953), p. 225. See Chapter X in Benedict for his 
account of the campaign to achieve surplus-control legislation. 
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So far, the strength behind McNary-Haugenism had 
rested in the corn and wheat states. The need was for a 
western-southern coalition in Congress—a marriage of corn, 
wheat, and cotton. Some southerners began to warm up to 
the McNary-Haugen plan in 1925 when cotton prices fell 
nearly 10 cents a pound, but most southern farm leaders 
were still primarily interested in co-operative marketing. 
Peek was a political realist. In seeking southern support 
early in 1926, he told the directors of the American Cotton 
Growers Exchange "to write their own ticket." Peek said 
he was willing to modify the McNary-Haugen bill to meet 
southern wishes in return for "their cooperation in helping 
us get what we want." 47 
The cotton people did not want a two-price, export-
dumping plan like that favored by the wheat men. They 
simply favored some central agency that could keep periodic 
surpluses from depressing prices. They generally favored 
using the co-operatives to bring about more orderly market­
ing, assisted perhaps by some kind of federal farm board. 
Although the McNary-Haugenites gained some southern 
support during 1926, it was the dramatic drop in cotton 
prices to as low as 10 cents a pound in the fall of 1926 
that brought the South into a full-fledged partnership in 
the fight for farm relief. Moreover, the McNary-Haugen 
bill introduced in January, 1927, was a compromise measure 
that included southern demands. This bill provided for 
setting up a federal farm board that would work through 
the co-operatives to dispose of surpluses of basic crops, 
including cotton, tobacco, wheat, rice, corn, and hogs. To 
finance orderly marketing through the holding of crops, or 
 Peek to Frank O. Lowden, Mar. 24, 1926, Chester C. Davis 
Papers, Western Historical Manuscripts Collection, University of 
Missouri; Fite, George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity,
chap. x. 
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to pay losses on export-dumping, a fee or tax was to be 
levied on each unit of the commodity sold. This was to be 
collected, however, as the board decided in the "transpor­
tation, processing, or sale" of a product. Until these fees 
could be collected, Congress would provide $250 million. 
Perhaps the most important change in this bill was the 
elimination of any special price objective other than to 
prevent surpluses from "unduly depressing" agricultural 
prices. 
Amidst charges of "vicious lobbying," the grain and 
cotton forces finally won a signal victory by passing the 
McNary-Haugen bill in February, 1927. But the flush of 
success soon turned to gloom when President Coolidge 
killed the measure with a lengthy veto. Relying on advice 
from Hoover and Jardine, as well as his own deeply held 
beliefs, Coolidge said that the bill was unsound, uncon­
stitutional, and violated "the philosophy of our govern­
ment" and "the spirit of our institutions." Coolidge also 
objected to the equalization fee as a "vicious form of 
taxation," and argued that increased prices would encour­
age production and intensify the surplus problem. Economic 
arguments were subordinated in his message to a defense 
of laissez faire.48 
Although not greatly surprised, leaders in the farm fight 
were bitterly disappointed. During 1927 they regrouped 
their forces, modified the bill in hopes of meeting some of 
Coolidge's objections, and repassed the measure in May, 
1928. In his second veto message the President still insisted 
that the bill was unconstitutional and "was repugnant as 
ever to the spirit of our institutions, both political and 
commercial." The campaign was over; the war was lost. 
And no one recognized this better than the McNary-
Haugenites. The conservative little Yankee from Vermont 
 Fite, George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity, p. 179. 48
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had been able to thwart legislation that probably had more 
western and southern farm support than free silver or any 
other issue ever considered by Congress up to that time. 
Blocked by White House action, farm leaders now sought 
to get a friend of agriculture nominated by the Republicans 
at the convention in June, 1928. When Hoover obtained 
the nomination, Peek, Chester Davis, and others looked 
to the Democrats. Democratic standard-bearer Alfred E. 
Smith could not, however, attract much farm support out­
side of the traditional Democratic South. He knew prac­
tically nothing about agriculture, and, besides, he alienated 
many midwestern and southern farmers because he was a 
Catholic and favored the repeal of Prohibition. Hoover, 
consequently, not only carried the traditional Republican 
Midwest but won several southern states as well.49 
Hoover's election created a feeling of resignation among 
the old McNary-Haugen crowd. He had probably been the 
strongest and most effective opponent of surplus-control 
legislation during the Harding and Coolidge administra­
tions. Like Coolidge, Jardine, and other conservatives, 
Hoover believed that the best way to help farmers was 
to strengthen the co-operative marketing organizations. He 
agreed that the federal government could properly assist 
in achieving this objective through advice and loans to the 
commodity associations."" 
With McNary-Haugenism hopelessly defeated, Hoover 
was free to proceed with his brand of relief. During the 
presidential campaign he had promised that, if elected, he 
 Gilbert C. Fite, "The Agricultural Issue in the Presidential 
Campaign of 1928," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, X X X V I I 
(March, 1951). 
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would call a special session of Congress to deal with farm 
problems. In June, 1929, Congress passed the Agricultural 
Marketing Act. The new law called for placing "agriculture 
on a basis of equality with other industries," an objective 
that the McNary-Haugen campaign had popularized. This 
was the voice of Jacob, but the hand of Esau! Agricultural 
equality was to be achieved through orderly marketing and 
strengthening the farm co-operatives. Congress appropri­
ated $500 million that could be loaned to co-operatives 
to construct facilities, to merchandise commodities, to hold 
products off the market, and for other purposes. In case 
of unusually large and price-depressing surpluses, the law 
permitted formulation of stabilization corporations that 
could purchase excess crops in order to maintain satis­
factory prices. If the stabilization corporations suffered 
operating losses, these were to be paid out of the $500 
million appropriation. A Federal Farm Board was provided 
to administer the new farm relief law.51 
Passage of the Agricultural Marketing Act climaxed 
Peek's efforts of nearly five years. Up to 1924 Peek and his 
supporters had pushed the rather radical idea that a cor­
poration of the federal government should guarantee ratio, 
or near parity, prices for basic farm commodities used 
in domestic consumption by purchasing price-destroying 
surpluses and dumping them abroad. Beginning in 1925, 
however, emphasis shifted to orderly marketing through 
farm co-operatives. The changed approach aimed to reduce 
Coolidge's opposition and at the same time gain political 
support from the large commodity groups. By 1928 the 
 Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, chap, xi; Saloutos 
and Hicks, Agricultural Discontent in the Middle West, chap xiv. The 
Agricultural Marketing Act soon failed, partly because it was not 
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provision to control large and continuing surpluses. By 1931 the 
Federal Farm Board had lost some $345 million in a hopeless attempt
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the rest of the Hoover administration. 
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positions of the McNary-Haugenites and the co-operatives 
had been compromised to the point where only two principal 
differences separated the Agricultural Marketing Act and 
the last McNary-Haugen bill. First, the Hoover measure 
provided government funds for supporting prices rather 
than taxing each unit of a commodity through an equaliza­
tion fee. Second, there was no provision for export-dumping 
in the Hoover plan. Farm relief leaders had moved toward 
a policy aimed primarily at improved marketing facilities 
by enlarging and strengthening the farmers' own co­
operatives. What started out in 1922 and 1923 as a sharp 
break from the past in agricultural policy ended up in the 
same conservative groove that characterized most of the 
American economy in the 1920's. 
The main reason that the farm movement of the 1920's 
continued in a conservative vein was because its leading 
spokesmen were fundamentally conservative. The views of 
George Peek and Calvin Coolidge on political economy were 
closer than either would admit. They both believed that 
government had a role to play in economic development 
and prosperity. The main difference was not that Peek 
favored government help for farmers and Coolidge did not; 
it was that Peek wanted to assist farmers and Coolidge 
favored extending government help to industry. Peek in 
1924 quietly voted for John W. Davis, who was as conserva­
tive as Coolidge. There is no indication that Peek even 
thought of voting for La Follette. Another sign of con­
servatism in the farm movement is that much of the 
argument in favor of doing something for agriculture was 
based on the belief that prosperous, land-owning farmers 
were the main bulwark against radicalism and socialism. 
In other words, a little government help to raise agricul­
tural prices and to provide a better life on the farm was a 
means of preserving traditional American institutions.52 
52
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Despite its basically conservative nature, the drive for 
farm relief during the 1920's was highly important. The 
McNary-Haugen campaign pointed up as never before the 
unfavorable position of agriculture in the nation's economy. 
It emphasized, too, that greater efficiency was not the sole 
answer, especially when more production simply resulted in 
additional surpluses. Farmers were also educated, although 
not with complete success, to the importance of co-operation 
and organization as a means of improving their economic 
position. It became clear that somehow farmers, at least 
those who produced a particular crop, must get together 
so they could act in unison. Otherwise, they could exert 
no influence over the prices of their products. There were 
differences of opinion as to whether farmers could achieve 
this goal through their own co-operatives or by using the 
centralizing power of government, but unity was essential 
if farmers were to have any influence over the price of 
their commodities. 
Furthermore, the question of surpluses held the center of 
attention and stimulated consideration of production con­
trol by restricting acreage. Most of the McNary-Haugenites 
did not favor any plans that would force or strongly 
encourage acreage reduction. Yet a discussion of surpluses 
could not help but raise the question of reduced acreage as 
one means to deal with overproduction. Almost unwit­
tingly, the McNary-Haugenites helped to publicize the idea 
of getting higher agricultural prices by cutting acreage. 
Perhaps the most significant thing about the farm relief 
campaign in the 1920's was the emphasis upon the parity-
price concept. This became a symbol in the farm mind, and 
parity prices actually became the goal of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933. Moreover, the idea became widely 
accepted that the federal government had a responsibility 
to help farmers achieve this price goal. Thus farm policy-
makers did not achieve significant concrete results in the 
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1920's, but they did prepare the way for an extensive 
agricultural program after the election of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. Their main objective, parity prices, and the 
means to achieve this goal, the federal government, were 
incorporated in New Deal legislation. 
Thus it was in the field of ideas, not in the solutions 
offered, that the McNary-Haugenites were most important. 
The McNary-Haugen bills probably would not have achieved 
what the farm groups hoped for. If that type of surplus-
control legislation would have worked at all, it would have 
been only on a temporary basis. The McNary-Haugen bills 
contained at least two serious weaknesses. Foreign reaction 
to American dumpings would surely have resulted in other 
nations putting up barriers against American farm produce. 
Second, higher prices would undoubtedly have stimulated 
production and added to the already burdensome surpluses. 
Farm spokesmen in the 1920's did not seem to realize 
that the continuing mechanical, chemical, and biological 
revolution in agriculture would create much larger sur­
pluses in the future. This meant that adjustment and 
control measures would have to be much more drastic 
than they contemplated. 
Meanwhile, farmers struggled to improve conditions 
through their own efforts. They increased their efficiency, 
enlarged their operations, and jealously guarded expendi­
tures. Thousands quit farming altogether. Between 1920 
and 1930 the number of farms declined by 159,695, and 
the average size rose from 148 to 157 acres. Prices for 
some farm commodities had become quite favorable by 
1928, but the crushing burden of debt left over from the 
World War I period, heavy local taxes, and high costs of 
production caused trouble for even the larger and more 
efficient operators. By 1930 some 42.4 per cent of the 
farmers were tenants, compared with 37 per cent in 1919. 
A great deal about the economic and political situation of 
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farmers can be seen in the following letter of a cotton-
grower who lived near Mangum, Oklahoma. Writing to 
President Hoover in the fall of 1930, he said that he had 
mortgaged his cotton crop, six mules, and three cows in 
order to borrow $600 to meet expenses. He wrote: 
Cotton is selling now at six cents per pound and I can't pay out 
to save my life at the price. I voted for Coolidge expecting relief, 
he promised it. He said we would have to help ourselves, we made 
too much. You promised farm relief, but our products have gone 
lower than they have been since before the World War. I 
am past fifty years old, and have voted for every Republican 
President in my time and the last few years have made me a 
pauper. But guess I will fall in the Republican ranks. But this 
year will wind me up as to farming. ,53 
At the end of the 1920's, agriculture still faced an 
economic and political dilemma. Farmers simply did not 
have the unity of interests, the organization, or political 
power to achieve their economic objectives. Moreover, they 
were handicapped in the struggle for a fair share of the 
national income by the individualistic nature of their indus­
try. It was not until the entire nation sank into depression, 
and practically all parts of the economy turned to the 
federal government for help, that farmers got the assistance 
they believed was rightfully theirs. George N. Peek was a 
John the Baptist crying in the wilderness throughout the 
1920's; Franklin D. Roosevelt was the Messiah. 
53 Garfield Todd to Herbert Hoover, Oct. 10, 1930, Secretary's File, 





I. THE QUESTION 
UNIONS symbolize many things. They are protective orga­
nizations designed to stabilize employment and working 
conditions. They are business organizations designed to 
improve the economic, social, and possibly the political 
fortunes of their members, their leaders, and various groups 
in general society. They are reform organizations working 
with an eye to specific or even general social problems. 
They are even simple cluster organizations that serve per­
sonal and social purposes such as education, insurance, and 
lobbying. And not infrequently, they are social-movement 
organizations grasping for an ethos; and if they are able 
to define it, they give such expression to that ethos as is 
meaningful to their function, their members' aspirations, 
and to the time. 
It is common to note the decline of American unionism 
in the 1920's. At the beginning they were (relatively) 
large; at the end they were small. At the beginning they 
expressed confidence (if not exactly assurance) ; at the 
end, they were cautious. At the beginning they had many 
plans and dreams; at the end they concentrated simply on 
survival. Perhaps the topical word is frustration. By the 
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end of the 1920's they seemed barely able to hang on to 
their members, let alone raise the banner and march 
into battle. 
But stress and adversity do have a very few advantageous 
products. As one catastrophe piles on another, the natural 
or rational thing for a unionist to do is to seek what he 
needs through some means other than unionism. By the 
same token, those who must deal with labor will develop 
other ways to organize and control their employees. If, 
at the end, there is something that adversity has not com­
pletely destroyed, the very hardiness of that something 
demands respect and investigation. Thus, this essay has, 
as one of its purposes, the indirect goal of identifying the 
hardy element of American unionism that survived the 
period of trial. 
"The use of history," Emerson claimed, "is to give value 
to the present hour and its duty." Dean Inge put the point 
even more directly when he commented that "our chief 
interest in the past is as a guide to the future." For these 
reasons particularly, the opportunity to look at "labor in 
the eclipse" (by which was certainly meant "unionism in 
the eclipse" in the 1920's) is a chance to see the significance 
of the changes in the light afforded by today's events. 
This essay is organized about several points. First, we 
look at the decline of unionism from 1920 to 1930 in quanti­
tative terms. Second, we ask what caused the decline, not 
so much because we are interested in identifying the crucial 
individuals or the critical moments, but because we want 
to know what factors were operative. Third, we ask what 
unionism had come to mean to its members by the end of 
the period, or, was there an emergent ideology that seemed 
to stand out more and more as the other faces of unionism 
shriveled and were cast aside. 
Finally, we consider the eclipse experience in the face of 
our own knowledge of what came later and what seem 
now to be the problems. What did the experience reveal 
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about the American worker, the American employer, and 
their thoughts about each other? What did it tell us about 
the economics of unionism, about the role of economic 
growth, and even about its attitude toward itself? 
II. THE DECLINE 
MEASUREMENT OF THE DECLINE 
The vintage year of trade union membership was 1920, 
when there were 5,047,800 members. This number was 
almost twice as large as the membership figure of 1913 
(2,716,300), and the ratio was even better than the 1915 
figure (2,582,600). Membership had swelled because of war­
time prosperity and because the federal government had 
encouraged unionism in war industries. It had grown 
because the 1916 Adamson Act, giving the railway unions 
legislatively directed concessions, suggested to many work­
ers that unions could accomplish meaningful achievements. 
The prosperity had continued throughout 1919, and the 
glow of success continued to suffuse the unions. Yet there 
were sophisticated observers who saw blight setting in. 
And they were right. They suggested that the easy wartime 
wage gains, the rapid upgrading of personnel, the generous 
resolution of grievance disputes, all characteristic of the 
war and postwar periods, were not likely to continue. They 
also believed that the antiunion crusades of many individual 
employers and such employer organizations as the National 
Metal Trades Association were likely to be resumed with a 
vigor that would astound the forgetful union rank-and-file. 
Even when the informed observers mentioned that union­
ism's gains had been geographically concentrated in the 
larger cities, at railroad division centers and in the North­
east and Midwest, that the citadels of antiunionism had 
not been cracked, the analysis fell on deaf ears. 
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Professor Leo Wolman has done much of the authorita­
tive work regarding the size of union membership. His 
figures show that by the end of the period (1930) member­
ship had fallen to 3.4 million; by 1933 it was to fall to 
3.0 million. Table 1 gives Wolman's figures. Examination 
of it suggests that the great lossses were between 1920 
TABLE 1 
REPORTED UNION MEMBERSHIP 
IAM 
ABSOLUTE ANNUAL CHANGE 
YEAR TOTAL % Deviation 
WOLMAN* of Wolman's
Wolman t PerlmanJ Figures from (000) (000) Wolman Perlman Perlman's 
1913 2,716.0 71.0 74.0 . . . . . . . . — 4.2% 
1918 3,467.0 143.6 229.5 . . .  . . . .  . —37.8 
1919 4,125.2 254.6 331.4 77.3% 14.4% —23.2 
1920 5,047.8 330.8 282.5 29.9 —14.8 + 11.7 
1921 4,781.3 273.6 206.9 —17.3 —26.8 + 13.2 
1922 4,027.4 180.9 148.3 —33.9 —28.3 + 12.2 
1923 3,622.0 76.4 104.7 —57.8 —30.4 —27.0 
1924 3,536.1 71.7 79.6 — 6.2 —25.9 — 9.9 
1925 3,519.4 71.4 72.0 — 0.4 — 9.5 — 0.8 
1926 3,502.4 71.4 71.6 0 — 0.9 — 0.3 
1927 3,546.5 72.3 71.0 + 1.3 — 0.9 + 1.0 
1928 3,479.3 74.5 69.0 + 3.0 — 2.8 + 8.0 
1929 3,442.6 77.0 71.6 + 3.4 + 3.8 + 7.5 
1930 3,392.8 78.0 69.4 + 1.3 — 3.1 + 12.4 
1931 3,358.1 77.6 63.6 — 0.5 — 8.4 + 22.0 
1932 3,144.3 70.7 58.9 — 8.9 — 7.4 +20.0 
1933 2,973.0 75.0 61.1 + 6.1 + 3.7 +22.7 
• Wolman, Ebb and Flow in Trade Unionism, p. 16 
t Ibid, p. 177 
% Perlman, The Machinists: A New Study in American Trade Unionism, p. 206. 
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and 1924. Thereafter, there were either fairly small gains 
or relatively small losses. 
Wolman's figures are estimates made by a reasonably 
skeptical mind, and although they suffer from some almost 
obvious shortcomings, they are still the best we have avail­
able at this time. He got them from the AF of L or the 
railway unions organizations, and the figures represented 
the number that each union used as a basis for its repre­
sentation claim (and tax) in the roof organization. Here 
we run into the first difficulty. Unions paid a representation 
tax to the AF of L (if they were affiliated). The amounts 
they chose to pay were governed by several considerations, 
only one of which was their actual membership. The other 
factors included the state of the affiliate's treasury and 
whether and how much the affiliate wanted to influence 
AF of L policy. 
Another problem of measuring union size is more thorny. 
Union policies regarding definition of membership have 
always varied widely. Some hold that an individual can be 
counted for internal representation purposes by his local 
only if he is currently dues-paying (usually delinquency of 
three to six months is permitted in order to allow for the 
inexperience of local treasurers); others are quite lax about 
internal representation matters and base their estimates of 
membership really on the size of per capita payments to 
the national (international) organization that the local 
makes. The impact of these differences in union policies 
and practices makes estimates of the relative sizes of 
different unions subject to irregular distortions. 
Dr. Wolman's figures for 1920-21 represent a possible 
overstatement of true membership numbers. That is, did 
union leaders' confidence in their ability to hold onto their 
wartime gains lead them to report inflated figures either 
because they believed that the losses were temporary or 
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because they feared that employers would become more 
aggressive if convinced that unions were losing worker 
appeal ? 
A comparison of Dr. Wolman's figures for the Inter­
national Association of Machinists and the figures that 
developed from my own research in the IAM's general 
secretary-treasurer's office records is interesting in this 
connection. Wolman's figures in Table 1 for 1920 exceed 
my own by almost 50,000 members (11.7 per cent). In 
1923 his figures were 27 per cent too low. But as will also 
be gleaned from column 7 of Table 1, the relationships are 
not consistent in amount or even in direction. Annual 
changes in membership, columns 5 and 6 of Table 1, also 
illustrate how neither the quantities nor their signs (plus 
or minus) illustrate stability between Wolman's figures 
(those given to the AF of L) and my own (coming from 
the IAM's confidential files). Any survey of the I AM his­
tory of the period will suffice to explain how the pressures 
mentioned above influenced its payments to the AF of L 
(which Wolman relied upon). The decade was one of 
general retrenchment, although after 1926 (when a civil 
war within the I AM was resolved), there was a small 
regular increase through 1930. After 1930 the Great De­
pression served to cut union membership, even though the 
I AM (for one) permitted unemployed members to maintain 
their affiliation at the monthly cost of only ten cents. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NUMERICAL DECLINE ON AF OF L POLICY 
Not all sectors of American industry were identically 
affected by the loss in membership. Dr. Wolman's figures in 
Tables 2 and 3 show some interesting points. 
Among the occupations only one, mail carriers, showed 
an increase in percentages of workers organized. Most 
showed substantial declines; the declines were relatively 
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small only in a very few. It is quite clear that the mail 
carriers were not affected by the private-employer animus 
against unionism. 
TABLE 2 
PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYEES ORGANIZED 
BY SELECTED OCCUPATION* 
(HAVING OVER 100,000 EMPLOYEES) 
OCCUPATION 




Brick & Stone masons 
Carpenters and joiners 




Machinists, millwrights, and 
toolmakers 
Mail carriers 
Molders, founders, and 
casters 
Painters, decorators, and 
paperhangers 





Teamsters & chauffeurs 












































• Sources: 1920 data from Leo Wolman, Growth of American Trade Unions 1880­
1923 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1924), pp. 156-67; 1930 
data from Leo Wolman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 222-23. 
t Pertains only to telephone operators 
} Data rejected as unreliable (i.e., well over 100 per cent unionized). 
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Table 3 tells much the same story. Generally, the per­
centage of workers in unions fell. The sole exception was 
among street railwaymen. Again, their activity has to be 
explained as a special phenomenon, namely, situations 
where the employer was occasionally a public authority or 
TABLE 3 
PRINCIPAL DIVISIONS OF INDUSTRY, PERCENTAGE OF 
TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION AMONG EMPLOYEES 
DIVISION OF INDUSTRY 1910 1920 1930 
Mining, quarrying, crude petroleum and 



















Manufacturing and mechanical industries 
including construction, total 11.4 22.2 12.2 
Transportation and communication 
Transportation, total 19.5 39.6 22.1 
Motor and wagon transportation.... 4.5 11.7 6.2 
Steam railroads 27.6 53.2 38.6 
Street railways 23.6 50.0 57.6 
Water transportation 33.2 80.9 30.4 
Communication, total 9.0 19.9 7.7 
Service industries, total 2.0 4.9 3.2 
Clerical service 1.7 8.6 5.4 
Commercial service 0.8 1.0 0.3 
Professional service 3.1 4.6 3.6 
Domestic and personal service, 
3.0 recreation and amusement 2.2 4.2 
Source: Lee Wolman, Ebb and Flow, p. 118. 
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a private corporation fearful of violence and the possibility 
of franchise cancellation. 
Usually, the skilled were the bulk of union membership, 
but it is clear also that the bulk of skilled workers was 
generally (but not always) non-unionized. 
Nor were all American unions affected in the same way 
by the general downswing. If we rely on Wolman's figures 
(and in the absence of any others, we must), the pattern 
TABLE 4 
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE IN ORGANIZED LABOR

OF PRINCIPAL GROUPS OF UNIONS BY

REPORTED SIZE OF MEMBERSHIP

1910 1920 1929 1933 
Mining, quarrying, and oil 12.8% 8.7% 7.9% 11.9% 
Building and construction 21.4 17.6 26.7 19.6 
Transportation and communication.. 22.5 24.9 25.9 20.5 
Clothing 4.6 7.4 6.3 11.3 
Paper, printing, and bookbinding.. . . 4.2 3.2 4.7 5.1 
Metals, machinery, and shipbuilding.. 9.2 17.0 6.1 6.1 
Textiles 1.0 3.0 1.0 0.5 
Food, liquor, and tobacco 5.7 3.6 1.9 1.9 
Public Service 2.7 3.2 7.2 10.0 
Total percentage identified 84.1 88.6 87.7 86.9 
Source: Wolman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 87, 88, and 91. 
is quite interesting and can be concluded from Table 4, 
which purports to show the strength of the various voices 
in the ranks of organized labor. What stands out is the 
relative growth of the building-trades unions' role and the 
relative stability of the transportation and communication 
industry (where increases in union membership on the rail­
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roads were offset by growth of such non-union sectors as 
the telephone- and automobile-connected operations). 
On the whole, the AF of L was dominated by the building-
trades unions. Internecine conflict between them may occa­
sionally have immobilized policy-making, but usually theirs 
was the biggest voice. That voice was given its timbre both 
by the relative size of its respective membership and by the 
seniority rights its representatives enjoyed in the AF of L 
executive council. The railway unions were not then (nor 
are they now) AF of L affiliates. The largest metal-trades 
union was the IAM, but until 1926, when its international 
president (William A. Johnston, a "radical") was replaced, 
the IAM had virtually no positive impact on AF of L policy. 
The mineworkers union, led by the redoubtable John L. 
Lewis, was isolated both because Lewis was unpopular and 
because of organizational weakness. Basic steel and the 
auto industries were unorganized, and consequently, they 
had no voice in the AF of L council. The typographical 
union was strong in the newspaper sector; yet its member­
ship was not large. The lithographers were even relatively 
more unionized but even smaller in absolute numbers. 
What I have suggested, then, is that American unions 
really had only three possible stable points of focus; the 
railway operating brotherhoods (outside of the AF of L), 
some parts of the printing industry, and the building trades. 
The operating brotherhoods had difficulties with several 
managements, but by 1926 had managed to get the manage­
ments to develop a program of governmental intervention 
that assured unions basic continuity; they usually repre­
sented the vast majority of the eligible workers, although 
certain large railroads were exceptions. The building trades 
unions (which I identify as the citadel of the AF of L), on 
the other hand, generally had to depend upon co-operation 
of the many small contractors in the industry who could, 
if they were willing, pass on the costs of wage benefits 
(changes in the factor market) to their customers. Since 
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factor markets (where the agents of production were hired) 
and the product markets (where the products were sold) 
were both local, it was not hard to maintain union stability 
unless the local contractors were vehemently antiunion. 
Many of them were, it should quickly be added. But where 
a desire to work with the building-trades unions existed, 
the employers, whose earnings were often tied to a fraction 
of labor cost, profited and did not substitute machinery for 
labor. Yet in spite of this unique factor/product relation­
ship, Wolman found that between 60 and 68 per cent of 
all carpenters were not union members during the period 
1920-30. Seventy to almost 80 per cent of electrical workers 
were not union members. Other similar figures could be 
cited for the plumbers, painters, plasterers, and so forth. 
So the decibel level of the building-trades unions' voice 
in the AF of L councils was tempered by a general knowl­
edge that they were not really in control of their own 
sub-industries. 
THE PATTERN OF DECLINE 
At the end of World War I union leaders were aware 
that their greatest strides had been made in industries 
where the sympathetic attitude of the Wilson administra­
tion had been economically most easily expressed. They had 
few illusions that the antiunionism of the pre-Wilson period 
on the part of many employers had really been changed 
during the war. Moreover, they were also aware that 
the swelled ranks of their organizations contained many 
workers who believed that unionism and union membership 
provided benefits without sacrifices. 
Their decision was to try first to convert by talking what 
had been the antiunion citadels into a more agreeable 
attitude. The Wilson administration staged two postwar 
labor-management conferences. Both were unsuccessful, or 
as one writer summarized the record, were dominated by 
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Mr. Gompers' eloquence and Judge Gary's (U.S. Steel 
Corporation) silence. 
Labor unions also tried to combine their resources to 
force recognition by U.S. Steel, a (if not the) bastion of 
the open shop. The "Great Steel Strike" of 1919 lacked 
many virtues as such operations go; principal among them 
was victory. And from that time on, it was apparent to 
any discerning mind that the prewar antiunion sentiment 
was once again going to be the rule (cf. Table 5). 
In some of the areas where unionism had gained strength 
during the war, it became weak afterward simply because 
the sub-industries vanished; munitions manufacture is an 
excellent example. Yet many munitions firms turned to man­
ufacture other things and did not vanish. Here the record 
shows frequently the impetuousness of the members, un­
accustomed to the real sacrifices that maintaining a union 
requires, and the inability of the officers to restrain the 
demands and remain in office. The men demanded wage 
increases to compensate for the loss of overtime and forced 
the leadership to condone strikes when negotiations failed. 
The strikes also failed. They were expensive, exhausted 
the unions' pecuniary reserves, and left the employers 
angry, the members disillusioned and frustrated, and the 
leadership, if anything, discredited. Such was the story in 
the International Association of Machinists; it can be 
repeated if one looks in the records of many other unions. 
What needs to be added, of course, is that management in 
these firms lost whatever enthusiasm or patience it had for 
unions and pursued open-shop policies. 
The AF of L leadership was only too well aware that 
the union movement lacked the money resources to win 
by fighting the employers. So, it proposed conciliation 
once again. At the 1923 Portland, Oregon, meeting of the 
AF of L executive council, the famous Portland Manifesto 
was issued. Its offer was for labor to eschew governmental 
intervention and thereby to reject even the barest trace of 
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socialism. The corpus of socialism had been rejected years 
before. The key phrase in the message was "The continuing 
clamor for extension of state regulatory powers under the 
guise of reform and deliverance from evil can but lead 
into greater confusion and more hopeless entanglements." 
Labor, so the Manifesto promised, would work directly with 
management, and a new era of peaceful industrial relations 
was promised. If the Manifesto represented the outstretched 
hand of organized labor, business did not rush to grab it. 
In fact, business ignored it. 
Business even ignored the orders of the governmental 
board administering labor conditions in the one industry 
where the law seemed to require an appreciable willingness 
to abandon unilateral decision-making, i.e., the railroads. 
The shop-crafts unions were not happy with what the 
governmental officials ordered, and they were even more 
astounded when the railroads refused to comply. The courts 
upheld the railroads' right to intransigence, and the 1922 
strike began. It ended in union defeat. Disaster was averted 
only because a very few of the railroads' managements were 
basically not antiunion; President Willard of the Baltimore 
and Ohio worked out with the shop crafts a compromise 
productivity program that several unions accepted as a 
means of salvaging something, if only continued recognition. 
SOME LIMITED SUCCESSES 
Some unions, particularly those in the garment industry, 
went more willingly up the road of joint responsibility 
for productivity improvements and cost control. Meyer 
Pearlstein, an officer of the International Ladies' Garment 
Workers' Union in the Cleveland market, was one who 
showed how unions could work sympathetically with em­
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ployers in the face of the latter's problems. Few employers, 
however, offered the reverse. 
One exception to that last generalization was the rail­
roads, not to the shop-crafts unions but principally to the 
operating brotherhoods. The Transportation Act of 1920 
had proved a failure; the railways dishonored it when it had 
served their immediate purpose to do so, and it brought 
them no peace when they needed it. Because of the work 
of a Chicago attorney, Donald Richberg, the two sides 
(union and management) did work out their differences 
and presented jointly a plan to Congress to reform the 
handling of labor disputes on the railroads and the allied 
transportation intermediaries. Congress passed the plan 
in 1926; it was strengthened by amendment in 1934 and 
continues to be the predominant legislation in the field. It 
looked most satisfactory in its first two decades of oper­
ation; since then, its results have seemed less and less 
attractive. 
Unionism, as I have suggested, was on the defensive 
virtually everywhere. The railroads seemed to be the one 
exception, and they were only partially so. 
III. THE DECLINE AS EXPLAINED 
There is an understandable temptation to explain decline 
as a result of poor decisions, bad timing, or villainy of 
key individuals. Although it may be true that any or all 
of these factors may play a significant role at a critical 
moment in history, yielding to the temptation to explain 
everything by resort to one or more of these three factors 
seems to me to be erroneous. The decline of American union 
growth during the 1920's can be partly explained by these 
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factors, but there were other factors as well. In this section 
I want both to suggest some of them and to consider how 
they affected the others, mentioned earlier. 
CAUSES ASSOCIATED WITH GENERAL ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Different rates of growth of specific industries.—A prin­
cipal problem of American union leaders was that the 
industries in which they were relatively strong tended to 
grow more slowly than those where they were relatively 
weak. Thus growth worked against the interests of 
unionism. 
Another way to consider the same point is to note that 
there were three major shifts in the characteristics and 
composition of the labor force during the period. The 
biggest, the shift from the farm to urban employment, will 
be discussed later, but it worked against the interests of 
unions. Second, the proportion of the labor force occupied 
as manufacturing operatives or as white-collar and service 
workers (types for which unionism had had previously 
little or no appeal) grew significantly. And third, women 
played an increasingly important role in the labor force, 
and they, too, had rarely been enthusiastic in large numbers 
about unionism. 
Some older industries were replaced (harness-making by 
auto repair shops or concert gardens by radios). Others 
were destroyed by law (brewing and saloon-keeping). And 
some were weakened simply by the force of new inventions: 
local transit companies gave way to private automobiles. 
On the whole, as I have suggested, industrial growth was 
greatest in the areas where unionism was weak, and some­
what less in the areas where unionism was relatively strong. 
Technology.—We have already suggested that new indus­
tries came into being and hurt established industries. 
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Behind this change was often a radical shift in technology 
that induced a demand for a completely new kind of labor. 
It was this change on the production line, a shift away 
from traditional to assembly-line production, rather than 
the AF of L's "inability to absorb industrial workers" that 
caused the problem. It is a frequently repeated error to 
claim that the AF of L consisted only of craft unions. In 
the first place, there were actually several industrial unions 
of the AF of L even before 1895; in the second place, very 
few of the predominantly craft unions were really com­
pletely craft-organized or even craft-dominated. And finally, 
craft unions had since 1895 rarely withstood the oppor­
tunity to take on production workers, if the latter could 
be incorporated without pain or expense. An example of 
this was the Machinists' absorption under its aegis of the 
production workers in "its plants." 
Nonetheless, the AF of L's problem was aggravated dur­
ing the 1920's when there was a general shift in American 
industry from the traditional methods of production to 
mass production or assembly-line organization. The product 
market, as Adam Smith might have observed, had grown, 
thus permitting (even encouraging) work specialization, 
with each employee performing a small number of care­
fully defined tasks. A vast output of product at a low unit 
cost resulted. What also resulted was each worker realizing 
that he was no longer a "wheel" (much less a "big wheel") ; 
what he had become was a "cog". Whether this change 
actually destroys the self-esteem of a new worker is a topic 
open to debate. It seems that it did do much to destroy the 
self-perception of craftsmen accustomed to the previous 
patterns of production. The unions' traditional strength had 
been among craftsmen, and this shift had significance for 
American unions in a variety of ways; among these was 
the stepped-up recruitment of new types of workers, gen­
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erally women or migrants from rural areas. These new 
types saw in the factory an opportunity to get good wages 
providing she or he did as he was told. These women 
workers and "green hands" competed quite successfully 
with older craftsmen, since, working with machinery and 
intense management supervision, they could produce prod­
ucts that sold widely for less than the craftsman-produced 
products. The traditional workers, whether they were truly 
craftsmen or only thought they were, had often offered to 
bring the women and green hands into their unions in 
order to police the job-opportunity area, but the latter 
were not to be fooled; they well understood that the unions' 
interest in them might result in improved rates of pay only 
in the short run. In the long run there would undoubtedly 
result fewer jobs for them. Union leaders seemed completely 
unable to break through to these new types of workers. 
Indeed, they were largely unable to do so until the mid-
thirties when the combination of a harrowing depression 
experience plus federal government aid sufficed to do much 
that was necessary. 
Different rates of regional growth.—What is true of 
industries is similarly true of regions. Textiles, as an indus­
try, did not fare badly during the 1920's; but New England 
textiles did. Thus, in so far as the New England mills were 
the unionized sector of the industry, the textile union fared 
miserably. The Textile Worker's Union tried to organize 
the growing southern textile industry, but failed to do so. 
It failed because of the hostility of the southern employers, 
who often used the local police forces as veritable extensions 
of their own plant guards. Employer groups in one region 
after another, forced by competition even when they were 
not led by evangelical antiunionists, came to embrace the 
open-shop movement, often known as "The American Plan," 
the "Anti-boycott League," or simply the "Open Shop Move­
ment." And as the change occurred, regions as well as 
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industries became known for their antiunionism. Southern 
Ohio, Detroit, Los Angeles, the South, the Mountain States, 
all were bastions of this antiunionism; inasmuch as many 
were also economically expanding areas, the impact on the 
American union scene of their attitude was large and, over 
time, expanding. Even in large cities where unionism had 
strong roots, trouble mounted; public investigations show­
ing racketeering in New York City and Chicago undermined 
public, and certainly worker, confidence in the building 
trades unions, to cite but one example. 
The point here is not subtle, but nonetheless it is often 
missed. If the less-unionized areas where the antipathy 
toward unionism was strong grew much faster than the 
areas more favorable to unionism, then unionism after a 
time became on the average (throughout the nation, defined 
as comprising both areas) relatively weaker in terms of 
its total or over-all strength than it had been "in the 
beginning." It was just this kind of differential regional 
growth that did occur in the 1920's. Consequently, economic 
growth as such worked against union success during the 
decade. 
CAUSES ASSOCIATED WITH EMPLOYER ATTITUDES 
It is apparent that employers, on the whole, thought that 
they could operate their plants without unions. But it 
would be an error to conclude that employers had learned 
nothing from unions. Quite the contrary, many of them 
realized that unions played a positive and significant role in 
industrial government. However, these employers believed 
that there was a preferable substitute for a union playing 
this role, and they set about creating the substitute. 
Unions, they reasoned, improved pay, reduced hours, 
provided grievance procedures, and offered an opportunity 
for potential leaders to identify themselves. They, as em­
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ployers, would do these things, and even outdo the unions. 
Pay increases would be generous rather than niggardly. 
Hours would be voluntarily reduced. Personnel adminis­
trators would be hired both to prevent grievance situations 
from developing (by not hiring proven trouble-makers) 
and to smooth other obvious inequities where shop com­
mittees (without any outside "agitators"—like union rep­
resentatives) suggested they existed. Finally, promotion 
would be given to almost anyone; no more was the bright 
worker to be passed over while a not-so-bright relative of 
an executive was promoted. 
The emphasis was on the appearance of consideration for 
workers' feelings. Employers emphasized the necessity of 
creating "an atmosphere of appreciation" for their em­
ployees. Promotions came easily, and in many instances 
there was marked improvement in the communication of 
workers' dissatisfactions. The personnel administration 
movement emphasized the advantages of the carrot over 
the stick, and many workers agreed to accept the pecuniary 
and other enrichments at the expenses of loyalty to what 
appeared to them to be an unneeded protective device, the 
union. Employers agreed to pay high pay rates and to give 
lavish benefits; it was useless for unions to point out that 
the workers so rewarded only enjoyed a portion (and often 
a small portion) of the outcome of increased productivity. 
These employer policies are usually identified under the 
rubric of "welfare capitalism." But they include the scien­
tific management movement inspired by Frederick Winslow 
Taylor and improved upon by H. L. Gantt and Frank and 
Lillian Gilbreth. There is also the personnel management 
movement, one phase of which was developed by Clarence 
Hicks at the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company and later 
at Standard Oil of New Jersey, and another phase coming 
out of the work of Edward Filene in Boston. What these 
plans had in common was a conviction that the functions 
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that unions performed could be better done by employers, 
and if they were done by employers, the employer was 
justified in all senses in keeping unions and unionists off 
of his property. 
All of this, of course, is not to suggest that many em­
ployers really had to be convinced that they could perform 
union functions better than unions could. Many were 
initially just basically antiunion. Many of the things they 
offered were given simply and obviously with the intention 
of weaning workers* affections away from unions. Very 
often, the employer was not particularly subtle: unionized 
workers were immediately discharged, and non-unionized 
workers were made welcome. Any worker who advocated 
unions was considered a traitor to the firm and was not 
only discharged but frequently blacklisted in the industry. 
One other point on this topic should be added. Rapid 
technological change, of which there was much, involves 
not only new machinery and new methods of assembly but 
also new methods of supervision. During the 1920's Ameri­
can industry, as will be mentioned again later, turned on 
a large scale to variant forms of Taylorism or "scientific 
management." One of the original tenets of scientific man­
agement was to deal with workers on an individual basis. 
But that alone was not enough to stop unionism. What 
scientific management usually preached, and what was even 
more injurious to the cause of unionism, was the insistence 
that management stood responsible for determination of 
worker methods; the individual workers were not to be 
consulted on how to do the job—they were to be told. Of 
course, over time some of the rougher edges of scientific 
management were smoothed off. But during the 1920's the 
technological change associated with mass production and 
scientific management worked to the detriment of unionism 
for no other reason than that the unionism available was 
a product of an earlier kind of industrial organization. 
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CAUSES ASSOCIATED WITH GOVERNMENT POLICY 
There can be no question but what Wilson's New Freedom 
incorporated enough of the elan vital of the old Socialist-
Populist reforms that socialism itself never recovered from 
the impact. In addition, the patriotic frenzy associated with 
World War I was channeled from anti-Kaiserism to anti-
Bolshevik activity. In so far as the Lenin revolution kindled 
an interest on the part of American workers, the xenophobic 
charge of subversive radicalism had to be faced. The raids 
staged by Attorney-General A. Mitchell Palmer were not 
discriminating in their targets. Hard as union leaders 
tried to disassociate their organizations from those that 
Palmer and others categorized as subversive, the efforts 
rarely succeeded. 
One can also point to other activities. Frequently, state 
governors used the National Guard to break strikes. Even 
the attorney-general of the United States under President 
Harding, Harry Daugherty, gratuitously injected the fed­
eral government into the ill-fated shop-crafts strike in 1922. 
His reasons for doing so can only be explained by his desire 
to help employers in their avowed battle for the open shop 
and even for the abolition of unions. 
Later it became apparent that unions did need the 
positive support of governments. In so far as this is true, 
the lack of any positive prounion position on the part of 
national, state, or local governments (to say nothing of 
an antiunion position) explains well the relative loss of 
union influence during the period. 
Another very important reason why unions declined 
relates to the difficulty union leaders had in reaching 
prospective members. There were legal factors that must 
be cited. The "yellow-dog contract" was upheld by the 
United States Supreme Court in a famous case involving 
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President John Mitchell of the United Mine Workers and 
the Hitchman Coal and Coke Company. That case stood as 
a precedent and increased the already great difficulty that 
unions invariably had when, in order to talk to "the men," 
private property had to be crossed. 
A recent study has also suggested that there was a 
systematic attempt on the part of former President Taft 
to put conservative (even reactionary) lawyers on the bench 
while he was Chief Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court in the early 1920's. These men, if the charge is true, 
had a predilection for issuing injunctive orders against 
union organizers or leaders. The courts, never particularly 
sympathetic to unions, became markedly unsympathetic 
during the 1920's. 
CAUSES ASSOCIATED WITH THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF UNION OPERATIONS 
The Economics of Decline.—Decision-making in unions 
is a topic all too frequently overlooked by students of labor 
history. There are many facets of it that should be analyzed: 
(1) Who makes the decisions? (2) What are the economic, 
political, social, ideological, and personality factors influ­
encing the decision-maker? (3) What is the role of timing 
as apart from the substantive characteristics of the deci­
sion? (4) Who opposes the decision and why? 
Generally, the rule is that in an atmosphere of optimism 
and expansion it is relatively hard to make a blunder, and 
that in an atmosphere of pessimism and contraction one 
can only choose the least bad (there being no really happy) 
outcome. 
Unions are basically political organizations, where the 
popularity of the leader counts more, particularly in the 
short run, than his economic insights or moral excellence. 
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However, it is necessary for us to consider the basic 
economics of union policies as they developed in the 1920's. 
Essentially, union leaders have the traditional business 
concern, namely, how to balance expenditure with income 
over some type of time period—usually longer than a year 
and usually shorter than the typical seven to eight years 
of a business cycle. Union revenue comes mainly from dues 
and assessments. Unions spend for personnel to conduct 
union business (usually termed business agents or union 
representatives, but also lawyers, pickets, and members on 
strike). There are massive economies in scale vis-a-vis many 
of these personnel. One representative can handle a great 
many contracts, but only superficially as to details. If the 
union employs a large number of representatives in any 
specified area or industry, each can specialize on a few 
aspects of the union-employer or union-member relation­
ships. Specialization here, as in Adam Smith's pin factory, 
creates true productive efficiency. 
During the massive decline in membership during the 
1920's, unions, on the whole, suffered diseconomies. As 
their memberships diminished, their revenues fell. As the 
revenues fell, they could afford fewer agents and, even then, 
often had to settle for less well-qualified individuals. The 
cost of organizing (in terms of gross and particularly net 
gains) became heavier and heavier. The economic burden 
of union business became larger for each member, i.e., a 
larger share of the cost of union representation had to be 
collected from each member. Bad as that might have been 
during the mid-1920's, when most businesses flourished, by 
the end of the period the revenue situation was desperate. 
What naturally had to result was the curtailment of services 
and a reduction in the amounts that unions could pay to 
each of its employees. 
I believe that my own studies of the Machinists' experi­
ence yield relatively typical conclusions. The program least 
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resistant to outside pressures was the business agent sys­
tem. The organizing and the strike programs during the 
period involved served the majority of members' interests 
only indirectly, and were therefore cut back radically. The 
I AM had to make all labor rates (possibly, but not probably, 
labor costs) more uniform in an area and an industry 
because such a change would work to the advantage of the 
strongly unionized segments of the industries in which IAM 
members worked. To accomplish this result, employers had 
to be approached and potential members convinced. When­
ever possible, strikes were avoided; but the IAM still occa­
sionally had to authorize walkouts for organizing purposes. 
As the depression deepened, per capita allocations fell, 
TABLE 6 
IAM GRAND LODGE EXPENDITURES ON 
SELECTED SERVICE PROGRAMS 
PER CAPITA EXPENDITURES 
Organizing Business Agents Strike Allocations 
1921 $1.26 $0.68 4.33 
1922 1.14 .82 4.19 
1923 1.22 1.31 .80 
1924 1.04 1.25 .59 
1925 1.46 1.29 .37 
1926 1.55 1.35 .27 
1927 1.62 1.38 .19 
1928 1.39 1.41 .86 
1929 1.79 1.31 .44 
1930 1.58 1.35 .13 
1931 1.45 1.42 .18 
1932 1.05 1.30 .11 
1933 .76 1.01 .02 
Source: M. Perlman, The Machinists: A New Study in American Trade Unionism 
220, 223. 
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and per capita resources fell even more. More and more 
members maintained a nominal tie to the union by buying 
"unemployment stamps," which was from the standpoint of 
the national organization a poor substitute for the usual 
per capita tax. In such an economic setting the union 
machinery worked inefficiently or not at all. The conclusion 
to be drawn is that the efficiency of union activity is worst 
in depression. It is often not very good during a period 
of decline, either. Inasmuch as American unions were 
depressed throughout much of the 1920's, their record is, 
in terms of how well they performed their usual functions, 
less than excellent. 
Communication problems.—But the size-of-operation fac­
tor was not the only one. There were also some very signifi­
cant social factors. The enactment of Prohibition closed 
the saloons, where previously a union organizer could 
contact a large number of men over a relatively short 
period of time. Before the close-down, if an organizer 
agreed to stand sponsor for a round of drinks, he usually 
could expect a reasonably friendly hearing, even if no out­
right decisions to join were made on the spot. The closing 
of the saloons, without any logical successor, made it much 
harder for union organizers to operate. Bad as that situa­
tion was, it was made more difficult by the wide sale of 
automobiles, such as Ford's Model T. Workers not only did 
not remain in the saloons where they could be contacted, 
but they didn't congregate at parks or picnic grounds as 
was the usual pattern for a summer's Sunday prior to the 
World War I. Instead, many workers packed picnic baskets, 
the children, and the wife and toured the countryside. Union 
organizers had a difficult job tracking them down, and when 
they found them at home, the organizer had frequently to 
contend with the on-the-spot expression of the wife's fears. 
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CAUSES PECULIAR TO LABOR LEADERSHIP

Other factors that must be included in this consideration 
of the causes of decline include several important points 
regarding union organizations themselves. The old leader­
ship was unwilling to retire and be replaced by younger 
men. Retirement was not a common feature of life after 
World War I. Though it was true that the span of life 
had increased, people were generally not aware of the 
implications of this with regard to business, government, 
universities, or even unions. The traditional leadership 
became less energetic as the men themselves passed sixty-
five years of age, to say nothing of the biblical allotment 
for life. 
Yet in many unions there were vigorous struggles for 
leadership. These struggles occasionally resulted in the 
installation of younger officers. But invariably, these instal­
lations followed a bitter political fight, and did not end it. 
John L. Lewis retained control of his union (even though 
charges of fraud flew), but an entire sector of it became 
disaffected. In the case of the Machinist's Union, the tradi­
tional leader, J. J. O'Connell, was defeated by William A. 
Johnston in 1911. Johnston never managed to consolidate 
his victory and finally was himself forced out in 1925. His 
successor, A. 0. Wharton, pursued a very cautious policy 
intended to consolidate the organization. Whereas Johnston 
had advocated large-scale organizing, Wharton advocated 
other policies intended to solidify support of the leadership 
within the organization at the expense of growth in 
numbers. 
Many of the old-time Socialists, who had been active in 
unions, lost their zeal for unions as an aid to socialism 
primarily because union leadership disavowed socialism in 
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order to escape the xenophobic charges mentioned earlier. 
Many of these socialist-radicals became bitter critics of 
unions and both believed and preached that the union 
leaders were traitors to the working class generally and 
to their own members specifically. In some instances it 
seems quite true that local union leaders were "bought 
out" by employers and that the local leaders sacrificed the 
economic interests of their members for bribes, either 
pecuniary or psychological. Moreover, the dangers of racke­
teering, always present where power can be concentrated, 
gripped several important unions in metropolitan areas. 
CAUSES ASSOCIATED WITH INDIFFERENCE OR 
HOSTILITY OF POTENTIAL MEMBERS 
There is no reason to believe that all workers are pre­
disposed in favor of union membership. The abstract or 
general reasons why some like it have been analyzed in 
one of my early books, Labor Union Theories in America. 
Professor Selig Perlman has synthesized in his A Theory 
of the Labor Movement what he calls the typical (or "Tom, 
Dick, and Harry") unionist mentality. Professor Frank 
Tannenbaum, to cite someone else with another view, also 
has some insights on the topic of the conservatism of 
unionists. 
But the important point is that unionism does not appeal 
to a lot of individual workers. Some view it as a blanket 
smothering the fires of their personal career ambitions. 
They have faith in their own ability to deal man-to-man 
with their employers or their immediate representatives, 
the supervisors. Some feel that the unions' omnipresent 
shibboleths, "seniority" and that what is good for the group 
averages out for the good of the individual, may only be 
correct in theory; and these people do not care about sen­
iority (they are young) or the group (they are industrial 
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transients or casuals). For these individuals unionism per 
se is not good; and if the employer offers them a good 
personnel policy, they are more than just satisfied. 
Other workers are anticapitalist. They look to real 
proletarian revolution or to widespread political reform. 
Unionism might appeal to them; American-type unionism 
generally did not. In the 1920's specifically, they rejected 
the capitalism-accepting, wage- or job-conscious-oriented 
unionism of the AF of L. Most of these embraced IWW-ism 
or the various organizations that the communists (including 
myriad splinter groups) spawned, baptized, buried, and 
resurrected. A few were Social Democrats who did not want 
to "bore from within" (the tactics of the Communists), but 
preferred to support the method of legal enactment. Hence 
they put their energies into lobbying for "security by 
legislation" rather than working for "security by collective 
agreement." 
But if adversity has its problems, it also presents some 
opportunities. Lack of resources precludes opportunities to 
make big (or even many small) decisions; but the time not 
so spent can be diverted to some thinking. The 1920's was 
such a period. In the next section, we are concerned with the 
evaluation of the philosophy or theory of American union­
ism which emerged quite clearly during the decade 1922-32. 
IV.	 THE ECLIPSE AS IT AFFECTED REFINEMENT OF 
LABOR UNION THEORY 
WHAT HAPPENED TO SOCIALISM 
At the turn of the century and for about a decade there­
after there seemed to be developing a stable variety (as 
well as several unstable competitors to it) of socialism 
within the rather amorphous "labor movement," and even 
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within its much better defined unit, the trade union move­
ment. Max Hayes, representative of the Printers' Union, in 
one AF of L convention after another challenged Gompers' 
antisocialist leadership. Hayes's strength was never enough 
to topple Gompers or even to threaten his antisocialism. 
But it was enough to give hope that in the near future there 
lay the possibility of socialist success. 
Hayes's socialism (and he was typical of those who 
influenced the unions most) was not intellectually rigorous. 
It merely emphasized the brotherhood of man (modified to 
exclude lesser breeds like the colored, orientals, and perhaps 
East Europeans) and stressed the necessity of industrial 
unionism. 
The election of 1912 not only presented a breach in the 
ranks of the Republicans, it also presented a renovated 
Democratic party. Woodrow Wilson's platform included a 
great many social reform planks. When Wilson was elected, 
he believed (as did a majority of the Congress) that a 
mandate for reform had been given. The New Freedom (as 
his program was called) absorbed many of the ideas that 
the Socialists had espoused. Thus at the same time Wilson 
was adopting many of their objectives, he was giving 
erstwhile Socialists a reason to vote for one of the estab­
lished parties. Many Socialists seized the opportunity; the 
obvious result was a decimation of the socialist ranks. 
Public interest in socialist reforms as such became weaker. 
And because of the pacifist sentiment found among many 
socialist leaders, America's growing participation in the 
Allies' military efforts intensified public antipathy toward 
them. It often spilled over to cover socialism, as well. And 
the unions, like most institutions in a democratic society, 
tended to absorb the prevailing sentiment (whenever pos­
sible) . The shift served to confirm and even exacerbate the 
unions' support of Gompers' antisocialism. 
But within the union movement there was also after 
World War I a change in attitude toward the brotherhood­
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of-man concept as it applied to unionism. The great in­
creases in unions' ranks during World War I occurred in 
war industries (building, shipbuilding, munitions, and tex­
tiles) and on the railroads. The attempts to make these 
increases permanent generally failed in the former group. 
A bitter lesson was learned. Though there were advantages 
to large numbers (emphasizing the brotherhood of man) in 
a given union, the disadvantages often outweighed the 
advantages. The sense of individual identity got lost, and 
many of the new members were at best halfhearted in 
their enthusiasm for unionism. 
Moreover, the conditions that brought about the increase 
in unionism—principally, prosperity—actually served as a 
substitute for unionism in many industries. If an individual 
was badly treated by his employer, he could get another 
job easily; employers knew this was so and consequently 
tended to be more considerate in their treatment of their 
employees. If an employer refused a pay raise, another 
employer, short of labor, usually agreed to the demand 
unless the demands were beyond the pale. Employers knew 
this to be true also, and consequently were relatively gen­
erous in granting pay raises. It is perhaps wise to add that 
pay raises were often granted in a variety of ways; over­
time was increased, rates were hiked, and upgrading of 
positions (promotion) was easy. In any event, the sense 
of solidarity of workers and the belief that unions should 
be the sword of the working class did not come to be a 
popular doctrine, and many of the worst social conditions 
that might have been expected to drive workers to unionism 
were alleviated by the impact of labor shortage. It was 
a case where reform was accomplished by the action of 
the market rather than by pressure group activity. 
Yet there were those who felt these should have been 
popular doctrines. The history of the left-wing labor move­
ment during the 1920's is an interesting one. However, it 
attracted little mass support, and if it has a colorful history, 
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much of the color is in the literature (principally in ballads) 
it produced. 
THE BENEFIT/COST THEORY 
There is another theory of unionism, quite "economics"­
oriented. This theory, made somewhat popular by Sidney 
and Beatrice Webb in England and by Professor George E. 
Barnett in this country, suggests that unionism is an insti­
tution that workers embrace when it serves to achieve 
easily the ends they want. In so far as unions lead to pay 
raises, job security, and status, workers will embrace them. 
It is quite apparent that at the beginning of the 1920's, 
many workers thought that unions could bring them the 
things they wanted. They supported unions' programs in 
the steel industry, in the metal trades, in the transportation 
field, and elsewhere. However, it soon became apparent that 
unionism was far from successful in these areas. Better 
deals could be made if one dealt directly with a welfare-
oriented employer (i.e., an employer believing in the Ameri­
can Plan). Thus it was logical for workers to reconsider the 
old question regarding the usefulness of union membership. 
Professor Barnett, for one, came to conclude that political 
enactment was a preferred means for providing economic 
and job security. In his well-known presidential address to 
the American Economics Association in 1932, "American 
Trade Unionism and Social Insurance," he rang the death 
knell of unionism. 
THE "WISCONSIN" OR "COMMONS-PERLMAN" THEORY 
A third theory of unionism argued that unions alone 
could provide the necessary job security that workers 
needed. It was this theory that was most thoroughly devel­
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oped during the 1920's. If it was synthesized by an acade­
mician (as indeed it was), his synthesis was grasped eagerly 
by many of the leaders of American union organizations. 
When Miss Florence Thorne brought out Samuel Gompers' 
autobiography (she was certainly the editor, and probably 
the ghost writer), she used this theoretical formulation to 
explain Gompers' objectives. This theory, best known as 
the Wisconsin, or Commons-Perlman, theory, explains the 
development of unionism as an attempt by job-conscious 
workers to stabilize their "ownership" of work opportunity. 
The theory was developed in Professor Selig Perlman's A 
Theory of the Labor Movement. Miss Thorne incorporated 
the theme in her work. 
What this brand of unionism suggested was that unionists 
were a special kind of people. They were essentially pessi­
mistic about opportunity, but were willing to accept the 
mores of a capitalist society, provided that society would 
modify its concept of ownership to include not only land 
but jobs too, and then argued that unions had to exist to 
guarantee rights to jobs. 
It would be an error to suggest that this "Wisconsin" 
theory of unionism was universally accepted. It would also 
be an error to suggest that all unions' activities could be 
explained by it. However, the years of disaster between 
1920 and 1933 did serve to produce more evidence of the 
kind upon which Professor Perlman had based his analysis. 
Later, as conditions changed, other ideas of unionism 
appeared. The economic-benefit theory was certainly appar­
ent during the New Deal renaissance of unionism. Yet the 
period of eclipse, namely, the 1920's, did produce something 
durable, if only a theoretical formulation. 
Professor Robert F. Hoxie had earlier described Ameri­
can unions in his book Trade Unionism in the United 
States as principally "business-oriented." His notion of a 
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business union was a union dominated by a passion for 
business-like efficiency. His use of the term was meant to 
suggest that American workers had become imbued with 
the businessman's mentality, which he thought particu­
laristic rather than ideological. Unlike the Barnett kind of 
formulation, Hoxie's stressed the place of ideology. Thus, 
although in his view the typical American union was 
benefit/cost analysis-minded, this aspect or concern was 
subordinate to a more pervasive consideration: "What was 
its attitude toward general social reform?" General social 
reform, he concluded, did not "pay off," and for that reason 
American unions tended to eschew all opportunities to 
improve the lot of the public generally and of the working 
class in particular. There were those who claimed that the 
job-conscious theory of unionism was simply a rendering 
of the business-unionism that they believed Hoxie described. 
Such a conclusion was not warranted. The union theory 
that emerged attempted to explain not only why unions 
had to exist (according to the Hoxie formulation, if "no­
union" paid off better than any union, then no-union would 
be used) but it also tried to explain the reason for the 
essential conservation of labor organizations—namely, the 
dependence upon the concept of property. 
V. A RETROSPECTIVE VIEW 
SUMMARY 
At the outset we considered some of the many things 
unions can do. In brief, they serve as protective organiza­
tions, business organizations, reform organizations, simple 
cluster organizations with specific purposes, and the work­
ing face of a social movement. In two of the substantive 
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sections of this paper we have considered the record and 
some of the reasons for it. Let us now very briefly ask 
what, if anything, provided the services that unions sought 
to furnish. 
Protective aspects.—Though it is said frequently that in 
the 1920's employees had to depend upon the employers' 
favor, which is implicitly no protection at all, there were 
then (as now) two elements that kept some (even many) 
employers from being capricious and overbearing. The first 
was custom; for if an employer is overly greedy or immoral, 
his reputation suffers, and a poor reputation can in time 
hurt him. The second was the market; for if an employer 
drove away employees by his inconsiderateness, he had to 
replace them with others who required training, and train­
ing cost him money. Thus, in principle, there were checks 
on the employer. In the face of the record, however, these 
checks were ineffective. So there was no substitute for the 
relative job protection unions offered. In other countries 
arbitration was used: it didn't usually work well, but it was 
something. Here there was all but nothing. By the end of 
the 1920's the idea of giving unionism a try (i.e., preventing 
employers from throttling it) was gaining popularity. 
Business aspects.—What raised wages and handled such 
grievances as were processed was some employers' willing­
ness to see that it was the ratio of value added to labor 
cost that was important rather than simple hourly or 
weekly rates of pay. America became an even higher wage 
economy than it had been because the scientific-management 
people and those influenced by the personnel administration 
movement had relatively open minds regarding wages and 
career opportunities. Although the economic position of 
many workers did not suffer consequently, not as much can 
be said for their political and social rights. Companies 
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dictated what products they had to buy (each major auto 
manufacturer's employees learned by violence what would 
happen if they bought a competitor's products). Companies 
dictated what friends they could not have (union sympa­
thizers, for example). As for the efficiency of the system, 
morality and market allocation do work; but they work 
neither quickly nor thoroughly. However, if one considers 
how inefficient unions became (as suggested in the dis­
cussion), the difference between the abstract forces of 
conscience and cost (on the one hand) and external union 
representation (on the other) were not great. Neither 
worked well, and by the end of the period, it was clear that 
unions possibly might work economically, but only if given 
an opportunity to grow. Not all employers agreed, as was to 
be expected, but the trend was in the direction of trying 
unionism—if only to forestall more radical possibilities. 
Reform organizations.—Although there have always been 
many socialist and other reform unions, they have not 
prospered in American soil, fertilized as it has been by 
federalism and only slightly irrigated by the traditional 
astringent interpretations of common-law precedence over 
liberal Constitutional construction. American unions oper­
ated best when the reforms they proffered were grafted on to 
the native vines of increased real wages and property rights, 
including the right to a job unless objective (rather than 
subjective) factors interfered. The good economic life was 
preached before all else. Utopian reform, such as it was, 
came via the political area—i.e., the New Freedom and the 
New Deal; and later, the Fair Deal, the New Frontier; and 
now, the Great Society. Unions have in the past (and even 
more recently of the last decade) offered themselves as 
pilots for the nation in its sailing forward (we always 
seem to claim to be progressing in that direction) ; but 
success has not been great, and general reform, as such, 
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has been left to the political parties or interested minority-
groups. The unions' role in national politics has varied. 
In 1924 (as in 1964) unions "could" support only one can­
didate. But always the problem remains—are the gains 
possible in the face of victory worth the losses probable 
in the face of defeat. Throughout the 1920's the general 
weakness of the federal government in matters of economic 
policy tipped (or perhaps should have tipped) the balance 
in favor of non-participation in political contests. Such a 
conclusion was similarly warranted if state government 
was similarly weak in economic policy matters. The reverse 
conclusion may now be the case because of the expansion 
of state and federal policy-making activities. But even 
where governments are active economic-policy formulators, 
just how unions will line up is not always clear. Yet if 
unions have not been leaders, neither have they been the 
stalwart opposition. What union leadership has had to learn 
is how to steer a middle course—one that neither embraces 
unnecessary or too soon membership-dividing reforms nor 
destroys the union's reputation for imaginative equity 
(where injustices previously existed). 
Cluster aspects.—The lessons of unions performing non-
job-connected functions for the members was not an easy 
one to master. Unions provided insurance benefits, ran 
banks, and tried to supplement their members educational 
opportunities. Each of these activities had program and 
business aspects. How popular the programs were, of 
course, depended in good part on the abilities of the leaders 
and the cultural and personal interests of the members. 
The business side, however, was influenced not only by these 
considerations but also by some purely objective elements. 
Insurance programs have a technical side involving an 
understanding of "area of risk," "nature of risk," abandon­
ment or protection of "individual equity," and so forth. If 
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unions learned anything in the 1920's, they learned that 
although these programs could be popular with the member­
ship and although they could provide an otherwise unmet 
service, technical (even professional) competence was 
needed. If it was to be had, some control had to be taken 
from the normal leadership and given to specialists. In 
the 1920's this transfer was on a few occasions successful; 
witness the early attempts at union medical clinics and 
homes for superannuated members. In some instance, the 
attempts were signal failures; the IAM, to cite one union, 
failed in its effort to run job-creating firms, an actuarially 
sound insurance program, a bank, and even a buyers' 
co-operative. 
Social movement aspects.—If the period of the 1920's 
showed anything clearly, it showed that there was no 
effective substitute for unionism as the voice of workers 
protecting their job- and wage-gains. Although it is true 
that many workers did not like the terms in which these 
gains were protected, it was clearly apparent that the solu­
tion lay in revising the unions' policies rather than in devel­
oping an alternative institution. The need for brevity does 
not permit elaboration of this point, but it can be found in 
much of the labor literature on scientific management, 
personnel administration, and in the partial "successor" 
to both, the "human relations" approach. 
THE KEY PROBLEMS AT THE END OF THE PERIOD 
Obviously the most important problem that faced Ameri­
can labor at the end of the 1920's and at the beginning of 
the New Deal was how to increase the size of its ranks. 
How could unions organize—should they be industrially 
oriented, should they be large, should they have national 
or local control, should they be job-conscious or economic 
reform-conscious? Disagreement about these factors led 
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ultimately to the formation of the Committee for Industrial 
Organization. 
A problem of almost equal importance was how to over­
come employer hostility. In an effort to overcome it, unions 
came to accept the role of continual governmental inter­
vention in labor disputes—even in purely jurisdictional 
matters. This idea was first proposed by Democratic Senator 
Robert Wagner of New York and later was administered, 
with both pro- and antiunion consequences, by the National 
Labor Relations Board. The extent to which unions and the 
labor movement should endorse one political instrument, the 
national Democratic party, was a natural result of unions 
relying on governmental intervention. In 1936 John L. 
Lewis, perhaps the most dynamic labor leader of the inter-
World War period, abandoned his traditional membership 
in the Republican party to campaign not only for President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt but for the candidates whom Roose­
velt had endorsed. Lewis' later disillusionment was swift 
and complete. But the question of unionism's political 
alliances remained afterwards. 
There was also the problem of replacing old leadership. 
In many cases by this time, the old-timers were dead. A 
new generation appeared and replaced some of the stalwarts 
by then in the pantheon of unionism. Not all the new leaders 
were permanent, but many established great reputations 
and records. Tied up with, but by no means tied to, this 
problem of leadership was the evil of racketeering elements 
in many union organizations. It is not hard to cite an 
impressive list of unions that had fallen prey to greedy 
individuals who used the control of the labor market that 
unions could exercise for their own selfish ends. 
Finally, there was the problem of accumulation of rev­
enue. The unions ended the period with small treasuries, 
little hope for financial improvement in a situation, and 
levels of operation far below anything approaching optimal 
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effectiveness. Left to their own pecuniary resources, it was 
probable that most unions could not achieve very rapid 
improvement in their situations. This is one of the reasons 
that explains the turning to governmental assistance. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 1920'S FOR THE 1960'S 
There are several ways in which the 1920's throw light 
on the present labor movement. The recent variety of rates 
of growth and of technological change in the various sectors 
of American industry and the shift from unionized to non-
unionized areas and industries in the country have great 
similarities to the situation in the 1920's. If the personnel 
management program of the Standard Oil Company was 
used then as a model for antiunionism, the unwillingness of 
the personnel of the International Business Machines Cor­
poration to join unions today has some points of similarity. 
In the one case, of course, the management was patently 
antiunion; in the present case the management cannot be 
patently anything; but the fact is that the workers now 
have not elected to use unionism as the preferred method 
for representation of their interests. 
Whereas earlier industry grew most rapidly in open-shop 
localities like Detroit, Cincinnati, or Los Angeles, today the 
most rapidly developing industrial areas are the Southeast 
and the "desert states" of Arizona and New Mexico. If the 
areas that grow fastest economically are antiunion, the 
portent for union growth is perforce discouraging. 
If high real wages plus regular increases without union 
pressure made workers happy in the 1920's, the same 
formula seems to work today. Whereas once production 
operatives, greenhands and/or women workers, seemed 
hostile to unions and no formula for organizing them 
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seemed to work, so today many white-collar workers remain 
hostile—or, at best, indifferent—toward unionism. 
Once again, unions have the problem of maintaining 
adequate revenue. The costs of representation have climbed 
increasingly as dependence upon economists and lawyers, 
rather than lay bargainers, has increased. The membership 
of one union after another has shown a reluctance to 
increase union revenue; and where they have agreed to do 
so, the agreement has often been accompanied by marked 
dissatisfaction with the personnel who demanded it. 
Again, we have problems of allegedly jaded leadership. 
In the past few years several key union leaders have lost 
control of their organizations. But the problem of leader­
ship is not simply a question of its jaded quality. Federal 
and state legislation has worked to make unions "more 
democratic." Leaders are no longer able to restrain impetu­
ous rank-and-file dissidents. If it was purportedly the intent 
of those who framed the legislation to make unions demo­
cratic, frequently that end was achieved at the cost of 
union stability. 
It is on the philosophical, ideological, or theoretical level 
where unionism today best parallels unionism in the 1920's. 
Critics of the AF of L in the 1920's derided the philosophy 
that the leading AF of L unions embraced, namely, job-
consciousness. Today, among the most active and successful 
unions are those that appear most to lack the reform 
idealism, so dear to the hearts of those who study the labor 
movement. The teamsters, the operating engineers, and 
even the dying railroad brotherhoods, all are principally 
concerned with their own parochial interests—principally, 
the protection of job rights. There are those who decry this 
emphasis and urge the labor movement to stand for some­
thing more. Nonetheless, a reading of the history of the 
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1920's suggests that it is this very parochialism that is the 
hard core of the labor movement. At least, it is arguable 
that that aspect has not changed. 
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The Rise and Decline of Welfare Capitalism 
DAVID BRODY 
"OUR job primarily is to make steel," the veteran head of 
Bethlehem Steel, Charles M. Schwab, told the American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers in December, 1927, "but 
it is being made under a system which must be justified. 
If this system does not enable men to live on an 
increasingly higher plane, if it does not allow them to ful­
fill their desires and satisfy their reasonable wants, then 
it is natural that the system itself should fail." Schwab's 
qualification expressed the key idea of the welfare capital­
ism of the 1920's. "There has been a change—an enormous 
change—and within the last ten years," a director of the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce said in 1929. "We are acquiring 
a new industrial philosophy that the fundamentals of 
decent and right conduct laid down by Jesus of Nazareth 
constitute the soundest, most sensible, and workable eco­
nomic system possible to devise." Callousness toward labor 
was receding into an unlamented past, enlightened business­
men assured themselves. "I have gone through some rather 
dark chapters in American industry," recollected Schwab 
(whose brilliant business career went back to the bloody 
Homestead strike of 1892), "and it is a great joy to me 
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to realize that humanity rules American industrial life 
today." 1 
The new outlook promised to transform the country's 
labor relations. Many businessmen foresaw a future of 
"concord and plenty," noted the economist Herbert Feis. 
"The concord is based chiefly on the expectation of coopera­
tion between workers and management. This cooperation is 
to show itself in a recognition of the worker's needs and 
desires. The plenty is to be expected by improving 
industrial technic, by lessening waste, by the gains of com­
mon effort marked by goodwill." Concord and plenty seemed 
within easy reach in 1928. "Much of American industry," 
said Feis, "is convinced that it has worked out simple means 
and policies for insuring steady and peaceful advancement 
of industrial life." 2 
That confidence proved remarkably ill-founded. Within a 
few years of the stock market crash in 1929, welfare capital­
ism collapsed in a burst of unexampled industrial strife. 
From the bitter 1930's there issued a system of labor rela­
tions that rested on collective bargaining, not the bene­
volence of management. In failure, welfare capitalism has 
been too casually dismissed. Flawed as it was, it seriously 
attempted to minimize the human problems raised by indus­
trialization. And it was a more vital phenomenon than it 
has seemed from the modern perspective. 
Welfare capitalism had its roots in the emergence of big 
business in the early years of the twentieth century. Even 
before, of course, employers had interested themselves in 
the welfare of their workmen. Pullman had built his model 
town near Chicago; Proctor and Gamble had started its 
profit-sharing plan in 1886; others had provided pensions 
1
 Law and Labor, X (January, 1928), 19; Nation's Business, XVII (April, 1929), 89, XVIII (February, 1930), 198. 
2
 Herbert Feis, Labor Relations (New York, 1928), p. 2. 
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and encouraged mutual benefit societies. During the indus­
trializing era, however, benevolence had been limited by-
frantic expansion and ruthless competition. As these moder­
ated, leeway opened for a departure from the hard labor 
policy ruled by the cost books and the labor supply. The 
larger scale of business enterprise increased the resources 
available to progressive employers. Above all, the consolida­
tion movement demanded more enlightened treatment of 
labor. Less imperative as progressivism subsided, that 
rationale remained binding in the 1920's. 
Consolidationists such as J. P Morgan intended to restore 
order to industries "demoralized" by cutthroat competition. 
Their strategy was, first, to combine warring firms into a 
giant concern and, second, through its dominance impose 
"fair" competition on the industry. Business should strive 
for "cooperation" and "stability," not ruinous warfare. This 
course would be profitable; it would also be right. Weighty 
ethics justified fair competition. "From the standpoint of 
morality," Elbert H. Gary said, the steel industry had been 
"a shame and a disgrace" before the formation of U.S. 
Steel. Spreading beyond its original advocates, the doctrine 
of co-operation dominated American business in the 1920's. 
"Even the most skeptical devotees of the old dog-eat-dog 
theory of business competition," said a Chamber of Com­
merce officer in 1929, "are being gradually persuaded from 
the sheer, cold pressure of the facts that war doesn't 
pay in this complicated world of ours." Owen D. Young of 
General Electric added: "The Golden Rule supplies all that 
a man of business needs." 3 
This mode of thinking inevitably influenced labor policy. 
Morgan's partner George W. Perkins told the National 
Civic Federation in 1909 that if capital and consumers bene­
fited from co-operation, so must the laborer. Ethical stan­
 David Brody, Steelworkers in America (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 
p. 149; Nation's Business, XVII (April, 1929), 90, 162. 
3
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dards applied to labor relations no less than to business rela­
tions, and would foster the same harmony of interests. 
"Ruinous competition, the crushing of small companies by 
monopolistic rivals continual strikes—there is no 
avoiding the punishment such plagues entail," pronounced 
a business spokesman in 1929. "Take strikes, for example. 
Ten years ago it was considered part of the game to 
cut wages without compunction. Today wage-cutting 
is the last thing any employer wants to resort to. He knows, 
from experience, that it is wrong and that it makes trouble." 
Modern business acted on the "sincere belief that the inter­
ests of the employer and employee are mutual and at bottom 
identical." 4 
These precepts depended on new industrial leadership 
for implementation. As business grew large and complex, 
control passed into the hands of lawyers and financial men, 
and they felt the broader obligation of their high places in 
the great corporations. General Electric's Owen Young, 
himself a lawyer, argued that "the new idea in manage­
ment sprang largely from the fact that lawyers were 
advanced to high managerial posts. If there is one 
thing that a lawyer is taught, it is knowledge of trusteeship 
and the sacredness of that position. Very soon we saw 
rising a notion that managers were no longer attorneys for 
stockholders; they were becoming trustees of an institu­
tion." B And labor was among the beneficiaries of that 
trusteeship. 
Public opinion served as a spur to action. Big-business 
leaders anxiously cultivated national favor. That alone, 
Elbert Gary and George Perkins had argued during the 
progressive era, might protect the vulnerable industrial 
4
 Robert Ozanne, "A Century of Labor-Management Relations" (in 
press), chap, vi, p. 4; Nation's Business, XVII (April, 1929), 90. 
5 Nation's Business, XVII (April, 1929), 164; also, Fortune, II (February, 1931), 110 ff.; (March 1931), 94. 
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giants from antitrust action. The legal dangers lifted, if 
they did not disappear, in the 1920's. But the sensitivity to 
public opinion remained, sustained as it was by the con­
viction of business leaders that theirs was an occupation 
clothed with the public interest. Earlier, muckraking at­
tacks and government investigations had prodded major 
reforms in industry. U.S. Steel had finally abolished the 
seven-day week in 1911 after the crusading first vice-presi­
dent, W. B. Dickson, had threatened to resign and take the 
fight outside the corporation.6 Public relations became less 
stormy, but not less important, in the 1920's. Businessmen 
remained sensitive to the country's rising expectations for 
the treatment of labor. What wants do employees "have a 
right to see satisfied as far as conditions permit?" asked 
Charles Schwab in 1927. He listed, among other things, 
steady employment, a voice in the regulation of their work­
ing conditions, opportunity to save and to own stock, and 
some guarantee of security in old age.7 This was the 
measure of national sentiment in the 1920's, so far as busi­
ness was able to read it. 
Initially, welfare work lacked any functional relationship 
to industrial operations. Businessmen did assert in a vague 
sort of way that they earned a profitable return on the 
investment in welfare work, especially in the creation of 
loyalty and contentment. But the moving impulse came 
from other than ordinary business considerations. Welfare, 
said Elbert Gary, was "a simple duty that industry owes to 
labor"; it was an obligation of the "big, broad employers 
of labor." 8 In the 1920's that paternal reasoning was joined 
by a second, more hardheaded argument: employee well­
being would increase efficiency. 
6
 W. B. Dickson to Sidney Hillman, Jan. 27, 1940, Sidney Hillman 
Papers, Amalgamated Clothing Workers	 of America. 
T Law and Labor, X (January, 1928), 14. 
8
 Brody, Steelworkers in America, p. 117. 
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When Gerard Swope became president of General Elec­
tric in 1922, he spread the new gospel in a series of informal 
talks to plant officials. Their job, he told Schenectady fore­
men, was threefold: "production, costs, and relations with 
men. Usually we think of the first two only The 
last thing our foremen will remember is the relations with 
the men who work for him Isic] and that, as a matter of 
fact, is the most important consideration that bears on the 
results that any executive is to achieve." The workers were 
not mere adjuncts to the machinery. "And there isn't any­
thing men expect more than fair treatment; they must be 
dealt with not only fairly and justly, but with sympathy." 
Swope pressed home his conclusion: "You are constantly 
being hounded to increase your output. One of the ways of 
getting it is to have your men cooperate with you." 9 
The intellectual sources for this line of business thinking 
derived from the scientific-management movement of Fred­
erick W. Taylor and the emerging science of industrial 
psychology. Many businessmen, too, had seen for themselves 
during the war how patriotic fervor had stimulated pro­
duction. Far from being a fixed item, the workers' per­
formance seemed a prime point for improving industrial 
operations. The war also drew attention to the neglected 
problem of labor turnover. For the first time, many em­
ployers realized the high costs of replacing experienced men. 
In the 1920's a low turnover rate became an index of the 
effectiveness of a company's labor program. The handling 
of labor assumed major importance for American indus­
trialists. Successful management, Charles Schwab told an 
engineering audience, "is going to depend more and more 
upon the management of men than upon the organization of 
machines and other problems of practical engineering." The 
future engineer would find little challenge in the technical 
 Quoted, Gerard Swope MSS., Oral History Collection, Columbia 
University. 
9
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problems. "Industry's most important task in this day of 
large-scale production is management of men on a human 
basis." 10 
The industrial-relations movement attempted to place 
labor policy on a rational, organized basis. It created a pro­
fessional group of managers (led by such men as Clarence 
J. Hicks and Arthur H. Young) and experts (such as Indus­
trial Relations Counselors, Inc.) backed by college courses, 
research and publications, and professional organizations. 
It centralized labor administration in industrial-relations 
departments and defined an area of decision-making in the 
business enterprise comparable to sales, production, and 
finance. It rationalized the recruitment and handling of 
labor—above all, by stripping the foremen of the power to 
hire and fire. The National Industrial Conference Board 
emphasized "that the individual employee represents a 
definite investment, and that sound business principles 
require that the investment be capably handled in order that 
it may yield a fair return." Advanced businessmen saw 
personnel administration "not as frill or as a vehicle for 
the fulfillment of philanthropic impulses, but as a natural 
and business-like method of dealing with the work 
force to secure results." n 
Yet the new approach also buttressed the welfare phi­
losophy of big business. For labor's well-being contributed 
to industrial-relations objectives. Modern economic life 
created insecurities among employees, acknowledged E. K. 
Hall of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. 
"We must find ways and means to help our workers get 
their worries out of their minds so they can get on the job 
'rarin to go' " Freed from anxiety over accident and illness, 
old age and unemployment, men would work with a better 
10
 Law and Labor, X (January, 1928), 19. 
11
 National Industrial Conference Board, Industrial Relations (New York, 1931), p. 104. 
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will. Many employers placed great faith in stock ownership. 
"A sense of proprietorship affords a powerful incentive to 
arouse interest in the performance of work," pronounced 
Charles Schwab.12 And the contributing firm would reap 
further dividends in the form of low turnover, high quality 
recruits, and labor peace. Welfare found a business justi­
fication in the approach of personnel management and, 
since responsibility for such activities fell to industrial-
relations departments, also an administrative home. 
The welfare plans proliferating in the 1920's were 
designed to meet the major hazards of modern industrial 
life. One group of schemes encouraged men to acquire prop­
erty. Some companies operated savings plans, often with 
the incentive of high interest rates or special bonuses. Many 
firms adopted home-ownership plans that provided em­
ployees with various kinds of technical assistance and 
financial aid. Stock-purchasing plans exerted special appeal 
in the prosperous 1920's. Most schemes offered special 
inducements for employees to purchase and hold company 
stock. By 1927, 800,000 employees had invested over a bil­
lion dollars in 315 companies. Other programs protected 
workmen and their families from losses resulting from 
accident, illness, old age, and death. Group insurance valued 
at $7.5 billion covered close to six million workers in 1928. 
More than 350 companies gave pensions in 1929. Besides 
granting these basic protections, companies improved plant 
conditions and safety, provided medical services and visit­
ing nurses, underwrote sports and classes, distributed land 
for gardening, and assisted workmen in all manner of per­
sonal problems. The costs mounted high for major firms: 
U.S. Steel's expenditures averaged over ten million dollars 
a year in the 1920's. Such generosity, Judge Gary assured 
the stockholders in 1923, was justifiable "because it is the 
i2 Law and Labor, X (January, 1928), 15; XI (March, 1929), 53. 
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way men ought to be treated, and secondly because it pays 
to treat men in that way." 13 
Both considerations supported employee representation, 
the most celebrated labor experiment of the decade. The 
idea had found a small group of advocates before World 
War I, above all, in John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Overcoming a 
personal aversion to public speaking, the younger Rockefel­
ler lectured across the country about the plan introduced 
at his Colorado Fuel and Iron Company in the aftermath 
of a bloody miners' strike in 1913-14. World War I pro­
vided a more forceful influence. Urgently desiring labor 
peace, many employers became willing to experiment. Simul­
taneously, the government itself adopted a variant of the 
idea; in over 125 cases, the War Labor Board ordered com­
panies to instal shop committees. Although many smaller 
firms discarded the arrangement immediately after the 
Armistice, other employers were won over by employee 
representation, and a number of large companies—among 
them, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, International Har­
vester, Goodyear Tire and Rubber, Yale and Towne Manu­
facturing—voluntarily introduced the plan in 1918-19. Fol­
lowing the postwar labor crisis, 317 companies joined the 
movement by which workmen elected fellow workers to 
speak for them before management.14 
More than any other item in the program of welfare 
capitalism, employee representation was couched in ideal­
istic terms. When a strike broke out at the Consolidated 
Coal Company in Pennsylvania in 1922, the younger Rocke­
feller, a major stockholder, publicly denounced the opera­
tors for denying "their employees all voice and share in 
determining their working conditions and any adequate 
13
 United States Steel Corporation, Stockholders' Meeting, April 
16, 1923, p. 9. 
14
 National Industrial Conference Board, Collective Bargaining
Through Employee Representation (New York, 1933), pp. 12-13. 
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machinery for the uncovering and adjustment of grievances. 
The day has passed when such a position can justly be 
maintained in a country like ours. Employees in 
every industrial unit [have] a fundamental right, namely, 
the right to representation in the determination of those 
matters which affect their own interests." Rockefeller's 
letter, widely praised, reflected the thinking of enlightened 
employers. "Industrial democracy" had become a national 
byword during World War I. "It would be strange if the 
people of the United States came out of the War [for demo­
cracy in government] without any concessions to the grow­
ing demand for more democracy in industry," a steel trade 
journal had remarked.15 Bitterly divided on other matters, 
the President's Industrial Conference of October, 1919, was 
practically unanimous on the proposition that workingmen 
had a right to representation with employers. Employee 
representation continued to exert a powerful idealistic 
appeal throughout the 1920's. 
The practical benefits received equal emphasis. The 
National Industrial Conference Board reported that execu­
tives found plant morale significantly improved by employee 
representation. 
It facilitates quick adaptation to special or changing conditions, 
when passive opposition would bring about the failure of plans. 
It engenders greater interest in the job, which leads to the offer­
ing of suggestions as to short cuts and improvements that in the 
aggregate may mean considerable savings for the company. The 
works council provides a meeting place, where management and 
working force can consider calmly, on the basis of accurate infor­
mation rather than rumor, their respective positions and problems. 
Beyond the settlement of grievances and, better, their 
prevention, is the broader and more constructive accomplishment 
15
 Raymond B. Fosdick, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. (New York, 
1956), p. 179; Brody, Steelworkers in America, pp. 225-26. 
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of employee representation in welding together management and 
working force into a single, cohesive productive unit. 
Charles Schwab observed that Bethlehem's plan stimulated 
"constructive cooperation along the lines of increased effi­
ciency, elimination of waste, and improved methods and 
quality and quantity of products. Along with this develop­
ment has come a growth in morale and in sympathy and 
understanding between employees and officials." They had 
"an unobstructed channel through which their unity of 
interest may be promoted." 18 
Employee representation seemed the capstone of welfare 
capitalism. Its other activities advanced the material well­
being and personal security of workingmen. Employee 
representation catered to their minds. "The men must be 
dealt with as thinking men," Gerard Swope lectured to 
General Electric foremen. Through the representation plans, 
workers could air their grievances and ideas, and in turn 
receive an understanding of the policies of their employer. 
Employee representation, concluded a labor expert, rested 
on "the citizenship theory of labor relations." 17 
Employers of the 1920's explained their labor policies as 
an expression of right conduct and as an effort to raise 
industrial efficiency. But welfare capitalism meant more 
than that. It sustained a power system that granted man­
agement full authority over the terms of employment. Con­
temporary labor programs, remarked the economist Sum­
ner H. Slichter in 1929, "are one of the most ambitious 
social experiments of the age, because they aim, among 
other things, to counteract the effect of modern technique 
18
 National Industrial Conference Board, Collective Bargaining, 
pp. 39-40; Law and Labor, X (January, 1928), 16. 
17
 Swope MSS., Columbia Oral History Collection; Irving Bern­
stein, The Lean Years (Boston, 1960), p. 170. 
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upon the mind of the worker, to prevent him from becom­
ing class conscious and from organizing trade unions." This 
aim, more than considerations of humanity or efficiency, 
measured the ultimate value of welfare capitalism to most 
of its advocates.18 
When labor trouble threatened U.S. Steel in 1919, Judge 
Gary told the subsidiary presidents that "there is nothing 
we can do better than to be sure we are liberal in the protec­
tion of our workmen and their families. Make the 
Steel Corporation a good place for them to work and live." 
Fair and generous treatment would leave "no just ground 
for criticism on the part of those who are connected with 
the movement of unrest." Some benefits—housing, pensions, 
profit-sharing—gave men a specific stake in their jobs. But 
the entire welfare effort presumably made workers loyal 
and contented. Union leaders objected to such programs, a 
steel trade journal observed, "because they realized that it 
was resulting in non-union men becoming more closely 
attached to the companies by which they were employed." 
Personnel methods reduced the resentments common to 
industrial employment, guaranteeing equitable, orderly 
treatment to all and opportunity for training and advance­
ment to the talented few. "To the best men," remarked 
Sumner Slichter, "promotion thus becomes a more certain 
and often an easier way of gaining higher wages than is 
trade union action." 19 
Employee representation hit most directly at the union 
threat. In 1918 and 1919 many plans had been inaugurated 
to ward off an imminent danger of unionization. Immedi­
ately after the Armistice, Arthur H. Young warned the 
18
 Sumner Slichter, "The Current Labor Policies of American 
Industries," Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXXXII (May, 1929), 
432. 
19
 United States Steel Corporation, Meeting of Subsidiary Presi­
dents, January 21, 1919, pp. 21, 24, 33; Iron Age, June 3, 1920, p. 
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head of International Harvester that labor agitation was 
sure to intensify and grow more radical. He urged the 
quick adoption of his employee representation plan, not 
only to safeguard the company's open shop, but to serve as 
an example for American industry generally.20 In other 
cases where labor organization had established itself—for 
instance, the plants of the major meat packers and the shop 
crafts of the railroads—employee representation replaced 
the unions as they were driven out. Clearly, the plans were 
intended to substitute for trade unions, both as a justifica­
tion to the public and an answer to employee needs. 
The difference was, however, fundamental. The American 
Federation of Labor, said an industry spokesman in 1922, 
"requires a continuing state of war and the constant 
preaching of enmity and antagonism." The representation 
plans, on the other hand, "aimed at the settlement of dis­
putes on a basis of fairness and justice rather than by 
argument of superior force." Labor and management had 
mutual, not antagonistic, interests; and employee repre­
sentation would harmonize those interests. Differing in 
structure and even in emphasis, the plans agreed on one 
point: they did not diminish the power of employers. 
"Management must lead and must accept the responsibility 
for carrying on industry," said C. B. Seger of the U.S. 
Rubber Company in discussing employee representation. 
"Intelligent leadership, however, presupposes that leaders 
will keep those whom they lead informed and it presupposes 
also that they will be responsive to those led." Charles 
Schwab was privately blunt about Bethlehem's widely 
praised plan: "I will not permit myself to be in a position 
1608; Slichter, "The Current Labor Policies of American Industries," 
p. 433. 
20
 Ozanne, "A Century of Labor-Management Relations," chap, 
vii, p. 7. 
160 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: THE 1920's 
of having labor dictate to management." 21 Assuredly, labor 
did not under the company unionism of the 1920's. 
At the time, welfare capitalism seemed a sure guarantee 
of the existing power system of American industry. In 1929 
a business spokesman announced that "the end of the strike 
era is in sight, and that the next five years will see an 
unparalleled gain in relationships of mutual understanding 
and good will between employee and employer."22 The 
prediction could not have been more mistaken. Those five 
years marked the start of the industrial upheaval that 
would end in a powerful union movement and collective 
bargaining in American industry. Welfare capitalism would 
leave a permanent legacy of benefits to workingmen and 
of methods of personnel administration. But the welfare 
approach did not prevent American labor from turning 
against its employers and demanding a share of power in 
the industrial system. And that was the essential test of 
the labor relations of the 1920's. 
Why did welfare capitalism fail ? Historians have inclined 
to see an inherent weakness. Irving Bernstein, for instance, 
concludes: "The central purpose of welfare capitalism— 
avoidance of trade unionism—could be achieved only tem­
porarily because paternalism failed to come to grips with 
the main issue: a system of shop government placed in a 
climate of political democracy and universal suffrage."23 
Bernstein's thought is congenial to the modern view that 
deplores the arbitrary control of one man by another and 
that favors the division of private power among different 
voluntary groups. It is comforting to think that welfare 
21 Iron Age, Feb rua ry 2, 1922, p. 356; S. A. Lewisohn and P. T. 
Moon (eds . ) , "Constructive Experiments in Industr ia l Cooperation," 
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, IX ( January , 1922), 
545-46; A. Pound and S. T. Moore (eds.) , They Told Barron (New 
York, 1930). 
22 Nation's Business, XVII (April, 1929), 90. 
23 Bernstein, The Lean Years, p . 187. 
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capitalism never was a success, never persuaded the Ameri­
can workingman that he was best off as a ward of his 
employer, and never could have survived once wage earners 
received a free choice protected from employer retaliation. 
Welfare capitalism certainly fell short of the glowing 
claims of the speechmakers. It was, for one thing, a minor­
ity phenomenon, limited to the large prosperous firms. The 
methods of personnel management, widely introduced on 
a piecemeal basis, frequently lacked the essential adminis­
trative base. One survey found industrial-relations depart­
ments in 6.5 per cent of companies employing under 500 
men, in approximately 30 per cent of companies employing 
between 500 and 2,000 men, and in 50 per cent of those 
over 2,000. The National Industrial Conference Board 
reported that some welfare activities were quite general 
by the end of the decade: over 90 per cent of surveyed 
companies operated safety programs; 70 per cent, group 
insurance; 60 per cent, mutual aid associations. But only one 
out of five provided formal pension plans, stock-purchase 
opportunities, savings and loan facilities. There was simi­
larly a gap between promise and fulfilment on the matter 
of wages. As the decade passed, employers gave increasing 
public support to the "doctrine of high wages" (which "not 
only promote the happiness and welfare of the men, and 
secure their cooperation but also create purchasing 
power"). Yet even its strongest advocates failed to translate 
the idea into action: wages rose insignificantly during the 
1920's.24 Nor was there much improvement in hours. The 
most notable improvement occurred when the steel industry 
ended the twelve-hour day in 1923. The reform actually 
was forced on Judge Gary and his colleagues by the pres­
 National Industrial Conference Board, Effect of Depression on 
Industrial Relations Programs (New York, 1934), pp. 4-10; Na­
tional Industrial Conference Board, Industrial Relations, p. 54; 
American Iron and Steel Institute, Yearbook (1929), p. 33. 
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sure of public criticism and ultimately the intervention of 
President Harding himself. On the whole, welfare capi­
talists lacked sympathy for shorter hours, and the work 
week did not shrink appreciably during the 1920's. 
Nor was there reason to assume the perfect operation 
of the labor policies of the New Era. Employee representa­
tion was a case in point. At the end of the decade the plan 
covered a million and a half men, over 80 per cent of them 
in some forty companies with work forces of over 5,000. 
So the resources and professional help available to such 
large corporations gave a maximum chance for the success 
of employee representation. Yet rarely, if ever, did a mean­
ingful relationship result. Herbert Feis sat in on one 
meeting of the Employees Conference Committee at the 
Ivorydale plant of Proctor and Gamble. No important 
matters were discussed; no enthusiasm was displayed on 
either side. "The men are not reaching forward through 
the plan," concluded Feis; "the management has ceased to 
attempt any great achievement through it." 25 At Inter­
national Harvester and Colorado Fuel and Iron, promising 
plans likewise disappointed their creators.26 Significantly, 
all three had suffered from an identical betrayal during the 
severe recession of 1921: wage cuts made either arbitrarily 
or with the barest pretense of consultation. Other plans, 
begun hastily and with obvious ulterior purposes, had even 
less likelihood of achieving any real vitality. 
The shortcomings of welfare capitalism, both of com­
mission and execution, surely stemmed principally from 
the monopoly of power in employer hands. To that extent, 
modern historians correctly assessed welfare capitalism. 
Yet its failings did not mean an inability to ward off trade 
2 5
 Peis, Labor Relations, pp. 60, 71. 
 B. Selekman and M. Van Kleeck, Employes' Representation in 
Coal Mines (New York, 1924), pp. 247 ff.; Ozanne, "A Century of 
Labor-Management Relations," chap. vii. 
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unionism. Organized labor failed to recover the million and 
a half members lost during the severe postwar recession, 
not to speak of making further gains. "Our trade union 
movement is going through most extraordinary experi­
ences," John Frey of the AF of L wrote in bafflement in 
1929. "After business began to revive in 1923, it was found 
that the former method of organizing did not bring the 
same results as in previous years. New methods in 
organizing are required to meet the new conditions in 
industry which confronts [sic] us." 27 The newest, for which 
no improved technique would answer, was the evident satis­
faction of the American workingman with the status quo. 
Professor Sumner H. Slichter, a most sensible observer, 
considered organized labor's weakness as less the result 
of welfare benefits and industrial-relations techniques than 
of prevailing employment conditions. The 1920's was a 
time of steady work in a weak labor market, stable wages, 
and declining living costs, hence, modestly rising real earn­
ings.28 Those facts rendered less important the flaws of 
welfare capitalism, but not the concept itself. For welfare 
capitalism exceeded the sum of its formal activities. It was 
also an idea: that management accepted an obligation for 
the well-being of labor. For that, employers claimed credit 
in the 1920's, and they had some reason for so doing. The 
labor surplus and slipping living costs actually permitted 
wage-cutting, had employers so inclined. Charles Schwab 
told the American Iron and Steel Institute in May, 1929, 
that the industry's prosperity must be shared with labor: 
"We cannot give consideration to the responsibilities that 
repose upon us in the steel industry without being impressed 
with a real sense of trusteeship for hundreds of thou­
27 John Frey to F. Kummer, June 28, 1929, Frey Papers, Library 
of Congress. 
 Slichter, "The Current Labor Policies of American Industries," 
pp. 428, 430. 
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sands of families. We seek to prosper ourselves but above 
all we seek the welfare, progress and happiness of our 
people. (Applause)" That meant, he said, good wages and 
steady employment.29 
By every measure and every account, American workers 
wanted nothing more. "The desire for steady employment 
and higher earnings became more dominant in the minds 
of the workers than the feeling for industrial freedom and 
independence," admitted the labor expert Lewis Lorwin. 
In their study of "Middletown," the Lynds found that 
employed workingmen were content to enjoy their Fords 
and radios, indifferent to the concentration of power in 
their employers. Management made the same assessment. 
Ralph Easley of the National Civic Federation confidentially 
polled railroad officials in 1929, seven years after the bitter 
shopmen's strike: did they detect any revival of interest in 
trade unionism? Almost invariably (one railroader feared 
communist influence on his immigrant workmen) the 
answer came back a confident "no." "In our shops since 
the strike of 1922, the shop employees have been very 
quiet," wrote the head of the Chicago and Alton Railroad. 
"The employee is much happier than under the old [union] 
regime. He is a peaceful worker and a peaceful citizen 
and he wants to be let alone in that state." The statistics 
confirmed the absence of discontent. Industrial disputes in 
1929 involved less than a sixth the number of men in 1916, 
and a seventeenth the number in the peak year of 1919. 
The turnover rate had fallen sharply, according to one 1927 
survey running at 40 per cent of the prewar rate. 
To Sumner Slichter in 1929, paternalism unhappily 
seemed permanent; he could only suggest that it might 
better issue from the government than from private indus­
try. The Frenchman Andre Siegfried arrived at a similar 
29 American Iron and Steel Institute, Yearbook (1929), pp. 33, 
36-37. 
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conclusion: "The American workman, when he realizes that 
society assures him a comfortable income, is ready to accept 
the existing organization of industry." 30 But industry actu­
ally could not assure that income. Therein lay the fatal 
weakness—really akin to the sin of pride—of welfare capi­
talism. Employers confidently undertook responsibility for 
labor's well-being. That obligation, in the end, they could 
not fulfil. 
"Why work so hard for Mr. Hoover?" General Electric's 
Owen Young chided a political friend in September, 1928. 
"Not that he does not deserve it from his supporters, but 
perhaps he does not need it. Worse things can happen 
to a country than to have a liberal party in power once in 
a while. In any event, nothing very serious is going to 
happen to this country however the election turns out." 31 
Few employers of labor had any greater premonition of 
economic disaster. Fewer still made any provision to meet it. 
A month after the stock market crash in October, 1929, 
President Hoover called into conference Myron Taylor, 
Owen Young, Walter Teagle, Alfred P. Sloan, Pierre du 
Pont, and others of the nation's chief industrialists. Con­
fiding his fear that a general depression would follow the 
Wall Street crisis, the President asked for a pledge against 
wage-cutting. The magnates readily assented. Actually, they 
needed no White House prodding. Wage maintenance had 
become part of the doctrine of "stability" that governed 
the oligopolistic industries. On October 25, in the midst of 
the crash, Schwab had lectured the Iron and Steel Institute 
30
 Bernstein, The Lean Years, p . 8 1 ; Will iam G. Bai rd to Ralph 
Easley, Nov. 9, 1929, Nat ional Civic Federa t ion Pape r s , New York 
Public L ib ra ry ; Nat ional Indus t r ia l Conference Board, Industrial 
Relations, p . 14; Slichter, "The C u r r e n t Labor Policies of American 
Industr ies ," pp. 429, 435. 
31
 Owen D. Young to Marie M. Meloney, Sept. 22, 1928, Meloney 
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on the importance of maintaining prices. Noting that the 
industry's prosperity was unimpaired, Schwab joked about 
"the smile of uncertainty upon the faces of a few who 
thought last week they were very rich and not quite so 
rich this week (laughter)." But, he insisted, steel had a 
"stabilized price structure" based on manufacturing cost 
plus a fair rate of return on the investment. The big steel 
firms would not permit "slight but inevitable fluctuations" 
to "disturb the healthy balance that has been established." 
That necessarily held for wages as well. "If you are going 
to sell your goods and eliminate your profit and expect to 
get it out of the men in the mills you are greatly mistaken," 
U.S. Steel's J. A. Farrell sternly admonished those who 
proposed wage cuts six months after the crash. "Wages 
are not coming down in the steel industry. We all 
know that just as soon as they go down, if they should, 
Mr. Customer gets it." 32 Wage maintenance offered mani­
fold benefits—humanitarian, psychological, and economic 
(everyone was saying that consumption was the key to pros­
perity) . But the policy depended on industry determination 
to hold the price line. 
Employment lacked that amenability to managerial con­
trol. As demand fell, production had to fall and diminish 
the amount of available work. The depression hit the auto­
mobile and textile industries first, and then spread with 
increasing force to other sectors of the economy. In past 
depressions American industry had simply laid off excess 
men, and so did most smaller firms now. But the proponents 
of welfare capitalism undertook instead to spread the work. 
The rubber companies of Akron went on a six-hour day, 
and many companies shifted to eight hours at this time. 
The other approach was to rotate men. Using this method, 
 Herbert Hoover, Memoirs. The Great Depression, 1929-19H (New York, 1952), pp. 43-44; American Iron and Steel Institute, 
Yearbook (1929), pp. 294-97, 302, (1930), p. 42. 
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U.S. Steel maintained on its payroll 94 per cent of its 
regular work force in January, 1931, while it was operating 
below half of capacity. The roll of participating companies 
included probably every important exponent of welfare 
capitalism, and then enlisted others as work-spreading 
gained the support of the National Association of Manu­
facturers, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Hoover 
administration, and even spawned an organized Share-
The-Work movement. By 1933, according to a Commerce 
Department survey, work-sharing existed among four-
fifths of the countryys firms and created one-fourth of all 
part-time jobs.33 
Share-the-work naturally evoked the criticism that it 
merely made "the poor keep the poor." (Only the rarest 
of employers—the Kellogg Company, for instance—raised 
wages to compensate for the shorter hours.) Candid em­
ployers admitted some validity to the charge. But did critics 
offer them a better alternative? Nor did the plan let busi­
ness off so easily. A Bethlehem Steel executive listed the 
ways by which the company supplemented work-sharing— 
extending credit, making work, advancing pensions, pro­
viding garden plots and seed. And rotation of men had 
operational drawbacks. "If low cost production and profits 
were the only aim of industry in these days," said a business 
spokesman citing a typical case, "it would probably be 
wiser for the employer to keep 400 on at full time and 
let the least efficient 200 join the ranks of the wholly 
unemployed." That ruthless practice of past depressions 
"has given way to the belief that the human relationship 
must be considered." Paul W. Litchfield of Goodyear Tire 
and Rubber believed "the six hour day in most cases eco­
nomically unsound but as the rubber industry in Akron 
employs the bulk of workers engaged in industry, we are 
33
 Bernstein, The Lean Years, p. 479. 
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permitting social conditions to govern, and are trying to 
keep as many men at work as possible." Work-sharing in 
steel seemed to Charles Schwab an "unexampled achieve­
ment of management." "Our men have stuck by us through 
thick and thin, and we are going to stick by them." 34 
To some extent, that responsibility covered even the 
growing jobless numbers. In October, 1930, Schwab urged 
steel men to care "in part at least for those people who 
have no jobs at all. We should . take such measures 
as may be necessary to carry everybody connected with 
the steel industry safely through this depression." And 
Myron Taylor added inspirationally: 
We shall have to dig deep into our purses to assist those in 
want and who must be cared for. They shall be cared for! 
And we of this great industry will do generously our part in this 
great service to humanity! Let it be said of the steel indus­
try that none of its men is called upon to ask help of the public. 
(Applause) 
When the journalist William Hard visited Braddock, 
Pennsylvania, the following winter, he found U.S. Steel's 
Edgar Thomson Works dispensing groceries to 753 jobless 
employees, and other local plants were doing likewise. "Un­
employment is a responsibility of industry very largely," 
asserted a trade journal, "and industry should take the 
leadership in practical plans for relief." Some companies 
established loan funds (General Electric, Goodyear, Inter­
national Harvester, Standard Oil of New Jersey) or direct 
relief (Westinghouse) for unemployed men. Some attempted 
to select workmen for layoffs on a basis of need and num­
ber of dependents. Finally, a few firms (Standard Oil 
3* Nation's Business, XIX (February, 1931), 132, XX (October, 
1932), 32; Bernstein, The Lean Years, p. 478; American Iron and 
Steel Institute, Yearbook (1931), p. 32; Steel, Dec. 12, 1932, p. 13. 
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of New Jersey, American Rolling Mill, Hills Brothers) 
acknowledged a kind of property interest of long-term 
employees in their jobs and made money settlements to 
those who were permanently let go.35 
Meanwhile, management thinking turned to reform. Even 
in the 1920's, unemployment had drawn attention, partly 
because the problem existed in the midst of prosperity and 
partly because welfare capitalism emphasized the working­
man's security. Concrete results were negligible—only a 
bare thirteen companies started formal programs—but the 
main lines of private action did emerge. One avenue was 
an annual guarantee of work. In 1923 Proctor and Gamble 
began its famous plan of promising the employees of its 
soap-making plants 48 weeks of full-time work a year. 
Essentially, this approach challenged management to sta­
bilize operations and devise labor practices that would 
regularize employment. Lacking Proctor and Gamble's un­
usually stable market, few employers dared make guaran­
tees, but General Electric, Bethlehem Steel, and other firms 
did begin to improve job stability. Once the depression 
struck, the practices that had been developed were utilized 
generally in the work-sharing programs—for example, 
shifting men from department to department, cutting 
hiring to a minimum, building up inventories, and doing 
maintenance work in slack seasons. The other approach 
was to create an insurance reserve, either by the employer 
alone or on a matching basis with employees, that would 
provide unemployment benefits of limited duration. General 
Electric and fourteen Rochester firms, led by Eastman 
Kodak, introduced insurance plans during the first two 
depression years. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce thought 
 American Iron and Steel Institute, Yearbook (1930), pp. 252, 
545; Nation's Business, XIX (February, 1931), 128, 129, XX (Novem­
ber, 1932), 55; Electrical World, Nov. 7, 1931, p. 815; William Hard, 
"Ingots and Doles," Survey, Feb. 1, 1932, pp. 453-58. 
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these confirmed the expectation "that long-range provisions 
for unemployment are becoming a settled policy of American 
industry." 36 
Before the National Electrical Manufacturers Association 
on September 16, 1931, Gerard Swope of General Electric 
outlined the most ambitious private program to emerge 
from the crisis. His plan incorporated the two basic con­
cepts of employment stabilization and insurance reserves 
(as well as provisions for workmen's compensation, life 
insurance, and pensions), but placed them in an unprece­
dentedly broad context. Swope argued that the individual 
firm could not cope effectively with unemployment. Stabili­
zation required industry regulation through trade associa­
tions, which in turn would come under some form of 
federal supervision. Unemployment insurance had to be on 
a national basis so that coverage continued when a man 
moved from job to job. The Swope plan evoked tremendous 
interest, partly because of its controversial features. What­
ever the dangers (especially regarding the proto-NRA 
aspects) he found in the proposals, the enlightened busi­
nessman could not question that Swope was right in his 
urgent concern over unemployment. "That this condition 
has ever been present in such periods detracts nothing from 
its wrongness. That industry must first ameliorate and 
untimately eliminate it, must be the reaction of every one 
who gives thought to what is taking place." 37 
s« Nation's Business, XVIII (August, 1930), 11, XIX (April, 1931), 
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Had the economy revived at about the time of Swope's 
speech, welfare capitalism would have emerged unscathed, 
indeed, enhanced. "This depression has shown us the extent 
to which business has become conscious of and accepted 
its social responsibility," wrote a Chamber of Commerce 
editorialist. "The employer has learned that labor is some­
thing more than a commodity to be bought in the cheapest 
market." Schwab expected that "the far-sighted and sound 
handling of our workers' interests will stand out in 
bold relief as the major accomplishment of American 
management today." By maintaining wages and spreading 
employment, business was "keeping our economic organi­
zation in orderly condition and guarantee [d] the purchasing 
power of the public as soon as better conditions resume." 
But conditions did not improve. They worsened, and 
worsened further, and bumped down finally to an un­
imagined bottom of economic stagnation. In 1932 auto 
production dropped to 20 per cent of capacity, steel to an 
incredible 15 per cent. After that terrible year, Schwab 
considered it "a tribute to the sagacity and flexibility" of 
the steel industry's leaders "that most of our companies are 
still intact, despite huge losses." 38 But, in the meanwhile, 
welfare capitalism fell into an irredeemable shambles. 
The economic collapse cut short any progress toward 
private unemployment insurance. Few companies followed 
the lead of General Electric and the Rochester firms. To 
supplement General Electric's relief and insurance efforts, 
Gerard Swope persuaded his board of directors to approve 
a guarantee of minimum earnings of half of normal for 
six months beginning November, 1931. "Conditions became 
steadily worse," Swope recalled years later, "and I was 
very thankful when the six months guarantee period ended. 
Nation's Business, XX (February, 1932), 14-15; American 
Iron and Steel Institute, Yearbook (1933), p. 28. 
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This was too ambitious a plan for any one company 
to undertake." Nor did he have greater success with his 
grand plan for industry-wide action. He continued to urge 
it, but, as he himself admitted, "not with very much effect." 
While industry remained inactive, sentiment was building 
up for public unemployment insurance; it gained the sup­
port of Governor Roosevelt of New York, was intensively 
studied by the Ohio Commission on Unemployment Insur­
ance, and even passed into law in Wisconsin. The threat 
renewed employer support for private insurance in the early 
months of 1933. Admitting past error, Schwab asserted 
that the steel industry would build up reserves "to help 
meet any future depression." If laws were passed, they 
"should be so drawn as not to affect or impair voluntary 
activity by forward-looking industries. Otherwise, years of 
progress and voluntary action would be endangered." 39 As 
a seasoned businessman, Schwab should have known better 
than to try to trade on exhausted credit. 
The immediate antidepression measures likewise were 
failing. The wage line could not be held. In steel, prices 
moved downward despite pleas from industry leaders. The 
fact was that money was still to be made by a few tightly 
run, ruthlessly competitive firms like E. T. Weir's National 
Steel Corporation. And wage rates crept downward as part 
of the hard game. "I think it is a pretty cheap sort of 
business when men are working three days a 
week, and then cut that three days a week another 10 
percent," exploded James Farrell of U.S. Steel before the 
Steel Institute in May, 1931. "Now that is not the idea 
of the old line companies." But they were soon obliged to 
follow. When U.S. Steel announced a 10 per cent cut effec­
39
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tive October 1, 1931, wage maintenance died in steel and 
in industry generally. A few weeks later, Ford abandoned 
the seven-dollar day (which he had dramatically proclaimed 
after Hoover's request for wage stability in November, 
1929) and by November, 1932, had the minimum down to 
four dollars. Average hourly earning for production workers 
in manufacturing fell from 51.5 cents in 1931 to 44.2 cents 
in 1933. The collapse of wage maintenance revealed the 
vulnerability of even the largest companies. "None of us 
can escape the inexorable law of the balance sheet," Schwab 
admitted after the first reduction in steel. And after a sec­
ond in the spring of 1932: "We cannot escape the dictates 
of present conditions." 40 
Corporate helplessness had far worse consequences on 
employment. Work sharing became hardly more than a 
cruel joke as production dried up. In the winter of 1931, 
Goodyear employees were working eighteen hours a week. 
Bethlehem Steel acknowledged in December, 1931, that 
under its rotation plan men "are now getting [less] than 
is necessary to sustain life." How much worse, then, was 
their plight ten months later when the company's operations 
had fallen nearly 90 per cent while its regular work force 
remained only 15 per cent below normal. Meanwhile, the 
jobless rolls lengthened alarmingly, especially in the heavy 
industries. General Motors had employed an average of 
233,286 people in 1929, 116,152 in 1932; Ford, 101,069 in 
1929, 56,277 in 1932. In some desolated industrial towns 
the employed worker became a rarity; the steel center of 
Donora, Pennsylvania, had 277 persons at work out of a 
population of 13,900 in March, 1932. Total jobless estimates 
crept upward from eight million in July, 1931, to a sicken­
ing fifteen million in March, 1933—one out of three in the 
i0
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labor force. Long before that, the industrial giants had 
ceased to talk about caring for their own, or even assuming 
that the relief task could be handled with local resources. 
In June, 1932, leading Chicagoans pleaded for federal relief 
for their city: the list included the heads of Armour, 
Wilson, Cudahy, International Harvester, Inland Steel, 
Bendix, and U.S. Gypsum.41 
The situation was actually worse than it seemed in 
Chicago and New York corporation offices. Industrial 
workers were not only losing hope in the promise of 
welfare capitalism; many were turning actively and fiercely 
against their employers. They did so despite the patently 
good intentions of management, for depression had the 
peculiar effect of spoiling even honest acts of benevolence. 
The fact was not obvious at a distance; close up, it could 
be perceived here and there. 
In May, 1931, 2,000 workers spontaneously walked out 
of a rubber-goods plant in Mishawaka, Indiana, not far 
from South Bend. The strike bewildered the management. 
The plant boasted a long history of good labor relations, 
first as an independent firm, and now under the control of 
U.S. Rubber, a leading practitioner of welfare capitalism. 
When hard times hit the plant in 1930, the company did its 
best to protect the workers through work sharing. "As a 
matter of fact," wrote Cyrus S. Ching, the able labor rela­
tions chief of U.S. Rubber, "I believe that in our efforts 
to take care of the situation, the management may have 
gone further than what might have been considered good 
business." Making a significant concession to end the strike, 
the open-shop company agreed to discuss grievances with 
an employees' committee elected by secret ballot. "We have 
the extreme desire for the good will of the employees," a 
4i Nation's Business, XX (November, 1932), 55; Bernstein, The 
Lean Years, pp. 317, 467; Nevins and Hill, Ford: Expansion and 
Challenge, pp. 587, 588; Law and Labor, XIV (January, 1932), 6. 
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company representative assured the committee in Septem­
ber. At that very time a federal conciliator found the 
workers dangerously angry. Three of "the best type men" 
warned him that they would kill the superintendent if 
they went out again. Notwithstanding its best efforts, the 
company found itself sitting on a powder keg. 
The depression had demanded a series of hard decisions. 
"With a greatly reduced amount of business, and with a 
reduction in the price of goods, the need of economies has 
been felt more than ever before," explained the super­
intendent. To meet the competition, he embarked on a 
drastic program, introducing new equipment and methods, 
cutting wages an average 10 per cent after a survey of 
day and piece rates, hiring an industrial engineer to start 
time-and-motion studies, and, finally, replacing straight 
piece work with a task-and-bonus system that figured earn­
ings on an hourly basis plus a bonus for all production 
over the standard fixed by time-and-motion methods. The 
new pay plan set off the rebellion in May. The strikers 
charged that the standards were impossibly high, that many 
operatives had to start an hour or two early to make an 
efficiency rating that would keep them on the payroll, and 
that earnings fell from a third to a half for much more 
work. Company explanations and assurances did not lessen 
the hatred for "the heartless and inhuman task and bonus 
system." 
The management faced a bitter predicament. The same 
depression conditions that called forth humane efforts 
demanded tough business decisions. What was worse, the 
benevolent acts themselves compounded the trouble. Had 
they cut the ranks ruthlessly so as to give the remaining 
employees full-time work, the Mishawaka managers felt 
that the task-and-bonus system would have operated better 
and raised no opposition. Other well-meant measures like­
wise backfired. The company had agreed to shift some men 
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to female jobs to keep them employed, and soon came under 
attack for paying them starvation wages. 
If we had laid those fellows off at the time we didn't have any of 
their kind of shoes and built up production on Savoys with 
women, we would have saved ourselves a lot of grief. And 
we didn't have the work for them, we could have laid them off 
legitimately. 
When the managers reacted accordingly, they merely 
worsened matters. The second period of labor trouble in 
September, 1931, occurred because of the layoff of fifty 
men. The employees' committee requested further work 
spreading and, when the company refused on the ground 
that it wanted to assure enough work for the remaining 
workers over the winter, accused the management of dis­
criminating against union men. In May, 1932, the firm had 
to cut wages another 15 per cent, but provided that the 
reduction would operate only in those weeks when the 
men had four days' work, doubtless hoping thereby to 
guarantee a living wage. The men, however, believed it 
was a trick. Certain that the company would schedule 
just enough work to effectuate the reduction, they went on 
strike again. So the bitterness deepened despite company 
pleas that "we haven't been selfish. We have perfectly 
clean hands." 42 
This was the terrible irony: just as everything redounded 
to management's credit in the 1920's, so now to its discredit 
in the depression. The Mishawaka experience was excep­
tional only because it resulted in overt trouble (possibly 
42
 Correspondence, memoranda, and minutes of company meetings
with employees' committee, 1931-32, Mishawaka plant, United States 
Rubber Company, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service Files, 
Record Group 174, National Archives. 
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because of the presence of both union and communist senti­
ment) . But everywhere resentment was silently building up. 
When it burst out under the aegis of the New Deal, the 
air would be filled with charges of inhuman speed-up, of 
ruthless rate-cutting, of rampant favoritism in the disposi­
tion of work. These grievances sharpened the edge of 
bitterness over the basic complaint of unemployment. 
On January 18, 1933, Goodyear's Paul W. Litchfield 
confided to a friend "that we are drifting like a rudderless 
ship into waters that become more and more dangerous. 
There appears to be an increasing spirit of dejection and 
disillusionment wherever one goes. The problem of 
unemployment is underlying all other ills." Litchfield's 
despair was partly over the intense suffering during the 
terrible third winter of depression. (The most poignant 
expression of that sympathy was an earlier outburst by 
Daniel Willard of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad that, 
if he were a jobless worker with a family, he would steal 
before he would starve.) But it sprang also from a sense 
of helplessness in the face of economic collapse. Welfare 
capitalism rested ultimately on confidence in the strength 
of the big employers. They guaranteed the well-being of 
their workmen, and in turn received loyalty and good will. 
But the guarantee had not been honored. In August, 1932, 
Myron Taylor observed that U.S. Steel was "at the mercy 
of business just like any other corporation." 43 It was a 
fatal admission for welfare capitalism. 
Careful observers read the signs of the future. In June, 
1929, a shrewd labor official, John Frey, had felt defeated 
 P. W. Litchfield to Ralph Easley, Jan. 18, 1933, National Civic 
Federation Papers; Fortune, XIII (June, 1936), 113. The formal 
welfare activities tended to be cut back to only a surprisingly small 
extent; the stock purchase plans, naturally enough, were the chief 
victims of the depression. National Industrial Conference Board, 
Effect of Depression on Industrial Relations Programs, passim. 
43
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by "the development of cunningly devised schemes for 
making trade unionism difficult to maintain." Two years of 
depression changed Frey's mind about union prospects. 
So many workmen here have been lulled to sleep by the 
company union, the welfare plans, the social organizations fos­
tered by the employer that they had come to look upon the 
employer as their protector, and had believed vigorous trade 
union organization unnecessary for their welfare. When we get 
out of this depression I look forward to a period of organi­
zing much more extensive than any we have ever had except 
during the period of the war. 
The fact is that the existing banking and industrial system 
has failed to justify the faith people have placed in them. The 
capitalist system as represented by these institutions have [sic'] 
broken down for the time being.44 
But Frey, no more than anyone else, estimated the force 
with which labor would shortly turn on American industry. 
Welfare capitalism could not sustain the management-
dominated system of labor relations. The failure was not 
inherent in its functioning in the 1920's, but sprang rather 
from an extraordinary turn in the business cycle. Ameri­
can industrial relations might well have continued on its 
paternalistic course but for the Great Depression. 
** John Frey to P. Kummer, June 28, 1929, July 28, Oct. 29, 1931,
Frey Papers. 
The Fundamentalist Defense of the Faith 
PAUL A. CARTER 
THE shambling defense attorney, hooking a thumb under 
one of his red galluses, with his other hand held out for 
inspection a lump of rock laden with fossil shells. When 
he claimed, in defiance of Bible chronology, that the relic 
was ten million years old, the large, balding, wide-mouthed 
man on the witness stand retorted: "It is better to trust 
in the Rock of Ages than to know the ages of the rocks"; 
and an excited member of the audience shouted, "Amen!" 
But the year was not 1925, and this scene was not played 
in Dayton, Tennessee, during the trial of Tennessee v. John 
Thomas Scopes. It took place thirty years later when a 
land-grant college troupe put on the play Inherit the Wind, 
with its re-creation of the celebrated "monkey trial," in 
their home state; and that "Amen!", however disconcert­
ingly it might have rung in the ear of an eastern intellectual 
liberal, was also "audience involvement" to a degree that 
the theater aims at but does not always attain.1 
 I have this incident from a member of the show's cast. A slightly
different account, making it "the road company" of the Broadway 
play to which this happened, is in Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellcc­
tualism in American Life (New York, 1963), p. 129. 
1
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Equally spontaneous was a line uttered on a fine spring 
day in 1962 by one of a group of university students who 
were gathered at the river, not for baptisms and prayers, but 
for that most modish of New Frontier recreations, water­
skiing. Strengthened by a Lutheran confirmation class text­
book, with its assurance that God had "created the many 
species of plants and animals," which were "not the result 
of a natural development from a single form, as claimed 
by the evolutionary theory," 2 one shapely coed pointed a 
painted toenail at some green algae at the water's edge 
and declared, "I'm glad I don't have to believe we're 
descended from that." 
These incidents suggest that historians of Fundamen­
talism, myself included, have erred in describing that move­
ment as a spent or dying force.3 But Thomas C. Oden, a 
seminary professor who taught in a region of the United 
States where "the fastest-growing religious communities" 
were "not the defensive 'status quo' churches of culture-
Protestantism (Presbyterian, Methodist, Disciples, and 
others) but such aggressive fundamentalist groups as the 
Churches of Christ, Pentecostals and Jehovah's Witnesses," 
reminded us once again in 1962 that "world views already 
discarded by the intelligentsia have a way of perpetuating 
themselves far beyond their expected life span." Bibli­
cal Fundamentalism "maintains remarkable grass-roots 
strength among the organization men and the industrialized 
mass society of the 20th century," Oden wrote, and "it 
would be a sad illusion for liberal Protestantism"—and for 
2
 Jacob Tanner, The Junior Confirmation Book (Minneapolis, 1943; 
tenth printing, 1953), p. 6.
3
 Church historians have been more observant than many of 
their secular colleagues on this point: cf., e.g., Sydney E. Ahlstrom, 
"Continental Influences on American Christian Thought Since World 
War I," Church History, XXVII (1958), 257. 
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the secular academic intellectual, he should have added— 
"to imagine seriously that fundamentalism is dead." * 
Perhaps the continuing power of the movement appears 
most vividly when one looks away from the conventional 
old-line Protestant denominations and observes, in almost 
any American city today, the proliferation of Assemblies 
of God, "holiness" churches, gospel missions, Bible taber­
nacles, Soul-Saving Stations, and iglesias pentecostales, all 
often housed in the store-front churches characteristic of 
Harrington's poverty-stricken "other America," but also 
(and increasingly) erecting churches that are of substantial 
architecture, or purchasing older houses of worship that 
were originally built for "mainstream" congregations. And 
in the "mainstream" itself there has been the phenomenon 
of Mr. Billy Graham, hobnobbing with Presidents and ex­
changing pleasantries before the camera with Jack Benny 
and Jack Paar. 
It is hard to imagine Billy Sunday playing quite so urbane 
a role, and it is therefore sometimes suggested that the 
latter-day evangelist ought to be distinguished from his 
predecessors by some such term as "neo-fundamentalism." 
But Billy Graham attended three fundamentalist colleges, 
taking his major in anthropology from professors who 
taught him that the theory of evolution was false; and one 
has but to observe the man in action, with the Book as 
his only stage prop and with his almost liturgical reitera­
tion, "The Bible teaches us ," to be reminded that the 
prefix "neo-" qualifies the word "fundamentalism" a good 
deal less than it does the word "orthodoxy." 5 
4
 Thomas C. Oden, "Fundamentalism's Weak Christology," Chris­
tian Century, LXXIX (1962), 1350 f. 
5
 William G. McLoughlin, Modern Revivalism: Charles Grandison 
Finncy to Billy Graham (New York, 1959), p. 477, uses the word 
"neofundamentalism" to describe the movement after World War II; 
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Moreover, the intent faces picked out of the crowd in 
the telecast of a Graham "crusade" are as likely to be those 
of people from Cleveland or Boston as they are to be those 
of people from "down South" or "out West". The Southern 
Baptist Convention, in which Graham was ordained, has 
long since broken out of the South to plant flourishing new 
congregations as far afield from the classic "Bible belt" as 
Hawaii, Alaska, and Maine. In the sixties it surpassed 
the combined northern and southern membership of the 
Methodist church and became the largest Protestant de­
nomination in the United States,6 still numbering many a 
Fundamentalist, young and old, in its ranks, some of them 
in positions of denominational power.7 As for Fundamen­
talism "out West," the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, 
among major Lutheran bodies in America the one in which 
resistance to the theory of evolution has been most stoutly 
maintained,8 in our own times has not only remained an 
important social and political force in many midwestern 
and High Plains states but also, like the Southern Baptists, 
has new parishes thriving everywhere, including such 
unlikely places as southern New England and suburbia. 
but in further discussion he shifts to categories of "ultra'' and 
"moderate" fundamentalism, terms that would have been equally 
applicable to the fundamentalism of the twenties. On Billy Graham's 
own use of the word "fundamentalist" vide ibid., p. 501. 
6 The Methodist church, 10,234,986; the Southern Baptist Con­
vention, 10,395,940. Time, May 8, 1964, p. 74. But Claire Cox, writer 
on religion for United Press-International in New York, reminds us, 
in The New-Time Religion (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1961), p. 23, that 
"electronic brains can tell man in a moment how many days it will
take him to get to the moon, but when it comes to determining how
many persons are affiliated with religious organizations, statisticians 
might just as well be counting on their fingers."
7
 For an example of the exercise of this power as recently as 1962, 
see the editorial, "A Desecration of Liberty," Christian Century,
LXXIX (1962), 1375 f. 
8
 For evidence of this continuing resistance, see Lutheran Witness 
Reporter, official organ of the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, I (May 9, 1965), pp. 2, 3, and passim. 
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Nor has this continuing conservatism been limited to 
clergymen. Anticlerical liberalism (in America, as elsewhere) 
perennially imagines a democratic and common-sensical 
people who would rid themselves quickly of religious bigotry 
and backwardness were it not for the machinations of 
reactionary priestcraft; there is more than a touch of this 
in Stanley Kramer's filmed version of Inherit the Wind, 
for example. But a Methodist pastor, writing in 1957 of 
"the cleavage between the beliefs of the average church­
goer and his minister," insisted that it was the clergy of 
his generation, educated by the seminaries "far beyond the 
understanding and religious position of the laity," whose 
personal religious convictions were often "far more liberal 
and unorthodox than they would dare to admit in public" 9 
—a judgment which, if valid, would suggest that Funda­
mentalism at mid-century may be even more pervasive than 
the mere persistence of preaching that relies for its proof 
upon the biblical text would indicate. 
Surprise, and sometimes alarm, at the vitality of "that 
old-time religion"—and particularly at its adoption by the 
young—have characterized intellectuals' encounters with 
Fundamentalism from the beginning. One pilgrim to the 
South in the summer of 1964, from New York's Union 
Theological Seminary, told with obvious concern of having 
met "persons who had renounced the training they had 
once received [as Episcopalians, no less!] in favor of 
a biblical and ethical fundamentalism strong enough to 
chill the heart of anyone who dreamed that an advance 
had been made beyond the Scopes Trial." 10 
The Scopes trial in its day had similarly come in some 
quarters as a rude awakening. "We thought that forty 
years ago in America religion had become adjusted to the 
 James B. Moore, "Why Young Ministers Are Leaving the 
Church," Harper's Magazine, CCXV (July, 1957), 66. 
10
 Letter to the editor, Christian Century, LXXXI (1964), 1338. 
9
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evolutionary theory," the president of Brown University 
wrote in 1923, "as it was adjusted in the sixteenth century 
to the far more startling Copernican theory"; instead, he 
noted by way of current example, "in one college a new 
professor happened in his first lecture casually to use the 
terrifying word 'Evolution.' Whereupon the whole class 
hissed him." n In 1927 Granville Hicks interviewed Hilyer 
Straton, son of one of the leading fundamentalist pulpit 
performers of the day, and was taken aback to learn that 
along one sector of the battle line no "Revolt of Youth" 
was taking place: "Half my crowd Sunday evenings are 
under twenty-five," the youthful minister declared. "Do 
you think the modern generation is bound for the dogs?" 
Hicks asked him. Young Straton smiled—and well he might, 
as an enthusiastic student minister with a busy Philadelphia 
parish turning out for two preaching services every Sun­
day—and replied, "That's where Father and I disagree." 12 
In the first article of a series on "The War in the 
Churches," published in 1923, Rollin Lynde Hartt painted a 
portrait of the liberal intellectuals, many of them "dwellers 
in apartments looking out across the Gothic quadrangle [s] 
of famous theological seminaries," who vibrated between 
"underestimating the enemy's strength" (or his intelli­
gence) on the one hand, and, on the other, giving way to 
panic, and perhaps to compensatory overestimates of 
Fundamentalism's strength, when they experienced the 
movement in its raw and vigorous reality; or discovered, 
as Glenn Frank did in the thick of the fight, that orthodox 
leaders seemed to have a "much better sense of generalship 
than liberals. The Fundamentalists have succeeded in 
11
 William H. P. Faunce, "Freedom in School and Church,'' 
World's Work, XLV (1923), 509. 
12
 Granville Hicks, "The Son of a Fundamentalist Prophet," 
Christian Register, CVI (1927), 197. "Father" in this case was 
John Roach Straton, of whom more anon. 
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giving the liberal and intelligent leaders of the church the 
appearance of renegades." Hartt thought it significant that 
Fundamentalist and Modernist each accused the other of 
being heavily subsidized—an explanation that permitted 
both sides to escape the logical dilemma of how a view 
regarded as unpopular should seem to be so widely accepted. 
Much of the liberal polemic of the twenties contained the 
ambivalent notion that Fundamentalism was both dying in 
ill repute and at the same time dangerously threatening to 
prevail.13 Harry Elmer Barnes, for example—a liberal by 
the canons of the twenties—asserted in the Preface to The 
Tioilight of Christianity that Fundamentalism had "burned 
its bridges behind it" and that it was "only a matter of 
time until it must decay and disintegrate." Two hundred 
pages later, however, he was not so sure: "The situation 
is likely to get worse, as the figures indicate that the sects 
harboring the Fundamentalists are those which are growing 
most rapidly." In like manner Kirsopp Lake, professor in 
the Harvard Divinity School, conceding Fundamentalism's 
"energy, determination, organization, and clearly in­
telligible position," predicted that in the long run the 
"Modernist" view of religion would no doubt prevail, but 
it might be a very long run indeed: "If any one of the 
parties wins completely and speedily, it is likely to be the 
Fundamentalists." And in Religion in Human Affairs, a 
book intended as a text for university courses in sociology, 
Clifford Kirkpatrick prophesied: "Doubtless each successive 
generation will contain a smaller and smaller proportion of 
aggressive Fundamentalists"; but he then recalled how the 
scientific-minded nineteenth century had somehow produced 
13 Rollin Lynde Hartt, "The War in the Churches," World's Work, 
XLVI (1923), 473; "Fighting for Infallibility," ibid., XLVII (1923­
24), 52. Glenn Prank's statement, from Century Magazine, CVI (1923), 637 ff., was reprinted in Eldred C. Vanderlaan (ed.), 
Fundamentalism versus Modernism (New York, 1925), pp. 92 f. 
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Joseph Smith14 and Mary Baker Eddy, and wondered, "Who 
can tell what religious leaders, prophets and messiahs will 
arise to lead men back to the old ways of thought" in the 
twentieth or twenty-first?15 
Stewart Cole, the first historian of Fundamentalism, 
concluded his study with the observation that the recent 
controversy in the church had "changed few minds." Prob­
ably there remained in 1931 "as many conservative believers 
as there were two decades ago." Cole criticized the liberals 
of his day for having "resorted to the logical rather than 
the psychological method" in evaluating the faith of their 
orthodox brethren. They had weighed fundamentalist doc­
trines in the balance of science and scholarship and found 
them "contrary to genuinely modern beliefs," Cole con­
cluded; and then they had committed the intellectual's 
characteristic blunder of assuming that if only other men's 
thought processes were informed and enlightened, general 
agreement would result. But to bring Protestant church­
goers "abreast of the problems and ideals that characterize 
the age," Cole predicted, would be "an exceedingly heavy 
educational task" for the next generation of church leaders 
—a task which, judging from the continuing strength of 
Fundamentalism into the fifties and sixties, those leaders 
failed to accomplish.18 Indeed, the problem for the historian 
14
 No account of Fundamentalism's impact on twentieth-century 
America would be complete without some mention of Mormonism,
which has long outgrown its purely regional significance, but remains
thoroughly literalist in outlook — indeed, to the Fundamentalists' 
literally inspired scriptures it adds several others of its own. My 
own high-school class's baccalaureate sermon was preached by a 
Latter Day Saints stake president who went out of his way to con­
fute Darwin, dramatically reading from Genesis 1 and closing the 
pulpit Bible with a thump.
15
 Harry Elmer Barnes, The Twilight of Christianitii (New York, 
1929), pp. vi, 219; Kirsopp Lake, The Religion of Yesterday and 
To-morrow (Boston, 1925), pp. 159 ff.; Clifford Kirkpatrick, Reli­
gion in Human Affairs ("Wiley Social Science Series"; New York, 
1929), pp. 399, 481. 
16
 Stewart G. Cole, The History of Fundamentalism (New York, 
1931), pp. 325, 328 f., 337. 
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of the twenties is not so much one of accounting for the 
later decline of Fundamentalism, as Cole, Norman Furniss, 
and Ray Ginger have assumed,17 as it is one of discerning 
elements in the movement that account for its continuing 
vitality. 
The showdown between Fundamentalism and Modernism 
was long in the making.18 Sixty-six years had elapsed 
between the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species and 
its constitutional testing (so to speak) in the Scopes trial. 
But as early as 1873, Charles Hodge, the formidable 
Princeton theologian, had rhetorically asked, "What is 
Darwinism?" and answered himself, "It is Atheism." 19 On 
the other side of the fence, Phillips Brooks had written 
from Boston in 1887 that he was "more and more sure 
that the dogmatic theology in which I was brought up"— 
well before the Civil War, since Brooks was born in 1835 
and ordained deacon in 1859—"was wrong." A biographer 
of Phillips Brooks added a footnote detailing the issues 
over which his subject had diverged from that dogmatic 
theology, and these turn out to have included "its literal 
theory of inspiration and its conception of Scripture as a 
whole; its indifference to intellectual culture; its insistence 
upon the necessity of acknowledging a theory of the Atone­
ment"; and its tendency to limit church fellowship to the 
"Ibid., pp. 309 ff.; Norman F. Furniss, The Fundamentalist 
Controversy, 1918-1931 (New Haven, Conn., 1954), p. 181, and the 
same author's essay in H. H. Quint et al. (eds.), Main Problems in 
American History (Homewood, 111., 1964), II, 200; Ray Ginger, Six 
Days or Forever? Tennessee v. John Thomas Scopes (Boston, 1958; 
paper, New York, 1960), p. 182. Cf. the Afterword at the end of 
this essay. 
18
 Robert T. Handy argues convincingly that the controversy had 
been coming to a boil ever since the original settlement of North 
America. "Fundamentalism and Modernism in Perspective," Religion
in Life, XXIV (1955), 381 ff. 
19
 Quoted in Frank Hugh Foster, The Modern Movement in 
American Theology (New York, 1939), p. 47. Foster was a partici­
pant in most of the controversies he describes. 
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"elect"—all adding up to a dissent from a point of view 
that unmistakably foreshadowed modern Fundamentalism.-" 
The heresy trials that shook the Protestant churches, and 
particularly their theological seminaries, in the eighties and 
nineties are also a part of this story; and it must be noted 
of those earlier controversies that by and large the Moder­
nists had won them. Going further than mere Modernism 
in his attacks on orthodoxy had been the itinerant free­
thinker Robert G. Ingersoll, as archetypal a figure of the 
Gilded Age as the shoe salesman-turned evangelist, Dwight 
L. Moody; and while the multitudes at Moody's public meet­
ings were singing Ira Sankey's gospel hymns, a host of 
critics, more systematic if less eloquent than Ingersoll, had 
quietly been thinking out a world view that left little if any 
place for "that old-time religion." In short, the world in 
which the famous "five points" of Fundamentalism21 were 
put forth in 1895 was a world that subjected all such con­
cepts to devastating attack—sometimes in sorrow, some­
times in anger, sometimes even by inadvertence, but always 
unremitting and inescapable. 
There is a sense in which it can be said that with­
out Modernism—and the anticlerical scientism that went 
beyond it—there could have been no Fundamentalism, in 
precisely the sense that without the New Deal-New Frontier 
—and the anticapitalist philosophies that went beyond them 
—there could have been no Goldwater Republicanism. 
Fundamentalism is not simply "the old-time religion"; the 
-" A. V. G. Allen, Life and Letters of Phillips Brooks (New York, 
1901), III, 252. 
21
 The version of the "five points" adopted as a "deliverance" (resolution) by the northern Presbyterian General Assembly of 1910 
lists the following: the infallibility of the Bible, the virgin birth of 
Christ, the substitutionary atonement, Christ's bodily resurrection,
and the factuality of miracles. Full text reprinted in E. C. Vanderlaan(ed.), Fundamentalism versus Modernism, p. 21. Earlier versions 
than the one of 1910 made the second coming of Christ one of the Five
Points. (Although it lies just beyond the scope of the present essay, 
a study of the relationship between Fundamentalism per se and 
apocalyptic millennialism would add much to our understanding of 
religion and society in America.) 
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mere affirmation of an inherited tradition is not at all the 
same thing as the affirmation of that tradition (or a more 
or less reasonable facsimile) after it has gone through a 
period of public eclipse by a rival faith. One can thus speak 
of Fundamentalism as "new" in the twentieth century, 
despite the relative antiquity of orthodox Protestantism, 
in the same way one can speak of a "new" American right 
in the time of the Cold War, despite the relative antiquity 
of orthodox laissez faire economics. 
It would be easy to push this parallel one step further, 
and simply identify Fundamentalism as the religious version 
of radical rightism. The continuing vitality of the one could 
then be seen as a function of the recurrent upsurges of the 
other, and we could settle back into the familiar groove of 
an economic or psychosocial interpretation of history. To 
put the matter into fundamentalist language, "Ye shall 
know them by their fruits" (Matt. 7:16), and by that test 
there is clear evidence for the identification; to make the 
point, one has only to compare William Bell Riley in 1926, 
labeling "those professors in our modern universities who 
in their devotion to the Darwinian theory dare to 
dethrone God" as "the outstanding leaders today" of 
"Sovietism" --, with Helen Wood Birnie in 1960, lecturing 
on the presumed atheist and materialist views of American 
college and high-school teachers as "Communism's Secret 
Weapon" and testifying that she had withdrawn her two 
boys from "the godless public schools" lest they be taught 
the theory of evolution.23 The line of evolutionary descent 
from Riley (and Gerald Winrod and Billy Sunday) to Mrs. 
Birnie (and Billy James Hargis and Harvey Springer) is 
 W. B. Riley, Inspiration or Evolution (C inc inna t i , 1926) , p . 102, 
quoted in F u r n i s s , Fundamentalist Controversi/, p . 18. 
23
 Notes taken by the author at one of "Sister" Birnie's public 
meetings. For further documentation of this modern right-wing 
Fundamentalist's evangelistic effectiveness in some far Northwest 
communities, see Gretchen Billings, "A Political Profile," People's 
Voice (Helena, Mont.), XXI (Feb. 12, 1960), 2, and ibid., XXI (Mar. 
17, 1961), 4. 
22
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all too clear.24 There have even been survivors from the one 
generation of right-wingers to the others: witness the career 
of Gerald L. K. Smith, who was twenty-seven years old at 
the time of the Scopes trial and was still going strong in 
the presidential election campaign of 1964, in which "for 
the first time in my mature life," this extremist declared, 
"a major political party has nominated a candidate for 
President worthy of respect." 25 
But descent and overlap do not quite add up to identity. 
Some latter-day Fundamentalists have bitterly resented 
being equated with the far political right; thus John W. 
Bradbury, editor of the Watchman-Examiner, a paper that 
in the fifties, as in the twenties, was a bastion of biblical 
evangelicalism, complained in 1952 of "religious vigilantes" 
who "cannot be classified with the original Funda­
mentalists. They may appropriate the name, but they know 
not the spirit of the movement." -a In any case, it would be 
a historiographic error to extrapolate backward from the 
"apparently cordial marriage" between the radical right 
and fundamentalist religion27 in the more recent years and 
assume therefore that all that it is necessary to say about 
the meaning of Fundamentalism in the twenties has been 
said. 
The most systematic defense of the basic fundamentalist 
tenets may be found in twelve paperback volumes of essays 
24
 On Winrod, see P . A. Car te r , The Decline and Revival of 
the Social Gospel ( I thaca , N . Y., 1956), p . 54; on Sunday, Will iam G. 
McLaughl in , Billy Sunday Was His Real Name (Chicago, 1955), 
passim; on Harg i s , Willie Morris , "Houston ' s Super-pa t r io ts , " 
Harper's Magazine, CCXXII I (October, 1961), 48 ff.; on Springer , 
Ra lph Lord Roy, Apostles of Discord (Boston, 1953), especially p. 199. 
25 Quoted in Gladwin Hill, "Gerald L. K. Smith Still in Business," 
New York Times, Oct. 11, 1964, p. 75. 
26 Quoted in Roy, Apostles of Discord, p . 226. 
27
 I t has been suggested t h a t the u l t rana t iona l i sm of this union 
may ultimately be destructive for the marriage: "One wonders 
whether people like Billy James Hargis and Fred Schwarz will not 
compromise fundamentalism so seriously that in large regions of 
the country it will no longer be recognizable as religion."—Elwyn 
A. Smith, "Rightism: Revivalism Revived," Christian Century, 
LXXIX (1962), 1387. 
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published and distributed between 1909 and 1914 under the 
over-all title The Fundamentalists: A Testimony to the 
Truth. At that time, such spokesmen for Protestant social 
concern as Shailer Mathews and Washington Gladden, 
Walter Rauschenbusch and Josiah Strong, most of them 
Modernists in their theology, were enjoying a considerable 
vogue. What did the framers of The Fundamentals think of 
the Social Gospel? The answer is difficult since nearly all 
of the several dozens of essays in The Fundamentals were 
characterized less by "right-" or "left-wing" views than by 
the absence of political discussion altogether. Their apoliti­
cal quality contrasts sharply with the neo-Fundamentalism 
of recent years.28 In this comparative ignoring by the 
earlier fundamentalist writers of the burning public ques­
tions of their day—the welfare of the workers, the control 
of the trusts, the purity of food,29 and elections—it is tempt­
ing to find a kind of conservatism by default. This, however, 
would be an argument ex silentio, and any such argument 
runs certain risks. In the discourse of all preachers, be they 
fundamentalist or modernist, social liberal or social reac­
tionary—or none of these—there is necessarily much that is 
of a purely devotional, doctrinal, or pastoral nature. The 
reader from outside the faith under consideration, for 
whom most of the material may have no meaning, is prone 
to skim it and dig down for the occasional nugget of socio­
political comment, assuming that this is the heart of the 
28
 Louis Gasper, The Fundamentalist Movement (The Hague, 
[1963]), documents the more overtly political quality of the present-
day "neo-" Fundamental ism as compared with the earl ier period. 
See also Richard Hofstadter, "Fundamental ism and Sta tus Politics 
on the Right," Columbia University Forum, VIII (Fal l , 1965), 18-24. 
29
 An interesting exception to early Fundamentalism's indifference 
to secular social questions is Alfred W. McCann, who worked in a 
testing laboratory under Harvey Wiley and subsequently became 
what might be called a pure-food vigilante; it was said that he had 
"initiated two hundred and six successful prosecutions of food 
adulterators and . . never lost a case."—Alfred W. McCann, The 
Science of Eating (New York, 1918), p. vi: cf. pp. 162, 386 ff. McCann 
later wrote one of the more imposing of the anti-evolution tracts, 
cited infra. The psychology of all this would be fascinating to explore, 
but would take us far afield from our present subject. 
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matter; indeed, the assembling of many such nuggets may 
well have inclined historians to view the liberal Social Gos­
pel ministry before 1914 as having been even more activist 
than in fact it was. 
But we do not have to proceed entirely by inference. The 
comparative neglect in The Fundamentals of political and 
economic issues does not go quite to the point of total silence. 
Unfortunately for our present purpose, the little that we 
do find of this sort of thing in The Fundamentals is some­
what inconclusive, even contradictory30—until we reach the 
last article in the closing volume of the series. In this final 
item, The Fundamentals suddenly got to the point: the 
article was entitled "The Church and Socialism." The 
author, Charles Erdman, was the son of William J. Erdman, 
one of the founders of the Moody Bible Institute in Chicago, 
and himself a professor at Princeton Theological Seminary, 
one of the most important American intellectual fountain­
heads of Fundamentalism, and a member of the editorial 
committee having general supervision over publication of 
The Fundamentals. Here at the end, the reader might sur­
mise, the "two Christian laymen," Lyman and Milton 
Stewart, who had patiently and anonymously supported the 
venture with their California oil earnings, could at last 
have expected their due. But if a Christian defense of free 
enterprise was what the Stewart brothers expected for 
their money, so to speak, that was not what they got. There 
were those in the church, Erdman admitted, "quite com­
fortable under what they regard as orthodox preaching, 
even though they know their wealth has come from the 
watering of stocks and from wrecking railroads, and from 
 Cf., e.g., Charles Gallaudet Trumbull, "The Sunday School's 
True Evangelism," in A. C. Dixon et at, (eds.), The Fundamentals: A 
Testimony to the Truth (Chicago, n.d. [1909-14]), XII, 61, as against 
Robert E. Speer, "Foreign Missions or World-Wide Evangelism," 
ibid., 70. Also cf. Arthur T. Pierson, "Our Lord's Teachings about 
Money," ibid., X, chap, v, and similar brief comments by the same 
writer in Vol. I, 70 ff. and Vol. IX, 67. 
30
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grinding the faces of the poor." But, he bluntly declared, 
"The supposed orthodoxy of such preaching is probably 
defective in its statements of the social teachings of the 
Gospels. One might be a social bandit and buccaneer and 
yet believe in the virgin birth and resurrection of Christ; 
yet one cannot be a Christian unless he believes [that] 
to live for Christ means to live for Him in every sphere and 
relationship of life, whether employer or employee, capitalist 
or laborer, stock-holder or wage-earner." As for socialism 
—a term that until comparatively recently had "suggested 
a dream of fanatics"—Erdman continued, it now embodied 
"the creed and hope of intelligent millions" as a "serious 
protest against the defects of the present economic 
system, against special privilege and entrenched injustice, 
against prevalent poverty, and hunger, and despair." 
A "New American Rightist" of our own day would find 
such a critique of socialism outrageously disappointing, if 
not downright subversive; and in such a context it would 
seem as logical to equate this early mode of fundamentalist 
thinking with radical social protest as to equate it with the 
reactionary right. As logical—and as meaningless, for in 
deepest essence this was not what the fundamentalist con­
troversy was about. "Christianity is a religion; Socialism 
an economic theory, or a political proposal," Erdman 
argued. It followed that "a man may be an ardent Socialist 
and a sincere Christian, or he may be a true Christian and 
a determined opponent of Socialism." 31 The major social 
thrust of Fundamentalism, in its earliest years at least, was 
neither liberal nor conservative in the political sense. 
 It should be noted that this fundamentalist statement on 
socialism constituted more of an "opening to the Left" than could 
have been found in American Catholicism of the period; cf., e.g., 
William Cardinal O'Connell, "Pastoral Letter on the Laborer's 
Rights," Nov. 23, 1912, reprinted in John A. Ryan and Joseph 
Husslein (eds.), The Church and Labor (New York, 1920), p. 183: 
"There is not, and cannot be a Catholic Socialist. . . . The principles 
of Socialism are utterly opposed to the principles of Christianity." 
31
194 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: THE 1920's 
Rather, it foreshadowed a position like that which was to 
emerge in the thirties among churchmen decidedly not 
fundamentalist in their outlook: "Let the Church be the 
Church"; "The Church is committed to no one social order. 
It is opposed to the wrongs and injustice of every 
system." 32 
Fundamentalism was not predestined from its inception 
to play a rightist role in America. Dogmatic as the authors 
of The Fundamentals were, they were not so graceless but 
that one of them could warn against "the temptation to feel 
as if we belonged to a superior order of Christians"; and, 
in sharp contrast to the anxieties and angers of the radical 
right of a later day, the tone of these essays is in general 
quite as much marked by love for God and man as it is by 
hate for the devil and Modernists. It is a spirit best summed 
up in the reply of a prominent evangelist to a well-bred 
young lady who balked at going out as a missionary to the 
"dirty Chinese": "I do not think the question whether or 
not you love the Chinese is the one to be considered; it 
seems to me that the real question is whether or not you 
love the Lord." 33 
One does not need to be a religious believer to be moved, 
for example, by the testimony of Philip Mauro, a wealthy 
and successful, but unhappy, Manhattan attorney who 
learned his religion "from a company of exceedingly plain, 
humble people, of little education, to whom I regarded 
myself as immeasurably superior," and whose meetings 
"from the ordinary standpoint would have been pronounced 
decidedly dull." 3i The pages of The Fundamentals are filled 
32
 Charles R. Erdman , "The Church and Socialism," The Funda­
mentals, XI I , 112, 108, 109, 111, 113. 
33 R. A. Torrey, "The Personali ty and Deity of the Holy Spirit ," 
ibid., I, 56; Henry W. Fros t , " W h a t Missionary Motives Should 
Prevai l , " ibid., XII , 93. 
3* Phil ip Mauro, "A Personal Testimony," ibid., IV, 109. This 
t r ibu te is all the more remarkable coming as it did from a man who 
in purely secular mat te r s remained probably the most elitist of all 
the contributors to The Fundamentals. Cf. Mauro, "Modern Philos­
ophy," ibid., I I , 97, 99 ff. 
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with this kind of discourse, both as testimony and as advice; 
and on occasion, as when Reuben Torrey, the dean of the 
Los Angeles Bible Institute, echoed a slogan associated also 
with the essentially liberal John R. Mott ("the evangeliza­
tion of the world in the present generation"), the purposes 
of Fundamentalism and of the Social Gospel could fuse.35 
Not even the blustering nationalism of World War I, 
which found vehement religious voice in Billy Sunday's 
notorious "damn-the-Germans" crusade in New York City 
in the spring of 1917, would entirely shoulder aside this 
humane and universalist side of Fundamentalism.36 James 
M. Gray, dean of Moody Bible Institute in Chicago, where 
most of the editorial work on The Fundamentals had been 
done, wrote in July, 1917, of a German pastor whom he had 
planned to bring to Moody when the war intervened: 
He is doing his best today to minister to the German soldiers, 
and to promote the interest of his fatherland I doubt not, and 
I expect to do the same for my country. But I love that man still 
and he loves me; and when this cruel war is over, one of the 
earliest exchanges of brotherly love I have in mind is to bring 
him here. [In the meantime] the German Christian is serv­
ing Christ in obeying his government and the American Christian 
is doing the same, and Christ is able to keep them both and to 
make them stand. Nor is either of them required to pray for 
victory [but rather] for the will of God to be done.37 
Such utterances in wartime were, of course, exceedingly 
rare from men of any faith except the foundering one of 
socialism; and in the red haze of generalized intolerance 
35
 John T. Stone, " P a s t o r a l and Personal Evange l i sm," ibid., XI I , 
30; R. A. Torrey, "The Place of P r a y e r in Evange l i sm," ibid., 106. 
36
 Accounts of th i s c rusade m a y be found in McLoughl in , Billy 
Sunday, pp. xvii-xxix, and Bernard Weisberger, They Gathered at 
the River (Boston and Toronto, 1958), pp. 255 ff. 
37
 James M. Gray, "What the Bible Teaches about War," (Chicago, 
[1917]), p. 15 (italics in the original). First published in Christian 
Workers' Magazine, July, 1917. 
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that hung so ominously over the postwar years, they 
became if anything even more rare—which suggests that 
Fundamentalism may have been not so much one of the 
causes of that wartime and postwar intolerance, as has so 
often been assumed, as it was one of its victims. 
If the war unleashed hate, it also unleashed disillusion­
ment. Fully to have accepted 100 per cent Americanism as 
a fighting faith would have involved subscribing to the 
American ideology of ongoing and inevitable progress, and 
progress, as J. B. Bury was about to point out,38 had been 
searching more than a century for a rationale and had 
finally found one in Darwinian evolution. One way out of 
the resulting dilemma for Fundamentalists 39 was to find 
in the war itself a convincing demonstration that the pro­
gressives—and, by implication, Darwin as well—had been 
wrong. 
Many non-Fundamentalists also felt this particular dis­
illusionment. George W. Richards, who would one day write 
on the topic Beyond Fundamentalism and Modernism, wrote 
in 1923 that the war years had reminded men of "the prox­
imity of savagery to culture. It matters little whether 
man wears skins or broadcloth, so long as the heart is 
unchanged." But it was the Fundamentalist who was pre­
pared to follow the logic of this most uninhibitedly to its 
conclusion: "Darwinism had saturated the war-lords with 
all the catchwords essential to the prosecution of their 
designs," Alfred W. McCann asserted, "and the people 
were prepared to follow to the end, little dreaming of the 
3 8
 J . B. B u r y , The Idea of Progress (London, 1920; first American 
edit ion, New York, 1932) , chap . xix. 
3 9
 This d i lemma w a s sensed even by so unreflective a Funda ­
men ta l i s t a s Billy S u n d a y : " I f by evolution you mean progress ,
go w i t h you. B u t if by evolution you mean t h a t I came from a 
monkey, good-n igh t !"—McLoughl in , Modern Revivalism, p . 411, quot­
ing t he Boston Herald, Nov. 14, 1916. 
 I 
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carnage, starvation and disease toward which their 'pro­
gressive' evolution was now thundering its flight." 40 
The reference to "the war-lords" suggests the World War 
I propaganda stereotype of the "Hun," although McCann 
noted that his German villains (Ernst Haeckel was a favor­
ite) had their French and British counterparts. But other 
Fundamentalists had felt a challenge from Germany long 
before American national interest became involved. They 
quite correctly saw their position undermined not only by 
the theory of evolution but also by modern critical study 
of the Bible, an impressive amount of which had been done 
in German universities. Their warfare against German 
historical scholarship easily broadened into a more general 
attack on Kultur. The Nietzschean superman, or the propa­
gandist's caricature of him, was a bogeyman for Funda­
mentalists long before he became one for George Creel and 
Woodrow Wilson. 
"It is notorious to what length the German fancy can go 
in the direction of the subjective and the conjectural," 
wrote a contributor to the first volume of The Fundamen­
tals. German biblical criticism, the same essayist observed 
(with some truth!), "deals with the writers and readers of 
the ancient Orient as if they were modern German profes­
sors." This same note of quasi-philosophical objection to the 
Teutonic penchant for "hypothesis-weaving and specula­
tion" runs through other pages of The Fundamentals. One 
contributor, for example, wittily satirized the skeptical 
extremism of certain German biblical scholars by applying 
their kind of reductionist logic to a contemporary figure, to 
"prove" that Theodore Roosevelt had, like Jesus of Naza­
 George W. Richards, Christian Ways of Salvation (New York, 
1923), p. 261; Alfred W. McCann, God—or Gorilla? (New York, 
1922), pp. 328 f. 
40
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reth never really existed!41 The Peerless Leader of the 
anti-evolution forces might not have been at home in a 
discussion at quite so sophisticated a level, but he had heard 
of Nietzsche; and at the Scopes trial Bryan conjoined the 
Nietzschean superman's transvaluation of values to Dar­
winism, and hurled back at Clarence Darrow the latter's 
plea for extenuation in another celebrated trial, made on 
the ground "that the teachings of Nietzsche made [Nathan] 
Leopold a murderer." 42 
At both the metaphysical and the moral level, Fundamen­
talists continued to see Germany as the fountainhead of 
what they were opposing. When Hitler came to power, some 
American Fundamentalists would view the Nazi govern­
ment as the logical outcome of half a century of godless 
German Modernism and declare in effect, "We told you 
so." « 
At the same time, however, the Fundamentalists were 
more open-minded in their attitude toward Germany than 
contemporary right-wingers are regarding the communist 
"menace." Thus, J. Gresham Machen, himself a former 
graduate student at Marburg and Gottingen and by all odds 
intellectually the ablest of major spokesmen for Fundamen­
talism, urged a protege who was contemplating a year of 
study abroad in the mid-twenties to spend all of his time 
in Germany: "At most of the universities you will be living 
in a highly stimulating intellectual atmosphere that will be 
entirely foreign to Christianity," he wrote; "not altogether 
an easy experience" for an orthodox young man, but one 
4 1
 Dyson H a g u e , " T h e His to ry of the Highe r Cr i t ic ism," The 
Fundamentals, I, 90 ff.; John L. Nuelsen, " T h e Person and W o r k of 
J e s u s Chr i s t , " ibid., V I , 103 ff. 
4 2
 Sheldon N . Grebste in ( ed . ) , Monkey Trial: The State of 
Tennessee vs. John Thomas Scopes (Boston, 1960) , p . 129, c i t ing the 
original trial transcript, p. 454. 
4 3
 Frederick K. Wentz, "American Protestant Journals and the 
Nazi Religious Assault," Church History, XXIII (1954), 328 ff. 
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that would give him "the satisfaction of having come into 
firsthand contact with those forces which underlie all the 
doctrinal indifferentism in Great Britain and this coun­
try." 44 It would be a rare bird indeed among right-wingers 
since World War II who would urge a student to spend a 
year in Moscow or Peking, or Havana, to become acquainted 
at first hand with the other side! 
But even more incongruous than Machen (whom Walter 
Lippmann called "a scholar and a gentleman") as a pro­
genitor for the radical right of our day was the arch-
Fundamentalist of all, William Jennings Bryan. In the 
apostolic succession of the Democratic party from Andrew 
Jackson to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Bryan has often been an 
embarrassment to the academic liberal, and never more so 
than in the anti-evolution campaign. Indeed, he has been 
judged by a double standard, so that we are inclined, for 
example, to remember that he went to Dayton in 1925 to 
prosecute a schoolteacher and to forget that he went to the 
Presbyterian General Assembly in 1920 to prosecute his 
own denomination's war profiteers.45 But the Great Com­
moner saw his public career as one self-consistent whole; 
he felt that his crusades against the scientists and the 
Higher Critics, like his crusades against the hard-money 
men and the militarists, were on behalf of popular democ­
racy. Well along in the pages of In His Image, his own 
special-creationist tract, Bryan reaffirmed his lifelong 
credo: "I fear the plutocracy of wealth; I respect the aris­
44
 Quoted in Ned B. S to rehouse , J. Grcsham Machen: A Bio­
graphical Memoir ( G r a n d Rap ids , Mich., 1954) , p . 241. Stonehouse 
had access to the Machen fami ly p a p e r s . 
45
 Willard H. Smith, "William Jennings Bryan and the Social 
Gospel," a paper read before the Mississippi Valley Historical 
Association, Cleveland, 1964, p. 12. I am indebted to Professor Smith, 
who was kind enough to allow me to read this paper in manuscript. 
It has since been published in Journal of American History, LIII 
(June, 1966), 41-60. 
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tocracy of learning; but I thank God for the democracy of 
the heart." 46 
But that, in the opinion of more than a few of his con­
temporary critics, was precisely what was the matter with 
Bryan: not that he attacked the principle of "one man, one 
vote," but that he defended it. The anti-evolution cam­
paign was seen by some of them as a characteristically bad 
example of popular, one man-one vote democracy in action. 
Thus the antics of William Bell Riley debating the theory 
of evolution against all comers but packing the meetings 
with loyal Fundamentalists, so that his defense of the Bible 
would be voted to have "won," and of John Roach Straton 
reacting to the American Museum of Natural History's 
exhibit on the Age of Man with what amounted to a demand 
for "equal time" for an exhibit of "The Bible Story of 
Creation" 4T only served to confirm H. L. Mencken's opinion 
that "the mob has made its superstitions official." Five years 
after the Scopes trial, Mencken wrote in praise of the 
civilized rule of enlightened skeptics during the eighteenth 
century, and lamented the subsequent "spread of the demo­
cratic pestilence"—the results of which in the United 
States, "where democracy has been carried further than 
anywhere else," included "such obscenities as Comstockery, 
Prohibition, and the laws against the teaching of evolu­
tion." 4S 
46
 Wil l iam Jenn ings Bryan , In His Image (New York and 
Chicago, 1922), p . 262. Fac ing the t i t le page of this work was an 
adver t i sement for B r y a n ' s other books, one of which the publisher 
represented as " the cream of Mr. Bryan ' s public u t te rances on 
Prohibi t ion, Money, Imperia l ism, T rus t s , Labor, Income Tax , Peace, 
Religion, Pan-Amer ican ism, etc. ," s t rongly implying t h a t a t least 
one sales-conscious copywri ter of the twent ies saw Bryan ' s p re - and 
pos twar audiences as essentially one and the same. Cf. also the 
"Social Gospel" s ta tements in ibid., pp . 146 ff., 205, and the whole 
of Chapte r VI . 
47
 On this tactic of Riley's, see Bruce T a r r a n t , "Minnesota: 
Modern or Mediaeval?", Independent, CXVIII (1927), 28, and 
Stewar t Cole, The History of Fundamentalism, pp. 272, 302, 314. 
On St ra ton 's proposed exhibit, see John Roach Straton, "Fancies 
of the Evolutionists ," Forum, LXXV (1926), 250. 
48
 H. L. Mencken, Treatise on the Gods (New York, 1930), p. 296. 
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The dilemma posed here was one not for Fundamentalists 
and their opponents only but for respresentative govern­
ment itself. "Can the public school, at this stage of the 
world's history, be dedicated to a literal interpretation of 
Genesis ? Can the religious frame of mind which this 
assumes be imposed by law upon educators and pupils?" 
No, said the liberal Catholic journalist Michael Williams, 
covering the Scopes trial for Commonweal. Yes, said Bene­
dict Elder, editor of the Catholic diocesan newspaper in 
Louisville: "If its citizens believe that the Bible is true, 
the state has no right to employ instructors to teach 
that the Bible is not true." State schools had to be 
controlled by the state "and not by any professional group 
—however learned," Elder went on; "After all, the common 
judgment of the plain people is not to be scorned." 49 Such 
also was Bryan's conviction when at one point in the Scopes 
trial he cried, "Your Honor, it isn't proper to bring experts 
in here to try to defeat the purpose of the people." 50 
At this point in discussions of Fundamentalism by liberals 
and Modernists, it was (and is) customary to shift from 
categories of left and right to categories of intellect and 
ignorance. Thus Clarence Darrow replied to Bryan that 
the logic of his argument amounted to saying, "It is a crime 
to know more than I know." 51 And it is further customary 
to equate these in turn with urban and rural life: one man's 
vote is the full equivalent of another's provided that both 
men are equidistant from the centers of modern thought 
and culture. Walter Lippmann, for example, readily em­
braced a rural-vs.-urban interpretation of Fundamentalism 
as the most practical way of arguing it down without falling 
into the illiberal assumption that the people ought to be 
governed by their betters: 
•>» Commonweal, II (1925), 242, 246. 
 Grebstein, Monkey Trial, pp. 125, 79, citing pp. 436, 207, of 
the trial transcript. 
61 Ibid. 
50
202 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: THE 1920's 
The deep and abiding traditions of religion belong to the country­
side. The omnipotence of God means something to men who 
submit daily to the cycles of the weather and the mysterious 
power of nature. But the city man puts his faith in furnaces to 
keep out the cold, is proudly aware of what bad sewage his 
ancestors endured, and of how ignorantly they believed that 
God, who made Adam at 9 A.M. on October 23 in the year 4004 
B.C., was concerned with the behavior of Adam's children.02 
One of the most persistent and persuasive of the inter­
pretations of Fundamentalism has set it in a wider context 
of rural-urban conflict in America, akin to the crusades 
against Demon Rum and Al Smith, and perhaps also to the 
pre-nomination struggles of 1964 between Barry Goldwater 
and those personalities within the Republican party whom 
the Senator was wont to term the "fat cats back East." 
John Washington Butler, author of the Tennessee anti­
evolution law, was moved to run for the legislature and 
introduce his bill in large part because a girl from his home 
town had gone away to college and had come back believing 
in evolution and not believing in God; this episode has 
often been cited as a demonstration of the role in the 
evolution controversy of "cultural lag"—a concept, popular 
in the 1920's, which is still too frequently employed by 
historians.53 
Such an interpretation of Fundamentalism, like the 
politico-ideological one, must be applied with caution. To 
be sure, a certain willful ignorance does pervade much 
fundamentalist discourse; and, to be sure, the record of the 
Scopes trial—that symbolic heart of the entire controversy 
—fairly crackles with resentment at the way Chicago, per­
sonified in Clarence Darrow, and New York, personified in 
52 W a l t e r L ippmann, A Preface to Morals (New York, 1929), 
pp. 62 ff. 
53
 Cf., e.g., Fu rn i s s , Fundamentalist Controversy, p . 3 ; Ginger, 
Six Days or Forever?, p. 8; Hofstadter, Anti-intellectualism, p. 126. 
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Dudley Field Malone, were interfering in the private affairs 
of Dayton, Tennessee. But every tale of a country boy or 
girl being ruined, intellectually or otherwise, by the liberal 
ways of a metropolitan university,54 could be matched by 
testimony to the contrary, such as that of Harry Emerson 
Fosdick, next to Darrow the prime target of fundamentalist 
wrath in the twenties. Discovering the theory of evolution 
toward the end of his freshman year in college in 1897, 
young Fosdick had announced to his family "as impres­
sively as I could manage it: 'I have made up my mind that 
I believe in evolution,' " only to have the wind taken out of 
his undergraduate sails by his father's reply: "Well, I 
believed that before you were born." 55 
A Methodist minister who came out of a hamlet that was 
culturally even more remote from modern America than 
Dayton to earn a B.A. degree in 1922 and a theological 
degree in 1925, the year Darrow took on Bryan, later 
recalled no tension or conflict between a rural upbringing 
and an exposure to modern science in college. The theory 
of evolution, this liberal clergyman wrote before 1940, "did 
not disturb my thinking at all, for it was the most natural 
explanation of the world of Nature I had known." 56 Thus 
one country-dweller, as Lippmann suggests, might sense in 
the powers of nature beyond his own control a transcendant 
power behind them, which would drive him into fundamen­
talist religion; but evidently another country-dweller could 
04
 E.g., the letter in Bible Champion, XXXV (1929), 5, from a 
college student who had learned "a little about biology and chemistry 
and physics . .  . a little more about history and comparative reli­
gion," but enough of all these to decide that "Jehovah is not for me."
The editor commented: "What are we doing to save students in 
these faith-wrecking institutions?" 
M
 Harry Emerson Posdick, The Living of These Days: An Auto­
biography (New York, 1956), p. 49. A slightly different version of 
this episode is told in Fosdick, Adventurous Religion (New York, 
1926), p. 107. 
50
 "Broken Spires," MS autobiography in the possession of the 
Rev. Manfred A. Carter of Hampden, Maine, p. 58. 
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have found in his own firsthand acquaintance with the liv­
ing things of field and forest a world of experience for 
which the theory of evolution gave him a fully satisfying 
explanation. "The study of evolution seemed perfectly 
natural," the same minister wrote after his retirement in 
1962. "The fundamentalism of the [home-town] church 
must have passed me by. I never did have to get rid of it." 57 
When one uncovers the intellectual roots of the funda­
mentalist controversy in the warfare of science and theology 
in the nineteenth century, the cultural-lag hypothesis, with 
urban high-brows all ranged on one side and rural low­
brows all on the other, becomes even harder to sustain as a 
universal proposition. For on this assumption what is one 
to make of John Wesley Powell, growing up in a village and 
educated in one-room schoolhouses and a library-laboratory 
housed in a private dwelling, then roaming the river banks 
of an Illinois barely a generation away from the frontier, 
and in the process insensibly making a first-rate geologist 
of himself?58 Free inquiry has never been wholly confined 
to the intellectual and cultural centers of the nation. In our 
age of dependence upon large university libraries and astro­
nomically expensive laboratories, we are prone to forget 
the number of Americans over the years in both town and 
country who have contrived to educate themselves catch-
as-catch-can. And just as there have always been instances 
of intellect at work in the American countryside (think of 
Edwards ministering to the Stockbridge Indians while writ­
ing Freedom of the Will), so there have been important 
revivalist and biblical-literalist manifestations in town. 
Fundamentalism in the 1920's claimed many a strategic 
city pulpit, from Boston's venerable Park Street Church to 
5 7
 Revised d r a f t of ibid., 1963; pages not numbered . 
5 8
 Wil l iam Culp D a r r a h , Powell of the Colorado (P r ince ton , N.J . , 
1951) , pp . 11-14, 23-33 , 36-46. 
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W. B. Riley's home base in Minneapolis. The Neiv Republic 
commented on this paradox in an obituary on the "Funda­
mentalist Pope" of Manhattan, John Roach Straton: "In 
spirit, he was a Baptist of the old school, attached to the 
letter of the Old Testament; in technique, he was a New 
Yorker of the twentieth century." A man who "planned a 
skyscraper church as a shrine for doctrines in which he 
believed as literally as did the tent-dwelling patriarchs to 
whom they were first proclaimed in Palestine" and preached 
the old-time religion over that most modern of gadgets, the 
radio, Straton "was typical of a persistent contrast in our 
national life." 59 
A further difficulty for a purely rural-urban interpre­
tation of the fundamentalist controversy is its international 
dimension. When Bryan took off his coat in the blazing 
July heat of Tennessee and "revealed the fact that he was 
not wearing galluses but a belt, an article of apparel 
affected only by advanced dressers and advanced thinkers," 
the drama would seem to have been about as far from the 
spirit of old Europe as it was possible to get; but of the 
three million copies of The Fundamentals that had been 
distributed by 1914, approximately one-third had gone out­
side the United States, half to the British Isles and the 
balance to the European continent and the rest of the 
planet.60 Even if we assume that most of these overseas 
recipients were British or American Protestant mission 
workers, no generalizations about the American self-made 
59 New Republic, LX (1929), 335. 
00
 W. O. McGeehan, covering the Scopes trial for the New York 
Tribune, July 10, 1925, reprinted in the Sunday Herald Tribune,
Apr. 17, 1955, with a photo of Darrow and Bryan both in shirt­
sleeves; publishers' statement, The Fundamentals, XII (Chicago, n.d. [but published after the outbreak of World War I, from internal 
evidence]), 4. It is not clear from this statement whether three 
million volumes or three million sets (of twelve volumes each) was 
meant as the claimed figure; probably the former. 
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man, the American rural mind, or American hostility to 
scholarship entirely suffice to cover the subject.61 
Does Fundamentalism, then, come down to unadorned 
anti-intellectualism, regardless of race,62 political creed, 
nationality, or regional origin? Once again, The Funda­
mentals are a major interpretive obstacle. These articles 
are, most of them, sober. Only one or two of them are really 
ranting in tone,63 and the level of the argument on the 
whole is only a hair more illogical than academic discourse 
in general—which indeed much of it is; a high proportion 
of the authors were professors of theology, many of them 
in respectable institutions, and a low proportion of them 
could have been classed merely as vulgar evangelists. And 
even if we dismissed these essays as irrelevant for under­
standing the Fundamentalism of the twenties, there would 
still remain the enigma of J. Gresham Machen, who was 
not only a man of impeccable scholarship himself but one 
who turned the sword's point around in the twenties and 
accused the liberals of low-browism. "We are opposed with 
fil
 Articles were contributed to The Fundamentals by a professor 
in Glasgow; a pastor in Kilmarnock, Scotland, and another residing 
at Ballineen, County Cork, Ireland; the bishop of Durham; the 
minister of Westminster Chapel and the vicar of St. Paul's, in 
London; the former principal of Knox College, Toronto; a canon 
of the Church of England in Montreal, and another in London, 
Ontario; and a professor emeritus in Stuttgart. Incidentally, even 
Bryan was not above quoting British and French writers for their 
snob value in supporting his views: cf. In His Image, pp. 124 ff. 
02
 The subject of Negro Fundamentalism needs exploration. When 
E. Franklin Frazier said that "the Negro church and Negro religion 
have cast a shadow over the entire intellectual life of Negroes," I 
am sure that he had more than segregation alone in mind. Frazier, 
The Negro Church in America (New York, 1963), p. 86. 
63
 The only essays that really "rant" (in the sense of "to scold 
vehemently," Webster, 2nd ed.) are those dealing with (1) the more 
outre of the Fundamentalists' sectarian rivals, e.g., Mormonism, 
Spiritualism, Jehovah's Witnesses, and (2) the Roman Catholic 
church. Cf. T. W. Medhurst, "Is Romanism Christianity?", The 
Fundamentals, XI, chap, vi, and J. M. Foster, "Rome, the Antago­
nist of the Nation," ibid., chap. vii. The relationship, and antipathies, 
between Protestant Fundamentalism and Catholic rightism in this 
country need further study. 
THE FUNDAMENTALIST DEFENSE OF THE FAITH 207 
all our might," Machen vowed in 1924, "to the passionate 
anti-intellectualism of the Modernist Church." The entire 
first chapter of his book What Is Faith? (1925) was a 
polemic against "the intellectual decadence of the day," not 
only in the church but in secular education with its "absurd 
pedagogic theories which depreciate the labor of 
learning facts." G4 
But how could a plea for high standards of intellectual 
enterprise be reconciled with a categorical rejection of the 
findings of modern science? The Fundamentalist who did 
not retreat into credo quia absurdem—an answer that a 
Machen would have rejected as contemptuously as a 
Mencken65—was forced into the assumption that some 
day, somehow, the whole evolutionary edifice must topple 
for lack of sufficient evidence and that science itself would 
conclude that Darwin had been wrong. In the twenties this 
did not seem as forlorn a hope as it sounds today. Alfred 
McCann in God—or Gorilla?, arguing that scientists' 
attempts to reconstruct man's subhuman ancestors from 
fossil remnants were at best hopes and at worst forgeries, 
went with a debater's unerring instinct in his first chapter 
to the "Piltdown Man," which of course was eventually 
proved a fabrication. We should bear in mind, too, that the 
provenance of Pithecanthropus, the Trinil or "Java ape­
man," was not finally established until 1939,66 and that 
"Rhodesia Man" had a hole in its skull that for years was 
believed to have been made by a bullet! This was later 
f>l
 J. Gresham Machen, "Does Fundamentalism Obstruct Social 
Progress?", Survey, LII (1924), 426; Machen, What is Faith? (New 
York, 1925), p. 15. 
65
 Machen's Weltanschauung is admirably summed up by Lefferts 
A. Loetscher in "Machen, John Gresham," Dictionary of American 
Biography, XXII, Supp. Two (New York, 1958), pp. 411 f. 
06
 Indeed, Trinil Man's discoverer died in 1940 insisting that his 
find had been no "missing link" but only a large gibbon. Herbert 
Wendt, In Search of Adam, trans. James Cleugh (Boston, 1956; 
originally published in Germany as Ich Suchte Adam), p. 299. 
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shown to have been the bite of a primeval hyena, but in 
the meantime it afforded people like McCann much fun at 
the evolutionists' expense.67 
As for Darwin's theory of the origin of species by nat­
ural selection, it had fallen on evil days. "Discussions of 
evolution came to an end," the British geneticist William 
Bateson told the American Association for the Advance­
ment of Science in 1921, "primarily because it was obvious 
that no progress was being made. Variations of many 
kinds, often considerable, we daily witness, but no origin 
of species." Noting Bateson's indiscreet remark that "when 
such confessions are made the enemies of science see their 
chance," and ignoring his insistence that "what has been 
learned [about evolution] constitutes progress upon which 
we shall never have to go back," Fundamentalists wrote 
sermons and editorials and whole books whose thesis was 
that the evolutionists were dogmatizing to cover up their 
own ignorance. From this point of view, the classic warfare 
between science and theology anticlimactically came down 
to a case of my faith versus yours.68 "It was remark­
able," one contributor to The Fundamentals had written, 
"that men of trained intellect should have so promptly 
accepted at face value [Darwin's] two principal works, in 
which the expression, 'we may well suppose,' occurs over 
eight hundred times." 69 
The defender of evolution was put in an awkward posi­
tion by this kind of attack. If he denied that any such tenta­
6T
 Alfred W. McCann, God—or Gorilla?, chap, i, "Making the 
Piltdown Man"; cf. Wendt, In Search of Adam, pp. 410 ff. On 
Rhodesia Man, ibid., pp. 422 ff. 
08
 William Bateson, "Evolutionary Faith and Modern Doubts," 
Science, LV (New Series), 56 f., 61. Note the selective quotation 
from this address in Louis T. More, The Dogma of Evolution (Prince­
ton, N.J., 1925), p. 28; and cf. Frank E. Allen, "Dr. Clark Arouses 
a Furor among Evolutionists," Bible Champion, XXXV (1929), 309 ff. 
69
 "Evolutionism in the Pulpit," "by an occupant of the pew,'' 
The Fundamentals, VIII, 27. 
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tiveness or doubts existed among the experts, a William 
Bateson—professionally aware that the mechanism of nat­
ural selection seemed to have proved unsatisfactory as an 
explanation of evolution and that the mechanism of genetic 
mutation was as yet very imperfectly understood—quite 
properly could be quoted in rebuttal.70 If he affirmed that 
supposition, inference, hypothesis is the way science oper­
ates, a McCann was ready with the Baconian observation 
that "science deals with facts known to be facts, and not 
with opinions supported by conjecture, speculation, assump­
tions, or theoretical connecting links." 71 
If there is a cultural lag in operation here, it is one not 
between science and superstition but between nineteenth-
century science and twentieth-century science. In the words 
of A. Hunter Dupree, "The quest for 'hard things' in science 
seemed a reasonable enterprise in the nineteenth century; 
it is madness in the twentieth." When Fundamentalists and 
evolutionists tried to reduce the issues between them to 
"hard things," the contending parties sounded startlingly 
alike.72 For men battling over what they took to be "hard 
things," the kinds of armistice terms proposed by Modern­
ism—that science deals with "facts" and religion with 
70
 Modernists who were t ry ing to have it both ways, preserving 
both science and some semblance of orthodoxy, often injured their 
own case by adopting neither the Darwinian theory of na tura l 
selection nor the Mendel-deVries theory of mutat ion but the then 
current vogue of neo-Lamarckianism, since t h a t hypothesis seemed 
to "have the inestimable advantage of opposing the materialist ic or 
mechanical theory of life."—More, The Dogma of Evolution, p. 211. 
Ironically, the Soviet Union was in the process of adopting the 
Michurin-Lysenko version of Lamarckianism for exactly the opposite 
reason. 
71
 McCann, God—or Gorilla?, p . 263. 
72
 A. Hunter Dupree, "Words or Things in the History of Science,'' 
a paper read before the American Historical Association, Washington, 
D.C., Dec. 30, 1964. Cf. Oden, "Fundamental ism's Weak Christology," 
p. 1350, in which nineteenth-century historicism, like nineteenth-
century scientism, is shown to be a common assumption in disputes 
between Fundamental is ts and liberals. 
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"values," or that evolution deals with the "how" of man's 
origin and the Bible with the "why"—were rejected on both 
sides as illogical compromises or dishonest evasions.73 
American Catholicism probably came the closest to a work­
able via media that anyone achieved in the 1920's on the 
evolution question,74 but it was the editor of the Catholic 
World who challenged "anybody to convey to a class the 
arguments for the evolution of man without revealing, I 
will not say his own scientific conclusions, but his own 
theology." 7B In the sixties we have become acquainted with 
the concept of a social "mainstream," but in the twenties 
the liberals and conservatives, religiously if not politically, 
were more inclined to insist that one climb out upon the 
stream's right or left bank.76 
73
 F o r a t t acks on a middle-ground position from the funda­
mentalist side, see Francis L. Patton, Fundamental Christianity 
(New York, 1926), pp. 202, 204; Machen, What is Faith?, p. 241, 
and from the liberal-humanist side, Barnes, Twilight of Christianity, 
p. 425, and Lippmann, A Preface to Morals, pp. 40 ff. The dilemma 
of a compromise position is expressed by a man who tried to maintain 
one in E. Y. Mullins, Christianity at the Cross Roads (New York, 
1924), p . 123. 
74
 F o r represen ta t ive Catholic expression on the Bible-versus-
Darwin problem, see A r t h u r Ryland, "The Inspi ra t ion of Scr ip ture ," 
American Catholic Quarterly Review, X L V I I I (1923), 121 f., and 
T. Lawrason Riggs, " F u n d a m e n t a l i s m and the F a i t h , " Commonweal, 
I I (1925) , p. 345. On the age of man, however, Catholics were not 
total ly immune to the appeal of fossil-debunking in the manner of 
P r o t e s t a n t F u n d a m e n t a l i s t s ; cf. Cornelius Merr ins , "On the Age of 
Man ," American Catholic Quarterly Review, X L V I I I (1923) , 176 ff. 
And note Mencken's comments on how Roman Catholicism had 
escaped the logical difficulties of Protestantism "by keeping the 
Bible in its place," in Treatise on the Gods, pp. 338 ff. 
75 Catholic World, CXXI (1925), 544. Cf. the valiant efforts of 
instructors in recent American history to be even-handed in their 
t reatment of Democratic U.S. Presidents and their Republican 
oppositions—an emotional-pedagogical problem almost exactly com­
parable to the one under discussion here. 
76
 That this tendency of the debate to polarize into opposites was 
felt in Judaism as well during the twenties may be inferred from 
Abba Hillel Silver, Religion in a Changing World (New York, 1931), 
pp. I f . A comparison between Judaism and Protestantism in 
America specifically upon the point of the reception and response 
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It is interesting that although the word "fundamen­
talism" is still used to describe a recognizable entity (e.g., 
the sermons of Billy Graham), the word "modernism" has 
all but dropped out of the American Protestant vocabulary. 
And in retrospect many of the modernist compromises do 
sound curiously empty. Thus Edward Scribner Ames, for 
forty years pastor of University Church (Disciples of 
Christ), Chicago, wrote of Christianity as being on the 
verge of a new "great epoch," which he described variously 
as "the religion of the spirit, as social Christianity, and as 
the religion of democracy." But by "spirit," he seemingly 
meant nothing more transcendental than the glow of good-
fellowship, as in the term "school spirit"; in fact, he made 
the parallel explicit: "Our college is our Virgin Mother, to 
whom we address songs and sentiments of genuine affec­
tion." " Fundamentalists were quick to deride the shallow­
ness of this kind of Christianity—"You could take the 'C 
out of Y.M.C.A. and nobody would ever notice the differ­
ence" 7R —and to warn of its total inadequacy for the great 
crises in life: "For mere popular lectures it is still service­
able ; but when despair at the loss of all one has loved 
to Darwin in the light of biblical criticism would, I think, be most 
enlightening. Literal insistence on the factuality of Genesis 1-3 has 
been a common problem in both religious traditions—and is more 
prevalent to this day in Orthodox Judaism, as in orthodox Protes­
tantism, than one sometimes supposes. 
77
 Edward Scribner Ames, The New Orthodoxy (Chicago, 1918), 
pp. 10, 50. 
78
 Hilyer Hawthorne Straton, quoted in Hicks, "The Son of a 
Fundamentalist Prophet," p. 197. That there was some substance 
to this charge was tacitly conceded in 1930 by the general secretary 
of the Y's sister organization, who spoke of the growth of "a sense 
of unreality in the expression of religion," and of "the quiet drop­
ping away in so many Associations of those things that we formerly 
spoke of as our religious activities."—Anna V. Rice, "The Association 
As a Religious Movement in the World Today," Eleventh National 
Convention of the Young Women's Christian Associations of the 
United States of America, Proceedings (New York, 1930), p. 138. 
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takes possession of the mind when one is on a sick-bed 
and death approaches just at this time when its help 
is most needed, this modern religion utterly fails." Or as 
Lippmann put it, "A man cannot cheat about faith." 79 
All of which suggests that the Fundamentalists may after 
all have been doing just what they thought they were doing: 
not merely defending a political ideology, however much 
some of them talked of the American way of life—for the 
Jehovah's Witnesses, equally literal in their interpretation 
of Scripture, were refusing to salute the flag; not only 
defending an economic system, however much oil money 
was poured into the dissemination of The Fundamentals— 
for other oil money built Riverside Church, and housed Dr. 
Fosdick therein; not simply defending the countryside 
against the city—for the "old-time religion" early discov­
ered, and has perpetuated, an evangelistic style of city-
based revivals; not even essentially defending ignorance 
against intellect—for the claims of intellect in the ivory 
tower were scarcely lived up to in the encounter in the 
courtroom that merely pitted authority against authority, 
"the Bible teaches" against "science says"; but also, and 
chiefly, defending what the Fundamentalists honestly 
believed was all that gave meaning to human life, "the faith 
once delivered to the saints." 
Although for many people living through the twenties 
science had in the words of Joseph Wood Krutch "not only 
won from us a confidence in her methods, but also made it 
well-nigh impossible for us to believe in any others," this 
does not detract from the high seriousness of the funda­
mentalist defense of faith. Krutch himself—one of the 
apostles of the gospel of science—acknowledged that the 
findings of science had indeed robbed human life of its 
™ F. Bettex, "The Bible and Modern Criticism," The Funda­
mentals, IV, 87; Lippmann, A Preface to Morals, p. 49. 
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intrinsic value: "We have grown used to a Godless 
universe, but we are not yet accustomed to one which is 
loveless as well, and only when we have so become shall we 
realize what atheism really means." 80 The terrible dark­
ness of this passage, I have found, still has power to kindle 
in student readers its author's despair; and from it one can 
understand why some clung to Fundamentalism in the 
twenties: God help them, they could do no other. 
AFTERWORD 
Since this is a frankly revisionist essay, it should be 
stated that, as even a cursory comparison between this 
essay and Chapter IV of my The Decline and Revival of the 
Social Gospel (Ithaca, N.Y., 1956) will demonstrate, the 
historian's views that have been most thoroughly revised 
are my own. I am indebted to the following for their chas­
tening comments in reviews of my earlier work, particularly 
as regards its treatment of Fundamentalism: C. Howard 
Hopkins, in Religion in Life, XXI (1957), 303; Sydney E. 
Ahlstrom, in Review of Religion, XXVI (1957), esp. p. 209; 
and Sidney E. Mead, in Church History, XXVI (1957), 
397 ff. I have also learned from reviewers with whom I 
remain in essential disagreement, e.g., Irving E. Howard in 
Christian Economics (Nov. 27, 1956), p. 4, and from those 
like Daisuke Kitagawa, Ecumenical Review, (April, 1957), 
who agreed with my judgments but restated them in briefer 
form that led me to doubt their soundness. Although it 
appeared too late for me to use in this essay, Ernest R. 
80
 Joseph Wood Krutch, The Modern Temper (New York, 1929) ; 
paper, 1956), pp. 154, 78. Mr. Krutch, as is well known, found his 
way out of those dark woods; but his way has been a highly 
idiosyncratic and personal one. Perhaps anyone's must be. 
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Sandeen's paper on the origins of Fundamentalism, which 
he read at the American Historical Association meeting at 
San Francisco in December, 1965, has opened a fresh and 
original line of investigation into the roots of the movement, 
particularly in its more formal theological aspects.81 
81
 Sandeen agrees with my judgment that the movement cannot be
reduced to economic, regional, political, or psychosocial categories:
"Fundamentalism originated in the northeastern part of this continent
in metropolitan areas and cannot be explained as a part of the popu­
list movement, agrarian protest or the Southern mentality." But he 
differs from my estimate of the movement as a defense, under fire, of
an existing orthodoxy: "It was marked by some special doctrinal
innovations," which Sandeen sees as having had their origin no earlier
than the nineteenth century. Ernest R. Sandeen, "Towards a Histori­
cal Interpretation of the Origins of Fundamentalism," Church His­
tory, XXXVI (1967), 66-83. 




THE Ku Klux Klan of the 1920's is a study in anxiety rather 
than in abnormality. The citizens of the Invisible Empire 
were deeply anxious men, but they were not, save for the 
psychotic few, moral monsters; and to dismiss these five 
million hooded Americans as peculiarly depraved is to blink 
away the banality of evil. The Klan illuminates the need of 
mediocre men to flee to the mysticism of the primitive col­
lectivity, and serves, therefore, to remind us that Americans 
are implicated in the totalitarian temper of the modern 
world. To discern more than a casual relationship between 
the Klan and twentieth-century collectivism, however, is not 
to say that the Klan is a study in un-Americanism. These 
True Believers of the twenties were not converts to an alien 
ideology; rather, they confessed to a creed shared, in whole 
or in part, by many Americans in every generation. The 
Klan illuminates the persistency of dark strains in Ameri­
can history, strains that have been eased but never entirely 
erased by faithfulness to the countervailing ideals of 
decency and fair play. Why, however, should these strains 
become acutely manifest in a decade fondly deemed the 
apogee of "normalcy"? Admitting that all men in the 
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modern world bear the burden of anxiety, acknowledging 
the racism, nativism, and irrationalism flawing the Ameri­
can past, it remains our task to comprehend what there was 
in the social and psychic air of the early 1920's making 
many Americans so terribly anxious as to compel them to 
seek release in a secret, hooded order which, if spawned in 
Europe, would have carried the designation "fascist." 
Any attempt to resolve this paradox must begin with the 
understanding that the Klan was a many-splintered thing 
or, less invidiously, a many-splendored thing. The Knights 
were troubled souls, but that which tried their souls varied 
from region to region and, indeed, from Knight to Knight. 
It was as though an outraged citizenry participated in a 
gigantic police line-up to identify the enemies of society, 
with each "good" American fingering a different suspect: 
uppity Negro, conspiratorial Catholic, avaricious Jew, dirty 
Mexican, wily Oriental, bloody-handed Bolshevik, scabrous 
bootlegger, fancy "lady," oily gambler, fuzzy international­
ist, grafting politico, Sabbath desecrator, wife-beater, home-
breaker, atheistic evolutionist, feckless-faithed Modernist, 
scoffing professor, arrogant intellectual, subversive social­
ist, slick urbanite, simpering pacifist, corrupt labor organ­
izer. Of necessity, the line of suspects was endless because 
the evils threatening America appeared legion: miscegena­
tion, mongrelization, Romanism, socialism, urbanism, skep­
ticism, secularism, paganism, modernism, radicalism, inter­
nationalism, materialism, Freudianism, relativism, surreal­
ism, alcoholism, sexualism. 
These myriad dangers appeared more clear and present 
in some regions and to some citizens than others; conse­
quently, it is imprecise to speak of the Klan of the 1920's. 
Rather, there existed many local Klans operating as virtu­
ally autonomous units, and each unit ranked the dangers 
in some order of priority, just as each Knight was motivated 
(whether consciously or not) by his life experiences. 
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Fragmented and amorphous, the Klan was yet a fellow­
ship of belief, knitted together by a shared anxiety about 
tomorrow and a shared longing for the return of yesterday. 
Perhaps, after all, there was only one great enemy: change! 
Made bewildered and fearful by the swift and surging forces 
reshaping "their" country, unwilling or unable to under­
stand this strange, new century, men banded together to 
offer resistance. Essentially, then, the Klan was a counter­
revolutionary movement. Its core appeal was to those 
Americans who, through considerations of rational self-
interest or unconscious emotional needs, dreamed that the 
clock might be stopped; and who, as they donned their white 
dream robes, knew a momentary identification with a fanci­
ful older and purer community. 
The older and purer community of the Klansman's dream 
was, of course, a white man's community. "I believe in the 
Klan. I don't believe the thing to do at this moment is to go 
out and shoot a nigger in the street. But when the time 
comes—when it comes—we'll take them down by the bus-
load, by the trainload, that's what we'll do. By the busload. 
By the carload! We don't hate Negroes. We love 'em, 
in their place—like shinin' shoes, bell-hoppin', street­
sweepin1, pickin1 cotton, diggin* ditches, eatin' possum, 
servin' time, totin' buckshot, river-floatin', etc." Thus spoke 
the voice of the Klan in 1965, as articulated by a Jackson­
ville, Florida, barber. "Our main and fundamental objective 
is the MAINTENANCE OF THE SUPREMACY OF THE 
WHITE RACE in this Republic." Thus spoke the voice 
of the Klan in 1867, as articulated by the delegates to 
the organizational meeting of the Reconstruction Klan in 
Nashville. 
Because the Negro was the central target of both the 
Reconstruction and mid-twentieth-century Klans, because 
both saw the untrammeled Negro as the nation's greatest 
menace, the temptation is to interpolate and conclude that 
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the same Negrophobia dominated the Klan of the twenties. 
Perceptive historians have not succumbed to this temptation, 
realizing that the Klan that flowered after World War I 
reflected the coalescence of many different fears and loyal­
ities. Indeed, students of the Klan in the Southwest, Far 
West, and Midwest deem the black man an inconsequential 
factor in the growth of the white-robed order. We may con­
cur that the movements of the 1860's, 1920's, and 1960's, 
although sharing a common name and ritual, were substan­
tively different. We may even concur that in great areas 
of the country where the Klan was powerful the Negro 
population was insignificant, and that, in fact, it is probable 
that had not a single Negro lived in the United States, a 
Klan-type order would have emerged, such was the per­
vasive anxiety of the post-Versailles years. 
Yet having escaped the errors of simplism and "present­
ism," perhaps in this very sophistication the principle of 
Ockham's Razor has been forgotten: complex and refined 
explanations of observed phenomena must not obscure the 
simple and evident. Just as there is no more demonic theme 
in American history, so there is none more persistent than 
that America was a white man's country. White supremacy 
was an article of faith with almost all modern Europeans 
and their descendents in the northern New World. Until 
almost today it was a faith seemingly supported by much 
scientific and scholarly evidence. Kluxers of every genera­
tion have feared the Negro—and consequently have hated 
him. And Kluxers in every generation have enjoyed the 
covert endorsement of large numbers of citizens too timid 
or too hypocritical to enlist under the banner of the fiery 
cross. The Klan of the 1920's was first, if not foremost, a 
movement to keep the black man in his place—if necessary, 
by digging his grave. Its founder, Colonel William Joseph 
Simmons, was an Alabaman who with a band of Georgians 
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on Thanksgiving night, 1915, ascended Stone Mountain near 
Atlanta to call "from its slumber of half a century" that 
Invisible Empire that once had saved the prostrate south 
from mongrelization. "The present Klan," testified Sim­
mons, "is a memorial to the original organization. In a sense 
it is the reincarnation among the sons of the spirit of the 
fathers." As gallant southerners had galloped with torch 
and mask to the defense of their society imperiled by con­
quering Yankee and former bondsmen, so their sons would 
band to resist with equal success the present pretensions 
of "darkies" who, said Simmons, were "getting pretty 
uppity." Childhood cloudy fantasies of redeeming Klans­
men were given sharper focus on the screen of the darkened 
Atlanta theater as the good Colonel saw repeated perfor­
mances (on scrounged passes) of that tarnished epic, The 
Birth of a Nation, afilm that wrote "history with lightning," 
to use Woodrow Wilson's words of mindless approbation; 
and in both fantasy and film Simmons identified the redemp­
tion of his beloved South with the preservation of the 
existing caste system. It is, therefore, not surprising that 
all prospective Knights vowed to "faithfully strive for the 
eternal maintenance of white supremacy." Nor is it a matter 
of astonishment that when Simmons was maneuvered from 
control, his successor, Hiram Wesley Evans, reaffirmed the 
ancient dogma that "God Almighty never intended social 
equality for Negro and white man," and who, with a coterie 
of Dallas disciples, implemented the Almighty's wishes by 
branding with acid the initials KKK across the forehead of 
a Negro bellhop. As the Klan was reborn in Georgia by 
southerners determined to rekindle with fiery cross the 
resistance spirit of their fathers, so it was in Dixie in 1920, 
1921, and 1922 that the movement first gained strength. 
To be sure, presently the Klan penetrated other sections and 
exploited other anxieties, but its southern "style" and 
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essential Negrophobia was never totally lost. And the 1960's 
have reminded us of the historic fact that white men in the 
North when put to the test are scarcely color-blind. 
The period immediately following World War I was a 
time of testing for the white man and a time of terror for 
the Negro. Even as the guns on the Western Front quieted, 
racial violence in America exploded. Service overseas gave 
Negro soldiers a taste of equality and a sense of pride. The 
migration of thousands to northern cities engendered a 
feeling of independence. And the millions who remained in 
the South hoped that President Wilson intended to include 
American Negroes among the beneficiaries of his new world 
of democracy. By 1920 their hopes had been shattered and 
their pretensions corrected. America was to remain, as it 
always had been, a white man's country. This was the hard 
lesson learned of a thousand floggings, a hundred lynchings, 
and a score of race riots in the months following the Armi­
stice—a lesson administered over the land from Washing­
ton to Omaha and from Chicago to Longview, Texas. Fur­
ther, it was an instruction to be repeated throughout the 
1920's for the benefit of forgetful Negroes by the revived Ku 
Klux Klan. 
If many Americans were made fearful by the rising tide 
of color, it is possible that an even greater number trembled 
over the menace of Rome. In truth, the shadow of the Pope 
seemed darker than that of the Negro, and anti-Catholicism 
was the key to the Klan's growth in the Far West and Mid­
west and, though not initially, perhaps in the South as well. 
Although Colonel Simmons dreamed of resurrecting the 
Reconstruction Klan, he in fact reawakened two other 
resistance movements, the Know-Nothings of the 1840's and 
1850's and the American Protective Association of the 
1880's and 1890's. In these movements there raged the fever 
of anti-Catholicism, the oldest and stubbornest variety of 
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the disease called "nativism," a disease far too common in 
the United States to be diagnosed a foreign or un-American 
strain. If the conquest of America by Rome seemed a 
frightening possibility to nineteenth-century Protestants, to 
their twentieth-century sons it was an imminent probability 
and, in the great northern cities, an actuality. In the twenty-
five-year period preceding the incident atop Stone Mountain, 
the Catholic church gained in membership 114.1 per cent, 
and in 1920, the year of the Klan's great surge, Catholics 
comprised 36 per cent of the American religious population. 
The power, the prestige, the "arrogance" of Catholicism was 
everywhere evident in American life; and when Alfred 
Emanuel Smith made his first bid for the presidency in 
1924, the last, worst fear of Protestants was at hand: the 
"Dago of the Tiber" (to borrow a Klansman's characteriza­
tion of the pope) would now take up residence on the 
Potomac. 
It is impossible to understand the enormity of the peril 
and consequently the enormous appeal of the Klan unless 
we comprehend the historic identification between Protes­
tantism and Americanism. Since the first settlements, Prot­
estants had prided themselves on being the senior partners 
in the American enterprise, and in the nineteenth century 
the American nation and the Protestant denominations had 
marched to greatness together. This was entirely appro­
priate, for there was no discernible tension between the 
evangelical churches and society, between piety and patri­
otism. The Protestant way of faith and the American way of 
life were one. What was good for the churches was good for 
the country. To be sure, this resulted in a "culture-Protes­
tantism" wherein the churches paid a tragic price for their 
comfortable relationship with American culture; rarely was 
it found necessary to cry, "Let the Church be the Church!" 
The churches were not merely domesticated, they were 
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virtually emasculated, and like the eunuchs of old, served 
as ornaments without seriously disturbing their master's 
establishment. 
Thus, the prideful cry of the Ohio Klan leader was repeat­
edly uttered: "We want the country ruled by the sort of 
people who settled it. This is our country and we alone are 
responsible for its future." Protestants viewed the growing 
power of Catholicism as not only a threat to their religion 
but also to their beloved nation. Indeed, since Protestantism 
and Americanism were inseparable, it was impossible to 
assault the one without wounding the other. Therefore, the 
Klan attracted patriots as well as bigots, appealing to 
nationalist loyalities as well as to religious prejudices. Even 
irenic-spirited Protestants saw (or thought they saw) in 
the authoritarian structure of the Catholic church objective 
reasons for opposing its spread in a democratic society. As 
in wartime true citizens willingly lay down their lives in 
defense of their free institutions, so patriots in peacetime 
should freely spend of themselves in the fight against inter­
nal subversion. It is instructive that the "Klan verse" of 
the New Testament is Romans 12:1: "I beseech you there­
fore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your 
bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which 
is your reasonable service." Perhaps we can now under­
stand why the Klan tapped anti-Catholic hostilities even in 
areas, such as rural Indiana, where the Catholic population 
numbered less than 2 per cent. Social conflict between 
Protestants and Catholics over such matters as schools, 
local politics, prohibition, and censorship heightened tension 
in many communities; but even where abrasive contact was 
absent, patriotic Protestants yet feared for the future of 
"their" nation. 
The very name Roman Catholic church was suggestive of 
sinister foreign influence, underscoring the essential Ameri­
canism of the Protestant denominations. The very militancy 
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of Catholicism transmuted Protestant tolerance from a 
virtue to a weakness. And the very authoritarianism of the 
Church of Rome sharpened the revelation of Protestantism's 
fragmentation, rendering efforts to quench the conflagration 
of Catholicism sweeping the land as feeble and ill-directed 
as the spray from a leaky hose. The Klan carried the hope 
of Protestant unity and the promise of Protestant militancy. 
At long last God-fearing men could know, as they assembled 
around the blazing hillside cross, identification with a 
mighty supradenominational movement. Like all crusaders, 
these Klansmen without conscious hypocrisy could cry, "For 
God and country," and in their righteousness have no sense 
of shame as they battled the enemies of their faith and 
nation. "I've attended a lot of church gatherings and con­
ventions," remarked an Exalted Cyclops after the Klan's 
1924 national convention, "but I never attended one where 
the revival spirit was as pronounced as it was at the Klan 
Klonvocation." 
The operative words are "revival spirit," for though 
anxiety over Catholicism's growth and ambitions was wide­
spread, few liberal Protestants could bring themselves to 
join the Klan. Thus, far from being a unifying force, the 
Klan further sharpened the cleavage between Modernists 
and Fundamentalists. Though not all Fundamentalists were 
Klansmen, virtually all Klansmen—aside from the obvious 
charlatans—were Fundamentalists. Fundamentalism and 
the Klan were perfectly mated in their anti-intellectualism, 
their morbid compulsion to destroy that which they did not 
understand, their passion for emotional release, and their 
frustration, as well as in their blind faith and total com­
mitment. At the same time we should note the national 
leadership of American Protestantism, including almost 
every minister of reputation and every theologian of signifi­
cance, denounced the hooded order, as did almost every 
national governing body of the larger denominations. Thus 
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the Klan was not an instrument of American Protestantism 
in the sense, say, that the Inquisition was of the medieval 
church. It is crucial to understand that the Protestant de­
nominations did not call forth the Klan; rather, the Klan 
sought desperately to become identified by Protestants as 
an ally, and it did so by tapping the historic anti-Catholic 
bias learned by Protestant children in cradle and conven­
ticle and by exploiting the prideful Protestant assumption 
that they were the darlings of American history. 
The Klan made the identification in many ways. Its sym­
bol was a cross, and "The Old Rugged Cross" became almost 
the official hymn, sometimes with the alteration, "I will 
cherish the bright Fiery Cross. " Its Kreed "reveren­
tially" acknowledged the majesty of God. Its code of con­
duct was drawn from the Ten Commandments. The Kloran 
declared that "the living Christ is a Klansman's criterion 
of character," and Klan pamphlets bore such titles as 
"Christ and Other Klansmen." Every Klavern had a chap­
lain called a Kludd, who opened each meeting with a prayer 
and closed with a benediction. The fervent religiosity of the 
meeting reached a crescendo as the Knights gathered before 
the altar to sing the "Kloxology." And perhaps as they 
marched from the Klavern to burn a warning cross atop a 
nearby hill, their voices broke forth in the militant "On­
ward, Christian Soldiers." Perhaps, too, a few thoughtful 
members quieted their troubled consciences with the words 
from another much loved hymn, "God moves in mysterious 
ways, His wonders to behold." 
Little wonder, then, that the Klan succeeded in attracting 
thousands of evangelical ministers, men already disturbed 
by the passing of "Old-Time Religion" and made uneasy 
by their own declining community status. When a Kleagle 
entered an area, almost invariably he made his first over­
tures to the local preachers, offering them membership free 
of the usual ten-dollar fee. Often a co-operating clergyman 
was thanked or a stiff-kneed one threatened by a sudden 
 225 THE KU KLUX KLAN
Sunday visitation of white-robed and masked Klansmen 
who silently entered the sanctuary, marched down the 
aisles, congregated in front of the pulpit to present a purse 
of perhaps forty dollars. Additional hundreds of ministers 
were on the Klan payrolls as organizers, lecturers, and 
officers; and without their active labors and without the 
tacit endorsement of a numerically impressive element of 
the ministry, the Klan could not have flourished. The 
obscene spectacle of men of God gathered about a cross 
ignited by their hands is perhaps tempered only by a sense 
of pity for Christians possessed by such anxiety. 
"My country in 1900 is something totally different from 
my own country of 1860. I am wholly a stranger in it." The 
writer continued: "The child born in 1900 would be 
born into a new world which would not be a unity but a 
multiple." This lament and this prediction were made by 
that purest of patricians, Henry Adams, grandson and 
great-grandson of presidents; but the words might have 
been uttered by the most banal of Klansmen, for the open­
ing years of the twentieth century saw the older Americans 
overwhelmed by a sense of estrangement as "their" land 
was flooded by a sea of new immigrants. Historians of 
immigration make much of the shock of alienation expe­
rienced by the "uprooted" as they migrated from the psy­
chological security of their familiar European villages to 
the unknown New World. These insights are altogether 
valid, for the immigrant's ordeal was seldom physically 
easy and never emotionally painless. The obverse side of 
the coin, however, has been examined by fewer students. 
How does a man accustomed to power and prestige respond 
when strangers enter the land to dethrone him—and if per­
chance the dethronement is only in the man's imagination, 
it does not lessen the fear. 
Between the year William McKinley enlisted as a private 
in the 23rd Ohio Volunteer Infantry in the Civil War and 
his assassination at the hands of a twenty-eight-year-old 
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Polish-American with the "sinister" name of Czolgosz, 
fourteen million people came to the United States, "new" 
immigrants from southern and eastern Europe accounting 
for over 50 per cent of the total by the 1890's. In the open­
ing fifteen years of the new century the torrent accelerated 
rather than slackened, an average of 1,000,000 entering 
annually, and now the "new" immigrants accounted for 72 
per cent. The impulse was temporarily stemmed by the 
war, but with the coming of peace, it renewed. From June, 
1920, to June, 1921, more than 800,000 individuals entered, 
and consuls in Europe reported that additional millions 
were planning to leave. Then, in one of the most momen­
tous enactments in American history, Congress virtually 
closed the gates, and the Statue of Liberty lost all relevance 
save for returning tourists—and a handful of immigrants. 
(Probably the whole twenty-five-year period after 1925 saw 
fewer immigrants to the United States than the single year 
1907.) 
There was more than a casual relationship between this 
surge of immigration and the resurgence of the Ku Klux 
Klan. These "new" immigrants, these "beaten men of 
beaten races," these mongrel worshipers of Bacchus or 
Baal or Marx, seemed no less threatening to the cherished 
America of yesteryear than insolent blacks and arrogant 
Romans. Inquired Colonel Simmons in explaining the 
growth of the Klan: "What were the dangers which the 
white men saw threatening to crush and overwhelm Anglo-
Saxon civilization? The dangers were in the tremendous 
influx of foreign immigration, tutored in alien dogmas and 
alien creeds, flowing in from all climes and slowly pushing 
the native-born white American population into the center 
of the country, there to be ultimately overwhelmed and 
smothered." The Colonel's successor, Evans, elaborated: 
"When the Klan first appeared the nation was in the con­
fusion of sudden awakening from the lovely dream of the 
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melting pot, disorganized and helpless before the invasion 
of aliens and alien ideas. After ten years of the Klan it 
arms for defense." Nordic Americans, he continued, finally 
decided that even the crossing of salt water did not dim a single 
spot on a leopard; that an alien usually remains an alien no 
matter what is done to him, what veneer of education he gets, 
what oath he takes, nor what public attitudes he adopts. They 
decided that the melting pot was a ghastly failure, and remem­
bered that the very name was coined by a member of one of 
the races—the Jews—which most determinedly refuses to melt. 
They decided that in every way, as well as in politics, the alien 
in the vast majority of cases is unalterably fixed in his instincts, 
character, thought and interests by centuries of racial selection 
and development, that he thinks first for his own people, works 
only with and for them, and never an American. They decided 
that in character, instincts, thought, and purposes—in his whole 
soul—an alien remains fixedly alien to America and all it means. 
It is again necessary to insist on a hard point. As the 
Klan tapped rather than created Negrophobia and anti-
Catholicism, so it did not so much inspire as reflect a per­
vasive Anglo-Saxon racism. The Klan can be understood 
only in the context of the tribalism of the times: the lynch­
ing of Leo Frank and the judicial execution of Sacco and 
Vanzetti; the subtle anti-Semitic discrimination instituted 
by eastern clubs, resorts, and universities and the crude 
slanders leveled at Jews by Henry Ford; the superman 
notions of Jack London and the elitist concepts of Irving 
Babbitt; the "Yellow Peril" warnings of Homer Lea and 
the anti-Oriental practices of native Californians; the find­
ings prideful to Anglo-Saxons and diminishing to other 
"races" of the Army intelligence tests administered during 
the war and the conclusions implicit in "objective" sociolog­
ical studies; and the consensus seemingly reached by genet­
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icists such as Henry Fairfield Osborn, geographers such 
as Ellsworth Huntington, psychologists such as William 
McDougall, and a host of pseudo scholars such as Madison 
Grant, that the American grain was being choked by alien 
chaff. 
It is disconcerting to note the similarities between this 
xenophobia and European fascism. Both stressed racial 
purity, a return to a primitive community of one blood, and 
the purging of alien minority groups. And if the Klan 
preached 100 per cent Americanism, was this not the 
national goal during World War I? If the Klan sought to 
save the country from mongrelization, was this not the 
intent of the Congressional restriction laws of 1921 and 
1924, laws as ardently supported by many patricians, popu­
lists, and progressives as by hooded Knights? 
John Higham has given a very serviceable definition of 
nativism: an intense opposition to an internal minority on 
the ground of its foreign (i.e., "un-American") connec­
tions; and he has discerned three major themes each with 
a separate history reaching back before the Civil War: 
anti-Catholicism, Anglo-Saxon racism, and antiforeign rad­
icalism. We have seen how the Ku Klux Klan reflected and 
exploited two of these manifestations. Almost equally cen­
tral to the Klan's purposes was the stamping out of rad­
icalism in all its variants. Throughout American history, 
patriots have feared their nation endangered by imported 
radical ideologies. The Birchites and McCarthyites of the 
mid-twentieth century experience an apprehension as old as 
that which impelled the Alien and Sedition acts during the 
anti-Jacobin hysteria of the 1790's. And when in the 1960's 
Klansmen proclaim "FIGHT COMMUNISM," the injunc­
tion is no more imperative than that given by their fathers 
to "FIGHT BOLSHEVISM." Today the enemy within is 
deemed less the alien immigrant than the native-born "fel­
low traveler" seduced by alien ideas. Following World War 
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I, however, the stereotype of the immigrant radical knew 
its most tarnished hour. 
During the war all Americans, irrespective of race or 
religion or ethnic background, had rallied 'round the flag, 
save only for some Socialists, Industrial Workers of the 
World, and other elements of the left wing. Thus radicalism 
was equated with wartime treason, the dissenter identified 
with the Hun. Scarcely had the United States been saved, 
despite the radicals' activities, than there loomed the men­
ace of Bolshevism. And in America the advance agents of 
the Comintern were quite obviously aliens who somehow 
owed a double allegiance to Germany and Russia. Surely 
alien agitators were responsible for the massive labor 
unrest, the Seattle general strike, the Boston police strike, 
the "Great Steel Strike," and the thousands of additional 
strikes involving millions of workers in 1919 and 1920. 
Surely no true American laborer, unless deranged by 
Bolshevik propaganda, would march in May Day parades 
or shout, "To hell with the United States!" or join the 
new Communist and Communist-Labor parties. And cer­
tainly only foreigners were capable of the bombings and 
attempted assassinations of public officials that seemed 
proof positive of a vast revolutionary conspiracy. 
Such was the peril, it was not enough to bar future 
immigration or patiently instruct foreigners in the meaning 
of Americanism. Heroic surgery was immediately required 
to cut out the cancerous growth. The "Great Red Scare" 
was a time of unparalleled intimidation, suppression, im­
prisonment, deportation—at the local, state, and federal 
level—because at no time in American history, either before 
or since, had the American people been seized by such a 
collective failure of nerve. It is, therefore, altogether fitting 
that the most feared nativist movement in American his­
tory, the revived Ku Klux Klan, should date its take-off 
point from the "Great Red Scare." The Klan never articu­
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lated an economic program, and capitalism was not men­
tioned in its constitution; but it is evident that the Klan 
saw Americanism and radicalism in irreconcilable tension 
and that at least some elements in the business community 
supported the order as an ally in the war against all forms 
of radicalism, including, as it happened, labor unions. 
Hopefully, the anatomy of the revived Ku Klux Klan is 
becoming discernible. Far from being a uniquely repre­
hensible episode in an otherwise sunny American pageant, 
it was the archetype of nativist movements, the receptacle 
for nativist themes flowing from the distant American past. 
Far from being an isolated, ugly phenomenon in an age of 
wonderful nonsense, it reflected the tensions of an age of 
revolution and embodied the anxieties of a people convulsed 
by change. Far from being a membership entirely of soci­
ety's failures, it embraced many citizens who historically 
had enjoyed power and prestige, the prerogatives of the 
nation's senior partners. To repeat a point made earlier, the 
Klan may best be understood as a counterrevolutionary 
movement called into being by sober individuals to resist a 
world they neither made nor admired—nor understood. The 
Klan adopted as one of its mottos the command attributed 
to George Washington: "Put none but Americans on guard 
tonight!" Alas, Klansmen would not acknowledge—indeed, 
could not bear to acknowledge—that Negroes, Catholics, 
immigrants, or "radicals" had any rightful claim to the 
coveted title "American." 
In 1927 in the southern Alabama farm country of Cren­
shaw, a group of Klansmen led by a Baptist minister, L. 
A. Nails, flogged a divorcee, the mother of two children, 
who had married a divorced man. After the whipping the 
Reverend Nails offered the consoling sermon: "Sister, you 
were not punished in anger this evening; you were punished 
in a spirit of kindness and correction, to set your feet aright 
and to show your childen how a good mother should go." 
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A collection for the woman was taken up among her assail­
ants and the resulting three dollars and fifty cents were 
given her along with a jar of Vaseline for her wounds. This 
incident and these words reveal still another color of the 
chameleon-like Klan: its moral authoritarianism, its vigi­
lantism, and its sadism. 
Recent scholarship has demonstrated what must have 
been self-evident to the victims of the Klan's wrath at the 
time: the hooded Knights, who took as their motto, "Not 
for self, but for others," regarded themselves as perfect 
knights, sans peur et sans reproche, and therefore the 
proper guardians of public virtue and private morality. And 
in the postwar years, public corruption and private de­
pravity seemed endemic. Is it necessary to explicate this 
point? Is it mandatory to refer once again to Hemingway's 
heroes and Fitzgerald's heroines and all the beautiful and 
the damned of the Lost Generation of the Roaring Twen­
ties? The quips about rising skirts and falling morals and 
the times being out of joint when the word "neck" abruptly 
became a verb are not merely surface manifestations of a 
society that remained at its core stable. Bootleggers, speak­
easies, rumrunners, syphilitic gangsters, organized gam­
bling, open prostitution, lurid movies, salacious literature, 
Sabbath sports, easy divorce, family disintegration, sexy 
dances, purchased politicians, bought policemen—these 
things, of course, were not unique to the twenties. Yet a 
social and moral revolution, already apparent before the 
war, was in fact dislocating the old nineteenth-century Vic­
torian structure. The acids of modernity were in truth dis­
solving the old verities of piety, patriotism, and moral 
purity, reverence for church, country, and home. To older 
Americans this revolution was as menacing as the rising 
tide of Negroes, Catholics, aliens, and radicals. Indeed, the 
strangers in the land (together with the proverbially sexu­
ally depraved blacks) had introduced these evils into a for­
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merly chaste society, and now, obviously, even the sons and 
daughters of the American Revolution were being infected. 
Read a Klan handbill: "Every criminal, every gambler, 
every thug, every libertine, every girl runner, every home 
wrecker, every wife beater, every dope peddler, every moon­
shiner, every crooked politician, every pagan Papist priest, 
every shyster lawyer, every K. of C, every white slaver, 
every black spider—is fighting the Klan. Think it over. 
Which side are you on?" In torchlight parades white-robed 
men (and it probably is not happenstance that white, the 
emblem of purity, was chosen for the robes) carried signs: 
LAW AND ORDER MUST PREVAIL. COHABITATION 
BETWEEN WHITES AND BLACKS MUST STOP. BOOT­
LEGGERS, PIMPS, HANGERS-ON, GET RIGHT OR GET 
OUT. WIFE-BEATERS, FAMILY-DESERTERS, HOME­
WRECKERS, WE HAVE NO ROOM FOR YOU. LAW 
VIOLATORS, WE ARE WATCHING YOU. BEWARE. GO 
JOY RIDING WITH YOUR OWN WIFE. THE SHERIFFS 
OF BOWIE AND MILLER COUNTIES HAVE MORE 
DEPUTIES THAN CARRY COMMISSIONS. PURE WOM­
ENHOOD. CRAP SHOOTERS BEWARE. LOVE THY 
NEIGHBOR AS THYSELF, BUT LEAVE HIS WIFE 
ALONE. Although the evidence is fragmentary, it is quite 
possible that the majority of individuals flogged, tarred 
and feathered, branded, emasculated, and otherwise tortured 
and intimidated by the Klan were those who had in some 
way transgressed morally. 
When the Klan proclaimed its opposition to "Jew, Jug, 
and Jesuit," its intimate relationship to Prohibition was 
merely underscored. There were millions of prohibitionists, 
of course, who never became Klansmen, but almost all 
Klansmen claimed to be as dry as a powder flask. The harsh, 
repressive spirit of Prohibition represented a souring of the 
original humanitarian passion of the early temperance 
reformers. Just so, the moral passion of the Kluxers was 
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a perversion rather than a denial of progressivism's vision 
of a redeemed society. 
And so it came to pass that thousands of good, decent 
citizens, genuinely alarmed by civic corruption and moral 
decay, failed initially to discern the Klan's own corrupt 
nature and welcomed it as an agency of reform. And seem­
ingly many a community was rid of gamblers, bootleggers, 
and prostitutes because of the Klan*s presence. Exulted the 
editor of a Texas newspaper: "It cost Goose Creek just 
$1200 to clean up. It cost the boys down there $1200 in 
fines assessed for flogging to transform a rough and tumble 
oil camp into a progressive and God-fearing community of 
industrious toilers. The Ku Klux Klan has made a 
new and different town of Goose Creek." After one visit 
from Klan regulators, it was said, a tough town became 
"almost a Sunday School class." Vigilantism is, after all, 
as much a sign of a desire for law and order as it is a 
manifestation of lawlessness. In America vigilantism was 
an old and not always dishonorable tradition. In fact, in 
1920 and 1921 masked farmers roamed the countryside 
with lighted torch in order to check the sale of cotton, and 
their acts of intimidation, however justified, provided an 
example for the Klan to follow. 
The dangers of men taking the law into their own hands, 
the arrogance of men appointing themselves as civic censors, 
the voyeurism and prurience implicit in Comstockery, the 
sadism in the act of stripping and whipping "fallen" 
women, the temptation to exact personal vengeance in the 
name of "morality"—these things are no less true because 
obvious. As Sartre observed, "It is fun to be an anti-Semite." 
Undoubtedly, the Klan attracted cranky professional moral­
ists, village vigilantes, local busybodies, prudish Pecksniffs, 
old ladies of both sexes haunted (as Mencken sneered) 
by the fear that someone, somewhere, might be happy. 
But even Klansmen of the purest conscious motives and 
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highest community status failed to heed the words of George 
Santayana: "Neither prosperity nor empire nor heaven can 
be worth the winning at the price of a virulent temper, 
bloody hands, an anguished spirit, and a vain hatred of the 
rest of the world." In our effort to understand the Klan 
we might heed the words of John Higham: "Perhaps, in 
the pageant of American history, the white-robed Klansmen 
should stand in the place of Santayana's genteel New 
Englander as the Last Puritan." 
When a Klansman addressed a Catholic priest, "You, 
who wears his collar backwards like a mule," his audience 
caught the allusion, for they were steeped in agrarian life 
and lore, and when they dreamed of the past it was of a 
pastoral community, a virgin land, inhibited by sturdy 
yeomen, unspotted by the urban world. But urbanization 
had come to the United States. In fact, the revived Klan 
emerged at the precise moment when the tides of popula­
tion, power, and prestige were running heavily to the city, 
and at the end of the twenties only 40 per cent of the popu­
lation still lived in rural areas. There is more than a casual 
correlation between this demographic change and the Klan's 
rise. Yet it is not a simple relationship. 
Most students interpret the Klan as a rural, village, and 
small-town phenomenon. This is true less in a statistical 
than in a psychological sense. The Klan was reborn in 
Atlanta. It enjoyed great strength in the booming cities of 
the Southwest: Shreveport, Dallas, Tulsa, Little Rock (but 
not cosmopolitan New Orleans). The Milwaukee unit was 
the first and largest in the state of Wisconsin, and Detroit 
was the center of the Klan's power in Michigan. It was 
strong in Indianapolis, Chicago, Dayton, and Pittsburgh in 
the heartland of America, and on the eastern shore in Nor­
folk and on the West Coast in Portland. Cities as diverse as 
Denver, Tampa, and Philadelphia were spawning beds. It 
is therefore misleading to presume that city dwellers were 
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protected by some invisible cordon sanitaire from the virus 
of the Invisible Empire. Yet it remains essentially correct 
to identify the Klan with the older agrarian angle of vision. 
For one thing, the Klan was in fact a force in the villages 
and small towns dotting the land. For another, there had 
migrated to the cities farmers and villagers who, regardless 
of how they might be located for census purposes, retained 
their rural mentality. They were America's own uprooted, 
as lost and dislocated as the European immigrant. Stripped 
of their identity by the externalization, impersonalization, 
and depersonalization of urban industrial life, they sought 
desperately to define themselves by clinging to the values 
of their fathers and perhaps of their own childhood. The 
Klan had held the hope that men might preserve their 
ancient, agrarian values even as they now lived in an urban 
environment. Indeed, it was imperative that these values 
be imposed on the cities. Thus when Klansmen spoke of 
redeeming the country, in reality they meant saving the 
great cities of the nation, for rural and village America 
had not yet been lest. It was in the cities, dominated by 
alien hordes and ruled by politicians subservient to their 
wishes, that there flourished gangsterism, alcoholism, skep­
ticism, radicalism, sexualism—in brief, the paganism that 
threatened to break forth from the metropolitan centers 
and engulf the entire land. The very enormity of the chal­
lenge heightened the Klansman's anxiety and dictated the 
extremism of his response. 
Just as Klansmen were in the twentieth century but 
dreamed they were not of it, so they hoped their country 
somehow could be in the world but not of it. The Klan 
clearly drew from the wellsprings of nineteenth-century 
American exceptionalism and isolationism. Equally discern­
ible is its marriage with the mood of disenchantment and 
bitterness that followed the Great Crusade. It is unneces­
sary to explicate this point at length. The Klan opposed 
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American membership in the World Court and, at least 
after 1920, in the League of Nations. It did not favor the 
reduction of war debts or disarmament, and it loathed 
pacifism. (However, the Klan did not agitate for interven­
tion in Mexico, a foreign adventure associated with the 
Catholic hierarchy.) It was the old story of American inno­
cence and European wickedness. Klansmen would have 
concurred in Ben Hecht's sentiment, if not in his imagery, 
in comparing Wilson at Versailles among the crafty Old 
World diplomats to "a long-faced virgin trapped in a bawdy 
house and calling in violent tones for a glass of lemonade." 
Once again it must be remarked that the spirit of the Klan 
fused intimately with the general temper of the 1920's. 
In its ethnocentrism, provincialism, and inability to accept 
the facts of twentieth-century life, the Klan mirrored per­
fectly the notion of Fortress America, a nation whose 
strength was the strength of ten because its heart was 
pure. And America's purity could be preserved only in 
isolation. Alas, the Klan's Manichaean view of the inter­
national scene was as murky as its vision of an America 
divided between the children of light and the children of 
darkness. 
Men who sees things in this fashion, who make simplistic 
judgments and draw sharp distinctions between right and 
wrong, good and evil, who think in terms of stereotypes 
and moralisms, tend to be prejudiced. They also tend to 
be anti-intellectual. Ambiguity, irony, paradox, relativism, 
contingency, skepticism, suspended judgment, speculation, 
open-mindedness—these are the attributes of the intellec­
tual's glory (and perhaps the source of his misery). The 
average Klansman was neither blessed nor cursed by them; 
the intellectual as Klansman was atypical. Indeed, we are 
of the conviction that while the Klan appealed to an entire 
host of Americans, poor and prosperous, disinherited and 
establishment-secure, southerner and Yankee, farmer, vil­
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lager, and urbanite, scarcely a single intellectual claimed 
citizenship in the Invisible Empire. Thus the Klan both 
perpetuated the pervasive anti-intellectualism in American 
history and illuminated the growing estrangement in the 
1920's between artists and scholars and the commonalty. 
Hiram Wesley Evans put it pointedly and poignantly: 
We are a movement of the plain people, very weak in the 
matter of culture, intellectual support, and trained leadership. 
We are demanding, and we expect to win, a return of power into 
the hands of the everday, not highly cultured, not overly intel­
lectualized, but unspoiled and not de-Americanized, average 
citizen of the old stock. Our members and leaders are all of this 
class—the opposition of the intellectuals and liberals who hold 
the leadership and from whom we expect to wrest control, is 
almost automatic. 
This is undoubtedly a weakness. It lays us open to the charge 
of being "hicks" and "rubes" and "drivers of second-hand Fords.'' 
We admit it. Far worse, it makes it hard for us to state our 
case and advocate our crusade in the most effective way, for 
most of us lack skill in language. 
Every popular movement has suffered from just this handi­
cap. 
The Klan does not believe that the fact that it is emotional 
and instinctive, rather than coldly intellectual, is a weakness. 
All action comes from emotion, rather than from ratiocination. 
Our emotions and the instincts on which they are based have 
been bred into us for thousands of years; far longer than reason 
has had a place in the human brain. They are the founda­
tions of our American civilization, even more than our great 
historic documents; they can be trusted where the fine-haired 
reasoning of the denatured intellectuals cannot. 
Thus spoke the spirit of fundamentalism with its repres­
sion through anti-evolution laws and heresy trials and 
textbook censorship of all in modern science and scholar­
ship threatening to a faith made truly blind by ignorance. 
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Thus spoke the spirit of fascism with its appeal to primitive 
instincts and tribal symbols. Thus spoke mediocre men 
maddened by the epithet's "yahoo," "boob," and "Babbitt" 
flung at them by all the sneering Menckens of the "Smart 
Set." Thus spoke Klansmen in an age when not only were 
ancient truths questioned, the very existence of Truth 
itself was coming to be doubted. 
If the Klan's anti-intellectualism is apparent, its predilec­
tion for violence is not. Contemporary observers tended to 
exaggerate the extent of Klan violence, but perhaps recent 
scholarship has swung too far in its minimization of it. 
In much of the North and East, physical coercion was 
rarely practiced, and never in some communities. The his­
torian of the Klan in Wisconsin, for example, believes it 
false and dishonest to picture the Klan as threatening. 
Often the Klan adjusted itself to community life and lived 
peaceably alongside other institutions within the social 
order. When the Klavern assembled, the proceedings were 
as prosaic as the lodge meetings of George F. Babbitt. In 
the South and Southwest, the lash and acid were more 
frequently employed, but even in these areas there was a 
definite lessening of violence by the middle of the decade. 
Evans, after his assumption of technical control in 1922, 
disavowed coercion. Moreover, undoubtedly some crimes 
were committed in the name of the Klan for which the 
order bore no direct responsibility, and some chapters 
offered sizable rewards for the arrest of persons practicing 
violence under the guise of the Klan. 
But to absolve the Invisible Empire of all acts of terror 
and torture simply will not wash. For one thing, perhaps 
the number of intimidated victims who did not report 
attacks exceeded the number of instances when the Klan 
was falsely held responsible for an outrage. For another, 
inevitably a secret hooded order would be attractive to the 
"tough guy," the psychopath driven by sadomasochistic 
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tendencies to deeds of cruelty; and in the total membership 
of perhaps five million, there must have numbered thou­
sands of embryonic storm troopers. Third, even when a 
chapter did not authorize a special "whipping squad" garbed 
in appropriate black robes and hoods (as some chapters 
did), it was impossible for the leaders to control the night-
riding activities of all members. After all, it made small 
difference to the victim whether his back was laid open 
by Klansmen under orders or acting independently. Fourth, 
there is much documentary evidence proving the Klan's em­
ployment of violence. Finally and above all, the American 
people have had a long and intimate acquaintance with 
brutality. Perhaps we have been compelled to spin the 
myth of our gentle dispositions precisely because we find 
unbearable the reality of our violence. This dark legacy 
from earlier generations of Americans was exacerbated by 
World War I. The war not only sanctified the killing of 
Germans, it gave sanction to the practice of vigilantism 
against "hyphenates," "slackers," pacifists, and all those 
who were less than totally committed to the Great Crusade. 
President Wilson accurately predicted, "Once lead this 
people into war and they'll forget there ever was such a 
thing as tolerance." Primitive passions were deliberately 
whipped to a feverish pitch. And then, too soon, came peace. 
As Charles W. Ferguson in The Confusion of Tongues 
wrote: "We had indulged in wild and lascivious dreams. 
We had imagined ourselves in the act of intercourse with 
the Whore of the World. Then suddenly the war was over 
and the Whore vanished for a time and we were in a 
condition of coitus interruptus." The frustration was in­
tolerable. It was urgent to seek release by identifying 
new enemies. Klansmen found many surrogates for the 
Hun. The spirit of violence appropriate to the war against 
Germany was proper to the new crusade against internal 
subversion. 
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The Klan embodied another characteristic that if not 
uniquely American is surely identified with the Yankee 
style: huckstering. In our more cynical moments the revived 
Klan's ancestors appear to be less convent-burning Know-
Nothings, night-riding ex-Confederates, or bigoted soldiers 
in the army of the American Protective Association than 
the Connecticut peddlers of wooden nutmegs, the slippery 
Simon Suggs who took as his motto, "It pays to be shifty 
in a new country," the outrageous P. T. Barnum, and the 
fatuous Colonel Beriah Sellers. And in these moments of 
disenchantment, the Klan seems appropriate to the mood 
of the 1920's less because it was a time of trouble than 
because it was the decade of Barton and Babbitt, Gantry 
and Coue. On reflection, these four men were themselves 
anxious and pitched their appeals to insecure people 
whether selling advertising or real estate, salvation or 
mental health, thus suggesting the many faces of anxiety. 
In any case, at least some Klan leaders in opening a pro­
motional meeting might well have borrowed the salutation 
of the night club empresario Texas Guinan, "Hello, 
suckers!" At least some might have taken to their hearts 
the admonition of W. C. Fields, "Never give a sucker an 
even break." And at least some might have substituted for 
the motto, "Not for self, but for others," the warning, 
"Caveat emptor." 
Enormous sums of money poured into the Klan coffers 
and the leaders' pockets, perhaps as much as $75,000,000. 
The initiation fee demanded of every new member was 
known as the "Klecktoken." Usually the split was as 
follows: the Kleagle who signed the candidate and collected 
the fee retained for himself $4, remitting $6 to the King 
Kleagle who in turn extracted $1 before sending the re­
maining $5 to the Grand Goblin of the Domain. He retained 
$.50 and passed on $4.50 to the Imperial Kleagle, who in 
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turn kept $2.50 and paid the rest into the treasury of the 
Imperial Wizard. 
The Klecktoken was not the only tax levied on the citizens 
of the Invisible Empire. The Gate City Manufacturing 
Company of Atlanta, controlled by high officials of the order, 
was given exclusive contract to furnish robes, hoods, and 
other regalia. The outfit sold for $6.50, perhaps double the 
manufacturing cost. "Initiation water," straight from the 
"sacred" Chattahoochee River near Atlanta, was bottled 
and peddled at bootleg prices, $10.00 a quart. "Horse robes," 
the carrying cases for the costumes, and trinkets such as 
pocket knives were happily made available. A Klansman 
paid an Imperial tax of $1.80 per year, plus a small addi­
tional duty, usually $.10 per month, levied by the state office. 
The local Klan had its own per capita tax, which customarily 
varied from $6 to $10 annually. A Klansman was further 
expected to contribute to the rental of halls, the purchase 
of Bibles and flags, the traveling expenses of local officials, 
accountants' and lawyers' fees, and publishing costs. 
Professing to do good, the Klan leaders did well. David C. 
Stephenson, Grand Dragon of the Realm of Indiana and 
points east and west, the most malevolent figure in the 
entire movement, amassed from his office an estimated 
fortune of $3,000,000. Imperial Kleagle Edward Young 
Clarke, a born huckster, for his exalted labors received as 
much as $40,000 a month. The good gray Colonel Simmons 
was sufficiently effectual to demand $146,000 before re­
leasing the reins of power to Evans, as earlier he had been 
sufficiently gallant not to spurn as Imperial Wizard such 
tokens of appreciation from the faithful as limousines and 
a mansion in Atlanta known as "Klan Krest." This passion 
for the dollar was the greatest source of Klan disunity. If 
we are rightly angered by the Klan's violence and bigotry, 
its commercialism offends our sensibilities. That is, until we 
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are sobered by the thought that huckstering was very much 
the fashion in the 1920's. In truth, when in all American 
history was the pursuit on the dollar deemed gauche? As 
in so many other ways, the Klan's commercialism was the 
spirit of America writ large. 
When Colonel Simmons before a Congressional investigat­
ing committee (a hearing, incidentally, that boomed the 
Klan) described his new order as a purely fraternal and 
patriotic organization, this was not pure dissimulation. As 
one student of the movement, Norman F. Weaver, con­
cludes : "What saved the Klan movement in Wisconsin was 
its discovery that fraternalism, if wrapped attractively, 
sold well. Fraternalism, good fellowship conviviality, and 
boon companionship offered the Klan a fertile field to ex­
ploit. " The Klan appealed to grown men who had not 
put away their adolescent fantasies. Indeed, like little boys 
in a neighborhood club or school fraternity, Klansmen de­
lighted in the chumminess of their secret, "select" lodge. 
It was a delicious feeling to be "in on things." Frank 
Tannenbaum further observed: "The danger of the Ku 
Klux Klan is that it dramatizes and perpetuates a state 
of excitation. It seizes upon the monotony of a small town 
and gives it a daily drama. It takes him who lived an un­
eventual life, one who is nobody in particular, and makes 
something of him. It gives him a purpose; makes him a 
soldier in a cause." A reporter, Leonard Cline, captured this 
spirit when he wrote: 
It must have provided a real thrill to go scooting through the 
shadowy roads in somebody else's flivver, to meet in lonely dingles 
in the pine woods and flog other men, to bounce down the fifteen-
foot declivity where the ridge ends and swoop at twenty-five miles 
an hour through the flatlands around Mer Rouge, through phan­
tasmal Lafourche swamp with its banshee live oaks waving their 
snaky tresses in the moonlight. It was perpetual Halloween. And 
even if one didn't care much for church, and took one's shot of 
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white lightning when one could get it, and would pay a dollar 
any day for five minutes in a trollop's arms, it was reassuring to 
know that religion approved and sanctified one's pranks. It made 
one bolder. 
Such is the fraternalism of the Americans, observed Will 
Rogers, that two citizens could not meet each other on the 
street without one of them pounding a gavel and calling 
the other to order; and it was said that when two or three 
churchmen gathered together in the name of the Lord 
they formed a committee. Our very freedom, our verti­
cal and horizontal mobility, the absence of a hereditary 
monarchy, established church, feudal class structure, and 
national university, have made us a nation of joiners. In 
a loosely constructed, traditionless, individualistic, atom­
istic society there is an even greater need for social (non­
governmental) control. "The looser the package the tighter 
the string must be." Commented Tocqueville, "I know of 
no country in which there is so little independence of mind 
and real freedom of discussion as in America." Because we 
have not been rooted to village or caste or clan, we have 
been a lonely people; hence our frantic efforts to escape 
this intolerable loneliness by joining clubs and lodges. In 
the 1920's there were an estimated eight hundred such 
fraternal societies with a combined membership of over 
thirty million persons. It is possible, therefore, to view 
the Klan as an effort to resolve the identification crisis of 
the generation of the 1920's. We are almost tempted to 
say that the typical Klansman typified Riesman's "other­
directed man." 
When Thoreau observed that Americans lead lives of 
quiet desperation, he might have added that they lead lives 
of desperate boredom. Novelists have long discerned what 
historians are coming to recognize: the ennui, intellectual 
sterility, cultural vacuity, and sexual repression of village 
and small-town life have exacted from their inhabitants a 
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fearful psychic toll. The Klan was the circus coming to 
town. It was a revival conducted by Billy Sunday or Gipsy 
Smith. It was a scandal involving the preacher and the 
married organist. It was news that war had been declared. 
It was a lynching. It was Halloween and the Fourth of July 
and the County Fair. A Klan newspaper appealed to pro­
spective members with the banner: "JUST TO PEP UP 
THE GAME. THIS SLOW LIFE IS KILLING ME." To 
countless men, citizenship in the Invisible Empire gave 
assurance that they were still alive. 
And what a grand and mysterious Empire it was! (To a 
prosaic few, of course, attendance at a Klan rally elicited 
only the groan, "Oh, my God, my feet hurt!") We now 
know that the Invisible Empire was a very fragmented 
thing, but on paper it appeared tightly structured. There 
were eight "Domains" varying in size from a single thickly 
populated state to a cluster of sparsely populated ones. 
Each one of the forty-eight states, known as a "Realm," 
was further broken down into "Provinces," comprised of 
perhaps a score of counties. Within each Province lay the 
local chapters. The Invisible Empire was under the rule of 
the "Imperial Wizard," the Domain under the command 
of the "Grand Goblin," the Realm under the jurisdiction of 
the "Grand Dragon," the Province under the control of the 
"Great Titan," and the local Klan under the leadership of 
the "Exalted Cyclops." The members of the Wizard's cabi­
net were known collectively as the "Genii." Coadjutor to 
the Wizard was the "Emperor," an office created in 1922 
in order to kick Simmons upstairs on his way out. The 
Imperial legislature was called the "Klonvokation"; the 
"Kloncilium" was primarily a judicial body. Assisting each 
Grand Dragon was a council of nine known collectively 
as the "Hydras." Attached to each Great Titan were seven 
advisors, the "Furies." Members of the local Klan were, 
in addition to the Exalted Cyclops, eleven "Terrors," the 
"Klaliff" (vice-president), the "Klokard" (lecturer), the 
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"Kludd" (chaplain), the "Kligrapp" (secretary), the "Kla­
bee" (treasurer), the "Kladd" (conductor of members into 
the meeting), the "Klarogo" (inner guard of the meeting), 
the "Klexter" (outer guard of the meeting), and the three 
"Klokann" (a board of investigators, auditors, and advisors, 
each member of which bore the title "Klokan"). The meet­
ing place of the local Klan was called the "Klavern"; the 
monthly meeting the "Klonklave." Each meeting was con­
ducted according to the rules set forth in the "Kloran." 
The Klan had its own "Klalendar," dating from the birth 
of the Reconstruction order. The seven days of the week 
were, in order: "dark, deadly, dismal, doleful, desolate, 
dreadful, and desperate." The five weeks of the month were 
"woeful, weeping, wailing, wonderful, and weird." The 
twelve months of the year were "bloody, gloomy, hideous, 
fearful, furious, alarming, terrible, horrible, mourning, 
sorrowful, rightful, and appalling." Thus July 4, 1923, for 
example, became "The Dismal Day of the Weeping Week 
of the Hideous Month of the year of the Klan LVII." 
The Klansmen sang "klodes," muttered passwords 
("Kotop," to which the reply was "Potok," both meaning 
nothing), and carried on "klonversations." The latter were 
an exchange of code words formed from the first letters 
of sentences. 
Ayak: Are you a Klansman? 
Akia: A Klansman I am. 
Capowe: Countersign and password or written 
evidence. 
Cygnar: Can you give number and realm? 
No. 1 Atga: Number one Klan of Atlanta, Georgia. 
Kigy: Klansman, I greet you. 
Itsub: In the sacred, unfailing bond. 
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They would then "Klasp" left hands and, if an "alien" 
(non-member) was near, whisper the warning, "Sanbog." 
(Strangers are near. Be on your guard!) 
The mumbo jumbo, the flimflam, was seemingly inex­
haustible: robes, hoods, parades (with visors up in friendly 
communities), fiery crosses, picnics, barbecues, sky diving, 
fire works, funerals, weddings (a Knight and his lady of 
the women's auxiliary were often married before assembled 
thousands). In areas where floggings were considered 
unfashionable, Klansmen busied themselves delivering 
Christmas baskets, Thanksgiving turkeys, and purses to 
the needy; and hospitals, orphanages, and schools were 
succored. The Klan organized a Women's Order, a Junior 
Order for boys from 12 to 18, and a Tri-K Klub for young 
girls; and a Krusaders unit for foreign-born Protestants, 
who would have been eligible for Klan membership had 
they been born in the United States. Apparently Negroes, 
Catholics, Jews, and prostitutes were never wooed. All 
in all, lonely men found it warming to chant with other 
lonely men: 
United we stick 
Divided we're stuck 
The better we stick 
The better we Klux! 
These benign activities must not be permitted to mask 
the Klan's authentic diabolism. Was it in a spirit of philan­
thropy that in Mer Rouge the Klan trussed two young 
men in wire and flung their still living bodies under the 
cleated wheels of a tractor? Was it an act of patriotism 
to beat to a pulp the genitals of a Tulsa Jew? Did the 
Dallas Negro disfigured by the branding of the initials 
KKK across his forehead deem himself the beneficiary of 
the Klan's charity? Did the abducted Miss Madge Ober­
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holtzer experience the Klan's love when Grand Dragon 
Stephenson sadistically attacked her naked body with his 
teeth, lacerating her so severely that she might have died 
from the wounds had she not, in her humiliation, first 
taken a fatal poison? Was it merely whimsical that the 
Klan should touch off civil war in Oklahoma, coerce Oregon 
into outlawing parochial schools, drench Williamson County, 
Illinois, in blood, and ignite riots in Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey and elsewhere? Was it true fraternalism to boycott 
business establishments owned by Catholics, Jews, and 
immigrants, and patronize only those displaying such signs 
as "Klansman's Kafe," "Krippled Ears Kured," "Kleans 
Klothes Klean" and "TWK" (Trade With Klansmen) ? What 
happens to the fiber of a community shadowed by the pres­
ence of a vast and mysterious Invisible Empire that "sees 
all and hears all ?" The mayor of Enid, Oklahoma, answered 
this question: "You elbow your best friends and you do not 
know whether or not you are rubbing up against a Klans­
man or not. Our watchword is 'Keep your mouth shut 
tight and keep out of the hands of the Klansman.'" The 
Oklahoma Leader caught the essence of the Klan's ugly 
nature: "The Klan is the 'beatinest' thing that ever came 
down the pike. It's a fraternal order for the promotion of 
strife; an empire for the promotion of democracy, a crim­
inal conspiracy for upholding the law; a peace crusade by 
violence, and a new sort of Christianity that would flog 
Christ for being a Jew and a foreigner." 
Inevitably the Klan entered politics, and invariably it 
became a divisive and sinister force. At no time did it 
sponsor or support a third-party movement, but this fact 
heightened rather than diminished its malevolent influence. 
A Klan leader justified this political concern: "Everybody 
knows that politicians nowadays cater to all kinds of 
'elements' mostly selfish, some corrupt, and some definitely 
anti-American. They cater to the German vote, the Catholic 
248 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: THE 1920's 
vote, the Jewish vote, the Italian vote, the boot-leg vote, 
the vice vote, and sometimes even to the violently criminal 
vote. What the Klan intends to do is to make them pay 
some attention to the American vote, the Protestant Chris­
tian vote, and the decent, God-fearing, law-abiding vote." 
Candidates were expected to certify their adherence to the 
Klan's definition of "Americanism" and their sympathy for 
the Invisible Order—or suffer the consequences. Neither 
unadvisedly nor lightly could politicians afford (as one of 
them lamented) to "withstand an incalculable impact, of 
indefinite forces, from an invisible source, and at an 
unexpected time." 
The Klan became a terrible element in state and local 
politics from North Carolina to California and from Indiana 
to Texas. It elected governors in Georgia and Oregon; a 
United States senator in Texas; congressmen in several 
states. In Arkansas it was so politically powerful that it 
held its own primaries. In Oklahoma it impeached the hos­
tile governor after a struggle reflecting little credit on 
either side. In Indiana under Stephenson the Klan was the 
state. In communities throughout the South, Southwest, 
Midwest, and Pacific Coast whole municipal establishments, 
literally from mayor to dogcatcher, were Klansmen or sub­
servient to the order. And the Klan's role in the presi­
dential nominations and elections of 1924 and 1928 suggest 
that the Invisible Empire came perilously close to achiev­
ing the status coveted for it by Imperial Wizard Evans, 
that of a "great militant political organization." 
The cast of Klan leaders seems incredible; that is, until 
we remember that the scenario was shot in the 1920's. 
The star of the production, albeit a dim and flickering one, 
was Colonel William Joseph Simmons, whose fevered imag­
ination called the Klan "from its slumber of half a century 
to take up a new task." Big and hollow, pious and prissy 
yet profane, genteely attired in rump-sprung britches and 
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diamond stick pin, laden with lodge badges and heavy gold 
watch chain, breathing a hopefully deceptive mixture of 
cloves and bourbon, fond of poker and the ladies (his wife 
was an invalid), this amiable fraud, this "engaging old 
reprobate," was as "full of sentiment as a plum is full of 
juice." What made "Doc" Simmons run? He pursued the 
same light as Jay Gatsby and Sammy Glick (though he 
would not have approved of the company) as preacher, 
drummer of ladies' garters, and professional lodge man 
(he claimed membership in twelve or fifteen fraternal 
orders). With his Klan, "The World's Greatest Secret, 
Social, Patriotic, Fraternal, Beneficiary Order," with its 
membership, raiment, and life-insurance fees, he whiffed 
at last the sweet smell of success. Oleaginous, mellifluous, 
lazy yet lovable, vacuous yet sly, he disarmed the Ameri­
can people as he did investigating congressmen with plati­
tude, piety, and pomposity. "Are we the only people that 
use a mask?," he asked of his inquisitors. "If so, what 
about Mardi Gras celebrations in this country, and what 
about Hallowe'en celebrations? Our mask and robe, 
I say before God, are as innocent as the breath of an 
angel." Not even Warren G. Harding could have improved 
on that. And is it unsporting to inquire what sort of 
man the sovereign citizens of the United States elected to 
their highest office in 1920, the precise year of Simmons1 
ascending star? 
Simmons' star ascended in 1920 (until that year his 
Invisible Empire after a struggling half-decade remained 
almost literally invisible) because he had the wit to tap 
the wits of two professional promoters, Edward Young 
Clarke and Mrs. Elizabeth Tyler. Eyeing the main chance, 
these inelegant hucksters transformed Simmons' easygoing 
southern fraternity of patriotic whites into a violently 
aggressive national organization of chauvinistic native-born 
white Protestants. It is a compliment to their promotional 
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abilities to say Klan membership skyrocketed under their 
shrewd guidance. It is a commentary on the Klan to say 
that in 1919 the dubious duo had been arrested, while drunk 
and undraped, and fined for disorderly conduct; that Clarke 
deserted his wife before being deserted by the divorced Mrs. 
Tyler; that in 1923 Clarke was arrested for transporting 
whisky, and in 1924 he pleaded guilty to violating the 
White Slave Act. Perhaps in their way Ed Clarke and Mrs. 
Tyler were as at home in the Jazz Age as the organization 
they promoted. 
In November, 1922, Simmons (and soon Clarke) was 
pressured out of power in a palace revolution led by a 
Dallas dentist, Hiram Wesley Evans. Plumpish, moon-faced, 
spectacled, benign, platitudinous, Evans called himself the 
"most average man in America." Evans testifies to the 
banality of evil, to the sinister consequences of a blind sin­
cerity, to the unhappy fact that sobriety and chastity are 
not incompatible with bigotry and fanaticism. Like another 
American in the 1920's, Calvin Coolidge, Evans was a 
"Puritan in Babylon." The country would not have missed 
the leadership of either "average" man. As for the gross, 
tough, amoral David C. Stephenson, it is sufficient to 
observe that had he exchanged roles with Al Capone, 
neither Chicago nor Indiana would have been the loser— 
or the winner. 
By late 1924 the KKK claimed a membership of four 
million, perhaps even five million, though most certainly 
not eight million as one authority estimates. "They just 
throwed the doors open," complained a once dedicated 
Knight, "and every man that had the money, they took 
him in just to get his vote. " It was really not a very 
exclusive fraternity. One needed only to be white, Protes­
tant, and native-born—and willing to part with $10. 
The Klan attracted good men, sincerely anxious about 
the future of "their" country, seemingly imperiled by 
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Negroes, Catholics, aliens, and radicals. It was a godsend 
to the frustrated and insecure, unconsciously seeking scape­
goats for their sense of failure. Weak men joined because 
their wills were unequal to the community pressures to 
conform. The Klan carried enormous appeal to lonely men 
who would join any fraternal order to erase the monotony 
of daily existence. Political opportunists saw the Klan as 
the highroad to power. To hucksters, the society spelled 
"Ku Klux Kash." 
For it's order and trumpet and anger and drum 
And power and glory command you to come; 
The graves shall fly open and let you all in, 
And the earth shall be emptied of mortal sin. 
(W. H. Auden, "Danse Macabre") 
Yet the membership melted away like chilled aspic on 
a warm summer afternoon. Immigration no longer seemed 
a threat after the restriction act of 1924. The task was 
now one of Americanization through education rather than 
the immediate intimidation and repression of a once cease­
less flow of new aliens. A Negro rebellion had not material­
ized, and by the late 1920's the black man was again his 
docile self. Although the U.S.S.R. failed to wither away, 
the feeble and feckless condition of both labor unions and 
socialist parties by the middle of the decade suggested that 
the fires of radicalism in the United States had now been 
banked. The general prosperity and the coolness (not to 
say placidity) of the Coolidge era drained reform ardor. 
Many Klansmen, like many prohibitionists and, for that 
matter, progressives, said farewell to reform. Ardor gave 
way to apathy. Or, perhaps, to a feeling of resignation. 
Decent citizens drew back in horror as the evidence of 
the order's indecency mounted. How could the good people 
of Indiana, for instance, continue to believe in the moral 
252 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: THE 1920's 
authority of the Klan after Grand Dragon Stephenson's 
imprisonment? In fact, everywhere Klan leadership proved 
either weak or obscene. Internal wrangling was endemic. 
Unlike fascist movements in Europe, the KKK threw up 
no charismatic Mussolini or Hitler. 
Official American Protestantism with increasing firmness 
rejected the Klan's representation of itself as a great, mili­
tant supradenominational agency. The world of journalism 
was almost uniformly hostile. Anti-Klan riots, anti-mask 
bills, and counterboycotts intimidated the timid member­
ship. And prudent politicians increasingly learned that the 
Klan's blessing was a kiss of death. (After all, native-born 
white Protestants were themselves in many communities 
a minority group, as the politician recognized when he 
arranged to have a cross burned in front of his home.) 
Moreover, when the Klan proved unable to dominate either 
major party, its failure to found a third party became 
fatal. But, then, how could the order survive politically 
when it championed not a single concrete economic or social 
reform. Its appeal was essentially negative, and if it played 
a part (minor, we think) in the defeat of Smith in 1928, 
more crucial is its failure to prevent his easy nomination 
in the first instance. The fact of religious pluralism in 
America, confirmed in the life of John F. Kennedy, was 
foreshadowed in the career of Al Smith. 
To be sure, most Klansmen remained loyal to their 
exclusive and prideful definition of Americanism, and they 
continued to cherish their dreams of an older and purer 
America. But they lost hope in the Klan as the agency of 
redemption. They were largely unmoved by rational per­
suasion or moralistic preaching that they had been wrong, 
and their drift from the Klan represented a rejection of 
the order itself, but not necessarily of its ideals. 
Ultimately, however, the Knights unmasked and dis­
mounted because an even larger number of Americans 
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recalled and honored Abraham Lincoln's indictment of the 
Know-Nothing party: 
How could I be [a member]? How can any one who abhors the 
oppression of Negroes, be in favor of degrading classes of white 
people? Our progress in degeneracy appears to me to be pretty 
rapid. As a nation we began by declaring that 'all men are created 
equal.' We now practically read it 'all men are created equal, 
except Negroes.' When the Know Nothings get control, it will 
read, 'all men are created equal except Negroes, and foreigners, 
and Catholics.' When it comes to this I should prefer emigrating 
to some country where they make no pretence of loving liberty— 
to Russia, for instance. 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
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American Politics (Washington, D. C, 1962) is good on its subject 
254 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: THE 1920's 
(save in the northern states), but its subject does not explicate the 
full Klan story. KKK (Evanston, 111., 1963), by Ben Haas, is a little 
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In another meritorious unpublished study, "The Southern White 
Resistance Movement to Integration" (Ph.D. dissertation, University
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Klan in Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism,
1860-1925 (Atheneum Edition, New York, 1963) is penetrating. An­
other brief, brilliant essay is by Frank Tannenbaum in Darkey Phases 
of the South (New York, 1924). The crudity of the Klan in Indiana 
and of its leader, David C. Stephenson, is revealed by Robert Cough-
Ian, "Konklave in Kokomo," The Aspirin Age, Isabel Leighton, ed. (New York, 1949). A gentler yet devastating portrait of Colonel 
William Joseph Simmons is drawn by Ralph McGill, The South and 
the Southerner (Boston and Toronto, 1959). The violence engendered 
by the Klan is documented in Paul M. Angle's account of Bloody
Williamson: A Chapter in American Lawlessness (New York, 1952).
Two contemporary books remain of interest precisely because of when
they were written: Henry P. Fry, The Modern Ku Klux Klan (Boston, 
1922), and Stanley Frost, The Challenge of the Klan (Indianapolis, 
1923, 1924). Edgar I. Fuller, The Visible of the Invisible Empire(Denver, 1925), and C. Winfield Jones, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan(New York, 1941), may be regarded essentially as documents rather 
than histories. Popular and scholarly journals in the 1920's carried 
many articles on the Klan, but see especially those by Robert L. 
Duff us, entitled "Salesman of Hate: The Ku Klux Klan,'" "How the 
Ku Klux Klan Sells Hate," "Counter-mining the Ku Klux Klan," 
"The Ku Klux Klan in the Middle West," and "Ancestry and End of 
the Ku Klux Klan," World's Work, Vol. XLVI (1923), and Frank 
Bohn, "The Ku Klux Klan Interpreted," American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. XXX (Jan., 1925) and Guy B. Johnson, "A Sociological 
Interpretation of the New Ku Klux Movement," Social Forces, I 
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(May, 1923). The famous New York World expose appeared in a 
series in September-October, 1921; for the feckless Congressional in­
vestigation see The Ku Klux Klan. Hearings before the Committee on
Rules, House of Representatives, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, 
1921). My own views on the relationship between the Klan and 
American Protestantism may be found in "A Note on the Relationship
between the Protestant Churches and the Revived Ku Klux Klan," 
Journal of Southern History, Vol. XXII (Aug., 1956) and American 
Protestantism and Social Issues, 1919-1939 (Chapel Hill, 1958). My 
friend and colleague George B. Tindall shared generously with me 
his massive knowledge of the modern South and of the revived Klan 
in the South, but I may not therefore presume that he shares my 
interpretations of the Klan. 
Kenneth T. Jackson's fine study, The Ku Klux Klan in the City,
1915-1,930, appeared too late to be used in this essay. It should be 
noted, however, that he estimated the total membership of the Klan 
to be only slightly over two million, a figure considerably lower than 
the estimates of most scholars. 

Prohibition: The Impact of 
Political Utopfanism 
JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD 
WHEN Herbert Hoover labeled Prohibition "the experiment 
noble in purpose," he was only continuing to use a language 
of scientific procedure that made "success or failure" the 
dominant scholarly question to be asked about the attempt 
to create a dry America. Experiments are acts that resolve 
scientific issues, and the experience of the nation with Pro­
hibition is trotted out and brought into the light of contro­
versy whenever issues of law and public opinion are under 
the scrutiny of popular discussion. Often the 1920's and dry 
legislation are pointed to as evidence for William Graham 
Sumner's casual but powerful aphorism that "stateways 
cannot make folkways." In the heat of current debates about 
Negro civil rights we recognize that the matter is much 
more complex than such aphorisms would allow. As Gunnar 
Myrdal suggested in 1944, law may not regulate sentiment 
but it has much bearing on behavior and on the framework 
within which education and re-education go on.1 
There is a greater significance to the experience of Pro­
hibition than the issue of success or failure. Human experi­
 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma, (New York, 1944), 
Appendix I. 
1
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ments are by no means analagous to those performed in 
laboratories, nor was "the noble experiment" carried out 
in a hermetically sealed nation. Hopes and aspirations were 
aroused, fulfilled, and quashed; loyalties were developed 
and repelled; organizations were affected with particular 
and unique character. The United States was not the same 
after repeal as it had been before the Eighteenth Amend­
ment was passed. Prohibition had some impact in producing 
that change. The analogy of the experiment that succeeds 
or fails is at best a limited one for gauging the implications 
of dry legislation and dry activity on American life. We 
must be attuned to what happened as well as to what lasted. 
In any analysis of the Prohibition period in American his­
tory the acceptance or rejection of the Eighteenth Amend­
ment is an essential part of the story. But it is not the 
whole story nor necessarily the most vital one. A concern 
for contemporary American life should make us sensitive 
to what the quest for the dry Utopia has meant for later 
events and issues in American society. 
The issue of national prohibition was a major focus of 
American politics for twenty years, from the beginnings of 
the Anti-Saloon League campaign for federal laws in 1913 
to the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1933. Most 
candidates for national, state, or local office could not ignore 
being dry or wet, or using their political art to walk deli­
cately between. By 1928, in Al Smith's campaign for the 
presidency, it was a dominating issue. Even in 1932, when 
repeal was in the air, it was still so vital a question that 
both presidential candidates thought it necessary to give it 
their attention. The impact of Prohibition upon behavior 
during the 1920's is evident. What we want to do in this 
paper is also to assess the influence of Prohibition upon 
the drinking habits of Americans after repeal. Was it only 
an experiment that lasted for fourteen years without any 
effects upon the climate of morality in the United States? 
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What did it mean for the politics that came during and 
after Prohibition ? Were the enemies of temperance and the 
advocates of repeal assuming a political identification that 
lasted even after beer and whiskey were again sold in the 
open? What did the demise of Prohibition mean to those 
for whom it had represented a triumph of reason and moral­
ity over the nefarious forces of sensuality and corrup­
tion? An assessment of the Prohibition Era and its place 
in American history cannot confine itself narrowly to the 
question of whether or not it succeeded in developing, for 
a short time, a world of sobriety and abstinence. 
The debate over the Eighteenth Amendment was not, as 
some have suggested, a sudden intrusion into American 
politics. It did not spring full-blown on the American scene 
as a conspiracy by which a small group of determined men 
foisted sobriety on a wet nation. 
American experience with various efforts to curtail drink­
ing and intoxication in the United States has a long and 
mercurial history. Licensing acts during colonial times 
regulated taverns and their use. From the 1820's on, a per­
sistent temperance movement sought many and diverse 
ways to limit, if not abolish, the use of spirits, beer, and 
wine.2 Under the leadership of New England Federalists 
the early temperance movement of the 1820's was less a 
2
 Though there is no single major history of temperance and 
prohibition in the United States, there are several works from which 
one gains an unbiased and scholarly account. John Krout, The Origins 
of Prohibition (New York, 1925) carries the history from colonial 
beginning to the Civil War. There is no adequate history of the move­
ment during the last half of the nineteenth century. The period 
1900-1933 has been well treated in James Timberlake, Prohibition and 
the Progressive Movement (Cambridge, 1963) and Andrew Sinclair, 
Prohibition: The Era of Excess (Boston, 1962). For an interpreta­
tion of the movement over the entire course of its history see Joseph
Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Tem­
perance Movement (Urbana, 111., 1963). For a history of temperance 
in one state see Norman Clark, The Dry Years: Prohibition and 
Social Change in Washington (Seattle, 1965). 
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movement for abstinence than a movement for moderate 
and temperate usage. Hence the name "temperance" for a 
movement that later came to be associated almost exclu­
sively with abstention. During the 1830's, however, as the 
movement became infused with the spirit of evangelical 
religion and the problems of Midwestern and frontier peo­
ple, it aimed more often at abstinence than at moderation.3 
The goal of abolishing the liquor traffic, rather than, and in 
addition to, the reform of the individual drinker, emerged 
during the 1840's and, in the famous Maine law of 1851, 
resulted in the first statewide legislation prohibiting the 
sale of "Demon Rum." 4 
The use of law as a means to achieve reform in drinking 
was by no means unknown before the twentieth century. 
Not only had statewide prohibition been tried in many 
places, but a great many parts of the United States had 
achieved prohibition through local option at the county, 
city, and township levels. American local and state politics 
was thus well filled with the issues of the legal regulation 
of liquor, beer, and wine. There were many vibrant con­
troversies over the relative merits of legislation and ex­
hortation; over moderation versus total abstinence; over 
political pressure-group actions versus the development of 
party legislation.5 
Though the temperance movement had advocated state­
wide prohibition at various times and had given such legis­
3
 The term "teetotalers" arose from the practice of placing a "T" 
beside one's name on temperance lists to designate a commitment to 
total abstinence. 
4
 Colonial legislation existed in many areas licensing and regu­
lating taverns. Krout, The Origins of Prohibition, chap i. 
5
 The argument over tactics was continuous in temperance history,
and the rationale of various positions can be seen in the argument 
for a third party, the Prohibition party, and for a pressure group, 
the Anti-Saloon League. See D. Leigh Colvin, Prohibition in the 
United States (New York, 1926) and Peter Odegaard, Pressure 
Politics (New York, 1928), chap. iii. 
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lation a prominent part in its activities from time to time, 
agitation for national legislation prohibiting sales did not 
occur until well into the twentieth century. That it came 
about at all is therefore a matter of some question for analy­
sis. A full discussion of how Prohibition came about is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but it is necessary to point 
to some of the ways in which it became possible at the 
federal level if we are to understand the Prohibition Era 
that came later. 
Success in obtaining national prohibition owes much to 
the work and action of the Anti-Saloon League. The forma­
tion of the Anti-Saloon League, in 1896 in Ohio, brought 
with it two important elements to the temperance move­
ment. First, it centered the attention of the movement on 
the eradication of the saloon. Second, it initiated an era 
of pressure politics that was divorced from the third-party 
tactics of the Prohibition party. The League utilized effec­
tive means for the mobilization of public opinion and politi­
cal power in the American party structure.6 Between 1906 
and 1912 seven states passed prohibition laws. By 1919, 
before the passage of Eighteenth Amendment, an additional 
nineteen states had passed restrictive legislation, and more 
than 50 per cent of the American population lived in dry 
areas. In 1913 the Anti-Saloon League reached its greatest 
success until then by managing the successful passage of 
the Webb-Kenyon Act, forbidding the transportation of in­
toxicating beverages into dry states. This was the first 
major national legislative victory of the temperance move­
ment. When the Eighteenth Amendment was passed (Janu­
ary, 1919), a good deal of American society had already 
found such legislation appealing. 
What brought about this new wave of dry sentiment and 
assured its political victories? In this paper I shall main­
 Odegaard, Pressure Politics, passim. 6
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tain that a common vision of a dry America underlay the 
two major strands of American reform in the late nine­
teenth and early twentieth centuries—the progressive im­
pulse and the Populist movement. That vision expressed 
the world of nineteenth-century Protestant, nativist, and 
agrarian-commercial American society. The roots of na­
tional prohibition, we shall argue, lay in the urban middle-
class reaction to a changing and industrialized city and in 
the rural antipathy to the growing dominance of the city. 
The issue between the drys and the wets was primarily one 
of cultural divergence in which the power and legitimacy 
of ways of life were symbolized by the acceptance or rejec­
tion of abstinence and sobriety as public ideals. A major 
thesis of this paper is that these two strands to American 
reform, and to drinking reform, separated and became op­
posed to each other during the 1920's in part over the issue 
of Prohibition itself. 
It is important to recognize the coexistence of both 
strands, and their differences, in the surge of public senti­
ment producing the prohibitionist victories of the early 
twentieth century. Recently, several scholars have sug­
gested a revision to the thesis that Prohibition ranged rural 
America against the cities. Timberlake and others 7 have 
rightfully corrected an overstatement in pointing to the 
progressive and urban roots of dry belief. It is crucial, how­
ever, to recognize that the political power of rural popula­
tions was essential in securing dry supremacy at state and 
national levels. That power was the major source of dry 
political strength before, during, and after the Eighteenth 
Amendment wrote "Dry America" across the Statue of 
Liberty. 
 Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement; Norton 
Mezvinsky, "The Temperance Movement: 1870-1920" (Paper pre­
sented to annual meeting of the Mississippi Valley Historical Society,
Kansas City, Missouri, April, 1964). 
7
 263 PROHIBITION: THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL UTOPIANISM
By the time the campaign for Prohibition began to gain 
force, the issues of drinking reform had developed their 
own sets of opposing supporters. Although Catholic senti­
ment for temperance existed in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, the support given to prohibition as a 
technique for reform was minimal, both from organized 
Catholic groups and from the large segments of Catholic 
populations in American cities.8 The symbol of the saloon 
as a force of evil in American society made sense in an 
urban population that saw political corruption and vice at 
home in the saloons of urban America. Those aspects of 
the progressive movement that reacted to the threats of a 
big-business civilization and an immigrant population, saw 
the saloon as one source of evil, and the reform of drinking 
habits as a necessity for an America of Protestant virtues.9 
For the social worker, the drinking habits of the poor and 
the immigrant were both a slap at Protestant morality and 
a source of the deep-seated poverty of industrial America. 
The professional and small-business urban middle class had 
grown up and had found its dominant ideologies in a sober 
and disciplined framework of churchgoing people. The 
drinking habits of the new immigrant population were both 
a threat to their values and an object for deep moral 
10 concern.
These considerations appear in the myriad arguments one 
can find in the vast mass of prohibitionist literature. In 
politics the argument for the sober electorate was a telling 
one. In the eye of the muckraker the dependence of the 
political machine on the saloon seemed self-evident. Just as 
Beecher had argued in 1820 that a whiskey-swilling elec­
8
 Sister Joan Bland, Hibernian Crusade (Washington, D.C., 1951). 
9
 Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement, chap, v; 
Odegaard, Pressure Politics, pp. 17-35. 
10
 John Higham, Strangers in the Land (New Brunswick, N.J., 
1955). 
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torate was a threat to the old aristocracy,11 so too the pro­
gressives could argue that the demise of the saloon would 
help the cause of free and clean government.12 
Prohibition appeared as a panacea for the economic ills 
of the society. Though liquor and beer brought in consider­
able revenue, it could be maintained that the worker would 
find his material salvation more rapidly through a change 
in consuming habits than in unionism or governmental wel­
fare. Science and medicine also contributed to the growing 
debate over the medical values of alcohol. The belief of the 
early nineteenth century that alcohol was essential to health 
received severe blows from "scientific temperance education" 
and the text material that the Women's Christian Temper­
ance Union introduced into the American educational system 
during the early twentieth century. For employers in an 
industrial society, the need for safety and the prevention 
of accidents had in turn added to the force of temperance ar­
guments. A number of companies, such as United Steel and 
the railroads, strongly supported efforts at temperance.13 
We should be wary, however, of deriving the support of 
the movement from its arguments. The same arguments had 
been used many times in the past and had not always proved 
so effective. To be sure, the growth in drinking during the 
early twentieth century had been considerable, and in the 
period 1911-14 reached the peak since Americans began 
keeping records on these matters following the Civil War. 
The saloon itself had become not only the working man's 
club but certainly in many cases the hiring hall for crime, 
prostitution, and political corruption. The brewers and dis­
tillers had been late in recognizing the strength of the tem­
 Lyman Beecher, Six Sermons on Intemperance (New York, 
1843), pp. 57-58. 
12 Bartlett C. Jones, "The Debate Over Prohibition: 1920-1933" (Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University, 1961) ; Timberlake, chap. iv. 
13
 Jones, "The Debate over Prohibition," chap. vi. 
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perance movement and in taking any measures that might 
bring about a reform of the saloon. Nevertheless, we must 
be careful not to overestimate the degree to which Prohibi­
tion was an urban phenomenon or the degree to which 
the economic logic of an industrial society pushed for 
temperance legislation. 
The United States is one of only three countries that 
have experimented with prohibition on a wide scale. Fin­
land and India are the other two. We would be hard put to 
relate prohibition in these three countries to economic or 
geographical similarities. Though some American indus­
trialists did support Prohibition, others did not. It is worthy 
of note that the American man of wealth who gave the 
greatest degree of effort to the support of the Prohibition 
movement both before and after the passage of the Eigh­
teenth American was S. S. Kresge, whose wealth was made 
not in manufacturing but in merchandising. There is little 
to indicate that manufacturing establishments, most clearly 
allied to an industrial society, saw in Prohibition so im­
portant a measure that they necessarily gave to it their 
united support. 
Any analysis of the actual distribution of votes through 
which prohibition measures gained ascent must recognize 
the importance of both the rural states and the rural legis­
lators in bringing about the passage of the Eighteenth 
Amendment. The South represented the greatest single 
source of legislative support for prohibitory measures.14 
Almost everywhere, the strength of the Anti-Saloon League 
represented the mobilization of church support more heavily 
in the rural than in the urban sectors.15 The states that 
went prohibitionist earliest were not those with the highest 
14
 See my discussion of the political base of prohibitionist senti­
ment in Symbolic Crusade, pp. 117-126. 
15 Odegaard, Pressure Politics, pp. 29-35, 121-24. 
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but with the smallest percentages of urban population.16 
The areas of national prohibition sentiment were strongest 
where the populations were Protestant, rural, and nativist. 
They were more likely to be found in the South and in the 
Midwest than in the East. Although states with high per­
centages of foreign-born were likely to oppose prohibition, 
this was less likely where the foreign population was Prot­
estant and rural, as in Minnesota. In Mississippi, for ex­
ample, it was in the rural areas with small Negro popula­
tions that one found the highest support for prohibition 
legislation both before and after the Eighteenth Amend­
ment was passed and repeal had been initiated. In many of 
the states the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment 
was brought about by votes in the state legislatures, con­
trolled largely by rural legislators. Though the progressive 
movement played a role and responded well to the demands 
of the Anti-Saloon League, it was by no means able to wield 
the political power through which prohibition itself was 
implemented. 
Both the urban middle class and agrarian America were 
substantially Protestant and nativist in their outlook. While 
they saw the cities engulfed by new groups of power, they 
responded both to demands of sentiment and concern for 
an urban and industrial poor and to the hostile threats of 
the cultural waves that distinguished eastern and Mediter­
ranean Europe from Anglo-Saxon cultures. Although it was 
never dominant, the drys found room in their arguments 
for the sophisticated racism in the doctrines of eugenics 
and ethnic differentiation that resulted in the theories of 
Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard.17 
 Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade, p. 109. 
" Bartlett Jones, "Prohibition and Eugenics, 1920-33," Journal of 
the History of Medicine, XVIII (1963), 158-72. 
16
 267 PROHIBITION: THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL UTOPIANISM
In 1917 the Hobson resolution for submission of the pro­
hibition amendment received the necessary two-thirds vote 
in Congress. The amendment was ratified on January 16, 
1919, and went into effect one year later to date. The text 
of the amendment was as follows: 
Section 1. 
After one year from the ratification of this article the manu­
facture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the 
importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the 
United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof 
for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited. 
Section 2. 
The Congress and the several states shall have concurrent 
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. 
A third section made the article inoperative until it had 
been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the 
legislatures of the several states. 
The Eighteenth Amendment was aimed at the eradication 
of the saloon and the distributor of liquor, wine, and beer. 
It was not an effort to govern the buyer but to get at intoxi­
cation by obstructing the seller. It was aimed at the saloon 
and at the liquor business. 
Despite use of the Prohibition experience as a basis for 
offhand judgments about law and morality, the entire ex­
perience has seldom been analyzed to determine whether 
accounts of its impact are myth or reality. Dry adherents 
have persisted in the views that the friends of "Demon 
Rum" killed Prohibition by telling untruths about its im­
pact. Those for whom it was unwelcome inhibition have, 
perhaps, had a greater influence in convincing most Ameri­
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can historians that the enforcement of the Volstead Act 
ran aground on the sharp rocks of intense public resistance. 
Even with difficulties in data, we are still able to give 
an accurate and qualified picture of what did happen to 
American drinking habits during the 1920's. That picture 
is a complicated one, suggesting different kinds of effects to 
different parts of the population. It does not support either 
the myth of increased drinking or the death of alcoholic 
indulgence. 
Any effort to gauge the effectiveness of prohibition legis­
lation must meet another problem in the analysis of the 
relation between law and human behavior. How much en­
forcement is effective enforcement? Laws may seek long-
range and long-run changes in a society rather than short-
range and short-run compliance. Laws may exist and func­
tion less as direct shapers of human behavior and more as 
means for symbolizing what is publicly legitimate and 
moral. Certainly prostitution, abortion, gambling, and drug 
addiction exist in the United States and have existed for 
many decades. The laws that forbid such behavior serve 
many functions. Perhaps they limit the degree to which 
such behavior would be discoverable without them. I have 
suggested, in Symbolic Crusade, that laws frequently serve 
highly symbolic functions, pointing to those groups in the 
society that achieve public recognition of their norms and 
values as the legitimate ones. This is certainly the case in 
relation to temperance legislation. If it was flouted by those 
who drank, it was clear whose law and whose culture was 
given dominant recognition as the legitimate and sanctioned 
modes of behavior. No politician could openly admit use of, 
or be seen using, alcohol. If public leaders gave only lip 
service to Prohibition, that itself was an indication of what 
was the public and official law of the land. 
In short, the evasion of laws is by no means a telling 
argument against their effectiveness. As Robin Williams 
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pointed out,18 a patterned evasion of norms exists in many 
cases in American society and frequently preserves both 
law and illegality, side by side. Though the laws of abortion 
exist in American life, there is a structure that makes abor­
tion possible for those who seek it. This patterned evasion 
is found in more or less frequency for a great many acts 
of government. 
What we need to know is the answer to a comparative 
question. Was there more or less excessive drinking than 
had existed before Prohibition? Were the effects such as 
to suggest a lessened degree of disapproval than had existed 
before Prohibition? In this way, the issue of the conse­
quences of prohibitory legislation is rendered a little more 
capable of answer. On the other hand, it requires a greater 
degree of specific data often conspicuous by its absence. 
The casual impressions of social workers, journalists, in­
dustrial executives, and temperance advocates is no substi­
tute for the kind of careful measurement on which com­
parative analysis is based. We turn then to what we can 
say with a high degree of validity concerning the enforce­
ment of Prohibition. 
Having used considerable political power to effect the 
Eighteenth Amendment and its ratification, the dry forces 
had now to provide for its enforcement. Despite the con­
siderable degree of support from public opinion and the 
rural-dominated state legislatures, the dry forces walked 
lightly. In this policy the federal and state legislatures were 
most co-operative. Having acceded to the intense pressure 
of the Anti-Saloon League and its supporters, Congress was 
in no mood to tweak the tail of the wets any more than it 
had to. The attitude toward enforcement was thus one that 
Charles Merz has effectively characterized as "nullification 
18
 Robin Williams, American Society (New York, 1960), chap. x. 
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by non-enforcement." 19 The organization of the Prohibition 
Bureau, the appropriations granted to it and to various 
state agencies, and the limited disposition of courts to sup­
port Prohibition were all involved in a system of enforce­
ment that appeared to seek compliance through patience 
rather than through authoritative action.20 
The chief measure guiding enforcement was the National 
Prohibition Act, popularly known as the Volstead Act, after 
Congressman Volstead who had introduced it. Under this 
act the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of the Treasury 
Department, rather than the Department of Justice, was 
given the power to detect and suppress violations of Prohi­
bition. The Prohibition Bureau itself was not brought under 
Civil Service—a fact that gave the dry forces effective 
power over the recruitment and maintenance of personnel. 
Under this situation the Prohibition Bureau and the salaries 
of Prohibition agents compared most unfavorably with 
other personnel. They were greatly dependent upon federal 
and state appropriations that were seldom large enough to 
make possible an effective legal and police organization. "It 
was not the business of the Prohibition Bureau to quarrel 
with its peers." 21 
The result, of course, was an ineffective organization 
whose morale was even further weakened by a succession of 
appointed heads. The first Prohibition commissioner, John 
F. Kramer, served for a year and a half until he was re­
placed by Roy A. Haines. Under Coolidge a new head, Gen­
19 Charles Merz, The Dry Decade (Garden City, N.Y., 1937), 
p. 129. 
20
 Similar accounts, using different data , a re found in Merz, The 
Dry Decade; Sinclair, Prohibition, chap, x, pp. 13-14; Clark, The Dry 
Years, chaps, x-xii. 
2 1
 Merz, The Dry Decade, p. 129. 
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eral Lincoln C. Andrews, was appointed. He resigned in 
March of 1927 and was replaced by several different people, 
including the assistant secretary of the treasury and the 
chief chemist of the Prohibition Bureau. Not until Herbert 
Hoover became President was the Bureau set upon a more 
regular basis, recruits required to pass the Civil Service 
examination, and the entire activity brought under the 
Department of Justice. 
American impressions of drinking during the 1920's owe 
much to the description of a "lost generation" that novelists 
and journalists have done much to maintain. It is a picture 
of flaming youth in short skirts and bobbed hair dancing 
wickedly in speak-easies run by tough-looking gangsters. 
It is a picture of orgiastic drunkenness complete with wood 
alcohol, bathtub gin, and illicit sex. Like many myths, it 
mixes truth with falsity. The general shift in American 
morals during the 1920's is beyond our topic. Nevertheless, 
the generally accepted view suggests an increase in exten­
sive drinking, especially among the young. A more sober 
analysis will recognize this as behavior that was decidedly 
not typical. Nevertheless, whether typical or not, its dra­
matic impact had a great deal to do with the setting of 
styles both during the Prohibition Era and afterward. It 
had a great deal to do with the ways in which people 
thought about drinking and Prohibition. 
Any analysis of drinking during Prohibition should begin 
with what we know about American drinking habits before 
1920. Table No. 1 presents data on the total amount of 
absolute alcohol consumed in the United States and the 
percentage of that alcohol contributed by various diverse 
components.22 
 Reprinted from Raymond McCarthy, ed. Drinking and Intoxi­
cation (Glencoe, 111., 1959), p. 180. 
22
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TABLE 1 
APPARENT CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES,

PER CAPITA OF DRINKING AGE POPULATION (PERSONS AGED OVER

FOURTEEN YEARS), U.S.A., 1850-1957, IN U.S. GALLONS*

SPIRITS WINE BEER TOTAL 







1850 4.17 1.89 0.46 0.08 2.70 0.14 2.11 
1860 4.79 2.16 0.57 0.10 5.39 0.27 2.53 
1870 3.40 1.53 0.53 0.10 8.73 0.44 2.07 
1871-80 2.27 1.02 0.77 0.14 11.26 0.56 1.72 
1881-90 2.12 0.95 0.76 0.14 17.94 0.90 1.99 
1891-95 2.12 0.95 0.60 0.11 23.42 1.17 2.23 
1896-1900 1.72 0.77 0.55 0.10 23.72 1.19 2.06 
1901-05 2.11 0.95 0.71 0.13 26.20 1.31 2.39 
1906-10 2.14 0.96 0.92 0.17 29.27 1.47 2.60 
1911-15 2.09 0.94 0.79 0.14 29.53 1.48 2.56 
1916-19 1.68 0.76 0.69 0.12 21.63 1.08 1.96 
1934 0.64 0.29 0.36 0.07 13.58 0.61 0.97 
1935 0.96 0.43 0.50 0.09 15.13 0.68 1.20 
1936 1.30 0.59 0.64 0.12 17.53 0.79 1.50 
1937 1.43 0.64 0.71 0.13 18.21 0.82 1.59 
1938 1.32 0.59 0.70 0.13 16.58 0.75 1.47 
1939 1.38 0.62 0.79 0.14 16.77 0.75 1.51 
1940 1.48 0.67 0.91 0.16 16.29 0.73 1.56 
1941 1.58 0.71 1.02 0.18 17.97 0.81 1.70 
1942 1.89 0.85 1.11 0.20 20.00 0.90 1.95 
1943 1.46 0.66 0.94 0.17 22.26 1.00 1.83 
1944 1.69 0.76 0.92 0.17 25.22 1.13 2.06 
1945 1.95 0.88 1.13 0.20 25.97 1.17 2.25 
1946 2.20 0.99 1.34 0.24 23.75 1.07 2.30 
1947 1.69 0.76 0.90 0.16 24.56 1.11 2.03 
1948 1.56 0.70 1.11 0.20 23.77 1.07 1.97 
1949 1.55 0.70 1.21 0.22 23.48 1.06 1.98 
* From Mark Keller and Vera Efron, Selected Statitsics on Alcoholic Beverages 
(1850-1957) and on Alcoholism (1910-1956), New Haven, Journal of Studies on 
Alcohol, 1958. 
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TABLE 1 — Continued 
SPIRITS W I N  E BEER TOTAL 







1950 1.72 0.77 1.27 0.23 23.21 1.04 2.04 
1951 1.73 0.78 1.13 0.20 22.92 1.03 2.01 
1952 1.61 0.72 1.21 0.21 22.97 1.03 1.96 
1953 1.68 0.76 1.18 0.20 22.81 1.03 1.99 
1954 1.61 0.72 1.18 0.20 21.73 0.98 1.90 
1955 1.66 0.75 1.18 0.20 21.74 0.98 1.94 
1956 1.76 0.79 1.23 0.21 21.53 0.97 1.97 
1957 1.70 0.77 1.21 0.21 20.62 0.93 1.91 
It should be noted that this data is based on United States 
tax returns and gives the gallons-per-capita population of 
drinking age, fourteen and over. For this reason it conflicts 
with the data presented in Warburton and other analyses 
of drinking during Prohibition. 
Two things are significant in this analysis of American 
drinking before Prohibition. First, the first decade and a 
half of the twentieth century saw a considerably increased 
consumption of alcohol. The high point of alcohol consump­
tion in the United States came in the years 1911-15. It is 
important, however, to recognize the second fact: there had 
been a great shift in the direction of beer-drinking and a 
great decrease in the use of distilled spirits. This indicates 
that there had been a movement away from a population 
consisting of a large stream of heavy drinkers (character­
ized by high rates of spirits-drinking) and many abstainers 
toward a population that indicated many less abstainers 
but relatively fewer heavy drinkers.23 
23
 E. M. Jellinek, "Recent Trends in Alcoholism and Alcohol Con­
sumption," Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol, VIII (July, 
1947), 1-43. 
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In analyzing the extent of drinking, we need to ask what 
kind of alcoholic beverages became prevalent during the 
dry era.24 The most careful and impartial analysis of drink­
ing during Prohibition is that contained in Clark War­
burton's The Economic Results of Prohibition. Even though 
it was conducted at the request of the Association Against 
the Prohibition Amendment, Warburton found a sharp de­
cline in the total amount of alcohol consumed.25 His analysis, 
furthermore, squares very well with that by Herman Feld­
man26 and the later analysis by Jellinek in 1948.27 War­
burton estimated the amount of alcohol consumed by three 
methods—the analysis of components used for production, 
deaths from cirrhosis of liver, and police arrests for drunk­
enness. All of these show the same general tendencies 
toward a sharp decline in the amount of alcohol consumed 
between 1920 and 1923 with an increase over the next seven 
years. Nevertheless, as Table 2 (below) indicates, the per 
capita usage at all times was considerably below that of 
the pre-Prohibition period of 1911-14. It remains evident, 
then, that Prohibition did succeed in curtailing, even if 
24
 I t should also be noted tha t beer-drinking is associated less 
with drunkenness than is liquor, both because of its lower alcohol 
content and because it is more likely to be consumed in conjunction 
with eating. 
23
 Clark Warbur ton , The Economic Results of Prohibition (New 
York, 1932). Warbur ton utilized reports of the production of the 
components of alcoholic beverages, a r res t s from drunkenness, and 
estimates from death ra tes and from cirrhosis of the liver. All of 
these require major assumptions concerning other usages of the same 
components, the uniform validity of crime ra tes , and the relationship 
between cirrhosis of the liver and alcoholism and can best be con­
sidered as systematic estimates. 
For another analysis of the effectiveness of Prohibition, see John 
Burnham, "The Prohibition Exper iment of the 1920's" (Paper pre­
sented a t the meeting of the Mississippi Valley Historical Society, 
Kansas City, Mo., April , 1964). 
26
 Herman Feldman, Prohibition: Its Economic and Industrial 
Aspects (New York, 1930). 
27
 Jell inek, "Recent Trends in Alcoholism and Alcohol Con­
sumption". 
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not stopping, the heavy drinking that had characterized the 
early twentieth century in the United States. Warburton's 
figures, based as they are on the general population rather 
than the population of age fourteen and over, probably 
overestimate the amount of alcohol usage during the 1920's 
as compared to the earlier period. Jellinek's later analysis 
TABLE 2 
ESTIMATES OF THE CONSUMPTION OF PURE ALCOHOL 

















1920 .64 .16 . . .  . > . • • 
1921 .26 .82 .43 .54 32.0 
1922 .90 .92 .81 .91 53.8 
1923 1.17 .97 1.05 1.07 63.3 
1924 1.08 1.02 1.05 1.05 62.1 
1925 1.13 1.07 1.06 1.10 65.1 
1926 1.24 1.11 1.11 1.18 69.8 
1927 1.08 1.15 1.15 1.12 66.3 
1928 1.23 1.13 1.25 1.18 69.8 
1929 1.31 1.09 1.18 1.20 71.0 
1930 1.03 1.09 1.06 62.7 
Sources of data: Estimate from sources of production: Table 30, Warburton, The 
Economic Results of Prohibition, p. 72. Estimate from death rates: Table 37, ibid., 
p. 89. Estimate from arrests for drunkenness: Table 44, ibid., p. 102. Final estimate: 
Average of the estimate from sources of production and the estimate from death rates. 
of alcohol consumption in the United States (those in age 
groups of fourteen and over) suggests that the rate of 
alcohol consumption per capita during Prohibition for those 
of drinking age at about one-half of that for the average 
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of the four years preceding Prohibition.28 Jellinek has used 
later alcoholism rates to shed light on 1920's drinking. 
These rates for alcoholism from 1920 to 1945 show a de­
cided drop as compared with 1910 and 1915 rates. Since 
chronic alcoholism is a reflection of past drinking habits 
(beginning approximately ten to fifteen years earlier), it is 
indicated by deaths of cirrhosis of the liver and is good evi­
dence for changes brought about during state and national 
prohibition in the early twentieth century. 
We can conclude then that Prohibition was effective in 
sharply reducing the rate of alcohol consumption in the 
United States. We may set the outer limit of this at about 
50 per cent and the inner limit at about one-third less 
alcohol consumed by the total population than had been the 
case before Prohibition and at the point of peak usage in 
the United States. 
When we come to survey the different forms of alcohol 
usage, however, the picture becomes a little more compli­
cated and a little closer to the lurid and impressionistic one 
of the novelist and the popular historian. It is highly sig­
nificant, however, that the abolition of the liquor traffic 
had different effects at middle-class than at lower-class 
levels of the urban population. 
We have already pointed out that the increase in total 
alcohol consumption during the first decade of the twentieth 
century was accompanied by a continuing drop in the per­
centage resulting from the consumption of distilled spirits. 
Prohibition succeeded in reversing that relationship. To a 
very large extent, according to Warburton, the decrease 
 The American population of the 1920's contained a higher 
percentage of older people than it did in the previous decade. Con­
sumption rates based on total population, as Warburton's are, actually
ignore the fact that the population of the 1920's had a higher per­
centage of potential drinkers than did the earlier decade. Using only 
the population above fourteen would result in lowered rates for the 
1920's. 
28
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in total alcoholic consumption was the result of a great 
drop in the use of beer. As Table 3 shows, the diminished 
use of beer was as great as a total drop of 85 per cent dur­
ing 1921-22 and a drop of more than two-thirds during 
1927-30. According to Warburton's calculations, there was 
actually an increase in the gallons-per-capita usage of 
spirits. This seems reasonable given two facts about illicit 
sale of alcoholic beverages during the dry era. The first is 
that the price of alcohol increased enormously. The second 
is that, per unit, there was more money to be made in the 
sale of hard liquor than in the sale of beer. Both were dif­
ficult to manufacture at home, but liquor was just as easy 
TABLE 3 
CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL BEVERAGES IN THE UNITED STATES 
BEFORE AND AFTER THE ADOPTION OF PROHIBITION 
(GALLONS PER CAPITA) 
PERIOD SPIRITS BEER WINE PURE ALCOHOL 
1911-14 1.47 20.53 .59 1.69 
1921-22 .92 1.49 .51 .73 
1927-30 1.62 6.27 .98 1.14 
Sources of data: 1911-14, Table 2, Warburton, The Economic Results of Prohibition, 
p. 26; 1921-22 and 1927-30, Tables 45 and 46, ibid., pp. 104, 106. Figures for spirits, 
wine, and beer taken from the estimates from sources of production. 
as beer if not easier. As now, so too then, hard liquor was 
more often the choice of those in the higher-income levels 
than among lower-income groups. 
Warburton concludes "that under Prohibition the work­
ing classes consumed not more than half as much alcohol 
per capita as formerly; and that the expenditure of this 
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class upon alcoholic beverages is probably a billion dollars 
less than it would be without national Prohibition. 
"That the per capita consumption of alcohol by the 
business, professional and salaried classes has been affected 
but little by Prohibition; and that due to higher prices 
this class is spending at least a billion dollars a year more 
for alcoholic beverages than it would be spending without 
national Prohibition." 29 The differential between the classes 
has been noted as well in the impressions of social workers 30 
and a testimony of executives observing workers.31 
It would be fair to say then that Prohibition did affect 
drinking behavior. The impressionistic notion that rural 
areas were more clearly affected than urban is substan­
tiated by the pattern of bootlegging. The total consumption 
of alcohol did drop. Even after the upsurge following the 
initial effects of the act, it still remained well below the 
rates of consumption in the pre-Prohibition years. It is 
also the case, however, that hard drinking was apparently 
substituted to some degree for beer, especially in those 
urban groups that represented high-income levels. Its great­
est impact in eradicating drink was thus on the working 
classes, and, paradoxically, coinciding as it did with the 
shift of morals in the general prosperity of the 1920's, it 
may well have increased the hard and excessive drinking 
among precisely those groups that had in the past been 
pace-setters and style-setters. As may often happen, Pro­
hibition was least effective in curtailing the drinking among 
precisely those groups that were most clearly visible to the 
mass media of communication. 
29 Warbur ton , The Economic Results of Prohibition, p . 262. 
 Mar tha Bruere , Does Prohibition Work? (New York and Lon­
don, 1927). 
3 1
 Whi t ing Williams, testimony before the Wickersham Commis­
sion. Quoted in Burnham, "The Prohibition Exper iment of the 1920's," 
p . 11. 
30
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If one attempts to adduce the economic results of Prohi­
bition, he is in an even more difficult morass, one in which 
it is extraordinarily difficult to separate the general effects 
of historical conditions from those which are specifically 
the results of legislation. The general increase in automo­
bile usage in the United States was so great in 1920 as to 
mask any efforts to determine Prohibition's impact upon 
automobile accidents. What is true, however, and this 
became of considerable importance later, is that the national 
and state governments lost visible revenue as alcoholic 
beverages disappeared from the lists of taxable items. It 
was also coupled with the fact that the existence of Prohi­
bition did lead to curtailment of certain specific jobs in 
the brewery and the distilling industries. To suggest that 
these were balanced by the ultimate economic gains is to 
pose an intangible and indirect effect against an immediate 
and visible one. For brewery and distillery workers such 
long-run considerations were cold comfort in the face of 
present unemployment. 
During the 1920's the existence of the bootlegger and of 
syndicated crime made many headlines. The gangs and 
gang warfare of Chicago and the dramatic quality of Al 
Capone impressed themselves upon American mentality. 
American crime had begun to change considerably with 
the growth of large cities and the development of big 
business in crime—gambling, prostitution, and other eco­
nomic services performed for clients rather than victims. 
That bootlegging was an industry of considerable magni­
tude is certainly unquestionable. Without Prohibition, of 
course, a bootlegging industry would have been non­
existent. It should be pointed out, however, that large 
gangs of a business nature had already been in existence 
before the advent of bootlegging. Capone himself came to 
Chicago from New York to function in the organization 
280 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: THE 1920's 
run at that time by Big Jim Colosimo, whose basic source 
of revenue came from the houses of prostitution in Chicago, 
well before Prohibition presented new opportunities. 
The history of the underworld matches the history of 
American big business in many respects. It is one of increas­
ing consolidation and centralization as small enterprises 
give way to large organizations.32 In the complex and 
often ruthless competition by which the underworld became 
organized, there was increasing evidence that a high degree 
of central control would lead to a disappearance of the 
rougher tactics made necessary by an unregulated market 
economy. The last echoes of this can be found in the famous 
St. Valentine's Day Massacre, when the Capone gang reput­
edly brought the severest of all sanctions to bear against 
"unfair competition." The firm of "Bugs" Moran and Com­
pany was found operating outside the zone that had been 
agreed upon as their sales and merchandising territory, 
and seven executives died in defense of free enterprise. 
To summarize this mass of evidence is not easy. Perhaps 
we may do best to quote Herman Feldman, who wrote 
in 1927: 
People who discuss the economic effects of Prohibition or, for 
that matter, any of the other effects of Prohibition, too often go 
to one of two extremes. The largest group attributes everything 
that had happened since about 1919 to 1920 to Prohibition, some 
finding the conditions insufferable while others are full of praise. 
The second group consists of skeptics who are so much impressed 
by the fact that other things could explain present day circum­
stances that they seem unwilling to admit that Prohibition has 
had any effects at all. Its effects may well be exaggerated, 
but they should certainly not be waved aside as negligible.33 
 Daniel Bell, "Cr ime as an American W a y of Life," in D. Bell, 
The End of Ideology (New York, 1960), chap. vii. 
3 3
 Fe ldman , Prohibition, p . 1. 
32
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The full story of any law, moreover, is not to be found 
solely in what happened while it was on the books. If 
drinking behavior changed during the 1920's as this paper 
argues, we should expect that it did not readily return to 
what had existed before the 1920's. In short, we need to 
search for some more permanent and lasting effects of 
the Prohibition Era in the later experience of Americans 
with alcohol in the periods after repeal. Here again we 
should find that the United States by no means has gone 
to a drunkard's dubious reward with the advent of repeal, 
nor did the Prohibition Era succeed in drying up the well­
springs of drinking habits. Nevertheless, it does appear 
evident that the experience of a dry society, even though 
less than perfect, did not contribute to a wave of excessive 
alcoholism. What we find, instead, is that those cultural 
sources that had produced abstinence continued to play 
their role and those that had enforced moderate drinking 
continued to grow. In this respect the experience with 
Prohibition appears to have had little permanent effect on 
American drinking behavior per se. 
In order to understand American drinking behavior, we 
must recognize the sharp differences in the various ways 
in which the different ethnic and religious groups of the 
United States utilize alcohol. Extensive use of beer was 
introduced into the United States largely by the Germans 
and Swedes. The use of beer, as we have pointed out above, 
reflects a strong relationship between eating and drinking 
as does the use of wine among the French and the Italians. 
A highly Protestantized country, such as the United States, 
has been given to more extreme patterns of use and non-use 
of alcohol, ranging from total abstinence to drunkenness. 
Studies of Italians and of Jews in the United States have 
shown that it is quite possible for cultures to sanction the 
use of alcohol and yet be surrounded with controls that limit 
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the impact of alcoholism.34 The Irish have represented still 
another motif of high rates of non-abstinence and high 
rates of chronic alcoholism.35 These studies indicate that 
as immigration increased in the United States, it brought 
into American society patterns in the uses of alcohol dif­
ferent from those encompassed by Protestant virtues. As 
our society became increasingly an urban one, the styles 
of life of the middle class in turn reflected newer modes of 
entertainment and leisure in which liquor and beer came 
to play distinctly different roles. 
Harold Pfautz has shown some of this in his study of 
the depictions of alcohol in popular fiction at the turn of 
the twentieth century and later at mid-century. Pfautz 
found that the earlier fiction was less likely to impute 
useful properties to drinking than were later works. Both 
periods in his mode-of-content analysis were equal in the 
frequency with which they perceived alcohol as harmful 
to the individual and as a focus for social interaction. What 
was true, however, was that the later fiction tended to 
place far more value on the social functions of alcohol than 
did the earlier literature.36 Pfautz's work provides addi­
tional support to our general understanding of the use or 
place that alcohol has come to play in American entertain­
ment and in the moderate drinking habits of the urban 
middle class. In a culture that has come to prize fellowship 
and ease of human relations, the relaxing effects of alcohol 
permit quicker dissolution of reserve among people and 
facilitate group formation. 
It is this general tendency toward a more moderate 
drinking pattern that characterizes the drinking behavior 
34
 Char l e s Snyder , Alcohol and The Jews (Glencoe, 111., 1 9 5 8 ) ; 
Giorgio Lolli, et. al., Alcohol in Italian Culture (Glencoe, 111., 1958) . 
3 5
 Robert F . Bales, "Attitudes Toward Drinking in the Irish 
Culture," in D. Pi t tman and C. Snyder (eds.), Society, Culture and 
Drinking Patterns (New York, 1962), pp. 157-87. 
36
 Harold Pfautz, "The Image of Alcohol in Popular Fiction: 
1900-1904 & 1946-1950," Quarterly Journal of Studies in Alcohol, 
VIII (September, 1947), pp. 265-73. 
283 PROHIBITION: THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL UTOPIANISM 
of Americans today. The general alcohol consumption in 
the United States by no means has risen greatly in the 
post-Prohibition period, and the long-run trend toward mod­
eration appears to have continued. Studies in 1945 and 
1946 both demonstrated that about one-third of the Ameri­
can population considered themselves abstainers from all 
alcoholic beverages.37 The Gallup Poll has remained, with 
one debatable exception, remarkably constant in its findings 
of abstinence. A recent national survey finds 29 per cent 
of its respondents indicating their commitment to total 
abstinence.38 Even a 1962 study of San Francisco adults 
found 24 per cent were abstainers.39 As Table 4 below 
TABLE 4 
PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTION OF DISTILLED SPIRITS, W I N E , AND BEER

TO THE APPARENT CONSUMPTION OF TOTAL ABSOLUTE ALCOHOL

IN THE UNITED STATES, 1850-1957,

BASED ON TABLE 1 ABOVE







Spirits Wine Beer 
1850 2.07 89.6 3.7 6.7 
1911-15f 2.56 36.7 5.9 57.4 
1940 1.56 42.9 10.3 46.8 
1957 1.91 40.3 11.0 48.7 
• Gallons per capita population of drinking age, fourteen and over. 
t Average figures. 
3 7
 Raymond McCarthy, ed., op. cit., p . 179. 
3 8
 Harold Mulford, "Dr ink ing and Deviant Dr ink ing , " Quarterly 
Journal of Studies of Alcohol, XXV (December, 1964), 634-50. Mul­
ford's 1963 s tudy shows 71 per cent of population d rank . Riley and 
Marden (1946) found 65 per cent. Compared wi th Riley and Marden, 
Mulford found g rea tes t increase among the small-town residents and 
among those over thirty-five. 
3 9
 Genevieve Knupfe r and Robin Room, "Dr ink ing in a Metro­
politan Community ," Social Problems, XII (Fall , 1964), 224-40. 
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shows, the total absolute alcohol consumed in the United 
States, although increased somewhat in recent years, has 
not fallen back to the 1911-15 levels. So, too, if one exam­
ines the components in American drinking, the substitution 
of beer for whiskey that occurred in the early twentieth 
century has continued. It is remarkable that a large amount 
of the increase in alcohol consumption since 1940 has been 
a function of the increased use of wines in American life 
All this supports the general tendency toward a more mod­
erate set of drinking habits in which both abstinence and 
indulgence are less normal. 
Of course, it is impossible to know to what degree this 
is a function of the Prohibition Era. What is important to 
recognize, however, is that neither the passage of the 
Eighteenth Amendment nor the repeal of it appeared to 
have had decisive effects upon American drinking habits 
or upon sentiment. If it did, we could only surmise that it 
tended to accentuate the moderate use of liquor and to 
some degree to diminish the high point in American alcohol 
use of the early nineteenth century, thus supporting the 
long-run trend toward moderate use of alcohol. Certainly 
the analysis of local-option elections since repeal, like the 
public opinion polls, does not indicate any remarkable shifts 
in basic sentiment. In 1939, 18.3 per cent of the American 
population lived in locally dry areas. In 1959 this percent­
age had only declined to 14.7 per cent.40 During the period 
1947-59 there were 12,114 local elections held in the United 
States on issues of liquor control, and most of these left 
the existing situation intact.41 The conception of alcoholism 
as a moral imperfection rather than a disease still con­
tinues to persist in many areas. Thus Mulford and Miller 
found in an Iowa survey that 45 per cent of their respon­
40
 Based on annual reports of the Distilled Spiri ts Inst i tute , 1939, 
1959, p. 51. 
4 1
 Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade, p . 161. 
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dents viewed the alcoholic as morally weak, although sur­
veys in Connecticut have shown a much higher percentage 
who viewed alcoholism as a disease.42 As compared with 
European countries, liquor in America is still limited in 
availability. The bars found in the theaters and museums 
of Europe are rarely encountered in America. 
The Prohibition period, with the experience of hard 
drinking in the middle class, and the absence of beer and 
liquor among the working classes may, however, have 
contributed to a different kind of shift in American drink­
ing habits. It is certainly the case that two things appear 
to have occurred: the middle-class components are more 
likely to be non-abstainers today than might have been 
true at an earlier period before Prohibition, and lower 
classes appear to be more abstaining. Certainly all the 
surveys have indicated that middle and upper classes 
represent higher levels of drinking than working and 
lower classes.43 Abstinence has declined among the college-
educated groups, and with it the less evangelical and highly 
prestigious denominations such as the Presbyterians, the 
Congregationalists, and the Methodists, who had been so 
firm in their support of Prohibition, have waivered and 
become much less enamored of abstinence. 
Although drinkers are perhaps no more frequent than 
was true in the pre-Prohibition Era, their character and 
status has considerably changed. As one informant put it: 
"There has been a breakdown in the middle classes. The 
 Haro ld Mulford and Donald Miller, "Pub l i c Definitions of the 
Alcoholic," Quarterly Journal of Studies of Alcohol, X X I I ( J u n e , 
1961) , 312-20. 
43
 John W. Riley, Jr., and Charles P. Marden, "The Social Pattern 
of Alcoholic Drinking," Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 
VIII (September, 1947), 265-73; Knupfer and Room, "Drinking in 
a Metropolitan Community"; Mulford, "Drinking and Deviant Drink­
ing." Mulford's story shows a slight decrease in percentage of 
drinkers among lower-educated persons when compared with Marden's 
1946 study. 
42
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upper classes have always used liquor; the lower classes 
have always used liquor. Now the middle class has taken 
it over. The thing is slopping over from both sides." 
The Prohibition period did not serve to set in motion a 
vast antipathy to abstinence. It did not check the continued 
long-run trend away from the excessive use of distilled 
spirits in the United States. The 1920's experience of upper-
middle-class urban drinking was consonant with the later 
shifts in the class usages of alcohol in the United States, 
resulting in moderate use by a formerly abstinent middle 
class. It was effective in diminishing the total of alcoholic 
consumption in the United States while it was in operation. 
Its lasting effects, then, in terms of American drinking and 
behavior appear to have been relatively few, although it 
may have to some degree acted to support other cultural 
shifts that were changing class patterns in the use of 
alcohol in the United States. In order to appreciate the 
impact of the Prohibition Era on American life we need 
also to look at its role as a political issue, a role that sug­
gests other kinds of cultural meanings than those we have 
already examined in terms of direct effect upon drinking. 
In many ways the movement for national prohibition was 
an inexpedient one. By 1913 an equitable arrangement 
seems to have developed in which temperance sentiment 
was recognized by both law and behavior in those areas 
where it was strongest. Where dry sentiments were weak, 
the populace continued to act in accord with what they 
thought to be culturally legitimate. Enforcement in urban 
areas, where cultural support was small, had been tried 
and had been shown to be a doubtful possibility. It should 
have seemed impossible to the reformer to enforce legis­
lation against so deep a resistance. Instead of seeking a 
 287 PROHIBITION: THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL UTOPIANISM
possible compromise on a national level, however, the Anti-
Saloon League and its supporters pushed their power as 
far as it could go into a law that made no distinctions 
between beer and liquor and gave no solace to those for 
whom drinking was part of the way of living. 
The issue of enforcement, however, hides some crucial 
functions of Prohibition as a symbolic issue in American 
life. If the norm against alcohol was often evaded, there 
was no question after 1919 about whose law it was. The 
Eighteenth Amendment made very plain the legal and 
public commitment of the American society to the utopia 
of the dry. Perhaps Billy Sunday was carried away by his 
own moral fervor when he described a world in which "the 
reign of tears is over. The slums will soon be only a 
memory. We will turn our prisons into factories and our 
jails into storehouses and corn cribs. Men will walk upright 
now. Women will smile, and the children will laugh. Hell 
will be forever for rent."4i The flamboyant orator's rhetoric 
expresses the fundamental moral conception of Prohibition 
that lies so deeply within the American and Protestant 
ethos. It is impossible to understand the politics of the 
1920's adequately, and its consequences, without under­
standing the interrelationship between moral stands, cul­
tural commitments, and political conflict. 
In describing the myriad of forces that supported Prohi­
bition, the one common denominator that united the some­
times disparate body of reformers was Protestant theology 
and its antipathy to the kinds of leisure that alcohol repre­
sented. If some overzealous supporters described the battle 
for Prohibition as a veritable Armeggedon, they were not 
without truth. They saw the drinkers and the opponents 
of Prohibition as people who stood for cultural values that 
4
* Quoted in Harry Elmer Barnes, Prohibition Versus Civilization (New York, 1932), p. 68. 
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were anathema to the dry. As one observer put it, "Crim­
inals, bandits, ex-convicts and thugs; street-walkers, har­
lots, prostitutes and degenerates are against Prohibition. 
But the good church people, the humanitarians, those who 
try to uplift and help others are for Prohibition."45 
In this disjuncture between the drinkers and the abstain­
ers, we find the same kind of cultural dichotomy that 
Horace Greeley had recognized at the base of political 
loyalties and animosities in the 1844 elections in New York 
State when he wrote, "Upon those working men who stick 
to their business, hope to improve their circumstances by 
honest industry and go on Sundays to church rather than 
the grog shop, the appeals of Loco-Focoism fell compara­
tively harmless; while the opposite class were rallied with 
unprecedented unanimity against us." 46 As we have seen, 
this distinction had a certain validity. It was in the cities 
that one found the saloon at its height and the problem 
of alcohol consumption at its greatest. It was the immi­
grants and the Catholics who provided the greatest contrast 
in values to the sober middle-class Protestant. These con­
flicts were focused around the issue of Prohibition. They 
were given sustenance by the nativism and racial theories 
that were then so current.47 
In this context consumption and abstinence take on 
meanings as signs and symbols of group loyalty and dif­
ferentiation. The styles of life to which people are com­
mitted in their status groups are signs to us of who they 
are. As important elements in the make-up of one's stan­
dards of living, they become symbols of membership and 
loyalty. Thorstein Veblen has shown this very clearly in 
his discussion of the theory of the leisure class. The fur­
« Ibid., p . 31. 
46
 Quoted in Lee Benson, The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy 
(Princeton, N.J., 1961). 
 Jones , "Prohibi t ion and Eugenics.1 ' 47
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nishings we use, the clothes we wear, and the foods we 
eat are those that are part of our specific culture. They 
are also enjoined upon us as ways of demonstrating that 
we are what we claim to be. In American society, drinking, 
like sex, is also an aspect tinged with a high degree of 
moral judgment. Whether one is a "drunken bum" or a 
"dried-up blue nose" is a matter of considerable moral 
moment. Hence, drinking in American society is affected 
with an intensive set of cultural designations. 
Politically, this implies that the designation of the public 
morality is also a determination of cultural dominance.48 
The quest for a given piece of legislation has meaning that 
is symbolic of, or in substitution for, instrumental goals. 
For cultural dominance to be symbolized by a piece of 
legislation, its mere existence is sufficient; enforcement is 
not essential. To have gained the legislative victory itself 
is to have gained the mark of cultural dominance; to be 
able to say, "Give deference to my way of living and 
degradation to yours", 
As a code of living, temperance performed two functions 
vis-a-vis its opponents. First, it existed as a style of life 
that was set forth in opposition to less stern orientations 
to family, to neighbors, and to a hierarchial authority in 
which leisure involved a separation between work and play 
and not a preparation for it. In this sense the effort to 
make others temperate (abstinent) was an act of coercion, 
dominated by a defense against a threatened overwhelming 
new cultural impulse. Second, temperance was an invitation 
to those, especially the newly arrived in the United States, 
to adopt the habits that spelled success and prestige in 
American life. It was in this respect an invitation toward 
48 Clark, The Dry Years, pp. 113-22, shows the split between 
middle class and lower class as deeply related to dry and wet antag­
onisms in the twentieth century in the state of Washington. The 
symbolic nature of the issue is discussed throughout my Symbolic
Crusade. 
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assimilation in which urban social problems were to be 
solved by the lower classes adopting the values by which 
middle-class citizens would permit them to enter their gates. 
The passage of Prohibition made clear that the cultural 
dominance of the old middle-class was proclaimed; Anna 
Gordon, president of the WCTU put it in an address in 
1915: "Total abstinence is no longer a ridiculed fanaticism. 
It sits in regal state on the throne of empires and of 
kingdoms and sways, in ever increasing measure, the 
voting citizenship."49 
If this cultural confrontation existed before Prohibition, 
it did so in a somewhat muted fashion. It was a major 
consequence of Prohibition and of the Prohibition Era that 
it served to make both sides more homogeneous and conse­
quently to polarize the cultural diversities within American 
society. In understanding the ways in which Prohibition 
functioned as a symbol of cultural conflict, we must now 
turn to the sources of growing commitment and antipathy 
during the 1920's. 
The polarizing effects of the campaign for national pro­
hibition were made manifest in an editorial of the Anti-
Saloon League's journal, the American Issue.50 "The liquor 
issue is no longer one of Wet and Dry arguments. Hence­
forth, it is to be a question of Wet men and Dry men." 
The campaign for Prohibition had the effect of widening 
the gulf between the cultures involved in the defense of 
drinking and of abstinence. Because it sought political de­
cisions, rather than moral suasion, the Anti-Saloon League 
and the dry forces tended to organize both sides around 
concrete issues. Because they sought a total victory, they 
4 9
 Annual Report, National Woman's Christian Temperance Union, 
1915, p. 93. 
American Issue, X X (January, 1912) , 4. 5 0
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made it extremely difficult for more moderate dry allies 
to stay in the same camp. 
One aspect of this was the almost total demise of Catholic 
organizational support for prohibitionist legislation. Al­
though the Catholic Abstinence Union and many of the 
Paulist fathers had been a source of aid in efforts to curtail 
drinking, they could not go along with the extreme position 
represented by Prohibition. When the Catholic Clergy Pro­
hibition League of America was founded in 1919, it had 
relatively small backing in contrast to the earlier more 
moderate efforts. "Most Roman Catholics, however, opposed 
Prohibition and became especially hostile after the reform 
began to reach the larger cities where Catholic strength 
was concentrated." 51 Two major non-evangelical Protestant 
churches, the Episcopalian and both Lutheran synods, did 
not climb on board the dry wagon. The Jews, who also 
represented an immigrant population, were similarly hostile 
to prohibitory legislation. The effect, then, of the campaign 
for Prohibition was to stamp it even more clearly as a 
middle-class, Protestant, and nativist activity. 
Despite the fact that the progressive movement was a 
major source for urban middle-class support for Prohibition, 
as Timberlake has shown, it yet remains the case that the 
drive for Prohibition tended to increase the gap along class 
lines between components within the progressive movement. 
Thus the labor movement, especially with the development 
of the American Federation of Labor, was by no means 
any longer a major ally of temperance. Although Terence 
Powderly, the founder and head of the Knights of Labor, 
had been actively allied with the temperance organizations 
of the late nineteenth century, his concern was by no means 
mirrored in the labor movement of the twentieth century. 
 Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement, p. 32. 01
292 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: THE 1920's 
Gompers was concerned with moderating the use of liquor, 
but both he and most of the labor movement were by then, 
in culture and temperament, opposed to both abstinence 
and the tactics of legislative prohibition.52 
The progressive movement, though it was dominated very 
much by the urban middle class, nevertheless gained very 
important strength from its general concern with the 
welfare of labor and the industrial worker. In this sympathy 
progressivism was anti-industrial and an opponent of the 
new business classes. Prohibition, so thoroughly identified 
in the urban areas with the Protestant middle class, split 
the progressive movement on the issue of drinking. To the 
worker it smacked of paternalism and class exploitation. 
Samuel Gompers, with considerable foresight, remarked to 
a Congressional committee that Prohibition would be dis­
criminatory against the worker. "The cry is against this 
discrimination, which is almost inevitable, except so far as 
a business man or a man of means may be himself a total ab­
stainer. Where a wage earner can not get a glass of beer, 
still a very large proportion of the men of means can have 
and do have a stock of intoxicating drinks to last men their 
lives." B3 The visible exemption of the urban rich from 
the restrictions of Prohibition made the gap evident to the 
urban poor. 
Despite the activity of urban progressives, a major con­
sequence of the Prohibition campaign was to intensify the 
conflict between the city and the country. As we have shown 
above, it was in the rural areas that the Prohibition forces 
found their greatest support. When the Webb-Kenyon Act 
was passed in Congress in 1913, the sources of support 
came far more from areas where old-stock middle classes 
 Despite Timberlake's assertion that Prohibition was a phase of 
progressive reform, he admits that "other Progressives, especially 
those identified with urban-labor-immigrant elements, disliked the 
reform and fought it" (ibid., p. 2). Also see his discussion of labor and 
Prohibition, pp. 88-95. 
63 Ibid., p. 94. 
52
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were strong than from those of the industrial and immi­
grant population.84 An analysis of percentage of state popu­
lations under prohibition by state or local laws in 1913 
shows that dry laws were far less likely to occur in urban­
ized than in rural states.55 
The same thing is true if one compares the Populist vote 
in the late nineteenth century to the prohibitionist status of 
states in 1919. In counties where Populist vote had been 
high, there the prohibitionist support was strongest. The 
earliest of the states to be drawn into the wave of prohibi­
tory legislation after 1906 were in the South, and it was 
in the South that one found the strongest support for 
national prohibition and prohibitory legislation. Those who 
were likely to see this as largely a reaction to the Negro 
are mistaken. County-by-county analysis in Mississippi and 
Alabama revealed that the strongest sources of support 
were in the rural counties that had been Populist in the 
late nineteenth century and that had a low percentage of 
Negroes. In the urban counties the support was much less, 
and in rural counties with high percentages of Negroes, 
largely disenfranchised, Prohibition found considerable op­
position. What differentiated the Prohibitionist from the 
pro-wet forces in these southern areas was largely the 
existence of evangelical Protestant religion. 
We are not implying here that Prohibition can be ex­
plained as a Populist reform. What we do suggest is that 
great opposition to Prohibition came from the eastern, 
urban states where large percentages of Catholics and immi­
grants were to be found. Major urban and industrial areas 
like Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania were the last to 
ratify the Eighteenth Amendment. The strongest areas of 
national prohibition sentiment were not the industrialized 
states nor the industrialized sectors of rural states. They 
54
 Ibid., p. 163; Sinclair, Prohibition, p. 154. 
58
 Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade, pp. 102-3. 
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were largely areas that were Protestant, rural, and nativist; 
in the South and in the Midwest rather than in the East. 
This is not to deny that the progressives did play an im­
portant role in Prohibition campaigns. This they certainly 
did, as Timberlake has shown. In California they played 
perhaps the greatest role, but in Los Angeles County, 
where the Populist candidate for President in 1892 had 
pulled 14 per cent of the votes and the Prohibitionist 4 per 
cent, one found intense support for the Anti-Saloon League 
and the Progressive campaigns of 1909-13.58 
The saloon and the drinker increasingly appeared to the 
Protestant middle class, both urban and rural, as a symbol 
of a culture alien to the ascetic character of American 
values. What was important was not so much that people 
drank but that they upheld the validity and the Tightness 
of liquor and beer within an accepted way of life. There 
were many strands in the Prohibitionist campaign, derived 
from many ideological sources of a nineteenth century com­
mercial and agrarian society. The reform movements that 
swept the United States in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, especially in the form of progressivism 
and Populism, were important roots for the Prohibition 
movement. But in the process of pursuing Prohibition, both 
the gaps between the older social system and the newer one 
and the elements involved in these movements themselves 
came into conflict. At the root of these conflicts were cultural 
differences that were symbolized by the very effort to make 
the American Protestant version of the good life embedded 
in law. 
The result was that what for one group was a part of 
its daily existence and a legitimate and welcome source of 
leisure was, to the dry forces, a vice whose eradication was 
Ibid., p. 104; Gilman Ostrander, The Prohibition Movement in 
California, 1848-19S3 (Berkeley, Calif., 1957), p. 105. 
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essential. Consider the cultural overtones of superiority in 
the argument of a Prohibition advocate: "The hope of 
perpetuating our liberties is to help the foreigners correct 
any demoralizing custom, and through self-restraint as­
similate American ideals." 5T The result of the Prohibition 
campaign was to increase the cultural conflict that had long 
been involved in temperance activity. "The Anglo-Saxon 
stock," declared the journal of the Anti-Saloon League, "is 
hardiest and fittest. If we are to preserve this nation 
in the Anglo-Saxon type, we must abolish [saloons]".58 For 
those who were the objects of such abolition, the attempt 
seemed only one of hostile aggressiveness. 
As the nation entered the Prohibition Era on the night 
of January 16, 1920, the issues had already been drawn 
and the conflicts and symbols already stated. The only new 
argument to emerge for the drys was that abstinence was 
now the law of the land, and the devotees of law and order 
must obey. The wet rejoinder, after the first few years, 
was that Prohibition had been tried and was found to be 
unenforceable. Though the arguments from science, reli­
gion, economics, and other areas of knowledge were con­
tinuously stated and restated by friend and foe, the basic 
for and against positions of rural-urban, of middle-working 
class, and Protestant-Catholic were apparent and more 
evident day by day. What was new and what made the 
Prohibition Era so consequential for later American politics 
was the tendency toward an increasing and vigilant moral­
ism among the drys and a fusion of these qualities with 
particular political parties and leaders. In the course of this, 
the moderates and the progressives were increasingly 
pushed to one or another side. When repeal came, it came 
 Barker, The Saloon Problem, pp. 49-50. Quoted in Timberlake, 
Prohibition and the Progressive Movement, p. 118. 
68 American Issue, XX (April, 1912), 1. 
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to a country that was tired of the moralisms of the drys 
and the wets and preoccupied with a totally different kind 
of problem. 
The progressive impulse had played a significant part 
in the Prohibition campaign. But even before Prohibition 
was achieved, there was a widening split. Although the 
urban, middle-class, and progressive supporters of Pro­
hibition were highly visible, their role in the major Pro­
hibitionist organizations was by no means this apparent. 
The WCTU, which had in the late 1890's been deeply com­
mitted to Frances Willard's Do-Everything policy, had been 
active in such diverse movements as female suffrage, the 
rights of labor, penal reform, and even cremation, as well 
as influenced by the general tenets of Christian socialism. 
After the Anti-Saloon League began its Prohibition cam­
paigns in 1906, however, this ladies' wing of the temperance 
movement began to retreat from its wider concerns into a 
far more specific and concerted attack on the liquor traffic.59 
The Anti-Saloon League itself was based upon a very 
explicit policy of isolation from all other issues. The title 
of its major periodical, the American Issue, was its basic 
point of difference from the Prohibition party and from 
many earlier temperance organizations. Even the famed 
Methodist Board of Temperance, Morals, and Social Legis­
lation was far less concerned with the latter two items than 
with the first. When Prohibition arrived, those organiza­
tions that had been so successful in mobilizing political 
strength had become isolated from other major progressive 
movements of the early twentieth century. 
The urban middle classes, so much wedded to the pro­
gressive ideology of clean government and paternalism to­
ward industrial workers, were far less hostile to the urban 
society than was the case among the rural components of 
Prohibition. As groups, they were less likely to be drawn 
 Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade, chap. iv. 69
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into some of the highly bombastic and hostile attitudes 
that came to govern Prohibition rhetoric and action during 
the 1920's. As residents in urban America, they were quick 
to feel the consequences of Prohibition for middle-class 
drinking and for organized crime. The easier enforcement 
of Prohibition in the towns and country areas made rural 
people far less susceptible to the belief that Prohibition was 
unenforceable and productive of excessive crime. As the era 
continued, the defection of the moderate progressive left 
the field still further open to the neo-Populists. When the 
Federal Council of Churches of Christ, the leading organ 
of expression of the social gospel and high-status churches 
in the United States, announced its opposition to continued 
Prohibition, it sounded the beginnings of a shift that proved 
highly destructive to the drys.60 
By the 1920's the progressive movement had run its 
course. Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson had both de­
parted, and the effort of La Follette was a last weak shot 
at revival. The alliance between temperance and nativism 
began to produce excessive and unsophisticated ideologies 
that pushed the urbanites further from identification with 
rural colleagues. It should be noted that in point of fact 
the northeastern urban progressives in the Progressive 
party of 1916, when the prohibition issue was raised, did 
not support it. The party convention opposed prohibition 
in its meetings in 1912.61 
In this respect I am in agreement with Sinclair and in 
disagreement with Timberlake. Timberlake sees Prohibition 
as largely an extension of the progressive reform, whereas 
Sinclair and I are likely to see it as one element but much 
overshadowed by the rural political base and sentiments 
60
 Sinclair, Prohibition, pp . 290-91. I t migh t also be suggested 
that this polarization among Protestants accentuated the shift in 
drinking standards, distaste for the dry's single-minded political zeal
undermining the standard he so zealously pursued.
61
 Ibid., pp. 95-96. 
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of antiurbanism and nativism. During the Prohibition Era 
the forces of nativism, antiurbanism, and religious funda­
mentalism gained strength. Both defensiveness over the 
enforceability of Prohibition and the very success in 
achieving it added to an expansiveness that took the form 
of a strong effort to expand the rural virtues embodied in 
Prohibition into other areas. Perhaps, too, as Virginius 
Dabney has suggested, the dry leaders felt themselves 
threatened by the obviously increasing strength and num­
bers of the Catholic, immigrant, and working-class people 
of the big cities. 
In his rhetoric and in his career William Jennings Bryan 
embodied much of what Prohibitionists stood for. His action 
in the 1920's reflected a good deal of what was happening. 
Although he had carefully refrained from taking a stand 
on liquor questions during his presidential campaigns, de­
spite his obvious personal pro-dry feelings, during the 1920's 
he came to feel that the Prohibition issue was now a domi­
nant one. He spoke out most strongly in the effort to make 
the Democratic party a stauncher vehicle for Prohibition 
sentiment and to prevent its domination by urban and east­
ern forces. The 1924 convention was a bitter one. It linked 
Bryan and the drys to the support of the Ku Klux Klan. 
In this respect, as in so much of the rhetoric of the drys, 
the nativism and anti-Catholicism of the Prohibitionists 
were made to seem the central tenets of a wider movement. 
Those urban supporters who had found in Prohibition a 
significance given by concern for social welfare and for in­
dustrial efficiency were more likely to be rebuffed by legisla­
tion that had now been given a decidedly different kind of 
symbolic significance. In 1924 the Prohibition party even 
passed planks to support the placement of Bibles in the 
schools and for legislation to enforce the Americanization 
of aliens.62 
«2 Ibid., p. 87. 
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The dry victory, and the later fight against repeal, made 
the conflicts between cultures more intense and polarized 
even more the forces of the urban and the rural, the Catholic 
and the Protestant, the immigrant and the native. Pro­
hibition was thus not an isolated issue but one that pitted 
cultures against each other. Given the constitutionality of 
Prohibition and the experience with the denunciation of the 
German brewers during World War I, the loyal drys added 
patriotism to the other arrows in their quiver. It was a 
patriotism directed less against external enemies than 
toward the urban and immigrant cultures in American 
cities. Ella Boole, then the president of the WCTU, said in 
1928 to its national convention that "this is the United 
States of America, my country and I love it. . As my fore­
fathers worked and struggled to build it, so will I work and 
struggle to maintain it unsoiled by foreign influences, 
uncontaminated by vicious mind poison." 63 
Bryan's own qualities, so effective on the prairies, were 
not calculated to gain loyal followers on the cement side­
walks. He embodied the prejudices and the virtues of rural 
America. At the Scopes trial, he was not simply a pathetic 
old man; his effort to shore up fundamentalist religion 
against the attacks of sophisticated science in turn con­
tinued that resistance to the modern that is in part at the 
root of the antiurbanism in Prohibition. In a mania for 
purity in literature, attack on the cigarette, and the demand 
for the eradication of jazz, the drys moved increasingly 
to an alliance with a general movement of fundamentalist 
conservatism in American manners, morals, and politics. 
It is in this sense that we speak of the radicalization of 
Prohibition reform. Both sides moved toward a more rigid 
statement of diverse orientations toward life. 
To some degree the increasing polarization was a function 
of the fact that the issues were posed as political choices. 
 Union Signal (Dec. 15, 1928), p. 12. 63
300 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: THE 1920's 
The split that Bryan had dramatized in the Democratic 
party began the set of events that tended increasingly to 
turn the Prohibition issue into one of party identifications. 
What the Anti-Saloon League had sought to avoid came 
into being—the identification of the Republicans with Pro­
hibition and of the Democrats with Repeal. In large measure 
the national legislative victories had been a function of a 
coalition between southern Democrats and middlewestern 
and western Republicans. The Hobson resolution submitting 
the Eighteenth Amendment to the states was originally 
defeated in 1914. In 1917 its passage was secured by the 
increased votes that came from Republican gains in the 
House from midwestern states.64 Nevertheless, neither the 
presidential campaigns of 1916, 1920, or 1924 had pivoted 
around the dry issue. Although Wilson and Harding had 
vetoed various pro-dry measures, such as Wilson's veto of 
the Volstead Act, they had all steered clear of any identifi­
cation on either side of the issue. 
The campaign of Alfred E. Smith for the presidency was 
a vital link in the processes by which repeal was achieved 
and by which the American political parties gained a great 
deal of their present stylistic differences. The conflict of 
cultures that Smith's candidacy mirrored had already been 
more than foreshadowed in the 1924 convention. The very 
fact that an urban Catholic, an avowed wet, was the 
candidate of a major political party was in itself an affront 
to the sober, Protestant middle classes that had put through 
Prohibition and that had for so long dominated American 
political life. 
Theda Tray has written that while Hoover and Smith 
were talking about issues, "the rest of the population was 
talking about Al—where he went to church, what kind of 
a lid he wore, what liquids he took with his meals, how he 
was born and brought up in Tammany Hall and the way he 
 Sinclair, Prohibition, p. 163. 84
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pronounced 'foist.' " 65 In Smith the wets had found a per­
fect symbol of a way of life—a man who had championed 
social welfare, whose sentiments and speech showed clearly 
the sidewalks of New York on which he had been reared. He 
was the best of the machine politicians and a deep defender 
of the urban underdog who "worked in factories, spoke 
broken English, and wanted a good time on Sundays." 66 
Herbert Hoover was, of course, the very opposite in manner 
and in speech. In so many ways he was the rural epitome 
of the American success story: the efficient engineer who 
had worked his way up from humble farm beginnings and 
who had made his mark in the effective organization of 
charity. At last the struggle was out in the open, and it led 
the Prohibitionist forces into a zealous fight against the 
devil. In a typical statement the Anti-Saloon League year­
book said in 1931, "When the great cities of America actu­
ally come to dominate the states and dictate the policies of 
the nation, the process of decay in our boasted American 
civilization will have begun." 67 Bishop Cannon, the Anti-
Saloon League, the Methodist and other evangelical Protes­
tant churches, the WCTU—all threw themselves behind 
Herbert Hoover, departing from their long policy of avoid­
ing specific recommendations in presidential elections. Even 
the Prohibition party, for the first time since its beginning, 
in 1872, supported another party's presidential candidate 
and failed to nominate one of their own. Such a split made 
it extraordinarily difficult for the Progressive and social 
welfare-oriented urban Prohibitionists. The bigotry of the 
 Quoted in ibid., p. 304. For a general description of the 1928 
campaign see Moore, A Catholic Runs for President (New York, 
1956). 
08
 Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade, p. 125. For an account of Smith's 
voting power in urban areas see Samuel Lubell, The Future of 
American Politics (New York, 1952). 
67
 Anti-Saloon League Yearbook. 1931 (Westerville, Ohio, 1931), 
p. 9. 
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open anti-Catholicism in which Cannon and other Prohibi­
tion leaders engaged further turned the knife in the wounds 
that a vindictive policy of nativism had developed during 
the 1920's. 
Hoover's victory, in a clear endorsement of Prohibition, 
should of course not hide what is evident today in Smith's 
defeat—the rise of Democratic majorities in the American 
big cities. These cities had already been the bastion of wet 
votes.68 Samuel Lubell has recounted the importance of the 
Smith campaign in presaging the development of the Demo­
cratic party as the champion of the urban underdog ethnic 
minorities. Not only was it the case that the Catholic and 
Jewish populations were increasing more rapidly than were 
middle-class Protestants, but the cultural conflicts repre­
sented in part by prohibitionist issues tended to drive some 
of the immigrant groups that had been Republican closer 
to the Democratic party.69 
What Smith had accomplished, in relation to the Pro­
hibition issue, was to swing the wet centers of the popula­
tion behind the Democrats. Sinclair's analysis of the vote 
in 1930 in the House of Representatives on the Jones Law 
shows this clearly. The drys, though winning a great victory 
in numbers (284-90), captured very little of the northern 
vote. Although the North had provided over half of the 
wet vote in 1917, now it provided just under two-thirds. 
The Republican party had become even more dry, whereas 
the Democrats were more split than ever.70 In short, Pro­
hibition had become identified with the Republican party. 
The basis for a compromise had increasingly diminished. 
When repeal came, it was as a vindiction of all that urban 
6 8
 With the exception of Los Angeles and several southern cities, 
no major American city was pro-dry. 
69
 Lubell, The Future of American Politics. 
70
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and industrial America had come to stand for in the dialogue 
of American politics. 
If Smith's defeat and the shifting nature of political 
polarization in the United States foreshadowed the possibil­
ity of repeal, the events of the 1920's had already begun to 
sharpen the opposition. The growth and development of 
the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment and 
the development of a Women's Auxiliary in the late 1920's 
had produced something that had not clearly existed before 
1920—an independent organization of wets. As long as the 
liquor and beer industries were behind all efforts to publi­
cize a wet position, their hearing in public was limited. 
However, growing dissatisfaction with the law had brought 
into being groups of people of high social position who could 
not easily be dismissed. The early defection of the DuPonts 
from the ranks of temperance supporters and their enthusi­
astic backing of the Association Against the Prohibition 
Amendment represented a serious blow to dry forces. The 
championing of Repeal by Mrs. Charles Sabin, a woman of 
social prominence, was another blow to the dry cause. 
The shifts in public opinion might have been borne and 
the amendment saved, at least in relationship to distilled 
spirits, had it not been for the major event of the depres­
sion. It was the Great Depression that killed the Eighteenth 
Amendment more than any other single act or process. In 
1929 Prohibition was still part of the Constitution. It had 
survived the attack of the 1928 election. The Prohibition 
Bureau, under Hoover, for the first time was placed on a 
sound footing under Civil Service in the Department of 
Justice. A strong effort to enforce the law seemed in exis­
tence. The Wickersham Report, though critical of enforce­
ment, laid the groundwork for an adequate discussion under 
which some compromise between wet and dry might have 
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been achievable. That the dry forces were still quite strong 
has already been indicated in our analysis of the vote on 
the Jones Law. The depression, however, made the issue of 
Prohibition a minor one, less calculated to instil enthusiastic 
loyalties in either direction. 
The argument of economic consideration now took pre­
cedence. In 1926 only a few unions had actively opposed the 
law in Congressional hearings. In 1930 and 1932 union 
representatives constituted a great source of the advocacy 
of Repeal, on the grounds that it would put men back to 
work in such jobs as lithography (making bottle labels), 
glass blowing, and among hotel and steward groups.71 Fur­
ther, the argument that new sources of tax revenues were 
necessary and needed appeared to play an extremly impor­
tant role among businessmen who had championed Pro­
hibition as the route to a sober and reliable work force. 
Even those great stalwarts of the dry reform John D. 
Rockefeller and S. S. Kresge had left the movement in 1932. 
For the first time in many, many years the Anti-Saloon 
League was suffering from a deficiency of funds.72 More 
importantly, tangible economic issues became paramount, 
and the cultural differences between the lower-class urban 
workers and the rural farmers became minimal when they 
were both so desperately in financial difficulty. 
The depression, however, had another important effect 
upon the consequences of Prohibition for American life. 
Having so thoroughly identified the Republicans with dry 
sentiment and with Herbert Hoover, they quite clearly 
underlined the antipathy of the urban and immigrant masses 
for the party that appeared to be the spokesman of the white 
Anglo-Saxon Protestant. Not only did the Republican party 
come to be viewed as the party of big business, but it was 
71
 See my discussion of these Congressional hear ings in Gusfield, 
Symbolic Crusade, pp . 127-28. 
72 Clark, The Dry Years, pp . 227-29. 
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also deeply associated with the party that had turned its 
back on the urban poor, the Catholic and the Jew and 
the working man whose leisure had little room for the 
dry utopia. 
It is in its implications for the setting of styles in Ameri­
can politics that Prohibition has had a considerable impor­
tance in American life. 
In becoming associated with the cause of the dry, the 
Republican party hardened its cultural overtones as the 
party whose heyday was the period of the 1920's—the high 
point of old middle-class political supremacy and a prosper­
ity that celebrated the effectiveness and virtue of a business 
civilization. The Great Depression dissolved the magic 
power of the old symbols and set in its place a conception 
of government closer to the welfare orientations of the 
urban, immigrant, and industrial poor. In Al Smith and 
in the New Deal, the Democrats moved more clearly out 
of the 1920's and the world of William Jennings Bryan. 
These images of political parties have continued to play 
significant functions in voter perceptions of Republicans and 
Democrats—the Republicans as the party of "big business" 
and the Democrats as the party of the "underdog." Public 
opinion polls have been consistent in reporting such designa­
tions among American voters.73 
We have already suggested that the era of Prohibition 
tended to polarize the cultural diversities in American life. 
In splitting off the welfare-oriented and progressive strands 
in Prohibition from the nativist and Populist strands, the 
1920's more completely effected the bond between political 
party choices and cultural loyalties. The differential avail­
ability of beer and liquor for working and for middle classes 
underlined the symbolism of the Republicans as the party 
 Bernard Berelson et al., Voting (Chicago, 1954), p. 79; Angus 
Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York, 1960), pp. 149-67; 
Lubell, The Future of American Politics. 
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of the old middle class, the Protestant establishment, and 
the agrarian past.74 The Democrats emerged more clearly 
as the party of the urban frontier, the champion of a good 
life of leisure and comradeship. Against the Utopia of an 
efficient and moral civilization, soberly dedicated to produc­
tion and perfectability, there was clearly posed the utopia 
of the happy consumers, sharing in the fruits of the eco­
nomy and practicing a "live and let live" attitude to the 
differences of a pluralistic society. 
The linkages between party and cultural styles involves 
as well distinctly diverse views of government and its obli­
gations and limits. Richard Hofstadter has described this 
in remarking on the contrast between the progressive's 
conception of government and that of the big city machine 
and its followers.75 For the urban middle class that sup­
ported progressivism, government was a vehicle for 
achieving moral purposes and the public good. Clean 
government and the rational electorate were his virtues, 
and the corruption and organization of the machine were 
deeply vicious. The saloon, in its alliance with the political 
boss, was anathema. The good citizen, in the progressive 
utopia, saw government as a vehicle in which he was the 
driver, not the passenger. The urban immigrant, on the 
other hand, saw society as a hierarchical structure in which 
authority did favors for those on the bottom in return for 
favors toward those at the top. The impersonal, moralistic 
vision of politics that the drys upheld was the common 
property of the old middle class, both urban and rural. A 
74
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often supposed. Much of the solid Republican strength lies in the 
rural non-farm communities and does not display the erratic quality 
of the farm vote, which is more closely related to immediate farm 
prices. See Lubell, The Future of American Politics, chap, viii; Sey­
mour Lipset, Agrarian Socialism (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1950), 
chap. i. 
75
 Richard Hofs tad te r , The Age of Reform (New York, 1956), 
pp. 180-84. 
 307 PROHIBITION: THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL UTOPIANISM
more personal practice that mixed human concern with 
ethnic loyalty was the stuff on which the urban politician 
based his power. Lincoln Steffens quoted the Boston "boss" 
Martin Lomasny as saying that what people wanted was 
mercy, not law and justice.76 
In their efforts to enshrine a Protestant Sunday as the 
ideal of American consumership, the drys set their face 
against the tolerant and indulgent cultures that had come 
to make up much of the new industrial populations. Their 
own logic and their intense need for the establishment of 
moral supremacy in public forms made compromises with 
the wets increasingly difficult. A politics of compromise 
was itself difficult for such moralists to accept. As the 
issues became sharper, became more clearly cultural in 
content, and became linked to political parties, political 
loyalties and ethnic identities were more clearly linked to 
stylistic differences. 
Perhaps here we touch upon deeper shifts in American 
life that were beginning to emerge in the 1920's and in 
turn appear to have been in process of changing American 
orientations toward consumption, toward leisure, and 
toward the use of alcohol. We have already pointed out that 
America, over the past eighty years, has shifted from a 
nation of excessive drinkers and abstainers to one of far 
more moderate consumption of alcohol. The intensive use 
of alcohol as a means of escape (and consequently the 
defensive reaction against it) appears to have given way 
to the use of alcohol in facilitating social camaraderie. In 
this respect Americans, in their quest to extend and main­
tain good fellowship, are more inclined to accept playfulness 
and leisure and less inclined to show continuous concern 
with production and work. The general shifts in American 
character that David Riesman has made so vivid are pre­
saged in the 1920's. Kinsey, in his famous study of the 
 Lincoln Steffens, Autobiography (New York, 1931), p. 618. 76
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sexual behavior of the human female, dates a sharp shift 
in American sexual morality from the appearance of the 
generation born after 1910.77 Certainly the 1920's saw 
a tremendous increase in what may be called the cultural 
mobility of the American population, especially in urban 
centers. It was the era in which communication and trans­
portation were greatly increased by the appearance of the 
automobile, the movies, and the radio. It was an era of 
affluence, in the main, and one in which the moralities of 
a sterner Protestantism were under attack both by the 
winds of change and by the appearance of whole new popu­
lations that were less committed to the utopia of the sober 
Sunday. After the 1920's the conflicts between the alien and 
the native, between urban and rural, Protestant and Catho­
lic, became less vivid than those between adherents to 
styles of fundamentalism and modernism, conflicts that 
cut across the different religious and residence groups.78 
The sentiments that American Prohibition expressed are 
by no means dead, although they have lost a great deal of 
their prestige and political dominance. Abstinence is still 
the commitment of a large segment of the American popula­
tion. What is true, however, is that the domination in 
cultural and political terms that it represented, the domina­
tion of the nineteenth-century Anglo-Saxon Protestant, has 
ended in American life. It is this that was the meaning of 
the struggle over Prohibition and that has made its loss 
so bitter for those who have identified with it. "For when 
all the old Prohibs are dead—as soon they will be—one may 
look in vain for the old America." 79 
" Alfred Kinsey et al, Sexual Behavior in the Human Female 
(Phi ladelphia , 1953) . 
78 This has also been discussed recently in sociological l i t e ra ture 
as conflict between "cosmopol i tans" and "locals ." See t he discussion 
of these cu l tura l styles in Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade, Chap te r VI . 
79 Clark, The Dry Years, p . 127, 




THE title of this essay suggests not only that the time from 
1918 to 1930 involved us in a very special, a unique, world, 
but also demands that the fiction published during these 
years be distinctive. I have no absolutely reliable measure 
either of the 1920's or of its fiction. Like the use of statistics 
in argument, evidence can be cited to support the idea of an 
unusual American society enjoying for a few years an un­
usual life, and of a fiction that held a mirror to this life. 
It becomes a matter of scaled values. To take the term 
"Jazz Age" by itself, one might say that it argues a quite 
free, say, even an irresponsible, "Age." This is a clicM 
about the decade, and it conjures up images of Gilda Gray, 
Grover Whalen, Jimmy Walker, and others, and Warren 
Gamaliel Harding playing poker with his buddies in the 
White House. It is true that there was an easing of tensions 
after World War I; since we were on the winning side 
and had suffered not much more than slight inconveniences, 
and since we were temporarily enjoying the illusion that 
there would be no more wars, the tone of the decade was 
special. This is true even though the country's economy 
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was only superficially prosperous, the distance between 
haves and have-nots quite noticeable, and at Versailles the 
seeds of World War II had been sown. 
In other words, although the "Jazz Age" phrase describes 
only a partial view of the 1920's, it refers to a sizable seg­
ment of our society—and that one of the most articulate. 
The attitude itself has been overemphasized in subsequent 
histories of the decade and of its literature; in no case does 
it adequately comprehend the genuine spirit of the 1920's; 
it points to surface glitter—the sort of world indicated by 
the epithet in the society of F. Scott Fitzgerald's short 
stories, of his flappers, of wealth, of a world in which (he 
said later) rewards were quick and success came early.1 
"Even when you were broke you didn't worry about money, 
because it was in such profusion around you. Charm, 
notoriety, mere good manners, weighed more than money 
as a social asset. " {Crack-Up, pp. 21-22) 
But in these words, and in others, there is more than 
surface gaiety; for Fitzgerald was not only the master 
reporter of the Jazz Age, he was, or he ultimately became, 
its most sensitive judge. He managed the reporting easily 
enough; in fact, it was all too easy and too much a tempta­
tion for him to report on the behavior of the decade's 
golden lads and lasses. In one of his Notebook entries, under 
"Girls," he wrote: " . She was lovely and expensive, and 
about nineteen." {Crack-Up, p. 133) These three character­
istics summed up quite effectively the superficial qualities 
of his people; and they were real enough qualities, for Fitz­
gerald's great popular attractiveness was due in part to his 
being able to define a part of an age, the part that has led 
to the decade's being called the Jazz Age. 
 See "Echoes of the Jazz Age," in The Crack-Up, ed. Edmund 
Wilson (New York, 1945), pp. 13-22. This essay was first published 
in Scribner's Magazine, November, 1931. 
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Nevertheless, one does not remain nineteen; the pressure 
of time upon his people is ever-present.2 In a crucial scene, 
Nick Carraway, the narrator of The Great Gatsby (1925) 
suddenly becomes aware of his thirtieth birthday (Fitz­
gerald was himself twenty-nine when The Great Gatsby 
was published) ; there is much said, in the person of Jay 
Gatsby, about "repeating the past." The following exchange 
with Carraway has an especial poignancy (they are discuss­
ing Daisy Buchanan's ability to recover her love for Gatsby 
after five years): 
He broke off and began to walk up and down a desolate path 
of food and rinds and discarded favors and crushed flowers. 
"I wouldn't ask too much of her," I ventured. "You can't 
repeat the past." 
"Can't repeat the past?" he cried incredulously. "Why of 
course you can!" 
He looked around him wildly, as if the past were lurking in 
the shadow of his house, just out of reach of his hand.3 
Of course, Carraway is right; you may have the illusion 
of retrieving the past, but what you actually have is an 
altogether different time, and you are beyond the range 
of the past when you most think you have it. The idea of 
time's hovering near, of the basic risk of overevaluating 
youth, is an important part of most of the decade's best 
novels and stories. The unreality of the 1920's—in some 
quarters, at least, the time and the circumstances did seem 
unreal—made these years appear at times to be a moral 
hiatus between two "substantial" and morally serious times, 
2
 See Richard Lehan's F. Scott Fitzgerald and the Craft of Fiction (Carbondale, 111., 1966) for a thorough study of the peculiar effect 
of time upon Fitzgerald's work.
3
 The Great Gatsby (New York, 1925), p. 133. 
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the prewar Victorian and the post-crash Marxian. Much 
of Fitzgerald's moral judgment of the decade came in re­
trospective glances at it. Charlie Wales, hero of one of his 
finest short stories, "Babylon Revisited," looks back at the 
years recently past and thinks of them as a time without 
"character": 
He believed in character; he wanted to jump back a whole 
generation and trust in character again as the eternally valuable 
element. Everything wore out.4 
Fitzgerald is the decade's most skilful judge and analyst, 
and he is at his best here. At his worst, he is merely friv­
olous, and his work seems merely to glance obliquely off 
the shining surface. His first novel (his "early success," as 
he later described it), This Side of Paradise (1920), is 
really about the "generation" that was three or four years 
younger than he, whom he observed from the maturity of 
his twenty-four years. It is a "classical" form of the bil­
dungsroman, but it is so many other things that only Fitz­
gerald's youthful and unanalytic enthusiasm could have 
given it an elan that makes it readable today. But it is not 
without its contemporaries: Stephen Vincent Benet's The 
Beginning of Wisdom (1921), Ben Hecht's Erik Dorn 
(1921), Floyd Dell's The Moon-Calf (1920) and The Briary-
Bush (1921), John Dos Passos' Streets of Night (1923), 
and Carl Van Vechten's Firecrackers (1925) and Parties 
(1930) are additional examples. Although there is much 
variety within these books, much the same type of material 
is drawn upon in each: exuberant, romantic youth, whose 
early introduction to experience either was responsible for 
slyly amusing scenes or was exploited as somehow "pro­
foundly moving." 
* "Babylon Revisited," in Taps at Reveille (New York, 1935), 
p. 387. The story was first written in 1931. 
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This is an exemplary kind of Jazz Age fiction, but it 
is only one kind. Other types need to be reviewed: the 
expatriate novel (Hemingway's The Sun Also Rises, 1926, 
is the "representative anecdote," 5 but there are others) ; 
the novel of war experiences (once again, a novel of Hem­
ingway's is the best example: A Farewell to Arms, 1929); 
the nostalgic or retrospective novel, which is written on 
the assumption that the postwar period was vastly inferior 
to the past (Willa Cather's The Professor's House, 1925, is 
the best example, but such of her contemporaries as Edith 
Wharton and Ellen Glasgow also dramatized the view) ; 
finally the parodic novel, directed usually at the American 
middle class and supporting a bias most strongly presented 
in H. L. Mencken's magazine, the American Mercury (of 
course, Sinclair Lewis' Babbitt is the supreme example 
here). I shall discuss each of these in turn. 
No one who has recently read Hemingway's A Moveable 
Feast (1964) can have failed to have at least a small sense 
of the "bliss" that it was to be alive in the 1920's, if not in 
Dubuque, at least in Paris. That book is a primary exam­
ple of the practice of making literature out of the weak­
nesses of others (perhaps the nastiest and the most effec­
tive of all literary exploitations of the roman a clef misde­
meanor). It shows Hemingway in the years before he was 
internationally known, living in Paris, on la rive gauche, 
getting along on very little, loving when there wasn't 
money enough for any other pleasures, sitting alone in a 
cafe through an afternoon and writing a story, "Up in 
Michigan." This was Hemingway, the ur-expatriate, to 
whom living in Europe was a thing you thought naturally 
good, because "Soldier's Home" (that is, the normality to 
6
 For a discussion of this term, see my The Twenties (New York, 
1955), pp. x-xii. 
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which the soldier found he had to return) just wasn't inter­
esting after the war. 
Like other major conditions of the postwar world, expa­
triation had its superficial, as it had its complex, moments. 
There were many American novels that described expatria­
tion superficially, or exploited it for its nuisance value. As 
the grand gesture of renunciation, the act of leaving the 
United States for Paris had its dramatic values, and in 
the fiction of the time the gesture had a value equivalent to 
that attached to the act of leaving Split Lip, Kansas, for 
Greenwich Village. The eastward movement, as a gesture 
reversing Horace Greeley's directions, was toward New 
York and eventually toward Europe. The great American 
expatriates were T. S. Eliot, Gertrude Stein, and Ezra 
Pound; none of these wrote a novel to dramatize his experi­
ence, though all of them applied themselves to its varieties 
of emotional experience. Early poems of Pound (Hugh 
Selwyn Mauberley, for example) and Eliot are often effec­
tively critical of both the United States and Europe. Glen-
way Wescott's stories, in Goodbye, Wisconsin (1928), also 
dramatize the need to move away from home to the East 
and to Europe. In any event, by the mid-1920's the offices 
of Paris' little magazines (Ford Madox Ford's Transatlantic 
Review, Pound's Exile, Jolas' Transition, and the recently 
arrived Little Review of Margaret Anderson and Jane Heap 
were among the best) were trying, in their art, to come to 
terms with Pierre, Des Moines, Eau Claire, or East Saint 
Louis. 
Much of the best American fiction of the decade was 
written in Europe: the most American of them all, The 
Great Gatsby and Glenway Wescott's The Grandmothers, 
(1927), were written in southern France; Louis Bromfield 
spent many of his productive years in France; and of 
course, one of the greatest dowagers of them all, Edith 
Wharton, wrote steadily at her villa, Pavilion Colombe, not 
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far from Paris. These facts do not necessarily suggest that 
they wrote expatriate fiction, though expatriation was cer­
tainly one of the general governing influences in what they 
did write. 
The real expatriate fiction, which explores the meaning 
of cultural dislocation, of cultural difference, in the manner 
of Henry James's Lambert Strether (The Ambassadors, 
1903) setting Woollett, Massachusetts, against Paris, was 
a comparatively rare thing. There are many spoofs of the 
American tourist, by Sinclair Lewis, Donald Ogden Stew­
art, and others. But tourisme is not expatriation; and the 
full emotional and psychological values belonging to a per­
son who has chosen to live outside his country are explored 
only in so complex a book as The Sun Also Rises. 
Here the full impact of postwar deprivation is seen. The 
characters are nervously aware of their expatriation, as 
well as of the reasons why they should be separated from 
their own countries. On a few occasions they try to enun­
ciate forms of moral order, but none of these seems to be 
quite appropriate or suitable. Robert Cohn, who is most 
anxious to define himself in terms of a culture, is considered 
hopelessly romantic by Jake Barnes and a nuisance by 
others. There is something to be said for Cohn as a gadfly, 
a character whose unpleasant task it is to point out the 
weaknesses of others. But mostly, the worlds of Paris and 
Pamplona that the novel describes demand moral improvi­
sation, "grace under pressure," and a day-to-day adjust­
ment to circumstance. 
There are many aches and pains in the novel, but the 
major ache comes from an absence suffered by everyone, 
even by Cohn: the absence of standards that can be trusted, 
securities that won't be momentarily upset, assurances that 
are worthy of more than a second's span of attention. 
Because of these failures, the major emphasis in The Sun 
Also Rises is upon a quiet-acceptance world, best repre­
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sented by the fishing trip in the mountains at Burguete. But 
there is still a more important modus Vivendi, the bullfight, 
which (even though it is largely a spectatorial sport, as the 
Mass is a spectatorial art-form) imposes a discipline upon 
an artificial set of circumstances that are nevertheless 
dangerous and will end in death. 
Hemingway is careful not to make a moral expedient of 
the bullfight. It is true that nothing is accomplished or 
decided in The Sun Also Rises; the characters do not emerge 
from their experience reformed, or even much advanced 
over their earlier conditions. The early view of a novel as 
developmental gives way here to the idea of it as static, at 
best describing a series of scenes in which groups of per­
sons are involved and in which they behave as they can. 
Hemingway's novel is not so much a series of actions as it 
is a non-literary ballet. The fact of its curiously quiet and 
static world makes The Sun Also Rises a quite admirable 
dramatization of its title; for it is true that "One generation 
passeth away, and another generation cometh: but the 
earth abideth forever.  " 6 Principally, the novel seems 
to advise patience and resignation to a situation that, while 
not intolerable, is nevertheless vexing and abnormal. 
Nowhere else has the full significance of expatriation 
been explored. And, of course, by implication and by direct 
reference, the fact of World War I stands as one of the 
primary causes. The fiction of the Jazz Age is in many 
ways a postwar fiction. Some of it, of course, is about the 
war experience, an engagement of great importance and 
the most significant of American military involvements 
since the Civil War. Much has been said, and more will be 
said, about the two principal war fictions. It is true that 
6
 Quotation from Ecclesiastes 1:4, used as part of the epigraph 
of The Sun Also Rises. 
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many of the novelists who wrote about World War II were 
conscious of the great master, Hemingway, and tried to 
emulate his successes. But the fact is that the experience of 
World War I was far more innocent than that of the second 
war. This is true because an ideology intervened between 
the two wars, and a great racial scandal engaged the full 
moral attention of the new writers. That is, in the 1930's 
writers were (or most of them were) taught the validity 
and the "saving qualities" of Marxism. It was a powerful 
incentive and a great comfort. As for the "racial scandal," 
few American writers lacked a sense of both dedication and 
horror in their description of the Nazi enemy; the antago­
nist was both more powerful and more loathsome than he 
was in World War I. The literature of World War II is 
scarcely innocent, though some of it (Harry Brown's novel 
A Walk in the Sun, 1946, for example) is neatly reductive 
and seems to be about nothing but the scene of the fighting. 
In the views of Hemingway, Dos Passos (One Man's 
Initiation, 1920, and Three Soldiers, 1921), Laurence Stall­
ings (Plumes, 1924), E. E. Cummings (The Enormous 
Room, 1922), and Thomas Boyd (Through the Wheat, 
1923), the experience of World War I is represented by the 
innocent soldier's meeting head-on with violence, finding no 
appropriate terms in which to describe it, and reacting 
finally to it by means of a "separate peace," an actual or an 
implied desertion of its allies. 
This sense of an enforced separation from the "side of 
the angels" (Edith Wharton's great bastion of Western 
civilization) is in a real way associated with the figure of 
exile; the war is, genuinely, a source of exile, since it forces 
its hero into a state of isolation from which he finds it diffi­
cult to recover. In all of the novels I have mentioned above, 
the essential result is a withdrawal into one or another 
kind of personal relationship from the large, confused dis­
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organization that war forces upon a man. The love of Lieu­
tenant Frederic Henry for Catherine Barkley is notoriously 
an example of this disengagement. Of course, Hemingway 
makes it clear that love is a false alternative to war, 
whether through Rinaldi's fear of venereal disease or be­
cause of the death of Catherine in childbirth. Henry does 
momentarily feel that "We could feel alone when we were 
together, alone against the others." 7 But this is only a tem­
porary sense of security. In the end he tries to find himself 
once again in the figure of the dead Catherine, but 
it wasn't any good. It was like saying good-by to a statue. 
After a wihle I went out and left the hospital and walked back 
to the hotel in the rain (p. 355). 
The gesture of resignation, which is also assumed in the 
behavior of Jake Barnes in The Sun Also Rises, marks the 
end of innocence, or sentimentality, or romantic self-
reliance, call it what you will. It is a considerable advance 
over Huckleberry Finn's gesture of defiance (when he says, 
of the question of returning Jim to his owners, all right, 
then, I will go to hell) ; that is, it is an advance in the recog­
nition of the futility of human decisions. The grand, heroic 
act of making our own moral decisions and abiding by them, 
which is a strong part of our cultural inheritance, is here 
(and in many war novels of the decade) set aside by a cir­
cumstance that is beyond the human will to contain. Therein 
lies the strength of A Farewell to Arms: its having sug­
gested a limit to the grand Emersonian gesture; not that 
the earlier naturalists had not already sounded such a note, 
but that they had done it crudely for the most part, whereas 
Hemingway put the stamp of the master stylist upon it, the 
man of strong and controlled feeling. 
i A Farewell to Arms (New York, 1929), p. 266. 
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If the 1920's are to be seen clearly, they must also be 
understood as a time that was heartily despised by some of 
those living in it. Henry James never got beyond the second 
year of the war, but he had been sensitively aware of the 
several cracks in the wall, which he described in The Prin­
cess Casamassima (1886). It was up to several of his most 
devoted imitators—Willa Cather and Ellen Glasgow, among 
them—who survived the war to go on and speak with 
amazed incredulity of the postwar world. "The world broke 
in two in 1922 or thereabouts." 8 Miss Cather said in 1936, 
when she was sixty years old; and she did little to try to 
repair the damage. 
It is not because Miss Cather was a "traditionalist" that 
I select her work as an illustration of this aspect of the 
1920's. There were better, or more confirmed, traditionalists 
than she: John Crowe Ransom, Allen Tate, and Humanists 
like Paul Elmer More and Irving Babbitt, who hated the 
principal lines of modernism and made a literature from 
alternative proposals. But, except for Tate's The Fathers 
(1938), no fiction was written by them. 
The Professor's House is designed to describe the two 
worlds that emerged from the "break" in 1922 "or there­
abouts." Typically, Professor St. Peter is a student of his­
tory, of the past; he prefers staying in the old house, where 
his study is in the attic, to going to the vulgar new one, 
paid for by the exploitation of an invention inherited from 
Tom Outland (the symbolism of the names is almost too 
obvious), one of his favorite students who had died in the 
war. Miss Cather had also written a war novel, One of Ours 
(1922), but she did not go the way of Edith Wharton, who, 
in A Son at the Front (1923) and elsewhere, came out quite 
frankly in favor of civilization and "proper art." Never­
theless, The Professor's House is an object lesson in the 
8 Prefatory Note in Not Under Forty (New York, 1936). 
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matching of past against present. It is here that the pro­
fessor is rescued from what appears very close to a willed 
death, though it is not a suicide, and that he does even­
tually come to the new house. But his final acts are simply 
and undramatically empty gestures. 
The Professor's House is a representative organization of 
a number of attitudes and dispositions found in the writers 
of the 1920's. The effort to comprehend what Mrs. Wharton 
once called "this after-war welter" 9 became increasingly 
difficult to those whose art had been fashioned before the 
world broke in two. The world of the 1920's—the first real 
decade of the twentieth century—required a new form; and 
it was provided by Hemingway in fiction, and in poetry by 
Pound, Eliot, and Hart Crane. Miss Cather's novel drama­
tized the nostalgia for the past, for the non-violence and 
the comprehensibility of the pre-World War I past. She 
also had the sense to admit that such nostalgia was not 
altogether useful, though it might be understandable and 
even, in some cases, pardonable. 
No review of 1920's fiction is complete without attention 
to Sinclair Lewis.—not because he was a great novelist but 
because his works belong to a great American tradition of 
journalistic debunking. Lewis' fiction corresponds to the 
world of H. L. Mencken's essays on the middle-middle class 
and of his collections of absurdities in the monthly Ameri­
cana section of the Mercury. The style of both of them is 
a matter of rearranging fragments and shards of what is 
actually historical truth into such a pattern that they add up 
to absurdity. This is the art of parody, of literary caricature, 
9 In A Backward Glance (New York, 1934), p. 362, she says of 
the postwar scene: "The war was over, and we thought we were 
returning to the world we had so abruptly passed out of four years 
earlier. Perhaps it was as well that, at first, we were sustained by 
that illusion." 
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in which a small excess becomes a large excess through 
overemphasis. 
The style of Babbitt (1922), Elmer Gantry (1927), and 
The Man Who Knew Coolidge (1928) features exaggera­
tion. Almost anyone can recognize a portion of actuality in 
any given incident; as, indeed, anyone can recognize that 
Mencken's quotations in "Americana" are really quota­
tions and not fakes. There is, in spite of evidence to the 
contrary, a tenderness in his treatment of Babbitt (though 
Elmer Gantry is handled viciously enough) that makes one 
always suspect sympathy rather than scorn. And this is 
what we have had for a comic tradition in the United 
States—journalistic parody, caricature, the "soft-hearted 
absurd," the clown who is a victim—of Babbitt, Robert 
Benchley, W. C. Fields, et al., in typically absurd situations. 
It is a comedy of the small person: Babbitt, when he 
endures the outraged sneers of his contemporaries, is no 
larger than Charlie Chaplin in a typical clown-victim scene. 
Of course, Lewis cannot maintain the pressure. Eventu­
ally, his novels give way to sentimentality; and the hero of 
Dodsworth (1929) becomes a "good man" in the Jimmy 
Stewart—or, perhaps better, the Cary Grant—tradition. 
Eventually, the typical American comedy became that of 
the violent snafu, of Joseph Heller's Catch-22 (1961). But 
in the 1920's it was a comedy in which the artist was linked 
to his victim by bonds of sympathy; essentially, it is the 
patter and scene of the vaudeville situation, invested with 
as much self-mockery as its victim can sustain and still 
survive. 
The fiction of the 1920's is sufficiently varied to resist any 
easy definitions. Surely the phrase "The Jazz Age" applies 
to only a small part of it; nothing could be further from 
the tone that phrase suggests than the work of Willa 
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Cather, Edith Wharton, Ellen Glasgow, and Ernest Hem­
ingway. In many ways these novelists penetrated beneath 
the surface reality that any catch-phrase suggests; and— 
at least in the first three cases—their origins were in the 
past. 
Nevertheless, it is time that a certain American fiction 
is justified as peculiarly the result of conditions set up by 
the postwar situation and encouraged by a social ease and 
an apparent prosperity. That this time should once more be 
the subject of a number of analyses testifies, not necessarily 
to the strength of the literature itself, but to the hardiness 
and energy of our continuing interest in it. The 1920's are 
the true sign of beginnings in our own century. 
However naive some of the attitudes and poses may now 
seem to us in subsequent phases and currents of experience 
to have been, they have become the models of twentieth-
century behavior. This may be either a hateful or an admir­
able fact; I have no interest in deciding which. The truth 
is that the Victorian sentiment had gone as far as it could 
by 1914, and the events since then have demanded basic 
changes, which our literary artists have been the first to 
describe and define for us. It is indispensable to a culture 
that its arts formalize the moral and social positions that 
we ultimately hope to assume ourselves. The complexity 
and depth of Jazz Age fiction are valuable because, from 
them, we have reached the position, the attitudes toward 
modern reality, that it is now possible for us to take. That 
is, we are perhaps two decades behind the aesthetic "law­
givers"; that rebellion often (surely not always) becomes 
our established world. This is to assume that they rebel 
intelligently against something that is not intelligent. Much 
of the nostalgia about the 1920's comes from the fact that 
some writers in the decade were both free and sensible, 
though they may not have seemed to be either in their time. 
The Revolution in Morals 
GILMAN M. OSTRANDER 
ALTHOUGH the United States had emerged by the opening 
of the twentieth century as the industrial colossus of the 
world, American society was still predominantly a rural 
and small-town society. Two-thirds of the American people 
were still living on the farm or in communities of less than 
2,500, deeply rooted in the American past and deeply sus­
picious of the social changes resulting from the industrial 
revolution and the rise of the city. Inevitably they were 
affected by the coming of the railroad and the rise of 
industry, and inevitably they grasped at the resulting oppor­
tunities to improve their economic conditions in revolution­
ary ways. Religion and the moral order, however, were 
based upon changeless principles and were not to be affected 
by changes in the economy. 
Righteous villagers and farmers were convinced that 
theirs was the society that most closely conformed to the 
laws of God and that theirs was no less than the mission 
to save America from the challenges of the modern world. 
How this American majority wished to train future gen­
erations to carry out their moral mission is to be found 
in the McGuffey School Readers, one hundred million of 
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which were sold during the course of the second half of 
the nineteenth century. In these readers, as Lewis Atherton 
has pointed out, there was no notice given of the coming of 
the railroad or of the rise of the city, although these books 
were used in city schools as well as by farmers' children. 
They concerned themselves with village life and farming and 
with the religious and moral precepts to be derived from 
that environment. A firm assumption upon which they 
were written was that America was a Protestant common­
wealth, and that it was the foremost duty of American 
schools to inculcate true religious principles in the minds 
of their pupils:1 
A little child who loves to pray.

And read his Bible too,

Shall rise above the sky one day,

And sing as angels do;

Shall live in Heaven, that world above,

Where all is joy, and peace, and love.

The pupil was taught that his admission to heaven required, 
in addition to Bible-reading, abstention from alcohol and 
tobacco as well as from those practices specifically pro­
scribed by scriptures. The sages and patriots of America's 
past had followed these precepts, he was told, and their 
good conduct had made possible the establishment of the 
great American republic; continuing good conduct was a 
necessary condition for its perpetuation. 
Social activity in small-town America of 1900 was church-
centered, probably to as great a degree as had been the 
case a half-century earlier, and church members continued 
to be zealous brothers' keepers. Churches earnestly pursued 
1
 Lewis Atherton, Main Street on the Middle Border (Bloomington,
Ind., 1954), p. 69. This discussion of rural social and religious life is
based largely on Atherton, Main Street, Chapter III. 
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the task of disciplining erring members with punishments 
ranging from public rebuke to excommunication. It was the 
unquestioned conviction of every sincere member of an 
evangelical church that everything that happened in the 
universe occurred according to the purposes of God. This 
belief in the providential significance of everyday happen­
ings was akin to the seventeenth-century Puritan belief in 
the religious significance of portents. God's ways were in­
scrutable, as when he took away little babies or virtuous 
persons who were engaged in useful work; the only human 
recourse in the face of these mysteries was faith and 
prayer. Church congregations prayed for rain as the Indians 
had before them and then accepted whatever followed 
as being in accordance with the specific intentions of a 
personal God. 
To the extent that American society was farm-centered, 
it was also family-centered. The family was a self-contained 
economic unit in a way that was not possible in the city. 
Where children in the city might become economic liabilities, 
they remained economic assets on the farm, and relatively 
large families continued to be the rule. There was ample 
biblical authority to establish the father as the undisputed 
patriarch of the family, and his authority was no more to 
be questioned by his wife than it was to be questioned by 
his children while they remained in his house. 
Courtship in rural and small-town America took place at 
church socials, picnics, and dances, often without being 
very much chaperoned, and generally—from the perhaps 
dubious evidence of many reminiscences—in an atmosphere 
of bucolic innocence. Girls were taught as early as possible 
that marriage was their destiny and that only nice girls 
were in a position to marry advantageously. The rule was 
not so rigid so far as boys were concerned, but they were 
taught to distinguish between the nice girls and the others 
and to conduct themselves accordingly. 
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They were, however, two sides to the track in small-town 
America. Saloons were beginning to be voted out of these 
communities by 1900, but not much had as yet been done 
along this line. They were still frequented during the day 
by respected men in the community and at night, especially 
Saturday night, by a rowdier element. Farm laborers, who 
did not stay long in any one community, got drunk regularly 
on Saturday night and brawled in the streets, along with 
disreputable native sons. Local sons who went to the dogs 
generally saw their advantage in leaving town for good, 
but if they remained, some sort of place would still be 
found for them in the disapproving community, for they 
were permanently entitled to some sort of status by right 
of birth. 
For that matter, so long as a man did not make a public 
spectacle of himself, he could get away with a good deal 
of "fooling around" and still retain a decent place in society. 
The small towns had their own red-light districts, just as 
the big cities did. Muncie, Indiana, the city that was the 
basis for Robert and Helen Lynd's Middletown, supported 
in 1890, with a permanent population of about 6,000, be­
tween twenty and twenty-five houses of prostitution, each 
of which employed from four to eight girls.2 There was 
always gossip about what went on between, say, the super­
intendent of schools and the new teacher, and much of this 
gossip was fairly readily verifiable. This sort of thing was 
expected and looked for. Men would always be what they 
always had been. Young women were taught that sex in 
marriage was a necessary evil and that prostitution was a 
necessary evil. The distinction between sexual intercourse 
within marriage and prostitution was therefore not abso­
lute. Under these circumstances, the important thing for 
2 Middletown (New York, 1929), p. 113. 
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men who could not control themselves was that they observe 
the outward forms of respectability.3 
Even disregarding these inevitable moral failures that 
occurred in every community, there did not exist the moral 
consensus in small-town America that the upright would 
have liked to have seen. For one thing, these communities 
had not altogether escaped the social impact of nineteenth-
century immigration, even though the immigrants had con­
centrated themselves in the larger cities. These smaller 
communities had their Irish and Italians and Greeks and 
Poles and even Chinese, and they were likely to have their 
Germans in considerable numbers. Among these, the 
Germans were looked upon as the most respectable—good 
farmers and hard workers who had arrived in the com­
munity with a sufficient competence to acquire land or buy 
a store and establish themselves on a solid economic basis. 
The trouble with the Germans was that they persisted in 
customs alien to the community. They organized their 
Turnvereins and sang loudly and drank beer flagrantly. 
Other national groups indulged in other peculiar customs.4 
There remained at least one further element disturbing 
to Main Street orthodoxy. Economic ruling groups developed 
—the prosperous lawyers, bankers, merchants, and large-
scale farmers—who tended to remove themselves from the 
community in some ways and to live according to a some­
what different set of moral precepts. It was quite in char­
acter for the scion of a good family to leave the Methodist 
3
 Oscar Handlin, Race and Nationality in American Life (Boston, 
1957). Chapter VI discusses late nineteenth-century medical ideas 
relating to sex.
4
 John Higham, Strangers in the Land (New Brunswick, N.J., 
1955). Merle Curti, in The Making of an American Community (Stan­
ford, 1959), concludes that alien ethnic groups were fairly well 
absorbed into the community, on the basis of an extremely intensive 
study of Trempealeau County, Wisconsin. 
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or Baptist church for the Episcopalian, where the doctrine 
of original sin was not rightly understood and where a 
latitudianarian view was taken of moral conduct. These 
people took trips to Chicago and to New York and perhaps 
even to London and Paris, and they tended to conform to 
the standards of the big city as against the traditional 
values of America. Their conduct was somewhat disturbing 
to Main Street orthodoxy in 1900, as was the Gemiitlichkeit 
and Catholicism of the otherwise proper, prosperous 
German-American burghers, not to speak of what went on 
across the railroad tracks. Still, these towns and surround­
ing farms were fundamentally wholesome, God-fearing 
communities, and still able to view themselves as compris­
ing the backbone of the nation and the best hope for 
its salvation. 
Many men and women in the cities also feared God and 
lived upright lives, but for them it took much more money 
to do it conveniently than was the case with their country 
cousins. In 1900 there were three American cities with 
populations in excess of one million—New York leading, of 
course, with 3.4 million people—and 36 cities with 100,000 
inhabitants or more. Virtually all of these possessed their 
roaring red-light districts and their crowded ghettos. The 
growth of even the smaller cities resulted in overcrowded 
conditions in tenement areas and worked to depress wages 
and living conditions generally. Religion was virtually out 
of the reach of many in America's slums, whereas the bar­
room and the brothel were right next door. According to 
Jacob Riis's count, there were, below New York's Fourteenth 
Street, 4,065 saloons to 111 places of worship of all kinds. 
Organized neighborhood gangs, in common with the saloons 
did much to establish the social order in slum areas. "The 
gang," Riis wrote, "is the ripe fruit of tenement house 
growth. Its gangs are made up of the American born 
sons of English, Irish, and German parents. The 
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assimilation of Europe's oppressed hordes, upon which our 
Fourth of July orators are fond of dwelling, is perfect. The 
product is our own." 5 
It was not so viewed by most middle- and upper-class 
Americans, however. The teachings of scientific philanthro­
pists and social gospelers notwithstanding, the slum-dwell­
ers were still looked upon as savages beyond the pale, the 
degraded classes against which upright America must de­
fend itself. The conscience of progressive America was 
stirred by the condition of these unfortunates, but it did 
not really sympathize with them. The staunch progressive, 
determined to make America a better nation for his children 
to live in, was apt not to notice the plight of the Irish or 
Italian upstairs maid living on a wage of a few dollars a 
week.6 It was this progressive representative of the com­
fortable classes who set the dominant moral tone in the 
cities in the early twentieth century. And when the younger 
generation kicked over the traces, it was the children of the 
respectable upper-middle classes, rather than those from 
the slum areas, who led the nation as a whole into the new 
age of moral freedom. 
Wealth leads to temptation, just as poverty does; but 
wealthy Americans at the turn of the century did not sup­
pose, in theory at least, that great wealth exempted one 
from the normal standards of moral conduct. Lavish dis­
play of wealth was the hallmark of society among the 
plutocrats. A hundred or more servants were maintained by 
the very rich to service lavish mansions, and the struggle 
was unremitting to keep up with the Vanderbilts. Those 
who could afford to do so built palatial "cottages" at New­
port and gave parties the costs of which ran into six figures. 
But this social life, though vulgar, was intended to be 
5
 Jacob Riis, How the Other Half Lives (American Century ed., 
New York, 1957), pp. 158, 164. 
9
 Lucy Salmon, Domestic Service (New York and London, 1901). 
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thoroughly decorous. The chaperone was omnipresent at 
the upper-class social gatherings of young people. Wrote one 
New York gentleman, "Even when I was thirty years old, 
if I had asked a girl to dine with me alone, I would have 
been kicked down her front steps. If I had offered her a 
cocktail, I would have been tossed out of Society for my 
boorish effrontery." 7 
Behind this Victorian fagade, however, a lot of things 
were going on, if one is to lend the least credence to the 
gossip column of the popular New York weekly magazine 
Town Topics. Week after week the "Saunterer" in Town 
Topics reveled in tales of high society adultery, incest, 
illegitimacy, abortion, transvestism, and nymphomania, 
giving broad clues as to the participants and sometimes 
coming right out and naming names. It may be doubted 
that Saunterer's charges were all accurate, but it may not 
be doubted that high society enjoyed them thoroughly. It 
would not do to be caught reading the magazine, but the 
Saunterer was avidly followed by the social set. According 
to the son of etiquette authority Emily Post, Town Topics 
"found its way into almost every cottage in Tuxedo Park, 
as it did into the cottages, villas, and mansions at Newport. 
It was read upstairs, downstairs, and backstairs." 8 Amer­
ican high society was characterized both by an impossibly 
strict moral code and by a blatant and pervasive prurience. 
Protestant middle- and upper-middle-class New Yorkers, 
living decent, orderly lives in substantial brownstone houses, 
represented a rather small minority of the population; but, 
more than any other element in the city, they represented 
traditional Bible-guided, family-centered America. They had 
reason to disapprove on moral grounds of high life in 
Tuxedo Park, just as they had reason to disapprove of the 
f Frederick Lewis Allen, The Big Change (New York, 1952), p. 11. 
 Andy Logan, "That Was New York," New Yorker, Aug. 14, 
1965, p. 55, in an article that deals extensively with Town Topics. 
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morals of Mulberry Bend. In the worlds of business and 
politics they had reason to fear for an America threatened 
by socialism from below and plutocracy from above. There­
fore, in the opening years of the twentieth century, in 
common with middle-class Americans throughout the 
nation, they joined in the progressive movement to restore 
the nation to moral order as well as to true republican 
principles. 
In somewhat uneasy alliance with progressivism in most 
parts of the nation were the prohibitionists, working 
through most of the Protestant churches of the nation 
under the direction of the Anti-Saloon League. In con­
trast to the progressives, the prohibitionists were rural-
oriented and literalistic in religion. Prohibitionists were 
persuaded that the single greatest obstacle to the regenera­
tion of society was the drink evil and that with prohibition 
the way would be prepared in one stroke for that regen­
eration. By the time of the triumph of Prohibition, however, 
the forces in support of it had already ceased to represent 
the national consensus, and probably its ratification was 
made possible only by the fact that rural native America 
enjoyed a disproportionate representation in the state legis­
latures that ratified it. A revolt had already broken out in 
America against this provincial moralism, and Prohibition 
served only to feed the fires of this revolt in the twenties. 
Even while evangelism and moral reform reverberated 
throughout the nation in the opening years of the twentieth 
century, silent dissent from established religious belief was 
taking place widely, and native American intellectuals were 
beginning to attack openly and rudely the most cherished 
of American assumptions. "The present age is a critical one 
and interesting to live in," wrote the philosopher George 
Santayana during the high noon of progressivism and pro­
hibitionism. "The civilization characteristic of Christendom 
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has not yet disappeared, yet another civilization has begun 
to take its place." 9 America was indeed at an Armageddon 
of sorts, and in the battle that took place the forces of 
nativist, moralistic Protestant orthodoxy, at the moment 
of apparent victory, went down to crashing defeat. 
As is true of all major revolutions, the American 
revolution against traditional morals was led by intellect­
uals. Darwin's Origin of Species, appearing in 1859, had 
touched off a debate immediately in America, despite the 
distractions of the sectional controversy and the Civil War. 
The war, itself, had served as a catastrophic repudiation of 
optimistic American asumptions, and, at the same time, it 
had served as a national demonstration of the working out 
of the law of survival of the fittest. Amid the great debate 
over Darwin, evolutionary biology appears early to have 
become widely and easily accepted in America, at least in 
the northern urban areas, many jokes and allusions being 
bandied about concerning ape men and missing links. It 
soon established itself in the curriculum of all but the most 
fundamentalist northern colleges, and by the opening of 
the twentieth century it was part of the intellectual equip­
ment of most college-educated Americans. Belief in evolu­
tion logically necessitated abandonment of biblical literalism 
and abandonment also of belief in man as specially created 
by God. Some ministers and scientists attempted systemati­
cally to reconcile evolution with the existence of an immortal 
soul in man, without much success. Many people were not 
to be talked out of their immortal souls, even while accepting 
evolutionary biology, but the basis for faith had been 
weakened.10 
Evolutionary theory was even more shattering to 
traditional beliefs in its destruction of the changeless 
9
 Henry May, The End of American Innocence (New York, 1959), 
prefatory quotation. 
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 Stow Persons, "Evolution and Theology in America," in Stow 
Persons (ed.), Evolutionary Thought in America (New Haven, 1950). 
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Newtonian universe, operating according to immutable 
laws, including immutable moral laws. This new concept 
revolutionized thinking in philosophy and in the social 
sciences, but it was in literature that it most vividly dem­
onstrated its destructive power so far as the traditional 
moral order was concerned. A school of literary naturalists 
emerged in America at the close of the nineteenth century. 
Crane, Norris, Dreiser, and London differed greatly in con­
tent and style, but they were united by a common assump­
tion. The universe was a mindless movement of forces, 
providing no objective basis for a fixed moral law. Man 
struggled in this universe as did other animals, and the 
course of his life was determined for him by forces over 
which he had little control. Like other animals, he was the 
product of his instincts and his environment. 
This deterministic and relativistic view of man and the 
Godless universe had come to be generally accepted by 
American intellectuals a generation before Walter Lipp­
mann lamented in 1929, quoting Aristophanes, that "Whirl 
is King, having driven out Zeus." n In 1922 there appeared 
a collection of writings by American intellectuals, edited by 
Harold Stearns, on Civilization in the United States. This 
collection failed to include an article on religion among 
the thirty topics selected. The editor felt obliged to com­
ment on the omission in his preface. "The bald truth is," 
he wrote, "it has been next to impossible to get any one 
to write on the subject; most of the people I approached 
shied off. 
Almost unanimously, when I did manage to procure an opinion 
from them, they said that real religious feeling in America had 
disappeared, that the church had become a purely social and 
political institution, that the country is in the grip of what 
 Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Morals (New York, 1929), 
prefatory quotation. 
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Anatole Prance has aptly called Protestant clericalism, and that, 
finally, they weren't interested in the topic. 
He noted, however, that the subject had not been altogether 
neglected, being discussed in the essay on "Philosophy" 
and again in the one on "Nerves." 12 
The beginnings of what Henry May has called the end 
of American innocence can be at least faintly discerned 
during the closing years of the nineteenth century. Thomas 
Beer named the 1890's the Mauve Decade, deriving his title 
from Whistler's definition of mauve as "pink trying to be 
purple." "The Americans of the '90's," Beer wrote, "achieved 
a frame of mind that was apparent even to small boys; 
when the ladies said 'actress,' they meant something else." 
The decade became a little more liberal in conversation and 
in print. "whore," came from its covert once or twice, 
rendered as "w ," which deceived nobody but gave everybody 
a sense of daring. Children were told that it stood for "where" 
and didn't believe it.13 
American intellectuals were becoming increasingly self-
conscious about American provincialism in morals as in 
other areas. The decadence of Swinburne and Oscar Wilde 
appealed to some of them, and the amoral and anti-Christian 
philosophy of Nietzsche gained an American following. De­
cadent little magazines made their fleeting appearances: the 
Chapbook in Chicago, the Lark in San Francisco and M'lle 
in New York.14 Most successful among such magazines was 
the Smart Set, which came under the editorship of H. L. 
Mencken and George Jean Nathan in 1914. By that time 
 Harold Stearns (ed.), Civilization in the United States (New 
York, 1922), pp. v-vi. 
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American intellectual amoralists had established their 
capital in Greenwich Village and had found their prophet 
in Sigmund Freud. 
Freud's American influence dates from his visit to the 
United States in 1909 to deliver a series of lectures at Clark 
University. He later commented in surprise on how warmly 
he had been received in "prudish America." American in­
tellectuals flocked to Freudianism before his writings had 
been translated into English and therefore before most of 
them could have gained any real understanding of his ideas. 
For them Darwin had already served to demolish the world 
of orthodox American Protestantism. For many of them 
Freud introduced a system that provided the basis for an 
entirely new morality, or perhaps a sanctioned immorality. 
Outside Greenwich Village, Freud was taken seriously also, 
and sex ceased to be taboo as a subject for discussion in 
educated mixed groups. 
By the 1920's Freudian terminology had entered the 
American vocabulary: id, ego, superego, repression, com­
plex, psychoanalysis, Freudian slip. Sexual restraint, which 
had been accepted as basic to social stability, was now 
blamed for virtually all the ills that society suffered. 
Freudian psychology was a much more titillating subject 
than Darwinian evolution, and borrowings from it were 
soon evident in motion pictures and popular literature, 
as well as in the works of the critically acclaimed writers. 
It soon was influencing millions of Americans who had 
hardly heard of Sigmund Freud. In the academic world 
opposition to Freud was mounting, but this affected his 
popular influence little.15 
By the outset of the twenties the revolution in morals 
was already virtually complete so far as many American 
 Oscar Cargill, Intellectual America (New York, 1959), Section 
VI, is the most thorough discussion of the impact of Freud on 
American ideas. 
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intellectuals were concerned. Stearns's Civilization in the 
United States shed remarkably little light on the thirty sub­
jects discussed by its authors. Its significance lay in what it 
revealed about the authors themselves. Their articles were 
almost uniformly cynical, shallow, and negative, almost 
blindly opposed to American society and all its moral shib­
boleths. Intellectuals had done little toward drawing plans 
for a new moral order, but destructively they had already 
completed their part of the task. 
Though it was the "lost generation" of intellectuals who 
made articulate the repudiation of the old moral order, it 
was their despised Philistine America that gave body to 
the new concepts in the age of the flapper. The younger 
generation had already started on its way to freedom 
before the war, although it was by no means as far along 
in revolt as were the intellectuals. The most evident symp­
tom was the much-discussed "dance craze," for ragtime 
was in vogue in the northern cities even before the wartime 
closing of the New Orleans brothels sent jazz musicians 
on their way to Chicago and New York. In 1911 Irving 
Berlin had written "Alexander's Ragtime Band," the waltz 
had suddenly faded in popularity, and the dance craze was 
on. There were the Fox Trot, the Horse Trot, the Grizzly 
Bear, and many others. One girl, according to a popular 
song of 1912, declared that "mother said I shouldn't dare/ 
To try and do the grizzly bear," but girls nevertheless did 
try to do it. Of these new dances, the Bunny Hug was 
singled out by critics for special censure.16 
Young women were already divesting themselves of some 
of the clothing their parents had worn. Skirts rose from 
the ground to the ankle, and some undergarments were 
shucked off altogether. The president of the New York 
16
 Mark Sullivan, Our Times (6 vols.; New York, 1926-35), IV, 
242-56. 
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Cotton Exchange announced in 1912 that these changes in 
dress had "reduced consumption of cotton fabrics by at 
least twelve yards of finished goods for each adult female 
inhabitant." 17 By 1915 the evolution of the new American 
woman had advanced sufficiently for H. L. Mencken to 
herald her arrival and bestow upon her the name of flapper. 
Observe, then, this nameless one, this American Flapper. Her 
skirts have just reached her very trim and pretty ankles; her 
hair, newly coiled upon her skull, has just exposed the ravishing 
whiteness of her neck. 
Life, indeed, is almost empty of surprises, mysteries, horrors 
to this Flapper of 1915. She knows exactly what the Was­
sermann reaction is, and has made up her mind that she will 
never marry a man who can't show an unmistakable negative 
is inclined to think that there must be something in this new 
doctrine of free motherhood. She is opposed to the double stan­
dard of morality, and favors a law prohibiting it. .18 
Then the war came for America, with its excitement, 
confusion, social disorientation, and call for service. Several 
million American men and a good many women went over­
seas to England and France. Mademoiselle from Armentiers 
may not have made a lasting impression on most of them, 
but the whole violent disruption of their lives had an endur­
ing effect. On the home front, bands played, lovers said 
good-bye, women went into war work, and everybody knew 
that everything was different and that life must be led 
according to new rules. Then, just as all was started, it 
all stopped. Armistice was declared, the boys came home, 
and a great deal of adrenalin, which was to have been 
used up on the enemy, was expended during the next few 
years domestically. 
" Ibid., IV, 273. 
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There followed a postwar period of disillusionment that 
remained a matter for puzzled comment by foreign observ­
ers, especially as it was reflected in American literature of 
the 1920's. Compared to Europe, America had been lightly 
touched by the war; yet the cynicism arising out of the 
war and its conclusion seemed to be more deeply felt in 
America than in the European nations that the war had 
ravaged. Americans loudly and rudely repudiated the mor­
alistic idealism of the Wilsonian war aims along with the 
moralistic idealism of Wilsonian progressivism. The fight­
ing war had directly touched relatively few Americans, but 
the mood that received its classic expression in Hemingway's 
A Farewell to Arms and The Sun Also Rises was widely 
shared. After the war the flapper almost at once made 
herself the flaming symbol of this cynical spirit. 
Within the space of a half-dozen years, women's skirts 
rose from the ankle to the knee. The number of inches 
between the hemline and the ankle was rightly taken as the 
index of the revolutionary change in morals and manners 
that accompanied and followed the war, and responsible 
elements in the nation moved to check the revolution by 
putting women back into their old clothes. Fashion writers 
warned that the American woman had "lifted her skirts 
beyond any modest limitation," and they decreed that she 
should drop them the next year. The YWCA issued a 
national "Modesty Appeal" and reported that it was getting 
good results. Bills were introduced in the Utah legislature 
fixing skirts at three inches above the ankle and in the 
Virginia legislature fixing necklines to within three inches 
of the upper part of the throat, but the girls went right 
ahead with what they were wearing.19 
 Frederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday (New York, 1931), 
Chapter V, remains the best account of the American flapper and is 
the main basis for this discussion. 
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Some of them took to smoking publicly and conspicuously, 
and proprietors of public places, who would have ejected 
them five years earlier, retreated. Then they were over­
running the speak-easies. The pre-Prohibition saloons had 
been male sanctuaries where primarily beer had been dis­
pensed. In the speak-easies mixed drinking of mixed drinks 
was the rule, the women bellying up to the bar with the 
men, skirts short, stockings rolled below the knees, and 
corsets sometimes checked at the cloak room. Many young 
women who did not frequent the speak-easies nevertheless 
felt obliged to school themselves in social drinking in their 
own homes and in those of their friends. Drinking, formerly 
proscribed for middle- and upper-middle-class women, be­
came, under the pressure of Prohibition, socially mandatory 
in many of those circles. 
The girls were petting also, and the "petting question" 
was anxiously discussed on and on in the ladies' magazines 
and elsewhere. The rule earlier had been that a nice girl 
did not allow a man to kiss her unless they were engaged 
to be married. By the early 1920's the polling of coeds 
showed that fairly indiscriminate petting was the rule. 
When it came to the question of extramarital sexual inter­
course, fewer of these coeds were inclined to give their 
unqualified approval, but that question also was much 
mooted and in a spirit of open-mindedness that was 
frightening to fathers and mothers. 
In sex as in other matters the girls were determined 
to demolish the double standard. They did not approve 
of s society in which men were free to wander back and 
forth across the tracks while women had to choose their 
side and stay there. In this wish they had been abetted by 
progressive reformers and later, during the war, by the 
Navy and War departments, which had fought against the 
red-light districts. The wartime antivice campaign had been 
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highly successful, and thereafter the era of the roaring red-
light district was substantially at an end except in some 
larger cities and some industrial and mining towns.20 
The war opened up unprecendented career opportunities 
to American women, and these opportunities were eagerly 
taken advantage of. In 1900 about one out of five American 
women was gainfully employed, but most of these were 
miserably victimized in sweatshops. Among the better 
people at that time it had been a matter for sorrow and 
concern that a girl one knew was reduced in circumstances 
to the point where she was obliged to take employment as 
a schoolmistress. The war turned the working girl into a 
patriot and opened up many opportunities to her, the single 
most important field being secretarial work. At the war's 
end women fought with some success to retain these posi­
tions and to enter new lines of activity formerly closed 
to them. 
The American housewife was freed for outside activities 
as never before. The tendency in the twenties was to move 
to smaller houses or to apartments, and at the time when 
immigration restriction laws reduced the supply of servants, 
the much more manageable electrical household appliances 
took their place. Throughout American history the number-
one killer of women had been childbearing. Advocates of 
birth control, led by Margaret Sanger, had long fought their 
cause against bitter official and unofficial opposition. Oppo­
sition continued throughout the 1920's, but the average size 
of families declined rapidly during the same period. 
That the emancipated women in the 1920's did not know 
quite where to go with their new freedom was indicated 
 Prostitution in America's major cities is surveyed in great 
detail in a series of books by Herbert Asbury: The Gangs of New 
York (New York and London, 1928), The Barbary Coast (New York, 
1933), The French Quarter (New York and London, 1936), and 
Ge?n of the Prairie (New York and London, 1940). 
20
 341 THE REVOLUTION IN MORALS
in the styles, which combined short skirts and make-up 
with bobbed hair and boyish figures. Nevertheless, the 
flapper was the symbol of the Jazz Age. So far as men 
were concerned, alterations in morals and manners were 
in large measure forced upon them by the new relation­
ship they found themselves in with respect to the new 
American woman. 
The flapper as a type was on the way out even before 
the coming of the depression, giving way to the siren. 
Mothers had followed the fashions set by their daughters 
early in the decade. Then in the late 1920's both mother 
and daughter let their hair grow a little longer and dropped 
the hemline of their skirts five or six inches below the 
knee. They did not do this under social pressure, however; 
by the end of the decade the issues aroused by petting 
and short skirts had ceased to burn brightly, which is to 
say that the women had won that battle. 
By 1930 the United States had become statistically an 
urban nation. More than half of its population was living 
in communities of 2,500 or more, and the automobile had 
made the city readily accessible to the farming regions. 
In almost all of the major cities first- and second-generation 
immigrants still made up a majority of the population. In 
most cities native American Protestants continued to con­
trol business and to set the social tone, but this differed 
from city to city. On the one hand, Boston retained, rather 
desperately, a properly Bostonian air amid the welter of 
newer immigrants. On the other hand, San Francisco's 
ruling class had been made up largely of non-Anglo-Saxons 
since the days of the gold rush, and the personality of the 
city was as cosmopolitan as that of Boston was provincial. 
Like San Francisco, St. Louis and New Orleans had been 
non-Anglo-Saxon in origin and had retained something of 
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their old Gallic flavor, and Cincinnati and Milwaukee con­
tinued to be influenced by their sizeable German popula­
tions. Los Angeles, by extreme contrast, was the most 
Protestant of any sizeable American city, and it was very 
mindful of its heritage of American Puritanism. A booster 
for the city had written that "it is a city of churches and 
schools and civic bodies, deeply interested in the best. The 
type is that of the highest moral and ethical citizenship."21 
Willard Huntington Wright, one-time editor of the Smart 
Set, agreed. The city had been formed, he wrote, by the 
"rural pietist obsessed with the spirit of village fellow­
ship, of suburban respectability. Hypocrisy, like a 
vast fungus, has spread over the city's surface. Los 
Angeles is overrun with militant moralists, connoisseurs of 
sin, experts on biological purity." 22 
In most cities where the non-Protestants outnumbered 
the Protestants, the newer immigrants had been effectively 
segregated into ghettos and kept down by bad wages, and 
their social influence had thereby been minimized. In the 
1920's, however, Congress passed two enactments that, 
in their consequences, did much to reconcile many among 
the older Protestant population to the more recent immi­
grants : the Volstead Act, passed to enforce prohibition, 
and the National Origins Act, passed to limit severely fur­
ther immigration from southern and eastern Europe. 
The National Origins Act of 1924 was illiberal and racist 
in intent, but in its consequences it proved enormously 
beneficial to the recent immigrant groups against whose 
former countrymen it was directed. These recent immi­
grants had formerly been despised and feared by older 
generations of Americans as the vanguard of an endless 
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army of foreign rabble that threatened to subvert American 
society. Following immigration restriction, however, these 
recent immigrants became part of an exclusive American 
community. They came to see themselves in this light, and 
they came increasingly to be so viewed by the older Ameri­
cans. When that happened, there developed a greater 
appreciation for their contributions to American culture, 
and American culture became more cosmopolitan than it 
had formerly been. 
More than anything else it was Prohibition that brought 
many older Americans to the conclusion that these newer 
arrivals were not such bad fellows after all. Drinkers and 
drys alike had supposed that Prohibition, once written 
into the Constitution, would be generally obeyed by a law-
abiding nation, but such proved to be not remotely the case. 
Only during the first year of the experiment was Prohibition 
even moderately successful. Then it absolutely collapsed. 
Systems were perfected for smuggling, moonshining, and 
bootlegging; and soon almost anybody who wanted his 
tipple could obtain it easily, even out in the countryside.23 
The bootleggers and the proprietors of speak-easies were 
drawn mainly from the newer immigrant population, and 
these became minor heroes to the people they served. The 
blustering and ineffectual Anti-Saloon League became an 
object of fun for many Americans, including many who had 
soberly advocated Prohibition in the first place. There 
emerged a distinctly anticlerical sentiment among urban 
middle-class Americans, such as had already been voiced 
by American intellectuals. Thus protected by immigration 
restriction and harassed by Prohibition, middle-class, urban 
Protestant Americans began to blur the distinctions that 
formerly had set them apart in their own minds from the 
newer arrivals. (Some among the newer arrivals who 
23 Charles Merz, The Dry Decade (Garden City, N.Y., 1931). 
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involved themselves in the bootlegging industry, meanwhile, 
took advantage of Prohibition to organize nation-wide 
crime syndicates that have remained a part of the Ameri­
can moral structure ever since.) 
Probably most Americans in the twenties were convinced 
that the chief contribution of the United States to civiliza­
tion lay in the fields of business enterprise and technology, 
and they were not by any means alone in this opinion. Teams 
of experts came from the corners of the earth to see how 
this miracle had been achieved. The Germans coined a word 
for it, Fordismus. In Russia, it was said, Henry Ford was 
honored above all other foreigners. From the coming of the 
Puritans through the rise of democracy, America has always 
had a message for the world. Of all America's messages, 
this materialistic one was the message that has been most 
eagerly received.24 
American intellectuals confused creative achievement in 
the realm of material things with materialism of the spirit. 
They lumped them together and damned them without 
qualification and without a second thought. Other Americans 
took an exalted and idealistic view of their nation's achieve­
ment. What it had accomplished had been no less than the 
democratization of the way of life that in other nations was 
restricted to the privileged few. It had created an affluent 
society and a democratic leisure class. 
In the 1920's millions of Americans became part of the 
carriage trade. The carriage had always been a hallmark of 
gentility (for the American businessman had not invented 
materialism), and in the early years of the century this had 
been true of the automobile, which had been custom-made 
and very expensive. It had been the view of Woodrow 
Wilson that nothing had done more to advance socialism 
in America than the automobile. Henry Ford had had a 
 See George Soule, Prosperity Decade (New York, 1947), for a 
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different idea, however, and in the 1920's millions of 
Americans owned their own mass-produced Model T's, 
which at one point could be purchased for less than $300. 
One of the most startling sights in America, in the view 
of foreign observers, was the factory parking lot filled with 
workmen's cars. 
The American majority was also given the leisure time 
to enjoy its new opportunities. In the nineteenth century 
the working day had commonly been from dawn to dusk, 
six days a week, the seventh day presumably being reserved 
for rest and prayer. The ten-hour day had been the best 
that the worker could hope for. In 1890 the average work 
week was estimated at 60 hours. In 1926 it was estimated 
at 49.8, and Americans at last had time on their hands. Real 
wages had risen substantially in the meantime, so Ameri­
cans had more money in their pockets than ever before. 
What would this do to their morals ? Employers had long 
followed the pious practice of keeping wages down for 
the reason that the added money would simply go down 
the rum hole. Employers had also always defended long 
working hours as the only means of keeping the lower 
classes out of trouble. The 1920's was, among other things, 
the first experiment in the history of modern civilization, 
except during periods of depression, in mass leisure. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the increased time and money, 
instead of debauching the working classes, proved an elevat­
ing influence, at least by the rum-hole standard. Where the 
old saloon had been known as the poor man's club, the speak­
easy's clientele was drawn to a greater extent from the 
middle and upper-middle classes; and intoxication, so far 
as it manifested itself in public, was afflicting "a better 
class than formerly and a much younger class," according 
to the chief supervisor of dance halls in San Francsico.25 
 Martha Bruere, Does Prohibition Work? (New York and Lon­
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What appears to have been the case is that blue-collar 
workers, untrained in the art of leisure, spent most of 
their free time working around the house and yard and 
listening to the radio with their families. Beyond that, 
sports provided them with their chief recreation. Fishing 
and hunting were the two sports in which they themselves 
participated to any great extent. Otherwise they remained 
spectators of baseball, football, boxing, and horse racing. 
They memorized baseball statistics and followed the exploits 
of Red Grange and Babe Ruth. This gave them plenty to 
talk about when they got together in their idle hours, as is 
still the case. 
Public-spirited persons of cultured taste hoped that the 
people would take advantage of their increased leisure by 
doing more reading, and they did. Newspaper circulation 
increased greatly, and in 1919 Bernard McFadden launched 
True Story Magazine, which achieved a circulation of 
almost two million by 1926.26 Asserting that "its foundation 
is the solid rock of truth," it featured such articles as "The 
Primitive Lover," "Her Life Secret," "How to Keep the 
Thrill in Marriage," and "What I Told My Daughter the 
Night before Her Marriage." Women have always made up 
the main reading public in the United States, and the two 
most popular themes for them have always been those of 
religion and seduction. The social developments of the 
twenties did not greatly alter this. To the extent that change 
is to be seen in that era, the change was in the direction of 
a greater interest in literary works. 
The "lost generation" of writers enjoyed thinking of 
themselves as alien to the Philistine American majority. 
Sinclair Lewis, upon receiving the Nobel Prize for Litera­
ture in 1930, delivered an acceptance speech entitled "The 
American Fear of Literature," in which he criticized his 
 Allen, Only Yesterday, p. 71. 26
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fellow Americans for failing to support their creative art­
ists. This was the same Lewis whose Main Street had sold 
more than 400,000 copies in 1920 to rival The Sheik as the 
best-selling book of the year and whose subsequent novels 
had all sold just about as briskly in his native land. Lewis 
had enjoyed greater success than most other serious-minded 
writers. It is, neverthless, true that America in the 1920's 
supported its best writers as it had never done previously. 
Happily, the new technology created new forms of popular 
entertainment at the same time that it created the new 
leisure class. Chief among these were the radio, the phono­
graph, motion pictures, and the automobile. In 1890 theater­
goers in Muncie were limited to the Opera House, where 
performances were irregular. The theater would be dark 
for as much as a month at a time. In 1924 Muncie supported 
nine motion-picture houses, operating daily the year around. 
The western was the staple at five of the theaters, but 
movies with sex appeal drew the largest crowds. Patrons 
were attracted in large numbers to "Alimony—Brilliant 
men, beautiful jazz babies, champagne baths, midnight 
revels, petting parties in the purple dawn, all ending in one 
terrific smashing climax that makes you gasp." Others such 
as Sinners in Silk, Women Who Give, and Rouged Lips 
similarly tried for gasps. Opinions varied widely as to the 
influence these movies exerted on their audiences, composed 
mainly of children and women; but to the extent that they 
were influential, the direction is evident.27 
The impact of the automobile upon morals in America 
was undoubtedly greater than that of the movies and is 
easier to determine. By the end of 1923 there were two cars 
for every three families in Muncie, a good many of the 
car-owners being without bathtubs in their homes. The auto­
mobile had replaced the house as the chief status symbol in 
 Lynd and Lynd, Middletown, p. 266. 27
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the community, and car-owners declared themselves willing 
to go without food or decent clothing rather than give up 
their automobiles.28 
One of the revolutionary results of the automobile was 
the institution of instalment buying, which established 
itself in the twenties. The traditional American virtue of 
thrift was undermined systematically and with great suc­
cess by the advertising companies, and a finance-company 
officer in Muncie estimated that between 75 and 90 per cent 
of automobiles purchased locally were bought on the instal­
ment plan. Living beyond one's means, a sin to previous 
generations, became the thing to do. 
There were those who argued that the automobile served 
to keep the family together by providing a diversion the 
whole family could share together. The opposite opinion, 
however, was the one more frequently expressed. Methods 
of courtship changed. In the days before the automobile, 
courtship might very likely consist of a boy and a girl 
attending a church social and then walking back to the girl's 
house to sit on the sofa and talk to her parents. What the 
automobile did, as Frederick Lewis Allen pointed out, was 
to take that sofa out of the parlor and put it on wheels and 
move it off into the woods. A judge in Muncie declared that 
of thirty girls brought before his court during a year for 
"sex crimes," nineteen had committed their acts in auto­
mobiles. And whether it was used for sex purposes or for 
more conventionally acceptable diversions, the car, and who 
was going to get to use it, became a major source of family 
conflict. 
Cicero in the first century B.C. was worried that the 
younger generation was going to the dogs, and spokesmen 
for the older generation have frequently been of this opinion 
since then. A lot was said to that point by members of the 
Ibid., pp. 235-59, for social impact of the automobile. 28
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older generation in the twenties, and during that decade 
there was much in what they said. It is no doubt true that 
every generation rebels to some extent against its elders, 
and it is also of course true that many young people in 
the twenties did not. The decade of the 1920's, nevertheless, 
remains the watershed in the history of American morals. 
It was the grandmothers of the present generation who 
hiked up their skirts, bobbed their hair, put on lipstick, and 
went out in the car with the boys to the speak-easy to drink 
bootleg liquor and do the Black Bottom. The twenties was 
the decade when there occurred, to some extent in the 
country as well as the city, the urbanization of American 
morals. 

The New Psychology: 
From Narcissism to Social Control 
JOHN CHYNOWETH BURNHAM 
IN 1931 Frederick Lewis Allen in his delightful book Only 
Yesterday synthesized a now familiar picture of the decade 
of the 1920's.2 He characterized as a unit the period that 
began with the end of the Great War and closed with the 
spectacular signals of the onset of the Great Depression. 
Although Allen focused on changes in American life during 
the 1920's, his portrait of those years has left the indelible 
impression that they constituted a unit in terms of both 
public mood and the style of living to which readers of 
middle class and mass media appeared to aspire. 
As historical analysis of the 1920's has proceeded, Allen's 
image of the decade as a unit has become increasingly 
untenable. In spite of the impact of the war and the depres­
sion, the decade now appears to have encompassed a period 
of critical change in American life. Instead of constituting 
a unit, it was a watershed. On one side were the progressive 
years and the rebellion of the intellectuals that began about 
1
 Many thanks are due to colleagues in addition to the editors 
who generously offered suggestions for improving this essay: Paul C. 
Bowers, Hamilton Cravens, Roy Lubove, Gerald D. Nash, John C. 
Rule, and Jack Tager. 
2
 Frederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday: An Informal History of 
the Nineteen-Twentiea (New York, 1931). 
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1912.3 On the other side came a period when spokesmen for 
their generation frankly embraced a mass, bureaucratic 
society and perhaps even the elements of the welfare state. 
Images from Allen's narrative will continue to permeate 
discussions of the Jazz Age, but the new periodization 
gives a more accurate idea of the direction in which 
American history was moving in the first decades of the 
twentieth century. 
During the 1920's one of the most crucial changes 
occurred in precisely the area that Allen depicted most 
effectively: public mood and style of life. The phenomenon 
of the decade that gave the best intellectual representation 
of the change was the "new psychology." The new psychol­
ogy was a popularization of conceptions of the human 
animal and his motives. Although its elements had been 
present since about 1912 or even earlier, only in the 1920's 
did the new psychology become one of the characteristic 
fads of the age and at the same time both symptom and 
cause of critical social change.4 
In the early 1920's the new psychology was of great 
interest because of its relationship to the cult of the self 
in which Jazz Age Americans were caught up. In a remark­
able reversal from an earlier day, social norms produced 
not only self-centered attitudes but self-indulgent behavior. 
To this narcissistic preoccupation the new psychology con­
tributed both the idea of the hidden self, with its many 
3
 Henry F. May, The End of American Innocence: A Study of the 
First Years of Our Own Time, 1912-1917 (New York, 1959); Henry 
F. May, "The Rebellion of the Intellectuals, 1912-1917," American Quarterly, VIII (1956), 114-26; Arthur S. Link, "What Happened 
to the Progressive Movement in the 1920's?", American Historical 
Review, LXIV (1959), 833-51. 
4
 Hornell Hart, "Changing Social Attitudes and Interests,'' in 
President's Research Committee on Social Trends, Recent Social 
Trends in the United States (New York, 1933), I, 395. See also, for 
example, Psychological Review and Journal of Nervous and Mental 
Disease in the 1910's. 
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ramifications, and a rationalization for the self-indulgent 
behavior. 
In the later years of the decade expositors of the new 
psychology became involved in an interest in social control 
that was taking a turn different from an earlier interest 
in the same subject. Because the new psychology provided 
information about the instincts, drives, and wants of men, 
it suggested new ways in which they might be controlled. 
"The belief that we are at last on the track of psychological 
laws for controlling the minds of our fellow men," wrote 
Abram Lipsky in 1925, "has brought about a revolution in 
the popular attitude towards the science that teaches how 
to do it. Out of this change has sprung the universal 
interest in psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, hypnotism, char­
acter-analysis, mob-psychology, salesmanship,—all connot­
ing a technique with which one may control the minds 
of others." B 
THE PHENOMENON 
The book that gave its name to the movement, The New 
Psychology and Its Relation to Life, was written by an Eng­
lishman, A. G. Tansley.6 An earlier generation of Americans 
had known another "new psychology"; indeed, E. W. 
Scripture of Yale had written a book in 1897 bearing that 
title.7 The new psychology of Scripture and his contempo­
raries was an experimental physiological psychology. It 
consisted primarily of exploring the functioning of sensory 
processes in normal adult humans. The new psychology of 
the 1920's represented a revolt against this "dry, academic" 
psychology, and Tansley, for example, meant explicitly by 
the term "new psychology," psychoanalysis. 
5
 Abram Lipsky, Man the Puppet: The Art of Controlling Minds (New York, 1925), p. 11.
6
 London, 1920. 
7
 The New Psychology (London, 1897). 
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Psychoanalysis represented the first of three phases 
through which the new psychology went. After psycho­
analysis came an emphasis on endocrine glands, and after 
the glands, behaviorism. Regardless of its changing face, 
however, there was a distinctive continuity in the new 
psychology. Tansley, for example, recognized that he was 
not speaking of psychoanalysis in any narrow sense; he 
wanted basically to present a " 'biological' view of the 
mind." 8 
Although behaviorism and the glands had, like Freudian­
ism, come into American technical and avant-garde litera­
ture about 1912, psychoanalysis clearly dominated the first 
phase of the new psychology.9 In an incredible number of 
publications the literate public had endless opportunities to 
learn about Freud's psychological theory: the unconscious, 
the psychic censor, repression, the instincts (especially the 
sex instinct), and the psychological mechanisms and sym­
bols by means of which drives can gain indirect expression 
in thought and behavior. Likewise, abnormalities, psychoses 
and neuroses, significant slips of the tongue and pen, the 
curative powers of self-awareness, and various facets of 
psychoanalytic therapy gained publicity. Although the out­
put of more or less popular books and articles on psycho­
analysis was beginning to decline perceptibly by the middle 
1920's, its influence persisted. Attacks, if not so many ex­
positions, continued to appear. The impact of psychoanalytic 
ideas on literature, another index of influence, seemed to be 
cumulative during the decade.10 The later decrease in expo­
sitions of Freud's teachings, in short, reflected their assim­
8
 Tansley, New Psychology, p. 5. 
9
 See, for example, L. L. Thurstone, "Contributions of Freudism to
Psychology," Psychological Review, XXXI (1924), 175. Monroe A. 
Meyer, in Mental Hygiene, IX (1925), 649-50, said that a bookseller 
told him that there were then in print about a hundred "psycho­
analytic works of the more or less introductory type, designed for 
popular consumption." 
10
 See, for example, Frederick J. Hoffman, The Twenties: Ameri­
can Writing in the Postwar Decade (New York, 1955), and W. David 
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ilation into popular thinking. Writers of the new psychology 
representing both glandular and behavioristic points of 
view, as a matter of fact, usually incorporated, and thereby 
perpetuated, psychoanalysis in the new psychology.11 
Competent, professional psychoanalysis was not involved 
in the new psychology. There were a few full-time analysts 
left from before the war, such as A. A. Brill in New York, 
and in the 1920's a small but growing number of young 
physicians took up analysis. Many of them went abroad for 
special training.12 Between them and the denizens of Green­
wich Village and intellectual salons there was considerable 
intercourse, both professional and social, but neither the 
Bohemians nor the analysts were usually involved in the 
flurry of publications about the new psychology. The fact 
is that the specialists, when confronted with popular 
writers' distortions and dilutions of Freud's ideas, usually 
reacted with either silence or agonized protest.13 
Relatively early in the 1920's, a few very active publicists 
established glandular theories of personality as a part of 
the new psychology.14 The shift was quite noticeable, and 
one observer commented at the time on the sudden change: 
Sievers, Freud on Broadway: A History of Psychoanalysis and the 
American Drama (New York, 1955). "Psychoanalytic" (and likewise 
"Freudianism") is, as noted below, used here in the loosest sense, 
as it was in the new psychology. In literature, for example, Jung's 
thinking probably had more influence than strictly Freudian psycho­
analysis. 
11
 See, for example, John B. Watson, Behaviorism (New York, 
1925), pp. 239-40. 
12
 The history of the competent, specialized practice of psycho­
analysis in the United States is a subject in itself and is not taken 
up in the present paper; see C. P. Oberndorf, A History of Psycho­
analysis in America (New York, 1953). 
13
 No attempt is being made in the present essay to explore the 
image of the new psychology in contrast to technical psychoanalysis 
as it existed and was distorted in the 1920's, nor to explore the 
reasons for the distortions. 
14
 For example, Louis Berman, The Glands Regulating Person­
ality: A Study of the Glands of Internal Secretion in Relation to the
Types of Human Nature (New York, 1921). 
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"How swiftly the spotlight of popular interest shifts from 
one part of the stage to another! The eyes of distressed 
humanity turn eagerly toward any quarter that appears to 
promise health and happiness. . Those who recently 
were reading Freud and Jung have now taken up with 
Berman and Harrow. Those who formerly were rushing to 
have complexes extracted are now anxious to have glands 
implanted." 15 
Following the example of a young New York internist, 
Louis Berman, these gland enthusiasts exploited not only 
the established knowledge that gland dysfunction can cause 
certain diseases and severe personality changes but the 
recent work of physiologists who had shown the connection 
between emotion and glandular secretions. The connection 
between libido and the glands was of course well known; 
but gland psychology suggested that one's entire personality 
depended upon the balance of body chemicals. Specific secre­
tions, according to the theory, can produce indolence and 
agitation, depression and megalomania. The public at 
large knew little of the general theory but fed eagerly 
on sensational stories about treatment with gland extract 
and gland transplantation. Even well-informed intellectuals 
took the exaggerated claims of the endocrine enthusiasts 
surprisingly seriously.16 
Relatively late in the decade, the new psychology came 
more and more to emphasize behaviorism. Behaviorism was 
a mechanistic stimulus-response psychology. Behavioral 
investigators, using human and animal subjects alike, 
avoided traditional psychological concepts such as con­
sciousness, cognition, and will. Instead, they carried out 
severely scientific experiments on how organisms in a 
15
 Edwin E. Slosson, "From Complexes to Glands," Scientific 
Monthly, XV (1922), 189. 
16
 See, for example, Lewellys F. Barker (ed.), Endocrinology and 
Metabolism, Presented in Their Scientific and Practical Clinical 
Aspects (New York, 1922), and the mental hygiene and education 
publications of the middle 1920's. 
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carefully controlled environment react to specific stimuli. 
For some years behaviorism had included as a fundamental 
unit of explanation the Pavlovian conditioned reflex. 
Behaviorism had been a serious reform movement within 
professional psychology since 1913. In the 1920's, especially 
after 1925, its founder and chief exponent, John B. Watson, 
who was himself a distinguished experimentalist, had taken 
to publicizing behaviorism flamboyantly. Behaviorism, like 
psychoanalysis, had a number of implications, many of them 
iconoclastic, and generated an intense opposition.17 
The new psychology in all of its phases was a distinctly 
popular phenomenon and was therefore subject to both 
extreme oversimplification and sensationalism. The compe­
tence of its expositors varied, but in popularization even 
the most capable seldom maintained high levels of scientific 
precision. Many were flatly incompetent to present more 
than a grossly distorted version of the ideas about which, 
allegedly, they were writing. Psychoanalysis, particularly, 
suffered from emasculation and misrepresentation. With 
all of their intellectual imprecision, however, the general 
ideas in the new psychology are discernible and can be 
discussed on that level. 
17
 See David Bakan, "Behaviorism and American Urbanization," 
Journal of the History of the Behaviorial Sciences, II (1966), 5-28. 
See, in general, Lucille Birnbaum, "Behaviorism in the 1920's," 
American Quarterly, VII (1955), 15-30, and Lucille Terese Birn­
baum, "Behaviorism: John Brodus Watson and American Social 
Thought" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, 
Berkeley, 1964), especially p. 291. See also discussion below, p. 376.
There were attempts to add other components to the new psychology.
The most notable was made late in the twenties by advocates of 
Gestalt psychology, which aroused much interest among professional 
psychologists. Aside from a few explanatory publications and even 
a few attacks, however, this attempt failed. Gestalt, significantly, 
lacked the potential for practical application possessed by the other 
elements of the new psychology and in other ways failed to mesh with
American society of the 1920's. See, for example, Louis Berman, The 
Religion Called Behaviorism (New York, 1927), which was more an 
advocacy of Gestalt than an attack on Watsonianism (Berman was 
he of gland fame, incredibly enough); Edward S. Robinson, "A Little 
German Band: The Solemnities of Gestalt Psychology," New Republic, 
LXI (1929), 10-14. 
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Because it was a popular phenomenon in the period when, 
as Allen pointed out, ballyhoo reigned, the new psychology 
was bound to contain at least an element of faddism. Yet 
the waxing and waning of psychoanalysis, gland psychology, 
and behaviorism was not entirely a matter of public whim. 
The proof lies in the great exception, Coueism, which, in 
contrast to the rest of the new psychology, was ephemeral 
because it lacked scientific support sufficient to sustain it. 
In November, 1921, the Swiss physician who founded the 
movement that bore his name, Emile Coue, made a triumphal 
tour of England. Americans immediately imported Coueism 
from England, and in January, 1923, Coue himself came to 
the United States. He received a ballyhoo welcome from 
midwestern as well as New York journalists that gave his 
message a currency along with mah-jongg. Coue was viewed 
essentially as a secular faith healer. His technique was 
vulgarized into a person's repeating to himself, "Day by 
day, in every way [emphasize the every], I'm getting 
better and better." Supposedly, this "autosuggestion" cured 
both physical and psychological difficulties and improved 
the character. A rhymster for Life suggested the enthu­
siasm and exaggeration of the publicity: 
Would you be freed from every kind 
Of woe and make your forces double? 
Bamboozle dark Subsconscious Mind, 
That ever-present source of trouble. 
No matter what your goal or aim, 
You must not doubt yourself a minute, 
But say, "Of course I'll win the game!"— 
Subconscious Mind will make you win it.18 
 See, for example, C. Harry Brooks, The Practice of Auto­
suggestion by the Method of Emile Coue (New York, 1922); this 
volume inspired the quoted "Rhymed Review" by Arthur Guiterman, 
in Life, LXXX (1922), 31, used by permission of H. T. Rockwell. 
18
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Coue based his work on the standard psychology of 
suggestion, which in turn had been inferred largely from 
the phenomenon of hypnosis (at the time thought to be 
suggestion in an extreme form). In addition to the conscious 
mind, so the theory goes, there is a subconscious mind 
that helps determine behavior. A repeated suggestion aimed 
at the subconscious will eventually influence it. This had 
been a well-known theory for many years before the 1920's, 
and a type of psychotherapy consisting of suggestions 
made by the physician was frequently employed. The 
idea of do-it-yourself suggestion, however, was relatively 
new on the popular level. This novelty made autosuggestion 
susceptible to ballyhoo, and the scientific aura of the panacea 
gave it a respectability lacking in other faith cures.19 For 
years afterward expositors of the new psychology often 
mentioned Coueism, along with suggestion, in eclectic 
treatises; but for the most part, it, like any other fad, 
disappeared without a trace.20 
THE BACKGROUND 
Contributing to both the acceptance and the image of the 
new psychology throughout the twenties were the mental 
testing and mental hygiene movements. Each had its own 
existence but interacted with the new psychology in impor­
tant ways. Mental testing was largely intelligence testing. 
19
 See, for example, Joseph Collins, "Coueism," North American 
Review, CCXVI (1922) , 190-99; H a r r y N. Kerns , review of Satow, 
Hypnotism and Suggestion, in Mental Hygiene, VI I I (1924) , 414: 
" . . One wonders why the public is asked to read another book 
on this question." 
20
 Even the gland fad left behind a solid contr ibution on a 
technical physiological level. The lack of professional backing for 
Coueism sets it apa r t . A. Kard iner , for example, in a review of 
Northr idge , Modern Theories of the Unconscious, in Mental Hygiene,
IX (1925), observed caustically t h a t "Coue's views a re given such 
space and dignity as to cas t serious doubt upon the au thor ' s abil i ty 
to criticize his ma te r i a l " (p . 419) . 
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The public, alerted before the war to the dangers of feeble­
mindedness, was entertained in the postwar period by the 
concept of one's mental—as opposed to chronological—age 
(IQ). Statistical standardization of the tests and their use 
by the Army in the war gave them added social significance. 
Intelligence and other mental tests appeared to offer a way 
in which scientific study of man could be really useful. Up 
until then psychology had been for the most part a science 
remarkable because of its lack of potential for practical 
application. The tests were of great importance because 
they suggested that psychology had practical value. This 
cult of practicability carried over to all of the components 
that went into the new psychology and eventually guided 
it in a direction that could not then have been foreseen.21 
Mental hygiene was a more complex movement. It grew 
out of both the psychotherapy movement of the prewar 
period and the discovery of shell shock by physicians and 
the public, a discovery that had any number of conse­
quences. The psychotherapy movement began about 1906 
and infiltrated both medicine and popular thinking. Fields 
as disparate as literature, politics, and religion felt the 
impact of the movement. Psychotherapists of the time 
assumed that environment—and especially social environ­
ment—is very important in determining both normal and 
abnormal human behavior. The success of the physicians 
using psychological or "moral" means to treat mental ill­
nesses suggested that a more general reform of society and 
the individuals in it was possible.22 Like many other aspects 
of progressive thought, the psychotherapy movement did 
not survive the experience of World War I in a recognizable 
form. It simply vanished, either absorbed or replaced by 
the mental hygiene movement. Indeed, many of the leaders 
 See discussion, pp. 389-90. 
2 2
 John C. Burnham, "Psychiatry, Psychology and the Progressive 
Movement," American Quarterly, XII (1960), 457-65. 
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of the psychotherapy movement were also leaders of the 
mental hygiene movement. 
Because psychoanalysis had been introduced as, and 
continued to be, an important part of the psychotherapy 
movement, it is paradoxical that while psychotherapy as 
a movement withered, psychoanalysis flourished after the 
war. The Freudian phase of the new psychology is the 
more surprising because World War I had had a devastating 
effect upon the growth of psychoanalysis within American 
medicine. Freudianism, an Austrian import, was suspect 
because of its supposed Teutonic origins. In the backwash 
of anti-German feeling, the American Psychoanalytic Asso­
ciation almost disbanded itself in 1919.23 The phenomenon 
of shell shock and its consequences heighten the paradox 
of the fad of psychoanalysis. 
Physicians had seen "shell shock" as early as the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904-5, but the trench warfare of World 
War I caused the malady to appear with sometimes epi­
demic frequency. Soldiers—and good soldiers—often devel­
oped severe symptoms of mental illness, such as hysterical 
(i.e., psychosomatic) blindness, paralysis, tremors, terrors, 
and even hallucinations, that rendered them unfit for fight­
ing. As the name implies, the disease was at first ascribed 
to shock caused by the concussion of exploding shells. The 
shock presumably disrupted the normal functioning of 
the nervous system. When careful inquiry revealed that 
shell shock was more common among troops who had 
not been exposed to shelling (or, indeed, any action at 
all) than among those at the front, physicians concluded 
that shell shock was a common neurosis, a mental illness 
without any apparent physical cause. The term persisted, 
however, partly to mask the fact that these ill war heroes 
had "weak nerves"; that is, were either constitutionally 
 Oberndorf, A History of Psychoanalysis in America, pp. 135-36. 23
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inferior or mildly mentally ill without any reference to 
war experiences. 
The shell shock diseases called attention to environmental 
causes—as well as to environmental types of treatment— 
and therefore tended to vindicate the belief of the psycho­
therapists that these illnesses were, at least functionally, 
psychological in nature. (Many prominent practitioners, of 
course, insisted in the name of theoretical materialism that 
there were real physical changes that just were not dis­
cernible by methods then available.) As knowledge about 
shell shock spread, the public became increasingly aware 
that one's mind could play tricks on one and produce 
neurotic symptoms and uncontrollable behavior. Even those 
of the public for whom shell shock represented physical 
injury to the nerves necessarily became aware of how com­
mon and agonizing nervous diseases could be. By turning 
the neurosis into a war wound, the experience of World 
War I mitigated public attitudes toward mental illnesses 
more effectively than years of humanitarian propaganda.24 
The war also created a profession to treat these ill­
nesses outside of the mental hospitals. The specialists in 
nervous and mental diseases had divided themselves by 
function into two distinct groups: the neurologists and 
the hospital physicians. The neurologists concentrated on 
organic diseases of the nervous system, but many of them 
participated in the psychotherapy movement and did some 
outpatient psychotherapy. The mental hospital physicians 
 The literature on shell shock is immense; one convenient sum­
mary is Mabel Webster Brown and Frankwood E. Williams, Neuro­
psychiatry and the War: A Bibliography with Abstracts (New York, 
1918). For examples of popular literature, see Frederick W. Parsons, 
"War Neuroses," Atlantic Monthly, CXXIII (1919), 335-38, and,
indicative of how late in the decade the idea was still filtering down,
"Second Wind," Saturday Evening Post, CXCVIII (May 8, 1926), 
8ff. 
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tended to keep to their asylums where they did more 
managing of the patients than curing them. Both neurol­
ogists and hospital physicians appeared before the public 
as alienists, or expert witnesses in legal proceedings. After 
World War I the new specialist, the neuropsychiatrist or 
psychiatrist, appeared. No longer exclusively a hospital 
physician or legal expert, the psychiatrist became in the 
twenties a healer, in either a hospital or an outpatient 
setting. It is significant, for example, that in keeping 
with this changing image the American Journal of In­
sanity changed its name in 1921 to American Journal of 
Psychiatry. 
This popular conception of the psychiatrist resulted 
largely from the work of the mental hygiene movement.25 
The mental hygiene movement had been launched in 1908 
by Clifford Beers, a former mental patient who enlisted 
the support of the country's leading specialists in nervous 
and mental diseases in a diffuse movement to improve the 
treatment of mental patients and in general foster mental 
health. As it became clear that the United States would 
probably become involved in World War I, the newly formed 
National Committee for Mental Hygiene approached the 
surgeon general and requested to be included in the war 
effort. A special committee of leading psychiatrists urged 
the Army Medical Department to create a special staff and 
service for nervous and mental diseases. The committee 
cited not only the statistics of increases in mental illnesses 
among European soldiers but the fact that "mental diseases 
were approximately three times as prevalent among the 
troops on the Mexican border last summer as among the 
 The standard histories of this movement are not very revealing; 
see, for example, Albert Deutsch, "The History of Mental Hygiene," 
in J. K. Hall, et al. (eds.), One Hundred Years of American 
Psychiatry (New York, 1944), pp. 325-65. 
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adult civil population." The Army eventually accepted the 
program of the committee.26 
By the end of the war several hundred specialists had 
been enlisted and several hundred more trained to operate 
a special neuropsychiatric service within the Army Medical 
Department.27 Because of the low caliber of many hospital 
physicians, other doctors had often regarded the entire 
speciality with some contempt. In the war, however, psy­
chiatrists found themselves fully recognized and appreciated 
for the first time. The recognition, acquired so abruptly, 
led these ambitious men to expect, and rightly so, that they 
could do even better in the 1920's.28 
The relationship of the psychiatrists, their patients, and 
their admirers to the new psychology is reflected in the 
movement that had so successfully infiltrated psychiatry 
into the army. During the 1920's and even the early 1930's 
mental hygiene flourished and grew.29 It had something for 
everybody: neurologist, psychotherapist, psychologist, social 
worker. The key to its scientific and medical success—as 
well as its political expediency—was the team approach. 
The team approach grew out of the work of William 
Healy, the neurologist who founded the child guidance 
movement. In the 1900's he had been approached by a 
number of reformers in Chicago, led by Jane Addams, who 
were concerned about juvenile delinquents. The reformers 
believed that science ought to be applied in order to discover 
why the children had gone wrong. In 1909, therefore, they 
26 Norman Fenton, Shell Shock and Its Aftermath (St. Louis, 
1926), chap, i; M. W. Ireland (ed.), The Medical Department of the 
United States Army in the World War (Washington , 1929), X, chap, 
i, and pp. 489-91. 
27
 I re land, The Medical Department, X, passim. 
28
 Fo r example, Pearce Bailey, "Applicabil i ty of the Findings of 
the Neuropsychia t r ic Examina t ions in the A r m y to Civil Problems," 
Mental Hygiene, IV (1920) , 301-11. 
29
 The menta l hygiene movement is best followed in appropr ia te 
volumes of Mental Hygiene. General t r ea tmen t s also appea r in the 
s t anda rd bibliographical indexes of the day. 
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commissioned Healy to carry out comprehensive studies— 
psychiatric, physical, psychological—of individual offenders 
brought before the Chicago juvenile court. Healy did the 
medical and psychiatric studies himself but also employed 
a psychologist (primarily to administer mental tests). The 
two of them, of course, discussed the cases informally and 
often conferred with social workers from other agencies. 
After 1917, when Healy moved his operations to Boston, 
he added social workers to his own staff and instituted 
the formal case conference to bring together the opinions 
of experts with different competences, each of whom had 
studied the same individual case. Healy used as a model the 
medical case conference of specialists, in which each one 
presented his particular view of the case and then the group 
together tried to reach a diagnosis.30 
The team absorbed and tended to obliterate the special 
approaches of the neurologist, the psychiatrist, the psy­
chologist or clinical psychologist, and the social worker. A 
psychiatrist at Buffalo State Hospital thus observed in 1924 
that within a few years a remarkable change had taken 
place in that psychotherapy could no longer be distinguished 
from psychiatry.31 Whenever a new emphasis or technique 
appeared, the mental hygienists could incorporate it and 
call it their own; such was the fate in the 1920's of Coueism, 
of gland therapy, of the mental testing movement, of both 
theoretical and applied behaviorism. Each was absorbed by 
adding it to the team.32 
30
 Lawson G. Lowrey and Victoria Sloane (eds . ) , Orthopsychiatry, 
192S-1H8 (New York, 1948) . Oral his tory interviews of Will iam 
Healy and Augus t a Bronner , conducted by John C. B u r n h a m , 1960-61 
(copies deposited in the H a r v a r d Univers i ty L ib ra ry and a t the 
Judge Baker Guidance Center, Bos ton) . 
31
 H. L. Levin, review of Yellowlees, Manual of Psychotherapy, 
in Mental Hygiene, VI I I (1924) , 1077. 
32
 The function of eclecticism in the science and t h e r a p y of menta l 
illnesses—of which menta l hygiene was a sophisticated and extremely 
clever example—is a la rge subject. Some account of i t appea r s in 
J . C. Burnham, Psychoanalysis and American Medicine, 1894-1918: 
Medicine, Science, and Culture (New York, 1967). 
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With democratic egalitarianism (or perhaps it was lack 
of discrimination), the movement welcomed not only medi­
cine, psychopathology, and neuropathology but "psychology, 
sociology, education, and other fields having to do with 
human behavior and the conduct of life." 33 If the members 
of the mental hygiene team were united on any point besides 
the value of co-operation, it was this: they all studied the 
adaptation, both physical and mental, or, more accurately, 
"biological," of the individual. In this emphasis they came 
close to the view of the dominant school in American psy­
chiatry, eclectic dynamic psychiatry. Dynamic psychiatrists, 
in addition to emphasizing individual life patterns and their 
adaptive function, included important elements from psy­
choanalytic psychology.34 
One further aspect of the mental hygiene movement de­
serves special notice: its emphasis on child mental hygiene 
and child rearing generally. Within psychiatry—and typi­
cally, dynamic psychiatry—the idea of the importance of 
early life was traceable directly to the influence of Freud, 
although popular attitudes that created the "age of the 
child" had other, equally important determinants.35 Ob­
servers at the time remarked on the unbelievable growth 
of both medical and popular literature about childhood and 
child rearing during the 1920's, a proliferation that lasted 
well into the 1930's.36 
33
 F rankwood E . Wil l iams,  "A Selected List of Books on Mental 
Hygiene and Allied Subjects ," Mental Hygiene, V I I I (1924), 327. 
34
 See Alfred Lief ( ed . ) , The Commonsense Psychiatry of Dr. 
Adolf Meyer: Fifty-two Selected Papers (New York, 1948) ; Burn-
ham, Psychoanalysis and American Medicine. 
35
 See discussion, pp . 381-82. 
36
 See, for example, Wil l iam B. Terhune , "Modern Trends in 
Juveni le Menta l Hygiene ," Education, X L I V (1923) , 65. Bernard 
Glueck, "Const ruct ive Possibilities of a Mental Hygiene of Child­
hood," Mental Hygiene, V I I I (1924), 651, connected child mental 
hygiene to an "unprecedented in teres t in child heal th, and child wel­
fare general ly . . " The incidence of ar t icles indexed in the Read­
ers Guide provides concrete confirmation of these impressions. 
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The dominance of the mental hygiene movement in the 
Jazz Age raises again the paradox of the psychoanalytic 
phase of the new psychology. Not only did mental hygiene 
almost completely supersede psychotherapy but the mental 
hygienists were not necessarily friendly to psychoanalysis. 
Even shell shock was used commonly to demonstrate the 
unsoundness of Freud's beliefs—or what were imagined to 
be Freud's beliefs. A good example is Sidney I. Schwab, a 
St. Louis neurologist who in 1906 had been the first person 
to introduce the term "psychoanalysis" into the United 
States. In 1920 he asserted that the war neuroses, which 
clearly had no sexual determinants, had shown Freud to 
have been basically mistaken.37 The secret of the success 
of popularized psychoanalysis lay in the cult of the self 
and its sequel. That is, a significant part of the literate 
American public discovered in Freud's teachings (and their 
distortions) ideas that fitted in with, first, their preoccupa­
tion with self and, second, their interest in the controlla­
bility of man. That these narcissism and control themes 
occurred also in the gland and behavioristic phases of the 
new psychology is a remarkable demonstration of the new 
psychology phenomenon. 
THE CULT OF THE SELF 
It is ironic that people who viewed their own times as an 
"Age of Crowds" should see the rise of a strong sense of 
the urgency of finding one's self. Or perhaps the irony re­
flects the reality that in the mass society of the twenties 
depersonalization called forth compensatory attitudes from 
a large proportion of the atoms of the faceless—and pre­
sumably lonely—multitude. 
37
 Sidney I. Schwab, "Influence of War Concepts of Mental 
Diseases and Neuroses," Modern Medicine, II (1920), 192-99. 
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One of the striking developments of the 1920's was the 
culmination on a mass scale of public interest in personal, 
introspective accounts of private experiences. A mass 
market for popularized personal documents grew primarily 
out of two sources: the lovelorn column of the newspaper 
and the cult of physical, that is, bodily, development.38 As 
a matter of fact, it was the editors of Physical Culture, the 
McFadden Company's health and exercise magazine, who 
initiated the phenomenon. Their offices had been flooded 
by unsolicited letters of an essentially confessional nature 
that contained the details of intimate secrets. The editors 
got the idea of publishing them, and True Story Magazine 
was born. Its success was immediate and unbelievable, and 
a host of imitators sprang up.39 
These cheap magazines appealed, as the editors of True 
Confessions observed in 1924, to readers whose reaction was 
that "that experience is very like my own." 40 Another 
aspect of this appeal of the confession magazines was the 
fact that the material in them tended to be guilt-laden or 
aberrant in some way so that variations from mass society 
conformity appeared more common—and easier for the 
reader to deal with in himself—than might otherwise have 
been the case. It is very much to the point, therefore, that 
candid and confessional autobiographical fragments were 
central in popular expositions of psychoanalysis. Psycho­
pathologists often observed that the neurotic's memories in 
effect caused his illness, and the case reports in the new 
psychology literature had all the appeal—and more—of 
true confessions. The relatively frequent, often didactic, 
use of psychoanalysis in fiction and drama as a device not 
38
 Noth ing could underl ine as subtly and surely as th is la t ter 
source the presence of narcissim in the phenomenon under discussion. 
 E r n s t Theodore Kreuger , "Autobiographical Documents and 
Persona l i ty" (unpublished doctoral dissertat ion, Univers i ty of Chi­
cago, 1925), pp . 16-17. 
40 Ibid., p. 31. 
39
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only for characterizing but for suggesting dramatic prob­
lems (mother-son relationships, for example) is testimony 
to the interest generated by personal revelation.41 
In other ways, however, psychoanalysis as set forth by 
the writers of the new psychology tended to diminish the 
personal and to reinforce the loss of identity and the sense 
of unreality fostered (presumably) by mass society. In 
the new psychology the apparent was not the real, and the 
real was never apparent. One leading exposition was en­
titled Unmasking Our Minds; the author's purpose was ex­
plicitly to help the reader discover his real self, under the 
assumption that it was not obvious.42 How the new psy­
chology led to confusion of appearances and realities was 
caught by the writer of a satiric "Nutshell Novel" of 1924 
of the variety, "A Psycho-Analytical Idyll" : 
Zachariah Hardshell and his beautiful daughter, Clammie, 
lived on a small farm where they struggled with Poverty and 
Boll Weevils. Trillion Plunks, the village banker, had warts on 
his nose, a mortgage on the farm, and designs on Clammie. 
But Clammie hated him. So Trillion dumped them into the county 
road. He was very cruel. He often kicked dogs, especially in 
the motion picture version of the novel. 
Byron Keats came along, playing his violin, and found them 
in the road. He was kind to them. He picked some wild flowers 
for Clammie. She loved him. 
But she couldn't marry him. At first she didn't know why. 
Then it Dawned Upon her. She didn't love him. She hated him 
for being a Softie. She loved Trillion because he was a Brute. 
She married Trillion and he beat her. That made her happy. 
But Trillion hated her for letting him get away with it. That 
made him miserable. Thus was poor old Zachariah avenged. 
He spent his old age Gloating. 
Ibid., pp. 31, 39. Freud had early noticed and condemned those 
who read case histories as if they were novellas; Sigmund Freud, 
Collected Papers (New York, 1959), III, 15. 
4 2
 David Seabury , Unmasking Our Minds ( N e w York , 1924) . 
41
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Byron Keats picked some more flowers. He didn't amount to 
much anyway. He had a complex on destruction. 'Way down 
inside of him he was bloodthirsty. That was what made him 
such a Softie.43 
The themes of deceptive appearance and concern with 
self came together in the idea of the hidden self. Popular 
expositions of psychoanalysis confirmed and extended the 
widely held belief that each person has a real self deep 
inside, the discovery of which, for some reason, may be 
desirable. "Dark hidden things," wrote Sherwood Anderson, 
describing the effects of psychoanalysis, " came out 
and found expression for themselves, and the miracle was 
that, expressed, they became often very beautiful." One 
of the better-known documents of the new psychology, for 
example, was called Your Inner Self. "Self-exploration," 
wrote David Seabury in 1924, in Unmasking Our Minds, 
"may suggest some answer to such questions as: 'What am 
I like? What are my strong and weak points? What uncon­
scious conditions suppress and injure me? How can I under­
stand my family, my children, my friends? What effect 
does my own nature have on health, happiness, marriage, 
« Chester T. Crowell, "Nutshell Novels," New Republic, XL (1924), 44. The idea of the illusory nature of appearances was not only
important but one of the fundamentals in the credo of the age. It 
represented an aspect of general disillusionment (see Christopher 
Lasch, The New Radicalism in America (1889-1963): The Intellectual 
as a Social Type [New York, 1965], pp. 254-55) as well as of the 
currents discussed in the present essay. The denunciations of in­
sincerity and hypocrisy and the cult of frankness, both of which 
were conspicuous in the postwar world, were other aspects of the 
feeling that the obvious is not the real. Rationalization, one of the 
major conceptual contributions of the new psychology, was exciting 
because it showed specifically how people fooled themselves and why 
the traditional, rational explanations for human behavior were both 
convincing and erroneous. See, for example, James Harvey Robinson, 
The Mind in the Making: The Relation of Intelligence to Social 
Reform (New York, 1921), pp. 40-48. 
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career? How can I solve these problems?' " 44 As Seabury 
suggested, literate Americans of the Jazz Age typically 
considered knowledge about the interior self—and cognate 
understanding of others—to be of the greatest importance. 
In literature, obsession with the unobvious and uncon­
scious aspects of personality was destructive of artistic 
effectiveness. In attempting to portray the flow of free 
associations, for example, writers often lost the inner con­
sistency that gives characterization its convincing—and 
interesting—quality. Novelists, for instance, tended to 
write about their inner feelings and emphasize impulses 
that they imagined had origins deep in the unconscious. 
Authors described, sometimes directly, sometimes symboli­
cally, polymorphous perverse and other primitive elements 
in behavior or motivation as if they conveyed to the reader 
more meaning than was really the case.4"' In addition to 
deliberate obscurantism, from the concept of the hidden 
self writers developed the literary device of a character's 
being saved by the revelation of his inner self. That is, 
either some shock or circumstance brought about signifi­
cant self-understanding, or else the dramatic action was 
resolved by the "deus ex clinica." 48 Literature of the decade 
was strewn with the wreckage of stories and plays in 
which the psychiatrist offered a clumsy means (often an 
overnight psychoanalysis) of resolving the dramatic con­
flicts. If the new psychology provided inspiration and tech­
44
 Sherwood Anderson , quoted in Hoffman, The Twenties, p . 206 ; 
Louis E . Bisch, Your Inner Self (Ga rden City, N . Y., 1922) ; Seabury , 
Unmasking Our Minds, p . x. 
45
 See, for example, Hoffman, The Twenties, pp . 204-5. 
46
 See, for example, E l sa Barker , Fielding Sargent: A Novel 
(New York, 1922), and Sievers, Freud on Broadway, pp. 80, 95-96. 
Sievers, ibid., p. 138, quotes the critic Alexander Woollcott, suggest­
ing t ha t the action in a supposedly psychoanalytic play in 1027 is a 
good example of pu t t ing very conventional d r ama in a faddish 
Freudian form: "If w h a t ails the gir l can be said to be hidden, then 
so is the Woolworth Building." 
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nical details for the literary exponents of searching-for­
the-self, they, in turn, contributed to popular knowledge 
of the new psychology, usually within the context of a 
sentimental narcissism. 
One impetus to the fervent search for the hidden self 
was the idea that one's real self had potential that the 
everyday one did not. James Oppenheim, a former poet 
and lay analyst who wrote for a Los Angeles newspaper, 
used Jungian psychology47 in his book on Your Hidden 
Powers: " Every human being has hidden powers 
which must be brought to light and used. Not only 
is a knowledge of human nature a great power, because we 
can more successfully deal with others, but it is all essential 
in learning how to deal with ourselves, how to solve our 
problems and develop ourselves for the sake of our happi­
ness, our health and our well being." 4S 
The chief purveyors of the new psychology, such as 
Oppenheim, asserted that man's potential—and particularly 
their own—was seldom fulfilled. If they were not great 
artists, the fault lay in external circumstances rather than 
in personal shortcomings. Influenced by Marx, for example, 
many intellectuals had spoken of the tyrannies of society 
that held creativity and intellectuality in chains. When the 
intellectuals realized that early twentieth-century society 
was not oppressing them, they found—in part through the 
new psychology—that it was their interior psyche, the 
47
 J u n g i a n psychology w a s a v a r i a n t of psychoanalysis , emphasiz­
ing the immediate causes of a neurot ic illness (as opposed to life 
h is tory) and such myst ical concepts as a Lamarck ian racial un­
conscious. In conformity to the usual American eclecticism, wr i te rs 
customari ly did not dis t inguish J u n g ' s work from Freud ' s but utilized 
them al ternately without regard for consistency. 
48
 James Oppenheim, Your Hidden Powers (New York, 1923), pp. 
5-6. This conception of the unrealized powers of the hidden self was 
usually not Freudian or even broadly psychoanalytic, but had its 
origin in the psychopathology of Janet , of which Coue represented 
a distortion. 
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internalization of conventional upbringing, that constrained 
their actions and withered originality.49 In this context a 
person could realize the hidden powers of his self—dis­
coverable through psychoanalysis—not so much by simple 
revelation of the hidden powers as by unmasking and 
breaking the interior chains.50 
In the behavioristic phase of the new psychology, the 
idea of internalization of external inhibitions persisted, but 
often in a simplistic form. The behaviorists viewed the 
personality as the congeries of habit systems built up by 
conditioned reflexes. Where the behavioristic view was not 
just a translation of psychoanalytic concepts, the Watson­
ians suggested that the traditional association psychology 
served to explain how habit systems of adults originated.51 
Except in so far as the behaviorists emphasized a few 
primitive fear and sex reactions, their extreme environ­
mentalism tended to change the emphasis of the new psy­
chology from searching for the inner self to finding out how 
a person got to be the way he was.52 
The new psychology expositions of the early 1920's had 
shifted remarkably in emphasis from comparable writings 
of the prewar period. For years there had been any number 
of books and articles addressed to the "nervous." The tone 
of these progressive period tracts was embodied in two 
motifs: self-improvement (the authors were generous with 
exhortation) and, either directly or indirectly, social im­
provement and service. Expositors of psychoanalysis before 
49
 Lasch, The New Radicalism, pp . 142-43. 
50
 See discussion, pp . 387-89. 
51
 F o r example, John B. Watson , The Ways of Behaviorism (New 
York, 1928), especially p . 120. 
52
 The a rgumen t migh t be made here , and will be made below, 
tha t like so much of the la te 1920's, the behaviorist ic phase of the 
new psychology in i ts emphasis on ex te rna l social control belongs 
with the 1930's, not the ear ly 1920's. See Bi rnbaum, "Behavior i sm: 
John Broadus Watson ," p . 345 and passim. 
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the war, for example, often stressed the idea of sublimating 
one's primitive desires into useful social activity.53 In the 
twenties the authors of the rapidly proliferating literature 
of the new psychology changed the emphasis from self-
improvement to self-justification; they moved from the 
progressive idea of service to the postwar idea of dis­
covering one's wants, needs, and desires (usually in the 
hidden self or primitive chemical and reflex systems) and 
gratifying them.54 
The method of justifying one's present condition was 
simple: no matter what you do, according to the new psy­
chologists, your motives are impure. Therefore, why im­
prove? Behind every action the new writers found a base 
motive. "Don't you even know, mother," said Claire, the 
flapper daughter in John Howard Lawson's Loudspeaker, 
"that everybody's thoughts are obscenely vile? That's psy­
chology." 55 Andre Tridon, a lay analyst in New York and 
prolific publicizer, in one chapter showed that people who 
talk about the weather are inhibited, "poor, weak, under­
developed human beings . not daring to love and admire 
violently anything or anybody "; that pompous per­
sons have a tendency to schizophrenia and "compensate for 
their intellectual inferiority by unbearably good manners 
and an annoying form of accuracy"; that snobs are "neu­
rotics afraid of life and of competition ," regressed in 
their exclusiveness "to the prenatal level in which the child 
is protected against all of life's problems but death"; that 
53 Burnham, "Psychiatry, Psychology and the Progressive Move­
ment." See, for example, James J. Putnam, Human Motives (Boston, 
1915).
64
 See, for example, the contemporaneous observations of Stanley 
P. Davies, "What Grown-Ups Cry For: Has an Eager Public Been 
Oversold on Mental Hygiene?", Survey, LXVII (1931), 253-54, 280­
81. Similarly, a quipster in Life, LXXXI (1923), 8, caught some of 
the underlying appeal of Coueism: "One thing about auto-suggestion:
It is practically the only suggestion the average man will take." 
<"> John Howard Lawson, quoted in Sievers, Freud on Broadway, 
p. 143. 
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those who begrudge praising others are trying "unconsci­
ously to kill those who [unlike themselves] do create by 
never mentioning them "; that superstitious people, 
besides having inadequate nerve and gland stimulation, "are 
obsessed by a sense of guilt, which, unfortunately, has a 
solid foundation of fact [in the unconscious], and they fear 
retribution"; that those who go to watch the spectacle of 
a destructive fire are envious sadists—"everyone is at heart 
a jealous brute who enjoys whatever damage is inflicted 
upon someone else's person or property." Tridon went on to 
analyze, similarly, animal lovers, busybodies, conservatives, 
and cardplayers, among others.66 
The popular pseudo-Freudians reserved their sharpest 
scorn for the reformer, a contrast to the prewar psycho­
analytic writers' tendency to urge social reform. It was 
explained that moral superiority originated in a most 
unrighteous secret self that was in danger of breaking 
loose. The "puritan" who was sensitive to sexual subjects 
suffered from "suppressed Pornophilia" and probably was 
hypersexual in nature. "We are told of certain professional 
reformers," wrote new psychologist William J. Fielding, 
"who have large collections of obscene pictures. " " 
When the gland psychology came in to supplement and 
supplant psychoanalysis, the wicked unconscious in each of 
us acquired palpable reality. Writers of the gland epoch 
attributed virtually every characteristic action to impulses 
generated by the chemicals secreted by the ductless 
glands.B8 Even the mental testing and IQ craze was utilized 
56
 In the bargain Tridon passed on tips on the serving of food; 
Andr6 Tridon, Psychoanalysis and Man's Unconscious Motives (New 
York, 1924), chap. v. 
67
 William J. Fielding, The Caveman Within Us, His Peculiarities 
and Powers: How We Can Enlist His Aid for Health and Efficiency 
(New York, 1922), pp . 264-69. 
68
 In combination wi th psychoanalyt ic explanat ions , the environ­
ment was believed to affect g l andu la r funct ioning and so to account 
in organic t e rms for w h a t had appeared to be an essential ly psycho­
logical re la t ionship of cause and effect. See, for example , the inde­
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as a justification for not changing one's self. Because intel­
ligence tests had suggested that feeble-mindedness was a 
major—and often unobvious—factor in criminal and other 
abnormal behavior, the IQ was often incorporated into the 
concept of the hidden self (and the public, it turned out, 
tended to confuse mental subnormality with abnormality). 
Unsuspected brilliance could also be discovered in the real 
self. As a Yale psychologist, Howard W. Haggard, wrote 
'Tisn't What You Know But Are You Intelligent? "Intelli­
gence," he said, "is the capability to do productive think­
ing." It is not necessary to know "what Leonardo da Vinci's 
two most famous paintings are." Or who wrote Carmen. 
Or, apparently, to do any disciplined thinking at all.59 One 
could, in short, justify his lack of self-improvement simply 
by pointing out his potential—a remarkable reversal of 
prewar devotion to acquiring character and culture. 
When behaviorism came to supplement and replace 
psychoanalysis and the glands in the make-up of the new 
psychology, one's present behavior was ascribed to the acci­
dent of environmental conditioning as well as one's gut 
reactions. In this way the idea of self-justification continued 
to be a basic theme in the new psychology. It was easy to 
trace one's character to the circumstances and automatic 
emotional reactions that conditioned and gave rise to his 
"habit systems." As Ross L. Finney of the University of 
Minnesota pointed out in a book attacking behaviorism, 
behavioristic mechanism implied that one experience—and 
the conditioning that results—is as good as another. There 
was therefore, again, no serious motivation to change 
oneself.60 
fatigable Andre Tridon, Psychoanalysis and Gland Personalities (New 
York, 1923). 
59
 Howard W. Haggard , 'Tisn't What You Know But Are You 
Intelligent? (New York, 1927), especially pp. 5-7. 
60
 Ross L. Finney, "Behaviorism's Silence as to Human Values," 
in William P . King (ed.) , Behaviorism: A Battle Line (Nashville, 
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Watson himself offered the most convincing evidence of 
the conservative nature of behaviorism. Although he was 
famous for his dictum that by manipulating environment 
he could make any infant develop into any specified kind of 
person, from beggarman to lawyer or chief, Watson always 
in fact qualified the assertion. By 1928 he confessed that 
although theoretically even adults should be able to change 
their personalities by reconditioning, modern man lacked 
the necessary means of thoroughgoing control to effect a 
significant reconditioning. People were too spineless, too 
lazy and careless, said Watson, to be able to change them­
selves. As he grew older, he said, he became convinced that 
"the zebra can as easily change his stripes as the adult 
his personality."61 
Regardless of specific content, the behaviorists in their 
popularizations echoed the same iconoclastic tone as the 
vulgarizers of psychoanalysis. Where the psychoanalytic 
writers ruthlessly showed the real self to be found in the 
mind, the behaviorists were talking about the real self of 
the gut, that is, reflex actions.62 
The expositors of the new psychology in centering on the 
self almost invariably spoke in terms of motives. This 
preoccupation with motives was one of the marks of the 
1930), p . 177. A. A. Roback, "Intel l igence and Behavior ," Psycho­
logical Review, X X I X (1922) , 54-55, noted t h a t intelligence t es t ing 
made assumptions similar to those of behaviorism in t h a t from both 
points of view intelligence is passive, i.e., mechanical—the machinery , 
r a the r t han active or a p a r t of the drive itself. Both the IQ movement 
and behaviorism pictured intelligence as a passive, au tomat ic reaction 
to a st imulus. 
61
 Watson, The Ways of Behaviorism, p . 138; Bi rnbaum, "Be­
haviorism in the 1920's," pp . 21-22, discusses on one level t he in­
consistency in behaviorism. Compare in general B i rnbaum, "Be­
haviorism: John Broadus Watson . " 
62
 Birnbaum, "Behavior i sm: J ohn Broadus Wat son , " especially 
pp. 291 ff., contains the in teres t ing charac ter iza t ion of behaviorism as 
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age.63 Psychoanalysis and its successors revealed that the 
cause of even the most innocent, everyday behavior could 
be shown to be impulses that were clearly improper and 
immoral, or at least uncivilized, in nature. H. M. Kallen, 
who knew both Academia and Bohemia in New York, 
asserted about his own times that "men have ceased to be 
clear in their hearts about their own motives and actions, 
and have become suspicious of those of their fellows." 64 
The hidden, even unconscious, motive was known long 
before, in the writings of eighteenth-century political phi­
losophers, for example, and the avant-garde had for some 
time used Marxian insights to discredit the motives of 
apparently altruistic contemporaries. The new psychology 
emphasized a far more primitive type of motive and the 
ways in which a man rationalized and hid such motives 
from himself. 
Even in Marxist analysis, the motives of men had some 
rational goal in terms of the function of the individual 
within the social system of production. The new psychology 
tended to emphasize the irrational, to deny at all the effi­
cacy of reason on the level of motive.65 A long period of 
intellectual preparation, including currents such as natu­
ralism, decadence, and primitivism, the writings of Zola, 
Nietzsche, and Marx, had effectively introduced ideas of 
the irrationality and animality of man.66 In a time of gen­
eral disillusionment after World War I, the new psycholo­
 See, for example, Horace Bidwell English, "Dynamic Psychology 
and the Problem of Motivation," Psychological Review, XXVIII (1921), 239-48; K. S. Lashley, "The Behavioristic Interpretation of 
Consciousness," Psychological Review, XXX (1923), 348. 
a* "Is Minding Behaving?", New Republic, XXIX (1922), 285-86. 
68
 Of course, this motivation was presented in a context of belief
that "facing the truth," with subsequent rational action, would have 
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gists, too, expressed disenchantment with the nature of 
man. Two immediate factors also helped account for the 
success of the disillusionist aspect of the new psychology: 
the war experience, when cherished beliefs turned out to 
be propaganda, and the popular impact of science, especially 
evolutionary thinking. One acute contemporary observer 
listed three propositions that were in vogue in the 1920's: 
"That men are moved by the same instincts as the lower 
species; that instinctive conduct is mechanically deter­
mined; and that the reasons conventionally given for con­
duct are mostly sophisticated 'rationalizations'. " 67 
It was during the 1920's that the famous instinct contro­
versy in sociology and psychology occurred, and its contents 
and resolution were often included in expositions of the 
new psychology. One of the chief aspects of the development 
of the psychology of motivation was the appearance of 
dynamic psychologies, in which the concept of instinct was 
used to account for the actions of man.68 Among the lists 
of human instincts that various writers suggested, those of 
Freud and William McDougall predominated. It was in the 
eventual defeat of McDougall's viewpoint that the new 
psychology reflected most interestingly the spirit of 
its times. 
McDougall, writing originally in 1908, had explained 
human behavior in terms of a number of instincts—such 
as the acquisitive and the gregarious—that he found 
expressed in well-refined adult human ways and, specifi­
cally, in civilized institutions.69 The new psychology tended 
either to analyze all behavior back into instincts that are 
67
 George A. Coe, The Motives of Men ( N e w York , 1928) , p . 45 . 
Ibid., Chapters I-VII, gives a good s u m m a r y of the rela t ionship of 
science, World W a r I, and indus t r ia l society to the cult of i r ra t iona l i ty 
of the new psychology. 
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strictly animal, in a traditional sense, such as sex and 
hunger; or, as in behaviorism, instinct was largely dis­
carded and man's behavior construed to be the result of 
accidental associations of primitive visceral and behav­
ioral reactions. It was no accident that behaviorism grew 
out of non-verbal, biological animal psychology. Where 
specifically human drives did show up in the new psychol­
ogy, they tended to have amoral connotations, such as the 
will to power or narcissistic self-love. The glands, as Theo­
dore Dreiser illustrated very well, suggested a somatic 
concomitant for both blind, reflex action and primitive 
instincts as determinants of supposedly adult, civilized 
actions. What he had once referred to as "chemisms" took 
by 1925 the form in the hero of "the Efrit of his own darker 
self." ™ 
That man has bestial passions was of course an ancient 
idea. In addition, Nietzsche and other writers had made 
common the idea that the supposedly compensatory noble 
instincts of man—as posited by many nineteenth-century 
thinkers—were in truth only myths. But this early 
twentieth-century conception of man's passions, emphasiz­
ing his irrationality, differed from Hobbes's conception of 
man in modifying the familiar idea of hedonism and intro­
ducing an element of wilful impulsiveness uncommon for 
some time in Western thinking on man's nature. "The 
gorilla in us," wrote Tridon in 1924, "is starved for fresh 
air, exercise, wild motions, explosive manifestations of 
mirth. And the gorilla in us now and then avenges himself 
by compelling us, in neurotic attacks, to act like a gorilla. 
. . .  "
 n
 This emphasis on the animality of man, however, 
70
 Robert E . Spiller, et al. (eds.) , Literary History of the United 
States (2d rev. ed.; New York, 1953), pp. 1201-2; Theodore Dreiser, 
An American Tragedy (New York, 1925), I I , 56. 
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THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY: FROM NARCISSISM TO SOCIAL CONTROL 381 
did not give the new psychology its distinctive tone. The 
bestial passions tended, in actual exposition, to be rather 
boringly conventional passions; and the will to power, for 
instance, was surprisingly well articulated and adult. The 
new psychology had its impact in emphasizing not the 
bestial so much as the infantile and the abnormal. 
Like other elements of the new psychology, the emphasis 
on the persistence of childish elements in adult behavior 
had developed in the period before World War I. As 
reflected in education and in other areas, America had 
"discovered the child," although in a culture long known 
for its indulgence of children, the child-centered school 
could hardly be described as a surprising development. Bio­
logical thinking of the day suggested that the process of 
growing and maturing—and adapting to the environment 
—both foreshadowed and determined adult patterns of life. 
Freud's assertions that early life patterns would persist 
into adulthood found a receptive audience. The behaviorists 
gloried in bringing infants into the laboratory, using infan­
tile behavior patterns to fill out their general psychology. 
Where in the progressive period the perspective had tended 
to be backward, tracing back the ways in which violations 
of the supposedly natural course of childhood had produced 
effects in adults, in the 1920's the perspective was forward 
looking: the environment and experiences that were pro­
vided for the child were of overwhelming importance 
because of their influence on later life.72 
The cult of child rearing and child mental hygiene that 
was so typical of the twenties signified the concern of the 
 See Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York, 1963), pp. 364-65, 368-69; Lasch, The New Radicalism, 
pp. 86-87; Birnbaum, "Behaviorism in the 1920's," pp. 26-30. Life,
LXXXIII (1924), 24, pictured a nurse in a modern nursery saying, 
"A penny for your complexes, Master John." 
72
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age with the childish—and more specifically, the infantile— 
elements in the hidden self.73 The educators especially 
seized upon the idea of self-expressionism in order to foster 
creativity in children and, presumably, adults. "The crea­
tive impulse is within the child himself," wrote the authors 
of a major pedagogical document of the period.74 This idea 
of course sounded very much like some traditional 
romantic ideas, but it appeared—not always with logical 
consistency—in the "scientific" context of psychoanalysis 
and behaviorism.75 
Since both the animality and infantilism of man were 
emphatically "natural," the deliciously rebellious flavor of 
the new psychology showed up best in the harping of its 
expositors upon the pervasive existence of abnormality in 
supposedly innocent human actions. "Civilization is a study 
in pathology and perversion," asserted one new psycholo­
gist.76 (Nor, it should be added, is there any more effective 
argument justifying one's shortcomings than pointing out 
the prevalence of the same or worse in the population in 
general.) For some, the very exposure of the forbidden 
subject of abnormality was, perhaps understandably, 
unpleasant. "It is certainly somewhat trying," remarked 
the Jesuit psychologist E. Boyd Barrett, "to be reminded 
in every new book on psychology of the abnormal charac­
teristics of pyromaniacs and homosexuals." The appeal of 
73 Very frequent ly when the hidden self expressed itself in neurotic 
ways, they were understood to represent inappropriate adaptations 
essentially infantile in nature. Indeed, "infantile" was used commonly 
as a synonym for "neurotic" when describing thought or behavior. 
There was, in other words, a distinction between the childish content 
or impulse in the hidden self and the choice between adult or infantile 
modes of expressing the content. 
74
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the new psychology, he asserted, did not need to rest on a 
morbid curiosity about side-show freaks.77 
Yet the writers of the new psychology in all its phases 
did exploit—in however sugar-coated a form—expositions 
of abnormality. Tridon in writing thirty-one chapters on 
Psychoanalysis and Love spent two chapters on fetishism, 
two on neurotic lovers, two on non-monogamous love, two 
on jealousy, two on homosexuality, three on sadism-
masochism, and one each (emphasizing abnormality) on 
virginity, modesty, and prostitution. Additional chapters 
likewise contain subheadings such as "Having Her 
Fixation-Fling." 78 The more urbane of the rebellious writ-
era could find in every traditional human institution an 
amazing amount of abnormality. One such author, Samuel 
D. Schmalhausen, must have come close to establishing a 
record in a chapter he entitled "Family Life: A Study in 
Pathology." He not only contended that the "family is the 
cradle of incest" but pictured it as holding its members in 
"neurotic bondage." Parents continuously, he asserted, "are 
predisposing their children to neurotic and psychotic break­
down, to social maladjustment and misery, by preventing 
them from achieving ego-adequacy." And he concluded 
pessimistically about marriage: "When two human beings, 
loaded with defect and derangement [as are all modern 
couples], attempt to bring to one another sexual joy and 
ego-tranquillity and human fellowship, one need not be an 
expert either in statistical reasoning or in psychopathology 
to realize with a start how very few the chances of harmony 
and beauty and fulfillment." 79 
The simultaneous interest in self and interest in the 
abnormal reflected the common concern of the time about 
" "Psychology or Science," New Republic, L I I (1927) , 343. 
78
 Andre Tr idon, Psychoanalysis and Love ( N e w York , 1922) . 
79
 Samuel D. Schmalhausen, "Family Life: A Study in Pathology," 
in V. F. Calverton and Samuel D. Schmalhausen (eds.), The New 
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(New York, 1930), pp. 275-99. 
384 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: THE 192O's 
"normality." The public in general had become vividly 
aware of the idea of normality when intelligence tests 
became standardized and widely publicized. The idea of 
deviation in the form of feeble-mindedness was refined to 
include personality traits. Not surprisingly, therefore, in 
the 1920's a number of personality tests appeared, designed 
to detect personality deviations. So great was the concern 
about normality that a discipline known as industrial 
psychiatry grew up to try to eliminate misfits from industry 
just as they had been screened out of the Army. The mental 
hygiene movement similarly popularized this concern about 
abnormalities of every kind: eccentricities could in a rather 
romantic way take on the quality of portending sinister 
events in the hidden self. The possibility that abnormality 
might include most people—which fascinated the self-
centered—grew not only out of the discovery of abnormality 
in garden-variety aspects of life but out of the publicity 
about shell shock, which underlined the well-established 
idea in popularized psychiatry that it is difficult to draw 
a line between normal and abnormal.80 
As the new psychologists introduced both primitive pas­
sions and abnormal behavior into their expositions, they 
inevitably and characteristically gave much attention to 
sex. The new psychology popularized two ideas: first, the 
importance of sexual desires and drives, and, second, the 
presence of sexual factors in a wide variety of supposedly 
non-sexual phenomena. One psychiatrist in the mental 
hygiene movement, Arthur G. Lane, admitted candidly that 
"The new psychology has created unwarranted antag­
onism in many minds, and morbid curiosity in many others, 
because of the prominence given to the sexual instinct as 
the main driving force that motivates all human conduct." 81 
8 0
 The concept of no rmal i ty and concern about i t is of course a 
ve ry l a r g e subject of which only t he above h in t can be given here. 
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 A r t h u r G. Lane , review of Green, Mind in Action, in Mental 
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The new psychology, with its high sexual content, paral­
leled the sex education movement and the change in moral 
standards traditionally associated with the new freedom of 
women and World War I.82 What was notable about the 
sex content of the new psychology was its adolescent char­
acter—adolescent in consciously sexualizing not only the 
hidden self but all human phenomena, and adolescent in 
using the sexual content for purposes of expressing a more 
general rebelliousness. 
To a surprising extent the very freedom to talk about 
sexual matters generated a great deal of energy devoted to 
testing that freedom, and expositions of the new psychology 
provided a vehicle for discussing in a scientific or reason­
able guise matters that otherwise would have been consid­
ered offensive, forbidden, or just plain puerile. Pornography 
was hidden in the case history; any word could appear in 
print as long as "neurosis" or "complex" appeared with it. 
As disillusionment became an end in itself for the intel­
lectual rebels and their followers, the iconoclasts found that 
imputing sexual qualities and motives to people's actions 
was an effective way to discredit them. The Marxists had, 
of course, for a long time used the conception of marriage 
as legalized prostitution to attack capitalism. In the 1920's 
such general attacks on institutions because of their effects 
on the relations between the sexes—and now with a tithe 
of abnormalities thrown in—flourished. Writer Floyd Dell, 
in his well-informed and sensitive essay on Love in the 
Machine Age, for example, condemned any number of social 
and economic institutions because of their undesirable 
effects on lovemaking.83 The religious establishment was 
82
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especially vulnerable to sexual analysis. The pious naturally 
reacted with anguished objections. Barrett, the Jesuit, for 
example, denounced the idea that religion was simply a dis­
guised expression of sexual instincts. "This blasphemous 
theory has, unfortunately, made its way into current liter­
ature," he admitted. "Hints and innuendos inspired by it 
are dropped here and there. Religious ritual is likened to 
pagan orgies. Devout and pious believers are described as 
neurotic, and in a veiled way it is suggested that they are 
homosexual. Heaven is spoken of as a disguised sex-dream. 
Religious symbols are spoken of as phallic. "8i 
The connection between sexual emancipation and the new 
psychology was clear to everyone. Ben Hecht, testing the 
limits of emancipation, provided a good example by dedi­
cating his work to 
the reformers—the psychopathic ones who publicly and shame­
lessly belabor their own unfortunate impulses; to the reformers 
(once again)—the psychopathic ones trying forever to drown 
their own obscene desires in ear-splitting prayers for their 
fellowman's welfare; to the reformers—the Freudian dervishes 
who masturbate with Purity Leagues, who achieve involved 
orgasms denouncing the depravities of others; to the reform­
ers the psychopathic ones who seek to vindicate their own 
sexual impotencies by padlocking the national vagina, who find 
relief for constipation in forbidding their neighbors the water 
closet. 85 
Nor was sexual rebelliousness the exclusive domain of 
psychoanalysis and its close relatives. The fact that popu­
larizers of the influence of the glands devoted a large part 
of their expositions to the gonads testified not only to their 
business sense but to the beliefs of both the writers and 
8 4
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85 Fantazius Mallare: A Mysterious Oath (Chicago, 1922), p . 13. 
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their readers. Similarly, behaviorism, in the laboratory 
more purely "scientific" than was tolerable to many psy­
chologists, in the hands of Watson and other popularizers 
sounded essentially the same as vulgarized psychoanalysis 
in stressing the importance of proper sexual education and 
the extreme importance of sex in all life matters. 
It was psychoanalysis, nevertheless, that bore most of 
the burden of the common popular association between the 
new psychology and sex. The usual belief was that Freud 
had shown that (1) repressions—presumably sexual in 
nature—were at the root of many nervous illnesses; and 
(2) the less repressed a person was, therefore, the healthier 
he was. This popular conception coincided in time with a 
widespread belief that sexual mores were changing and 
led to the conclusion that psychoanalysis and the whole 
new psychology were partly responsible for the change 
in moral standards. 
Liberated spokesmen for the Jazz Age as well as their 
critics shared this belief. "We studied Freud, argued Jung, 
checked out dreams by Havelock Ellis, and toyed lightly 
with Adler," asserted a precocious teen-age writer. "And 
all these authorities warned us of the danger in repressing 
our normal instincts and desires. " Playwright Rachel 
Crothers, in her heavy-handed satire Expressing Willie,86 
recognized the common belief with the song lyrics, "Express 
Yo'se'f My Chile," in which one is warned not to suppress 
himself but to let all his emotions "rise to the top." Play­
wright Crothers explicitly contrasted the injunction of 1924 
to "Express yo'se'f" with the type of child training and 
advice to young ladies known in a former time and embodied 
in exhortations to suppress one's feelings and impulses. 
Expositors of the new psychology such as Tridon implied 
 Elizabeth Benson, quoted in Hoffman, The Twenties, pp. 89-90. 
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continuously that expressing one's true self—more than 
was customary—would be the royal road to health and 
happiness.87 
The extent of the change wrought by the new psycholo­
gists' tender concern about repression is reflected best in 
the sex education movement. During the 1920's the sex edu­
cators played down their customary emphasis on abstinence 
for the sake of preventing disease from fear of causing too 
much repression. One critic of the new psychology, for 
example, who charged that Schmalhausen's book Why We 
Misbehave deserved to be called Why We Should Misbe­
have, still showed himself remarkably timid about asserting 
that a little repression, at least, is harmless.88 
Unreconstructed critics of the new psychology alone 
remained relatively unconcerned about repression, possibly 
because they understood the fundamental issues. One of the 
most vitriolic, Harvey Wickham, recognized the similarity 
between popularized psychoanalysis and behaviorism. Both 
are materialistic, he wrote, and both are mechanistic. "The 
two philosophies," he continued, "have but one effect—to 
 For example, Andre Tridon, Psychoanalysis: Its Theory and 
Practice (New York, 1919), chap. xxi. Although often invoking the 
idea of sublimation and socially useful expressions of forbidden im­
pulses, such wri t ings as Tridon's lacked the moralistic flavor of 
p rewar expositions of psychoanalysis. The question has often been 
raised whether sexual behavior did change in the Fitzgerald period 
or not, and if so, whether fear of repressions—learned from the new 
psychology—was a cause or j u s t a symptom or rationalization for 
the change. I t was t rue t h a t adventure-seeking young ladies went to 
Greenwich Village and cast off their repressions. But had Freud 
been unknown (or known more accurate ly) , the adventure-seekers 
could have been asser t ing their emancipation ra the r than gratifying 
their impulses, and, indeed, had done jus t t ha t in an earlier period. 
(This example was suggested by Waldo Frank , who knew Greenwich 
Village well, in an in terview). Without a t tempt ing to answer probably 
unanswerable questions, it is still possible to observe tha t the new 
psychology was very frequently associated with expressions of new 
at t i tudes (regardless of behavior) toward sexual mat te rs . 
88 S. C. Kohs, "We've Gone Psychiatr ic ," Survey, LXIV (1930), 
189-90. See in general Journal of Social Hygiene for these years. 
THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY: FROM NARCISSISM TO SOCIAL CONTROL 389 
sanction laissez-faire in matters of sex. A verbalized but 
otherwise unconditioned 'gut-reaction' is but a conscious 
'libido* freed from the suppression which might create a 
'complex.* Dr. Watson's superiority lies in his insistence 
upon education where sex is not involved. Freud's 
superiority is literary." 89 
Even the sexual emphases of the new psychology, in the 
context of emphasizing man's wants rather than his duties, 
were often understood to be self-indulgent, or at the least 
self-centered.90 This theme of egocentricity flourished espe­
cially in the psychoanalytic period of the new psychology. 
The behaviorists also incorporated it by emphasizing, for 
example, the uniqueness of each organism. With the behav­
ioristic phase, however, came the second characteristic of 
the new psychology, one that set popularized psychology of 
the later 1920's off from the immediate postwar period and, 
in one way, connected it to the 1930's. This was the theme 
of control—social control. 
SOCIAL CONTROL 
When the psychologists used the mental test in World 
War I to bring attention to the usefulness of psychology, 
they gave impetus to the development of an important 
aspect of modern bureaucratic society.91 In the 1920's the 
mental tests were used primarily in the schools, but as part 
of the new psychology were also applied to industry. During 
the war the military had adopted three devices from the 
psychologists: the intelligence tests to weed out those whom 
89
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it was not worthwhile to train; systems of rating subor­
dinates so as to introduce a semblance of objectivity; and 
aptitude tests. After the war, segments of industry, with 
much encouragement from psychologists, ostentatiously 
adopted or at least experimented with the three devices.92 
The industrial use of psychological tests reflected a major 
shift in attempts at scientific management. Scientific man­
agement had, in the progressive period, typically focused 
on the job, as exemplified in the Taylorization, or rational­
ization, of industry and time-motion study. Gradually the 
conception grew that centering attention on the worker 
rather than the job might turn up ways to increase output. 
From the one-best-way approach to a task, the new thinking 
turned to a recognition of individual differences in the 
workers. Thus personnel work, with its own literature, sci­
entific management, and paternalism in industry, with its 
dual goals of increasing production and killing unionism 
with kindness, all called attention to the importance of the 
worker. After stable employment conditions replaced the 
high labor turnover period of the immediate postwar years, 
and after the evident failure of much of the testing to 
achieve practical results—around 1925—interest in mental 
tests declined. But the basic quest of industry for a prac­
tical industrial psychology remained.93 
The new psychology, as a psychology of motivation, had 
great potential for any applied psychology. As one pro­
fessional psychologist noted at the time, "A rather insistent 
demand for an adequate psychology of motivation has 
always been made by those who are interested in the con­
trol of human nature. It has come from economists, soci­
9 2
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ologists, educators, advertisers, scout masters, and investi­
gators of crime. "fl4 The businessmen, especially, 
because of their interest in controlling human nature, 
wanted to know how to predict it. As Loren Baritz has 
pointed out, with the growth of large bureaucratic organi­
zations, managers needed to avoid the unpredictable, even 
the unpredictable human element. "The goal was to create 
an organization so perfect that it would be run by 
law, not men." 95 
In the first stage of the attempts to apply the new psy­
chology as such to industry, writers suggested that indus­
trialists take into account the instinctual drives of their 
employees. Ordway Tead, for example, produced a book on 
Instinct in Industry in which, for the sake of completeness, 
he even took up "the sex instinct" as applied to the factory. 
Since Tead (who used primarily McDougall's conception of 
instincts) spoke chiefly in terms of the direct expression 
of instincts, the chapter dealt mostly with seduction and 
stands as a parody on itself and the not uncommon idea of 
applying general concepts of instincts directly to the prob­
lem of control of labor.96 
Meanwhile, the psychology of advertising and selling had 
developed early in the century as one of the first areas in 
which psychology could be applied.97 For some time the 
standard motivations of man appeared in the literature of 
both psychology and business as elements to which ad­
vertisers and salesmen could appeal. Then in the period of 
the new psychology, while the basic idea of appealing to 
94
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men's wants remained the same, advertising psychologists 
largely abandoned the concept of human instincts as such 
and turned instead to the specific, determinable wants of 
men. As Henry C. Link, an advertising psychologist, ex­
plained, the new psychology of selling led to "studying peo­
ple's wants and buying habits as the best clue to what they 
will buy, in contrast with the older emphasis on overcoming 
their sales resistance to articles which we think they should 
buy." To Link the market survey was fundamentally be­
havioristic, and certainly this departure represented the 
applied psychology version of the movement—again, largely 
behavioristic—to avoid speaking in terms of theoretical 
human instincts.08 
A similar development, a second stage, within industrial 
psychology was even more revealing. The personnel special­
ists began to talk about the specific wants of the individual 
workers rather than generalizing about them. Control of the 
workers and preclusion of "labor problems" was now 
thought of in terms of dealing with the concrete and im­
mediate set of desires of each worker. The wants could 
either be satisfied or they could be tempered, diverted, or 
otherwise controlled. Although writers on industrial psy­
chology tended to assert that they had the workers' good 
at heart, control obviously could lead to exploitation." 
When Benjamin Stolberg, a well-known Marxist writer, 
denounced psychology for its sellout to capitalism, he could 
present a strong case. Not only had a group of leading 
scientific psychologists formed their own corporation—The 
Psychological Corporation—to spread the use of psychology 
by businessmen (at considerable profit to the psychologists, 
98
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as it turned out), but industrial psychological consultants 
were making effective use of the idea of dealing with 
immediate wants of workers so as to prevent either a 
major problem or any questioning of the situation. The 
worker was supposed to be at fault, not the system, and 
he was supposed to adjust to it. "The key-word of psychol­
ogy today," asserted Mary Parker Follett, one of the best-
known writers on industrial psychology, "is desire." She 
developed a system of solving labor problems by open and 
candid analysis of the wants and desires of the parties 
involved, during which process the reduction of the conflict 
to simple, specific elements took much of the fight out of 
both sides. A smart manager, she said, would study habits 
and reaction patterns and anticipate them, thereby bringing 
them under control.100 
Perhaps it was appropriate that in the "business civiliza­
tion" of the 1920's the concept of social control should have 
had experimental application in industry and that important 
techniques in the bureaucratic manipulation of people should 
have been pioneered by business. The idea of social control 
was an old one. Originally the concept had centered on the 
informal controls that society exercises over the individual, 
the mores or folkways. Out of the possibility of manipulat­
ing these informal controls rather than, say, laws or orders, 
came the idea of social management.101 
After the war, many intellectuals sensed that old social 
patterns had disintegrated or were in the process of doing 
so. Many of these thinkers therefore eliminated the concept 
 Benjamin Stolberg, " T h e Degrada t ion of Amer ican Psychology," 
Nation, CXXXI (1930) , 395-98. See, for example , E . E . Sou tha rd , 
"The Modern Specialist in Unrest: A Place for the Psychiatrist in 
Industry," Mental Hygiene, IV (1920), 550-63. M. P. Follett, "The 
Psychological Foundations: Constructive Conflict," in Henry C. Met­
calf (ed.), Scientific Foundations of Business Administration (Balti­
more, 1926), pp. 114-31. 
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of determining social patterns from among the major 
underpinnings of their world views; such thinkers instead 
began utilizing the new psychology of the inner self.102 It 
was inevitable, then, that the new psychology, while 
replacing the older assumptions on which previous ideas of 
social control had been based, would contribute new 
approaches to the subject. The behaviorists, especially, 
explicitly emphasized the idea of predicting behavior in 
order to control it. Advocates of the new objective psychol­
ogy were acutely aware of what one avant-garde writer dis­
covered only in 1924: its "crying and significant social 
meanings." 103 
In the new psychology, writers did find aspects of the 
individual that might be used for purposes of social control. 
" . The disillusioned—not disheartened—liberalism of to­
day," observed William Ernest Hocking, a Harvard Univer­
sity philosopher, in explaining contemporary interest in the 
problem of human nature, "turns itself heart and soul to 
psychological enquiry. It perceives that there is a human 
nature which invites the use of the same principle that 
Bacon applied to physical nature,—something having laws 
of its own which must be obediently examined before we 
can hope to control it." 104 It was in searching for means of 
control that the postwar thinkers found the irrational. In 
1925, in his book describing Means of Social Control, sociol­
ogist F. E. Lumley expressed this fact in his conclusion that 
"control by the methods discussed has been accompanied 
by and charged with a very large amount of primitive or 
childish feeling." And Lipsky, in his Man the Puppet: The 
Art of Controlling Minds, remarked on "the growing real­
102
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1930: A Comment on American Civilization in the Post-War Years (Boston, 1935), p. 248. 
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ization" that knowing "the nature of the psychological dis­
positions make[s] control possible." 103 
Just as the businessman found that direct appeals to 
basic human nature would not lead to control, so thoughtful 
Americans learned from the use of propaganda during the 
war the way in which the irrational in man can be mani­
pulated. Walter Lippmann, in Public Opinion,106 one of the 
most influential books of the decade, stated the common 
conclusion that predictability does not follow from knowing 
the basic drives and interests; what was needed for social 
control was the knowledge of how each individual will per­
ceive a situation, how his conceptualization of reality as 
he knows it will in turn activate his drives and instincts, 
not in their primitive form but in their practical, habitual, 
and adult form. In business the market survey provided one 
model; in public life, public opinion polls. The test of valid­
ity was not hypothetical drives but actual behavior. 
The new psychology contributed, therefore, in many ways 
to the preoccupation of the people of the 1920's with con­
trolling other people. An outstanding example was H. A. 
Overstreet's famous book Influencing Human Behavior.107 
Here was a chapter, "The Appeal to Wants." Here was the 
idea of changing people by changing their habit systems. 
Here were explanations of behavior such as "rationaliza­
tion." All of them were synthesized in a context of common 
sense to the end of enlarging the individual's feeling of 
power and control, on the one hand, and on the other hand, 
self-valuation and self-importance. 
It is easy to show how the new psychology reflected and 
exemplified main currents in American society and culture 
in the 1920's: how self-centered, self-indulgent attitudes 
and an emphasis on men's desires laid the foundation for 
ids Freder ick E lmore Lumley, Means of Social Control ( N e w York, 
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social control, how the search for the interior self led to 
attempts at external control of people.108 At first used by 
business in the twenties, the new psychology emphasis on 
social control portended much for the 1930's. 
The new psychology was involved in the expression of 
many phenomena and attitudes distinctive to the twenties. 
It was part and parcel of the change in manners and morals 
that F. Scott Fitzgerald and Frederick Lewis Allen por­
trayed so vividly. And the new psychology was also involved 
in trends of the decade that may eventually appear more 
significant than changing moral standards (such as, for 
example, the remarkable intellectual assault on the institu­
tion of motherhood) but which scholars have thus far 
hardly explored.109 In most of these examples the role of 
the new psychology was no greater than that of other 
cultural forces, such as the popular discovery of primitive 
cultures through the work of such anthropologists as 
Margaret Mead. The new psychology was so involved in 
cultural changes of the 1920's as ultimately to raise the 
question whether its importance can be determined with any 
precision or even suggested meaningfully. 
But important as it was as the mirror and index to an 
era, the new psychology provided, if not the tool for cultural 
change, at least the avenue of its expression. The new 
psychology suggested a meaningful way to work out in 
practice the relatively vague concepts of social control that 
had developed in the progressive period. 
The new social control movement adopted from the health 
crusades of an earlier period the concept of improving the 
108
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clusion in a different context : "The study of the inner man could 
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world not by social action but by a patient program of 
individual treatment of large numbers of people. As tuber­
culosis and syphilis were fought not primarily by general 
laws but by curing everyone who was sick, so the mental 
hygienists and other new psychologists wanted to change 
the social mass—one atom at a time. The change can be 
epitomized in the shift from general prohibition laws to the 
individual treatment of the alcoholic by a psychiatrist—or 
Alcoholics Anonymous. 
More clearly than even the businessmen, the social 
workers showed the impact of the new psychology in their 
emphasis upon individual therapy and adjustment and its 
use as a melioristic device. Social workers had been a power­
ful and important element in the prewar progressive move­
ment and in harmony with that movement had emphasized 
the role of environment in the lives of their clients. As a 
consequence, the social workers gave much attention to 
general social reform measures as well as to the dependent 
people with whom they worked directly. By the late twenties 
casework, under the influence of psychiatry, tended to 
abstract the client from his "environmental and cultural 
milieu" and to emphasize his internal attitudes and even 
his emotional life. The inner man, not the outer environ­
ment, was to be adjusted.110 By offering the technique of 
conditioning, the behaviorists, too, furnished a concrete 
method whereby their aspirations for social control could 
be worked out in practice, case by case, person by person, 
without any troublesome recourse to general social reform. 
The new psychology of the twenties, whether in the form 
of mental hygiene, psychiatric social work, or business per­
sonnel and welfare practices, provided the technique for 
110
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modern bureaucratic society: m in addition to control 
through mass movements, advertising, the propaganda and 
voluntary actions typical of, say, World War I, now there 
was control through the bureaucratic society in which the 
inner need, the individual desire, was carefully manipulated 
and indulged, person by person, so as to prevent the childish, 
brutal, perverse, or savage in any man's hidden self from 
disrupting the predictability of civilization.112 
The agencies of control in bureaucratic society were still 
the experts, as in the progressive period, but now their ex­
pertise was directed toward individuals rather than general 
problems. Floyd Dell, who typified the intellectuals of the 
early twentieth century, reflected the sentiment generated 
by the new psychology in suggesting that social salvation 
lay in the deus ex clinica, the psychiatric treatment of every­
one.113 More typical of the extravagant bureaucratic society 
to come was the team approach, the committee of experts, 
looking not for desirable social changes, but trying to help 
the individual in a world taken as given. 
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Metropolis and Suburb:

The Changing American City

CHARLES N. GLAAB 
THE facts of demography, presented in their customary-
statistical form, are not the kind of information likely to 
arouse public attention and controversy. Yet at each de­
cennial census from the mid-nineteenth century on, com­
mentators on the American social scene had noted with 
alarm the steady and seemingly inexorable urbanization of 
the country's population. To a nation whose traditions 
emphasized the value of the sturdy, independent farmer on 
his freehold, the urban-rural ratio in the 1920 census had 
particular symbolic importance: for the first time, the 
census reported, a majority of the people in the United 
States could be classified as urban, with 51.2 per cent of 
the population living in incorporated municipalities of 2,500 
or more. 
In a sense this finding only confirmed a long-standing 
reality. Nineteenth-century changes in technology, trans­
portation, and communication had assured that the city 
would shape the character of American society. By 1920 
the customs and the standards of the city had to a large 
extent already been imposed on the countryside. But this 
did not mean diminishment in the intensity of the anti­
urban sentiments that had pervaded American culture. On 
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the contrary, they became even more vigorous, for the 
"agrarian myth" was part of an ideology that had evolved 
in defense of groups losing their economic power and social 
status in society. And ideologies may be most effective 
when they least reflect current reality. 
During the decade of the 1920's the old city-country 
polarity frequently influenced events—in the effort to re­
strict immigration, in the struggle over prohibition, in the 
crusade for religious fundamentalism, and in the election 
of 1928. Sometimes, the polarity now became that of small 
town and large city, but this did not alter the argument. 
People could still accept at face value the famous photo­
graph of Calvin Coolidge seated on a hay wagon with rake 
in hand, his clothes spotless, while in the rear his assistants 
stand by an automobile waiting to whisk him back to the 
city. Writers of articles and stories in popular magazines 
still employed the imagery of the soulless city. To find "real 
values," to regain honesty, courage, and independence, one 
had to flee the city. "I have had to do things, terrible 
things, things no decent man should have done," says a 
hero of a Cosmopolitan short story who finds peace in the 
wilderness. "Thank God that's all behind me now. Out here 
I can be a real person again." 1 On a higher level, twelve 
southerners in their notable manifesto I'll Take My Stand, 
published at the end of the decade, defended an idyllic 
rural life that probably never existed. "Back to the land," 
a position popularized by Ralph Borsodi, who established 
a subsistence homestead outside New York City in 1920 
and preached the joys of the Thoreauvian way of life, be­
came an organized movement that influenced federal re­
settlement policy with the coming of the depression. Its 
advocates offered a classical Jeffersonian defense of the 
farm against the city. "The farms have always produced 
 R. B. Gray, "Tiger, Tiger," quoted in an unpublished paper by 
Lionel Johnson, "Images of Urbanity: City People in the Popular 
Literature of the Twenties." 
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our great leaders in finance, industry and statesmanship," 
Robert A. Green testified before a House committee. "The 
vast population must depart from the congested industrial 
centers and cities and once again become self-sustaining on 
our vast and fertile farms, pasture, and prairie lands. Herein 
lies the real hope for the bright destiny of America." 2 
The traditional view of country and city, which persisted 
during the 1920's, was that they represented distinct and 
opposed environments. In the nineteenth century, and 
earlier of course, there was a measure of truth in the view, 
particularly in a physical sense. Despite the presence of 
suburbs, which might date back to early in the century, 
cities were reasonably compact; their limits were certain; 
a few miles journey from the center of any downtown 
brought one to the rural countryside. But in the period 
falling roughly between World War I and the early 1930's, 
this situation was drastically altered. Cities began to spread 
out; suburbs multiplied; small towns were joined to larger 
cities by bands of residential development; the metropolis 
extended its influence over vast adjacent areas that might 
vary in population density or in land use but that often 
were not really distinguishable as either country or city. 
The emergence of the sprawling super-city, with its new 
patterns of urbanization, added new dimensions to the tra­
ditional urban problems. Although everyday debate might 
still center on a conflict between city and country, many 
thinkers and reformers in the 1920's began to develop new 
conceptions of the social environment that emphasized the 
community, the neighborhood, and the region. What was 
needed, they suggested, was not to solve just a single urban 
problem but rather to reorder a whole environment that 
I'll Take My Stand: The South and the Agrarian Tradition (Harper Torchbooks Edition, New York, 1962). See particularly 
Andrew Nelson Lytle, "The Hind Tit," pp. 201-45; Ralph Borsodi, 
Flight from the City (New York, 1933); Green is quoted in Paul K. 
Conkin, Tomorrow A New World: The New Deal Community Pro­
gram (Ithaca, N.Y., 1959), p. 33. 
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often transcended city and country. In the 1880's the 
rapidly growing cities had seemed a major threat to Amer­
ican civilization. In the 1920's many saw the huge metropolis 
that had begun to obliterate all the old distinctions between 
city and country as the same kind of danger. In that group 
of trenchant essays on American life, Civilization in the 
United States: An Inquiry by Thirty Americans, Lewis 
Mumford, who became one of the better-known students 
of the city during the decade, sounded a theme that in­
formed much of the analysis of urban society during the 
period. "Our metropolitan civilization is not a success," he 
wrote. "It is a different kind of wilderness from that which 
we have been deflowered—but the feral rather than the 
humane quality is dominant; it is still a wilderness. The 
cities of America must learn to remould our mechanical 
and financial regime; for if metropolitanism continues they 
are probably destined to fall by its weight." 3 
A wealth of statistical material documents the dramatic 
growth of the metropolitan super-city, which many observ­
ers found to be a key force shaping American civilization 
in the 1920's.4 The large American cities substantially in­
creased in population during the decade—New York by 23.3 
per cent from 5,620,048 to 6,930,446; Chicago by 25 per 
cent from 2,701,705 to 3,376,438; Detroit by 57.4 per cent 
from 996,321 to 1,568,662; Los Angeles by 114.7 per cent 
3
 Lewis Mumford, "The City," in Harold E. Stearns (ed.), Civili­
zation in the United States: An Inquiry by Thirty Americans (New 
York, 1922), pp. 19-20. 
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from 576,673 to 1,238,048. Even more significant was the 
population growth in areas near large cities. As early as 
1880 the federal census had noted the metropolitan region 
that had begun to form around New York City. In 1910 
the census bureau, noting the inadequacy of the simple 
definition of "urban" based on the classification of people 
in municipalities of a certain size, applied the concept gen­
erally and presented data on central cities and their con­
tiguous related areas for twenty-five metropolitan districts. 
Whether one employs this older device or the more refined 
device of the standard metropolitan area, which was intro­
duced in 1950 and applied to past censuses, the conclusions 
that emerge from an examination of population change are 
comparable. First, there was a great increase in the size 
of the larger metropolitan areas. Nearly 71 per cent of 
the total population growth in the period from 1920 to 1930 
occurred in the metropolitan districts, and much of this 
occurred in the larger ones. The New York-Northeastern 
New Jersey metropolitan district, for example, had a popu­
lation growth greater than the gain in 28 states and the 
Chicago district more than the gain in 21 states. 
TABLE 1 
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Second, after 1920 the outlying areas of metropolitan 
regions (as demonstrated in the statistics on "metropolitan 
rings" outside the central cities) grew much faster than 
the central cities themselves. 
TABLE 2 
GROWTH OF STANDARD METROPOLITAN AREAS, 1900-1940 
RATE OF GROWTH DURING PRECEDING DECADB POPULATION IN 
YEAR NUMBER DISTRICTS IN 
MILLIONS SMA Total Central Cities Rings 
1900 52 24.1 
1910 71 34.5 32.6 35.3 27.6 
1920 94 46.1 25.2 26.7 22.4 
1930 115 61.0 27.0 23.3 34.2 
1940 125 67.1 8.3 5.1 13.8 
The decade from 1920 to 1930 saw the complete emergence 
of the modern residential suburb, and this was reflected 
in spectacular growth rates for some of the better-known 
suburbs: Beverly Hills, 2485.0 per cent, Glendale, 363.5, 
Inglewood, 492.8, Huntington Park, 444.9 (suburbs of Los 
Angeles) ; Cleveland Heights, 234.4, Shaker Heights, 1000.4; 
Garfield Heights, 511.3 (suburbs of Cleveland) ; Grosse 
Pointe Park, 724.6, Ferndale, 689.9 (suburbs of Detroit); 
Webster Groves, 74.0, Maplewood, 70.3, Richmond Heights, 
328.3 (suburbs of St. Louis) ; Elmwood Park, 716.7, Oak 
Park, 60.5, Park Ridge, 207.9 (suburbs of Chicago). Numer­
ous new towns and villages appeared around large cities, as 
demonstrated in the incorporation statistics for the decade. 
Of the 38 new incorporations in Illinois, 26 were located 
within the metropolitan regions of Chicago or St. Louis; 
of the 33 in Michigan, 22 were suburbs of Detroit; and of 
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Ohio's 55 incorporations, 29 were near Cleveland. Cities in 
the 2,500-10,000 bracket showed a rapid growth rate for 
the period, chiefly because so many of them were located 
on the fringes of metropolitan areas.5 
Many of the specialized functions that had been centered 
within the city were also suburbanized in the decade of the 
1920's. In 1919, for example, 11 central cities in the 40 
largest manufacturing counties had accounted for 85 per 
cent of the nation's manufacturing workers; by 1937 this 
share had fallen to just under 60 per cent. The number of 
wage earners in the eleven central cities decreased during 
the period from 2,045,789 to 1,808,692, while in the outlying 
areas the number increased from 365,403 to 1,218,465. The 
bulk of the increase occurred during the period from 1919 
to 1929, when most new factory construction took place 
outside of large cities. The growth of industrial suburbs 
was an important aspect of suburbanization during the 
1920's. Similarly, many of the commercial functions of 
the nineteenth-century city showed a marked tendency to 
deconcentration during the period.6 
A number of influences contributed to the decentralization 
of cities. Cheap electric power, which could now be trans­
mitted over considerable distances, freed manufacturing 
from centralized steam power. Improvements in communi­
cation, particularly the telephone, permitted information 
to be transmitted nearly instantly over great distances. 
Rapid fixed transportation systems contributed to the 
greater mobility of labor. But the most important develop­
ment stimulating rapid suburbanization in the 1920's was, 
of course, the mass use of the automobile. At the turn of 
the century the automobile was still only a toy of the rich, 
5
 McKenzie, The Metropolitan Community, pp. 183, 71. 
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with only 8,000 motor vehicles registered in 1900. By 1910 
the number had grown to 468,500; in 1915, to 2,490,932. 
Then came the tremendous postwar expansion of the in­
dustry: motor vehicle registration jumped from 9,239,161 
in 1920 to 19,940,724 in 1925 to 26,531,999 in 1930.7 Enough 
automobiles were in use to put the entire population of the 
United States on the road at one time. 
In the first two decades of the century, cities had spread 
out along the lines of interurban railroads, and the subur­
banized sections of the metropolis resembled thin tentacles 
extending from the central city in radial fashion. Highways, 
particularly in older and larger cities like Chicago and 
New York, first tended to follow the established railroad 
lines. The new residential and industrial suburbs made 
possible by the automobile became part of the older pattern 
of growth. Gradually, however, as road-building greatly ex­
panded during the decade, the interstices of the metropoli­
tan areas began to be filled in. New cities like Los Angeles, 
whose metropolitan district had grown to 2,318,526 by 
1930, lacked railway systems and spread out along streets 
and highways that opened new routes of travel. As a con­
sequence, cities that were a product of the motor age did 
not develop the highly specialized, clearly defined central 
business districts characteristic of older cities. The trans­
portation systems of older cities, on the other hand, still 
tended, even after the automobile came into general use, 
to funnel traffic into the center, greatly intensifying the 
problem of congestion.8 
7
 Historical Statistics of the United States 1?'89-19%5 (Washington, 
D.C., 1949), p. 223.
8
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Values," in Jean Labatut and Wheaton J. Lane (eds.), Highways in 
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During the latter part of the 1920's, engineers perfected, 
and governments adopted, the various devices that were 
part of a high-speed system of highway transportation— 
the grade separation of highway from city street, the traffic 
circle, and the divided dual highway. These techniques, 
along with new bridges such as the George Washington in 
New York and the Camden-Philadelphia, and an innovation 
such as the Holland Tunnel under the Hudson, permitted 
easier movement of automobile traffic throughout the huge, 
sprawling metropolitan region. By the end of the decade, 
however, the rush-hour, weekend, and holiday traffic jam 
had become all too familiar to many city dwellers.9 The 
institution during the 1920's of comprehensive urban traffic 
systems involved a high degree of governmental control and 
planning; this, and many of the actions of municipalities, 
runs counter to the established conception of the laissez­
faire character of public policy during the period. 
The automobile, in addition to changing the spatial pat­
tern and organization of established cities, also added a 
new dimension to one of the oldest economic activities as­
sociated with urbanization—the promotion of new cities 
and urban real-estate speculation. The celebrated Florida 
land boom of mid-decade was tied to the automobile. Tour­
ists from the northeastern seaboard, by driving south for 
only a few days, could escape winter temporarily. During 
the early twenties people flocked to Florida in ever increas­
ing numbers. Hundreds of promoters and salesmen went 
to work selling lots—usually on option through a "binder"— 
and advertising new town sites. Much of the boom went 
on in Miami, which grew from a population of 30,000 in 
 Spencer Miller, Jr., "History of the Modern Highway in the 
United States," in Labatut and Lane, Highways in Our National 
Life, pp. 106-7. For contemporary accounts of traffic problems, see 
"Los Angeles and Its Motorjam," Literary Digest, LXXXI (1924), 
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XXX (1924), 612-15. 
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1920 to 75,000 by 1925. But, as on so many past urban 
frontiers opened by transportation, fabulous claims were 
advanced for fabulous new cities—Silver Heights, Coral 
Gables, Picture Bay, Montezuma Manors, Sea Cove Crest, 
and Biscayne Bay. The number of lots platted in Florida 
during the boom, according to some estimates, reached 20 
million, which with a little overcrowding would have been 
sufficient to house the entire population of the United States. 
Large profits were sometimes realized in series of frenzied 
property transactions. Before the boom a New Yorker 
bought a stretch of land in West Palm Beach at a low 
figure and sold it for $800,000 in 1923. The tract was then 
turned into city lots that sold for one and a half million 
dollars; by 1925 the tract was evaluated at four million 
dollars. One Carl Fisher bought a tract in Miami Beach for 
$8,000,000, paying $3,000,000 down. Two weeks later he 
had sold it for $11,000,000, collecting a down payment of 
$4,000,000. The boom continued through 1925; early in 
1926 it began to fall off slightly as fewer people appeared 
in Florida for the winter. A severe hurricane struck the 
state on September 18, 1926, turned many of the shoddily 
constructed developments to ruins, ended the boom, and 
wiped out virtually all the ambitious speculators. Although 
in the long run a good share of the land involved in the 
boom was utilized as urban property, as late as ten years 
afterward the bulk of the lots were weed-grown or under 
water.10 
The Florida land boom is often considered another bizarre 
episode of a decade of excess. Yet it was part of a pattern of 
overdevelopment of land for urban purposes encouraged by 
 For a colorful account of the Florida land boom, see Frederick 
Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday (Bantam Edition, New York, 1959), 
pp. 191-205. A basic article is Homer Vanderblue, "The Florida Land 
Boom," Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics, III (1927), 
113-31. See also Eugene Rachlis and John E. Marqusee, The Land 
Lords (New York, 1963), pp. 87-130. 
10
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the use of the automobile. Portions of Los Angeles County 
experienced subdivision development similar to Florida; 
75 per cent of the total platted area of Burbank, California, 
for example, was vacant in the early 1930's. In 1929, 
175,000 of Cleveland's 375,000 lots were empty; over 65 
per cent of the lot area in Duluth, 50 per cent in Portland, 
Maine, 30 per cent in El Paso was unused in the early 
1930's. Similar premature subdivisions occurred in the 
metropolitan area of New York. The announcement of plans 
for the George Washington Bridge set off a boom in Bergen 
County, New Jersey, characterized by many of the features 
of the Florida boom. A large section of farm land was 
platted and divided by paper streets; lots were sold at 
auction, through high-pressure mail campaigns, and by 
newspapers as part of their subscription efforts. But little 
of the area was actually developed. During the 1920's lots 
sufficient for all the inhabitants of the five boroughs of 
New York were platted on Long Island. By late in the 
decade, nearly half these lots had become county property 
owing to unpaid taxes. The chaotic development of sub­
divisions in the 1920's greatly complicated the problems of 
urban leaders in trying to provide municipal services over 
vast thinly settled areas and in attempting to establish 
some degree of social order on the rapidly burgeoning 
American metropolises.11 
In addition to leading to vast, excessive subdivision de­
velopment, the urban land boom of the 1920's radically in­
flated property values in the heart of cities. Particularly 
where automobile routes tended to follow older fixed forms 
of urban transportation—which had been built in a fashion 
to funnel people to central points in the city—considerable 
expansion took place in the central business districts. Ex­
11
 Urban Planning and Land Policies: Volume II of the Supple­
mentary Report of the Urbanism Committee to the National Resources
Committee (Washington, D.C., 1939), pp. 217-19. 
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pansion contributed to an optimism that caused property 
values to rise. In 1920 the total value of land in American 
cities of over 30,000 population—only about one-fifth of one 
per cent of all the land in the United States—was estimated 
at $25 billion; by 1926 this figure had doubled to $50 billion. 
During the same period the value of American farm land 
dropped from 55 to 37 billion dollars, a figure 33 per cent 
less than the value of land in cities above 30,000. Real 
estate on Manhattan Island was assessed at over five billion 
dollars in 1930, which was more than the value of the farm 
land in 23 states in 1925. The corner of State and Madison 
in the heart of Chicago's Loop was leased during the 
decade at a rate of $50,000 a front foot, a figure equivalent 
to $21,780,000 an acre. One small holding at 1 Wall Street 
in New York City sold for $100,000 a front foot, a rate of 
nearly $44,000,000 an acre.12 
To some extent, all cities experienced a similar inflation 
of land values, but this did not occur in uniform fashion 
through downtown districts. In Milwaukee, for example, 
the land occupied by the taller buildings of the city ranging 
from six to twenty-four stories increased in valuation by 
80 per cent between 1920 and 1930 and the buildings them­
selves by 95 per cent. Yet the assessed value of the rest 
of the land in the downtown district actually decreased by 
30 per cent while the assessed value of buildings increased 
only slightly. In general, when the upward expansion of 
business districts in cities supplied the need for additional 
commercial space, the commercial core of the city tended 
to shrink away from neighboring blighted areas, contribut­
ing to additional slums and blight. This might cause some 
drop in speculative land values, as demonstrated in the 
Milwaukee example, but land values were still too high to 
permit the sites to be used for any new construction besides 
 John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 1921-1933 (Harper
Torchbook Edition, 1963), p. 117; Hoyt, "The Influence of Highways,"
in Labatut and Lane, Highways in Our National Life, p. 204. 
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commercial buildings and expensive apartments. Since only 
a limited amount of space was needed for these purposes, 
many sections of the downtown remained blighted, and the 
process of decay continued.13 
The deconcentration permitted by the automobile did have 
the desirable effect of relieving population congestion in the 
center of cities, a long-standing urban problem that had 
developed in some eastern cities early in the nineteenth cen­
tury. Older parts of St. Louis along the river, for example, 
lost 50,000 people between 1910 and 1930, resulting in the 
lowering of densities throughout the city to below 80 
persons per acre, but the remaining residential areas in the 
interior of the city had by the early 1930's turned into 
slums.14 Suburbanization in the 1920's extended the oppor­
tunity for individual home ownership and permitted a 
number of people to live in better surroundings, but it was 
part of a process of changing urban development that led 
to deterioration and decay of the heart of cities. Many of 
the familiar problems of today's cities had their origin 
in this decade of urban growth tied to the use of the 
automobile. 
The general inflation of city land values and the expand­
ing prosperity of many sections of the economy during the 
1920's stimulated the great era of skyscraper-building in 
American cities. The Woolworth Building of New York, 
completed in 1913, set the style. Chicago's group of towers 
along the Chicago River built in the early years of the 
decade differed little from the new "Woolworth Gothic" 
buildings that sprang up in New York. Cleveland, Pitts­
burgh, San Francisco, and Kansas City developed the 
jagged skylines distinctively characteristic of the twentieth-
century American city. By 1929 American cities had 377 
skyscrapers of more than 20 stories in height, largely built 
13
 Urban Planning and Land Policies, pp. 269-70. 
14
 Ibid., p. 222. 
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without concern for the character of the surrounding urban 
space and without concern for the patterns of traffic created 
by the buildings. Even on the cities of the plains the sky­
scraper was as much demanded as on the tight land plots 
of lower Manhattan Island. "A 60-story tower in New 
York evokes a 70-story tower in Chicago," wrote the archi­
tect Hugh Ferriss in 1929. "What is more serious, a 60­
story tower in New York evokes a 70-story tower directly 
across the street. The skyscraper is said to be America's 
premier architectual contribution to date, popular fancy 
pictures 70-story skyscrapers side by side for miles." 15 
Many of the nation's tallest buildings were begun in 1928 
and 1929 and only completed after the depression. The 
most famous skyscraper of all, the Empire State Building 
was finished in 1930 and for many years was a white ele­
phant in a city that during the depression had more than 
enough office space. Although architects criticized the sky­
scraper for its lack of esthetic distinction and planners 
criticized it for its contribution to grave traffic congestion, 
it was through the jagged towering skylines of great cities 
that many observers perceived the character of the new 
urban civilization. The German director Fritz Lang was in­
spired to make his classic motion picture "Metropolis," with 
its striking vision of the urban future, after a visit to Man­
hattan in the mid-1920's. The French historian Bernard 
Fay, who visited New York late in the decade, echoed the 
sentiments of many travelers to the city in finding the mass 
of skyscrapers an appropriate symbol of a new order: 
The very thing which I admire most in New York is its adapta­
tion to the continent. In this sense, its architecture is intellectually 
reasonable, logical, and beautiful. Skyscrapers are the dwellings 
15
 Hugh Ferriss, The Metropolis of Tomorrow (New York, 1929), 
p. 62. For a general account of the architecture of the period, see 
John Burchard and Albert Bush-Brown, The Architecture of America: 
A Social and Cultural History (Boston, 1961), pp. 299-386. 
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of the supertrusts; they are Eiffel Tower cathedrals which shelter 
Mr. Rockefeller, the Emperor of Petroleum, or Mr. Morgan, the 
Czar of Gold. Some say that New York crushes them—and 
not without reason; the individual is overwhelmed by these great 
buildings. This is not an architecture for men, like the Parthenon 
or the chateaux of the Loire and Versailles. It is an architecture 
for human masses. Such buildings do not shelter or isolate men 
as do those of Europe. They gather and shuffle them. Often more 
than five thousand persons are united under one roof. The 
New York skyscrapers are the most striking manifestation of 
the triumph of numbers. One cannot understand or like them 
without first having tasted and enjoyed the thrill of counting 
or adding up enormous totals and of living in a gigantic, compact, 
and brilliant world.16 
During the 1920's American cities went upward and out­
ward. Decentralization altered the pattern of urban func­
tions within cities. Moreover, the character of urban popu­
lation and its distribution throughout the areas of the city 
also changed. The decade of 1900-1910 was the last in 
which foreign immigration contributed substantially to the 
growth of American cities. In 1907, the high year for the 
decade, 1,285,349 immigrants had arrived in the United 
States. With the outbreak of war in Europe, the number 
fell to 326,700 in 1915 and reached a low point of 110,618 
in 1919, with European immigration constituting less than 
25,000 of the total. Immigration revived in the early 1920's 
reaching 805,228 in 1921, but the legislation establishing 
a quota system passed in that year and revised in 1924 
reduced annual immigration to around 300,000 in the years 
from 1925 to 1929. There are no statistics indicating ex­
actly what proportion of immigrants settled in cities, but 
it is clear that from at least 1870 on the foreign-born had 
tended to concentrate in larger cities. As a result, by 1920, 
 Quoted in Bayrd Still, Mirror for Gotham: New York As Seen 
by Contemporaries from Dutch Days to the Present (New York, 
1956), pp. 298-99. 
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31.5 per cent of the total population in cities over one 
million and 23.3 per cent of the population in cities between 
one-half and one million was foreign-born. By contrast, only 
11.3 per cent of the population in cities from 2,500 to 
10,000 and only 6.5 per cent of the total rural population 
was foreign-born.17 
With immigration from abroad sharply restricted, cities 
in the 1920's achieved their large growth in population 
through internal migration, since city-dwellers did not 
reproduce at replacement levels until the period after 1940. 
One of the more significant aspects of this rural-urban mi­
gration was the movement of the southern Negro to the 
cities of the East and Midwest. From 1820 to 1910 the ur­
banization of the white population of the United States had 
always been at a more rapid rate than that of the Negro. 
Owing largely to the demand for labor in northern cities 
during World War I, this trend was reversed. During the 
1910-20 decade the percentage of native white population 
classified as urban increased by 6 while that of Negroes 
increased by 6.7. The trend was intensified during the next 
decade, with the percentage of native white population 
classified as urban increasing by 4.9 while that of Negroes 
increased by 9.7.18 
This changing population pattern modified the social 
character of larger cities. The older ethnic colonies in cities 
had always contained a fairly high proportion of population 
not of the predominant group. In addition, these colonies 
had been relatively impermanent. As members of an ethnic 
group achieved greater economic and social status, they 
moved throughout the city, and some more recently arrived 
immigrant group would begin to occupy the area. The Negro 
colonies in northern cities, which grew rapidly in the 1920's, 
" Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1US, p. 33; 
Bogue, The Population of the United States, p. 139. 
 Bogue, The Population of the United States, pp. 126-27. 18
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were much more homogeneous, and, as time proved, much 
more permanent. Wards in New York and Chicago had 
percentages of Negro population that approached 95 by 
1930. The Negro ghetto created a new kind of urban prob­
lem. Racial segregation drastically limited the possibility 
of upward mobility by individual or group. The Negro sub-
cities, with populations of over 225,000 in Chicago and 
New York by 1930, were areas where few could benefit 
from the economic and cultural advantages of the city but 
where all the long-standing urban problems of crime, pov­
erty, and disease existed in aggravated form.19 
The segregation of the Negro reflected a general tendency 
to increased economic and cultural segregation in the 
emerging metropolitan cities. During the decade the wealth­
ier and more powerful members of the community continued 
their movement to the outer zones of the city and to the 
new suburban regions. A study of over 2,000 substantial 
Detroit families, for example, demonstrated a striking de-
concentration of the city's elite. In 1910 nearly 52 per cent 
of this group lived within a three-mile radius of the main 
business center of Detroit, and only 9.7 per cent outside the 
municipal boundaries. By 1930 these percentages were 
nearly reversed with only 7.5 per cent of the substantial 
families near the business district and 50 per cent in subur­
ban areas. Numerous studies of economic zones within 
cities and of spatial zones away from the center during 
the 1920's demonstrated clearly the cultural advantages 
and the greater stability of the outer regions of metropol­
itan centers. Crime, the need for public welfare, and infant 
mortality decreased sharply in the outer areas and usually 
in direct proportion to the distance of the area from the 
center of the city.20 Traditionally the city had been resented 
because its extremes of wealth and poverty seemed a denial 
1B
 McKenzie, The Metropolitan Community, p. 242.

2° Ibid., pp. 184-86, 248.
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of American equalitarian beliefs. In the metropolis of the 
1920's these inequalities appeared more obvious, more 
rigidly confined, and more permanent. 
From the middle of the nineteenth century, American re­
formers had been concerned with problems that had special 
urban dimensions—health, poverty, and the slum. These 
classic urban problems did not disappear in the supercities 
of the twentieth century. Housing the poor of the cities, for 
example, continued to be one of the principal concerns of 
urban reformers during the decade. But the complexity of 
the new metropolitan communities forced those concerned 
with American cities to try also to find ways of reordering 
the whole urban environment. Proposals for new kinds of 
cities and for comprehensive plans that encompassed whole 
urban regions now became part of the discussion of the 
future of American cities. During the 1920's most of the 
conceptions that became a permanent part of plans for 
cities were formulated and debated. With the coming of 
the depression, these conceptions were to have a significant 
effect on public policy toward urban life. 
The inspiration for many of the new plans for cities, as 
was frequently the case with urban innovation in the United 
States, came from Europe. Particularly influential was the 
"garden city" idea of Ebenezer Howard, a London court 
reporter and reformer. In 1898 Howard had proposed a new 
kind of community that would combine the best features 
of town and country. The size of the garden city would be 
limited to 30,000 people. A permanent greenbelt would sur­
round it, and enough industry would be developed in care­
fully specified areas to ensure the community's self-suffi­
ciency. The land on which the city was built would be owned 
by the community as a whole and administered by a public 
authority. All leases would contain specific and detailed 
building requirements, and areas of greenery would be 
preserved throughout the city. Howard argued that the 
rising land values occasioned by a growing city would pro­
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duce rents high enough to pay for municipal services. Under 
the system of public control, the profits of growth would 
go to the community rather than to the speculator, since 
only limited dividends could be paid to the original investors 
in a garden city project. The system would also ensure 
that there would be no temptation to modify land use or to 
increase the planned density of the city. Howard foresaw 
garden cities being founded throughout England, providing 
a way of checking the continued growth of the huge, con­
gested industrial cities. A number of nineteenth-century 
American planners, led by Frederick Law Olmsted, the de­
signer of Central Park in New York, had advanced pro­
posals for planned communities that would preserve a 
natural setting in the fashion of the garden city. But 
Howard's plan went much further: it provided for a whole 
new city, not just a residential suburb, and introduced a 
radical conception of land ownership. The successful estab­
lishment of the first garden city of Letchworth, England, 
begun in 1903, led to a world-wide garden city movement; 
interest was reinforced by the start of a second community 
called Welwyn in 1919. Letchworth and Welwyn were the 
only two cities built in accord with Howard's over-all plan, 
but his ideas were adopted by a number of American plan­
ners and architects. Although they seldom embodied any 
significant aspects of Howard's plan, "garden villages," 
"garden suburbs," and "garden homes" became the fashion 
of the day in the 1920's. In addition, there were serious 
efforts to incorporate elements of his proposal into a num­
ber of private efforts in community development. Later, 
the garden city was to inspire the federal government's 
greenbelt-town experiments in the 1930's.21 
 Howard's proposal is contained in Ebenezer Howard, Garden 
Cities of To-morrow (London, 1945). For an excellent, brief dis­
cussion of the garden city in America, see Conkin, Tomorrow a New 
World, pp. 59-72. For a critical view of the influence of the garden 
city concept, see Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great Cities (Vintage Edition, New York, 1963), pp. 17-21. 
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The French architect Le Corbusier was responsible for 
an influential plan to bring the garden city to the metrop­
olis and accommodate it to the automobile and the sky­
scraper. His Radiant City, first suggested in 1920, would 
be composed of a group of 700-foot-high towers sur­
rounded by 250 to 300 yards of park, a plan that would 
permit housing 1,200 people to an acre and yet leave 95 
per cent of the ground open so that the "whole city is a 
Park." Le Corbusier's design, tied to the concept of the 
huge superblock, included an elaborate system of great 
arterial roads for automobiles that were separated from 
pedestrian routes. By the close of the decade his ideas had 
begun to influence the writings of American architects and 
planners concerned with finding new approaches to the 
building of cities.22 
Utopian proposals for cities that required drastic recon­
struction by government and new forms of property own­
ership could not be expected to make rapid headway in a 
nation strongly committed to traditions of individual enter­
prise. Yet the planning and zoning movement, which flour­
ished in the 1920's, did reflect to a limited extent the same 
kind of concern with the whole environment of metropolis 
that had motivated Howard and Le Corbusier. In part, the 
vogue for planning in the United States had its origins in 
the City Beautiful movement of the turn of the century. 
The effort to beautify the centers of cities through the 
construction of new public buildings and civic centers that 
had been inspired by the Chicago Columbian Exposition of 
1893 produced comprehensive advisory plans for city 
redevelopment such as the one Daniel Burnham proposed 
for Chicago in 1909. The attention paid to these proposals 
led municipalities to establish planning commissions and 
 Le Corbusier (Charles E. Jeanneret-Gris), The City of To­
morrow and Its Planning (New York, 1929), pp. 164-78; Burchard 
and Bush-Brown, The Architecture of America, pp. 356-57. 
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planning boards with advisory powers. Before 1914 there 
were seventeen such agencies. Between 1914 and 1922, 207 
new agencies were established, and another 161 were added 
from 1923 to 1926. Toward the end of the decade the 
power of planning commissions tended to be increased, and 
their number had grown upwards of 735 by 1930.23 
Closely related to the establishment of planning com­
missions was the passage of zoning regulations, for zoning 
was ordinarily a part of plans for city redevelopment and 
growth. The techniques of zoning had initially been applied 
in German cities beginning in 1900, but zoning in the 
United States was largely a development of the postwar 
period. Before 1916 only five American cities had zoning 
regulations, but New York's adoption in that year of a 
zoning law for the entire city popularized the approach. 
Between 1916 and 1920 twenty-five cities passed zoning 
laws, and by 1930 the number of zoned cities had risen to 
981. After several years of litigation, the United States 
Supreme Court finally upheld this type of governmental 
regulation in 1926. The earliest zoning ordinances in the 
United States were designed mainly to keep residential 
areas free from business and industry and only regulated 
land use in various districts of the city. The laws passed 
after 1925 tended to be more comprehensive and regulated 
not only land use but the height and bulk of buildings as 
well. A study in 1929 indicated that of the 754 municipali­
ties with zoning, 475 had comprehensive ordinances con­
trolling the use, height, and area of buildings. Measures 
requiring setbacks on the upper portions of taller buildings 
contributed to the uniformity of the tower skyscrapers of 
 McKenzie, The Metropolitan Community, pp. 294-99. For the 
relationship of the planning movement of the 1920's to earlier plan­
ning traditions, see John W. Reps, The Making of Urban America: 
A History of City Planning in the United States (Princeton, N. J., 
1965), pp. 497-525. 
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the 1920's, and in general led to more consistent building 
styles in American cities.24 
Although zoning and planning were advocated by urban 
reformers who were genuinely concerned with trying to 
make cities better places in which to live, the movement to 
some extent merely intensified certain problems of the 
metropolis. Building requirements often contributed to the 
segregation of groups within the city on the basis of wealth. 
Many residential suburbs, for example, were kept as 
enclaves of wealth through rigorous zoning requirements. 
Until they encountered court difficulties, early zoning meas­
ures in southern cities were rather frankly aimed at main­
taining the segregation of Negroes. It has been argued 
that zoning requirements represented an effort by older 
inhabitants of cities to maintain control of the downtowns 
they were abandoning. In this way they protected their 
investments at the same time they kept newcomers to the 
city confined.25 
Business interests often supported planning and zoning 
not out of an altruistic concern to improve the quality of 
urban life, but rather because they recognized that these 
programs would make cities economically more efficient and 
easier places in which to do business. Powerful support for 
the basic New York zoning law of 1916 came from Fifth 
Avenue merchants, who were distressed by the encroach­
ment of garment industry plants into their shopping dis­
trict. The reports that preceded the law appealed to this 
24
 McKenzie, The Metropolitan Community, pp. 299-301; Coleman 
Woodbury, "Some Suggested Changes in the Control of Urban De­
velopment," Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics, V (1929), 
249. For the German background of zoning, see Roy Lubove, The 
Progressives and the Slums: Tenement House Reform in New York 
City, 1890-1917 (Pittsburgh, 1962), pp. 229-30. 
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 421 METROPOLIS AND SUBURB: THE CHANGING AMERICAN CITY
kind of sentiment. "The natural result of a poor utiliza­
tion of its land areas by a city is high rents for occupiers 
and low profits for investors," stated the New York Com­
mittee on Building Heights in 1913. "It may seem para­
doxical to hold that a policy of building restriction tends 
to a fuller utilization of land than a policy of no restric­
tion; but such is undoubtedly the case. The reason lies in 
the greater safety and security to investment secured by 
definite restrictions." 26 
The report on the St. Louis city plan of 1918 reflected the 
dual objectives that underlay the planning and zoning 
movement. City plans, the report argued, were tied to the 
goals of American democracy; they provided a way of 
advancing "human contentment and human growth" 
through scientific experiment and through applying the 
techniques of modern social science to the problems of the 
metropolis. Yet planning could also be a means to promote 
industrial and commercial prosperity. 
Only by forethought can the city hope to take advantage of vast 
commercial opportunities which the new era is to bring forth. 
The Plan Commission aims to take immediate and effective steps 
to relieve the Mississippi River, the city's greatest natural re­
source from bankruptcy. All modern men who are con­
vinced of the hopelessness of future individual effort, know that 
the time has come, if the city is to prosper, to replace individual 
effort by community forehandedness. The development of the 
terminal system and the construction of new bridges logically 
follow; while, unless the city is provided with adequate sewers, 
water-supply and scientific garbage disposal, the money for all 
industrial improvements will have been spent in vain.27 
28
 Quoted in Harold M. Lewis, Planning the Modern City (New 
York, 1949), p. 260. For the background to the New York zoning 
law, see Lubove, The Progressives and the Slums, pp. 238-45. 
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Other extensions of the "City Efficient" idea during the 
1920's—the visiting teacher movement, mental hygiene 
clinics, and the expansion of parks and playgrounds—were 
supported as measures that would advance economic pros­
perity of the city. For example, business leaders endorsed 
the building of additional parks and playgrounds with the 
argument that they would increase the efficiency of factory 
workers. A spokesman who found that parks were "wisely 
industrial" and "wisely economic" as well as "wisely 
human" argued also that they would "enhance the desira­
bility of nearby land, thus yielding more taxes to the 
municipality and boosting the sales value of the property 
to the owner." 28 
As a result of the general support of measures designed 
to make the complex urban environment more efficient, the 
supposedly laissez faire period of the 1920's witnessed a 
considerable extension of the activities of municipal gov­
ernments not only in such new fields as traffic control and 
zoning but also in relation to the older, established urban 
services. A census study of municipal spending in cities of 
various size groups from 1915 to 1929 showed a general 
per capita increase in expenditures (measured in 1915 dol­
lars) that varied from 55 per cent in cities of 50,000-99,999 
to 30 per cent in cities of 300,000-499,999. Much of this 
increase went to support expanded municipal services in 
public health, education, and recreation. A survey of gov­
ernmental activities in 34 representative cities during the 
above period demonstrated wide adoption of a variety of 
specialized new services ranging from the provision of 
public health nurses and children's clinics to community 
centers and vocational guidance. In accord with the effi­
ciency ideal, numerous cities introduced such measures as 
28 William Butterworth, "Community Recreation—a Wisely Hu­
man, Wisely Industrial, Wisely Economic Thing," American City,
XXXIX (1928), 82. 
 423 METROPOLIS AND SUBURB: THE CHANGING AMERICAN CITY
centralized purchasing, public improvement planning, and 
executive budgets. Expenditures for the fundamental urban 
functions—police, fire, and water—also increased at more 
rapid rate than population growth.29 
One of the most noted extensions of government author­
ity in the 1920's—the Port of New York Authority—repre­
sented an effort to cope with metropolitan problems by 
establishing agencies that cut across the traditional units 
of government. In 1917, in response to a struggle between 
New York and New Jersey interests over railroad freight 
rates to various parts of the Port of New York, the U.S. 
Interstate Commerce Commission denied New Jersey's 
claim for a favorable rate differential and recognized the 
significance of the growing metropolitan region. The Com­
mission observed that "historically, geographically, and 
commercially New York and the industrial district in the 
northeastern part of the state of New Jersey constitute a 
single community." 30 This decision led eventually to the 
creation in 1921 of a permanent interstate agency respon­
sible for the administration of the Port. 
Regional planning commissions established in the 1920's 
for areas in and around Boston, New York, Chicago, Los 
Angeles, Toledo, and other places reflected a similar aware­
ness of the developing metropolitan character of American 
society. These commissions were primarily advisory and 
often dealt only with one or two specialized problems. The 
Los Angeles commission, for example, was concerned 
chiefly with highways and subdivision control; the Milwau­
kee commission, with park planning and county zoning. 
Disciples of planning vigorously argued the inadequacy of 
this kind of limited approach. But as a result of the popu­
29
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larity of the regional planning movement, cities and coun­
ties greatly extended their use of agencies that dealt 
regionally with problems of sewage, water, and parks. By 
the middle of the decade, the specialized metropolitan 
commission—a device used in Boston for providing sewer­
age facilities as early as 1889—had become a relatively 
common institution of local government. The regional 
planning movement of the 1920's also produced a landmark 
in the history of planning, the eight-volume Regional Plan 
of New York and Its Environs. This privately financed 
study, which cost over a million dollars to prepare and took 
ten years to complete, provided an enormous amount of 
data about the most significant of American metropolitan 
regions. Many of its proposals relating to railroads, water­
way and harbor improvements, airports, civic centers, and 
parks and boulevards were eventually adopted by local 
governmental agencies in New York and established prece­
dents for actions in other urbanizing regions.31 
During the 1920's, zoning, planning, and other measures 
of control over the urban environment were established in 
large part through the efforts of business groups tied to 
the City Efficient movement. Similarily, many of the con­
ceptions that were a part of garden city and other plans 
for new-style towns and cities were initially applied by 
businessmen who were not unduly concerned with creating 
the good community but who foresaw that their utilization 
might enlarge the profits to be made in real-estate develop­
ment. The term "garden city" was often used to describe 
any planned new community that preserved a natural set­
ting. Torrance, California—one of several planned sub­
urban industrial communities developed in the early years 
 Flavel Shurtleff, "Fifteen Years of City Planning in the United 
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of the century—was labeled by its founder, the industrial­
ist Jared Sidney Torrance, as the "greatest and best of the 
garden cities of the world." 32 In 1914 the limited-dividend 
principle, which had been a fundamental part of Howard's 
plan, was employed in the development of a suburban area 
of Boston called the "garden suburb" of Billerica. Nowhere, 
however, was more than a portion of Howard's plan util­
ized ; often in the 1920's "garden city" became a description 
of any suburban housing development.33 
One of the most famous suburbs of the 1920's, the spec­
tacularly successful Shaker Heights outside of Cleveland, 
provided an example of how the new planning conceptions 
could be applied to real-estate development. The community 
served as a model for hundreds of less successful experi­
ments in controlled suburban development. Shaker Heights 
was the creation of two business tycoon brothers, Oris P. 
and Mantis J. Van Sweringen, who had started out as 
office clerks, had briefly owned a bicycle shop, and had 
become interested in real estate at the turn of the century. 
After a successful experience with developing a tract of 
land beyond the Cleveland street-car line and then persuad­
ing a local street-car company to extend its tracks to their 
holding, the two promoters purchased 1,400 acres of country 
land, which had once been the site of a Shaker religious 
community. Their plan, carefully conceived from the begin­
ning, was to develop a rigorously controlled residential 
suburb having different-priced homes in distinct areas so 
that the cheaper houses would not depress the prices of 
the more expensive ones. The Van Sweringens employed 
many of the features of suburban residential development 
that were to become standard: abandonment of the tradi­
tional gridiron and the substitution of curving and semi­
32
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elliptical roads running from main automobile boulevards; 
the preservation of natural park areas throughout the 
development; and rigorous architectural, building, and 
decorating requirements. With the opening of a rapid-
transit system to the community in 1920, Shaker Heights 
began to boom. From 1919 to 1929 nearly 300 new houses 
were built each year; the community's population jumped 
from 1,700 to 15,500. The price of one-hundred-foot lots 
increased from $20 a foot to over $200 a foot in some sec­
tions of the development; by the end of the decade, the 
evaluation of the property had climbed to $80,000,000. The 
Van Sweringens used their profits from real estate to 
engage in some of the more grandiose railroad speculations 
of the decade, and until their pyramid of holding com­
panies collapsed in the 1930's, occupied a high rank among 
American corporate leaders.34 
The Van Sweringens were taciturn, unlettered, self-made 
men who offered no public analysis of the significance of 
their innovations in suburban residential development. In 
contrast, Jesse D. Nichols, whose Country Club District of 
Kansas City, Missouri, attracted international attention 
in the 1920's, became a forceful spokesman of the zoning 
and planning movement. In his real-estate operations, he 
was genuinely concerned with establishing new patterns 
of business and residential location that would alleviate 
some of the problems of the sprawling metropolis. Nichols 
grew up on a farm near Olathe, Kansas, graduated from 
the University of Kansas, and studied economics at Har­
vard University, where he wrote a thesis on land develop­
ment. On a visit to England during his student days, he 
was impressed by the parks, lawns, and gardens of the 
smaller English cities and later argued that the notion for 
the Country Club District was conceived at that time. After 
leaving Harvard, he got his start in business building 
 Rachlis and Marqusee, The Land Lords, pp. 60-86. 34
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houses for workers in Kansas City, Kansas, and with 
capital accumulated from this venture, in 1905 began 
buying property south of Kansas City, Missouri. The resi­
dential district he established was a success from the 
beginning. It was eventually to cover 6,000 acres, one-tenth 
of the area of the city. 
By the 1920's the Nichols Country Club District had 
already become one of the most extensive restricted resi­
dential developments in the country, and the techniques 
he employed were widely copied by real-estate men else­
where. Comprehensive deed restrictions on all property 
sold by the Nichols company controlled land use, minimum 
cost of buildings, open space, set-back lines, and sales to 
Negroes. The Nichols company was probably the first to 
employ the device of self-perpetuating deed restrictions. 
These were automatically continued unless a majority of 
the owners in an individual subdivision moved to change 
them at least five years before the expiration of the usual 
25-year term of initial subdivision deeds. Nichols also 
sponsored the formation of self-governing Homes Associa­
tions, which received charters from the state. These 
Associations, which had grown to twelve in number by 
1926, levied assessments on residents and provided a vari­
ety of governmental, cultural, and recreational services 
such as garbage and snow removal, lawn contests and 
flower shows, and maintenance of parks and playgrounds 
initially provided by the Nichols company. Students of the 
city, including a number of English visitors who made 
comparisons with the garden city, pointed to the Homes 
Associations as a desirable system to promote the spirit of 
neighborhood in the impersonal metropolis. City planners 
from as far away as South America and Australia visited 
the Country Club District in the 1920's. The British 
planner Charles Read echoed their local public reactions 
when he commented that no man in the world had done as 
428 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: THE 1920's 
much as Nichols "to carry beauty and comfort into every­
day life." 35 
In the 1920's Nichols also won attention for his develop­
ment of the first large decentralized shopping center in the 
United States, the Country Club Plaza Shopping Center, 
begun in 1922. In the early 1920's Nichols visited the 
garden cities of Welwyn and Letchworth and also toured 
Spain to get ideas for the project. His carefully planned 
and controlled shopping center successfully harmonized 
Spanish-style architecture with the natural setting of the 
district. The design for the center was widely copied by 
suburban developers, but few other planners were able to 
preserve the harmony and architectural integrity that 
Nichols insisted upon.36 
Owing primarily to the attention his Country Club Dis­
trict received, Nichols in the 1920's became a national 
leader in the real-estate industry. In his speeches he con­
sistently defended zoning and planning. Zoning, he sug­
gested, could provide a means of ensuring "air, light, sun­
shine, and decent surroundings" for the laboring man as 
well as for the owner of the large estate; it would bring 
"order instead of chaos into American building." Lack of 
planning intensified the problem of the automobile; traffic 
congestion was largely the result of the "stupid application 
of the conventional checkerboard scheme without regard to 
grades or traffic needs." In addition to pointing out that 
planning could make cities more livable, Nichols always 
emphasized to business audiences that planning could also 
be profitable. "City planning," he told the Kansas City 
Chamber of Commerce in 1921, "is based on love, ambition, 
35 F o r an account of t he development of the Coun t ry Club Distr ict , 
see Urban Planning and Land Policies, pp . 83-85 . 
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and profit. If you are ambitious for the growth of 
your business, your institution or your city, if you believe 
in its future growth, you plan for healthy expansion." 37 
Nichols, like many less practical theorists of the city, was 
acutely sensitive to the ugliness of the new metropolitan 
environment that was rapidly being created in the 1920's. 
In a 1926 essay on shopping centers he developed this 
theme: 
In American cities of any considerable size our new outlying 
business centers frequently are becoming the ugliest, most un­
sightly and disorderly parts of the entire city. New traffic throats 
of congestion are being created that will sooner or later call for 
the expenditure of gigantic sums of public funds to relieve. 
Buildings of every color, size, shape, and design are being huddled 
and mixed together in a most unpresentable manner. A mixture 
of glowing billboards, unsightly rubbish dumps, hideous rears, 
unkempt alleys, dirty loading docks, unrelated, uncongenial mix­
tures of shops of every type and use, with no relation to one 
another; shacks and shanties mixed up with good buildings; 
perfectly square, unadorned buildings of poor design, are bring­
ing about disorder, unsightliness, and unattractiveness that 
threaten to mar the beauty and good appearance of the residential 
regions of American cities. The abandonment of formerly 
beautiful residential areas, neglected and blighted former business 
sections, should arouse in everyone a determination to protect the 
appearance of his city as well as the property values themselves.38 
Nichols was aware of the problems of the metropolis and 
attempted to do something about them. His innovations 
37
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helped to provide a better way of life for many city-dwellers. 
But not everyone could benefit from the amenities of 
Nichols' Country Club District. Deed restrictions kept out 
Negroes, a practice not invalidated by the Supreme Court 
until 1948. Construction requirements assured that lower-
income groups would not live there. By the early 1930's the 
area contained a homogeneous population of upper-white­
collar and professional families.39 The Country Club District 
reflected the difficulties in private efforts to develop new 
living patterns in cities. Well-planned industrial villages 
and luxurious residential suburbs did virtually nothing to 
provide housing for the poor. And this was one of the most 
significant problems of the metropolis. In the 1920's real-
estate men like Nichols frequently accepted the need for 
government regulation of urban expansion through city 
plans and zoning laws. But they did not of course advocate 
any significant departure from the established practices of 
private ownership and private development of land in cities. 
It remained for reformers outside the real-estate business 
to argue the necessity for more drastic approaches to the 
problems of the metropolis during the 1920's. 
Much of the initial agitation for new policies toward 
cities stemmed from experiments in housing during World 
War I. The shortage of housing for low-income groups that 
had been developing in the early part of the century became 
so serious during the war that it interfered with produc­
tion, and as an emergency measure the federal government 
instituted a program of public housing. Through two 
agencies, the United States Shipping Board's Emergency 
Fleet Corporation and the Department of Labor's United 
States Housing Corporation, the government built, spon­
sored, and controlled a number of housing projects for war-
workers. Developments like Yorkship Village (later the 
Fairview section of Camden, New Jersey) and Union Park 
Gardens near Wilmington, Delaware, provided reasonable, 
attractive, and well-designed housing. The projects also 
 Urban Planning and Land Policies, p. 85. 39
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permitted American architects and planners—many of them 
imbued with garden city concepts—to experiment with new 
kinds of urban design, including curvilinear street systems, 
the row house, and balanced residential neighborhoods. 
Despite protests, Congress when the war ended liquidated 
the programs as quickly as possible. But the memory re­
mained. Throughout the 1920's housing reformers and 
planners pointed to various aspects of the wartime pro­
gram as a model for government action in housing.40 
The acute housing shortage that followed the armistice 
indicated the need for new policies. Shortages of capital and 
inflated construction costs checked the anticipated resump­
tion of normal building, which had provided the justification 
for the quick termination of the government programs. 
Building increased after 1921, and was one of the factors 
sustaining the mixed prosperity of the decade, but expan­
sion was accompanied by a disproportionate rise in building 
costs. From 1923 to the end of the decade, wholesale build­
ing material costs remained 80 to 100 per cent higher than 
before the war. Rents also rose much faster than wages. 
One survey of 178 cities, for example, showed a rise in 
rents of 85 per cent between July, 1914, and June, 1924.41 
In addition, there was considerable deterioration in the 
older tenement areas of American cities. Studies in the 
1920's generally substantiated the point that became com­
mon currency in the next decade—that one-third of the 
nation was ill-housed. By 1930, census reports indicated that 
over 6,000,000 homes in cities, over 25 per cent of the total, 
did not meet minimum standards.42 The studies of the new 
urban sociologists, including Clifford R. Shaw's examina­
40
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tion of juvenile delinquency in Chicago and the Lynds' anal­
ysis of Middletown, demonstrated a relationship between 
inadequate housing and social disorganization. Numerous 
statistical investigations during the decade documented the 
problems of public health that resulted from bad housing.43 
Because of the seriousness of the problem, much of the 
discussion of the future of cities during the 1920's had hous­
ing as its central emphasis. City planners and housing re­
formers generally agreed that private builders operating 
within a free market were simply not able to provide satis­
factory low-cost housing. They offered a variety of solutions 
to the problem that were often based on garden city con­
cepts and on the wartime experiments in public housing: 
cheap rapid transit subsidized by government to enable 
workers easily to reach garden communities built in the 
country where land costs were low; efforts by municipalities 
to aid private builders or to establish local co-operative 
housing projects; federal housing loans to low-income work­
ers or to limited-dividend philanthropic building compa­
nies ; various kinds of federal subsidies and tax concessions 
to builders; and comprehensive government slum clearance 
44 programs.
As a result of this agitation, there were efforts during 
the decade to encourage the establishment of limited-divi­
dend and co-operative housing projects. A precedent-break­
43
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ing Wisconsin law of 1919 permitted counties and cities to 
purchase stock in co-operative housing companies, and 
a Milwaukee co-operative company, with support from 
the city, erected 105 houses, at an alleged savings of $1,500 
a house. Other private housing co-operatives, totalling forty 
in number at mid-decade, were organized, virtually all of 
them in New York City. The New York State Housing Law 
of 1926 provided tax exemptions to limited-dividend hous­
ing projects, permitted municipalities to exempt the proj­
ects from local taxes, and set maximum rents for authorized 
projects. Two co-operatives and one limited-dividend com­
pany built a total of six projects in New York City under 
the law. In short, private and public efforts to supply low-
cost housing during the decade were so restricted that they 
had virtually no effect on the general problem. But the years 
of agitation of the housing question did produce a body of 
information and a number of approaches on which future 
public programs could be built. By the end of the decade 
there was increasing recognition of the fact that some type 
of government intervention in housing had become a 
necessity.45 
A group particularly influential in establishing this point 
during the decade was the Regional Planning Association 
of America, an informal association of planners, architects, 
social theorists, and housing experts who began meeting 
in 1923. The organization included many of the leading 
students of city problems: Clarence Stein, an architect who 
was most responsible for the formation of the group; Lewis 
Mumford, a social theorist and planner; Frederick L. Acker­
man, an architect, planner, and follower of Thorstein 
Veblen; Charles H. Whitaker, editor of the Journal of the 
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American Institute of Architects; Benton MacKaye, a dis­
ciple of Thoreau and an experienced forester; and Henry 
Wright, an expert on housing costs and site planning. The 
KPAA evolved from other groups concerned with the post­
war housing crisis, and good housing for the poor remained 
a dominant concern of the organization until it broke up 
around 1933. But the group went much further and at­
tempted to formulate ways to plan whole metropolitan 
regions. Their program emphasized the development of a 
new kind of regional city that would preserve small towns 
and villages and renew metropolitan centers through a com­
prehensive, flexible ordering of the relationships between 
population, resources, and institutions.46 
As part of their effort to develop more reasonable and 
more livable urban communities, the RPAA turned to 
Howard's garden city as a beginning. In 1923 Stein con­
vinced Alexander M. Bing, a New York real-estate man, to 
support RPAA plans for building residential communities 
along garden city lines. Bing sponsored the formation of a 
limited-dividend housing company, the City Housing Corpo­
ration ; between 1924 and 1928 the corporation built the first 
of its two garden city-style communities, Sunnyside Gar­
dens, New York. Sunnyside was located on a seventy-acre 
tract in the borough of Queens on land purchased from the 
Pennsylvania Railroad. Unable to obtain modification in the 
existing gridiron plat for the area, Stein and Wright, who 
designed the community, were forced to work with the 
gridiron block; but despite this handicap they laid out an 
attractive development of row houses and apartments en­
closing large central gardens. Contrary to the hopes of its 
founders, the project did not supply housing that accom­
 The history of the group is thoroughly examined in Lubove, 
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modated low-income groups. Even though the dividends of 
the City Housing Corporation were limited to 6 per cent and 
certain economies in efficient site planning were realized, 
Sunnyside did not provide housing that was competitive 
with that built by large-scale, private speculative builders.47 
The RPAA'S most significant effort—and one of the most 
significant housing efforts of the decade—was carried out 
in New Jersey on a 1,258-acre site some seventeen miles 
from New York. Sunnyside had been a kind of trial run; 
Radburn, New Jersey, was to be a real garden city of 
25,000 people. Before the project could be completed, the 
depression hit; Bing's corporation was thrown into receiver­
ship; and Radburn remained a town of about 1,500. But in 
the period betwen 1928 and 1931, Radburn was considered 
the closest approximation of a garden city in America, and 
was internationally hailed as the "town for the motor age." 
Radburn had no unique features of building or design, but 
it artfully synthesized most of the ideas that were a part of 
proposals for planned communities in the 1920's—the 40­
acre superblock, interior parks, curvilinear streets, and per­
haps, most significantly, a system of roads that separated 
the automobile from the pedestrian. Benton MacKaye's 1930 
plan for the "townless highway," which anticipated most 
of the features of the modern turnpike, was suggested by 
the Radburn experiment. But Radburn was at most only 
a limited success. Because of high land costs, no greenbelt 
was provided, and the founders were never able to attract 
industry as they had hoped to. Rather ironically, in the 
1930's Radburn became a suburb of white-collar commuters 
instead of the self-sufficient, neighborly community that the 
RPAA leaders had hoped to establish within the modern 
regional metropolis.48 
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Radburn was the most famous experiment in American 
community planning during the 1920's. The failure of its 
founders to realize their objectives was typical of most 
efforts to cope with the problems of the metropolis during 
the decade. During a period in which the huge sprawling 
supercity assumed its present form and made its influence 
felt over the length and breadth of the land, most public 
debate on the subject was still informed by the old concep­
tion of city and country as polar ways of life. The accepted 
efforts of control that became popular during the decade— 
zoning, controlled private residential development, and the 
decentralized shopping center—created new problems while 
providing only limited solutions to old ones. But these 
measures did firmly establish the principle that a large 
degree of collective control over urban growth was neces­
sary ; the 1920's saw a considerable expansion of municipal 
regulation and public works, particularly in relation to 
automobiles and highways. Moreover, most of the ap­
proaches that became a part of national plans for cities 
in the New Deal period were evolved during the decade. 
Radburn, for example, served as the prototype for the 
greenbelt cities, and Lewis Mumford could reasonably argue 
that had it not been for the ideas that the RPAA "put into 
circulation during the twenties, the Greenbelt Towns under­
taken by the Re-settlement Administration in 1935 would 
have been inconceivable."49 Similarily, the housing pro­
grams and the experiments in regional planning of the New 
Deal were the outgrowth of the proposals of the preceding 
decade. In 1932 Franklin D. Roosevelt prophetically recog­
nized that "something new" had developed out of the earlier 
experiments in city planning—"not a science, but a new 
understanding of problems that affect not merely bricks and 
mortar, subway and streets; planning that affects also the 
 Introduction to Stein, New Towns for America, p. 15. 49
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economic and social life of a community, then of a county, 
then of a state; perhaps the day is not far distant when 
planning will become a part of the national policy of this 
country." 50 Here was implied recognition of the central 
view of many of the urban theorists of the 1920's—that city 
and country were no longer separate and distinct, that the 
urban problems of the past had now become the social 
problems of the nation. 
6» Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Growing Up by Plan," Survey, LXVII (1932), 483. Conkin, Tomorrow a New World, pp. 70-72, develops 
the influence of the planning movement on Roosevelt's thinking. 
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